2020-KK-01219 Precedential Writ application granted. Processed

State Of Louisiana v. George Cepriano

Louisiana Supreme Court · Filed November 13, 2020

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Opinion text

Supreme Court of Louisiana
November 13, 2020
Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VS.
GEORGE CEPRIANO
No.2020-KK-01219
_ _ _ _
_ _
IN R
E: State of Louisiana - Applicant Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory Writ,
Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Number(s) 18-1111, 18-1112, Court
of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, Number(s) 20-K-285;
_ _ _ _ _ _
November 13, 2020
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
Genovese, J., dissents and would deny.
SJC
BJJ
JLW
JDH
WJC
JHB
11/13/2020 “See News Release 044 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents.”

11/13/20
S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No
. 2020-KK-01219
STA
TE OF LOUISIANA
ve
rsus
G
EORGE CEPRIANO
O
N SUPERVISORY WRIT TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON
PE
R CURIAM:
D
efendant is charged with simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, La.R.S.
14:62.2, violation of a protective order, La.R.S. 14:79, and domestic abuse battery,
La.R.S. 14:35.3. The district court determined that evidence defendant committed
another domestic abuse battery, and violated another protective order, about one year
after the incidents giving rise to the present charges and involving a different dating
partner, would not be admissible in the State’s case-in-chief because incidents that
occurred after are not relevant to defendant’s intent earlier. The district court erred.
The mere fact this criminal conduct occurred after the underlying offenses does not
preclude its admission or detract from its relevance in regards to the numerated
exceptions of La.Code Evid. art. 404(B). See State v. Altenberger, 2013-2518, p. 12
(La. 4/11/14), 139 So.3d 512, 517; see also State v. Taylor , 2016-1124, pp. 16–18
(La. 12/1/16), 217 So.3d 283, 294–295.
While recognizing that the order of the events is not wholly dispositive, the
court of appeal nonetheless found the district court did not err because the other
crimes evidence offered by the State had no substantial relevance independent from
showing defendant’s general criminal character. State v. Cepriano, 20-285, p. 3 (La.

20-KK-1219

2 of 2

App. 5 Cir. 10/19/20) (unpub’d). The court of appeal erred. “ ‘This court has
recognized the principle that where the element of intent is regarded as an essential
ingredient of the crime charged, it is proper to admit proof of similar but
disconnected crimes to show the intent with which the act charged was committed.’”
State v. Jackson, 625 So.2d 146, 150 (La. 1993), quoting State v. Cupit, 189 La. 509,
179
So. 837, 839 (1938). Here, to convict defendant of the violation of a protective
order, the State must prove defendant’ s requisite intent, i.e. his “willful
disobedience” of the protective order. See La.R.S. 14:79(A)( 1)(a). Defendant’s
subsequent violation of an unrelated protective order may illuminate his intent
related to the prior action.1
Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the court of appeal. We also vacate that
portion of the district court’s ruling, which found that evidence defendant
subsequently committed a domestic abuse battery and violated a protective order
pertaining to another victim would be excluded from the State’s case -in-chief. We
grant the State’s motion to admit this evidence. We remand to the district court for
further proceedings consistent with the views expressed above.
REVERSED AND REMANDED

1 In addition, we note that commission of a domestic abuse battery upon one dating partner may
be admissible in the trial of the charge of a domestic abuse battery committed upon another
dating partner, pursuant to La.C.E. art. 412.2, as amended 2017 La. Acts 84 (eff. August 1, 2017)
(“When an accused is charged with a crime involving abusive behavior against a . . . dating
partner . . ., evidence of the accused’s commission of another crime, wrong, or act involving
assaultive behavior against a . . . dating partner . . ., may be admissible and may be considered
for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant, subject to the balancing test provided in
Article 403.”).