Tige D. Scott v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, Robert E. Anderson, Gregg Fortner, and Aig Insurance Company

TIGE D. SCOTT * NO. 2022-CA-0728

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF *
NEW ORLEANS, ROBERT E. FOURTH CIRCUIT
ANDERSON, GREGG *
FORTNER, AND AIG STATE OF LOUISIANA
INSURANCE COMPANY *******

APPEAL FROM
CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 2017-08127, DIVISION “G-11”
Honorable Robin M. Giarrusso, Judge
******
Judge Rachael D. Johnson
******
(Court composed of Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge
Rachael D. Johnson)

Raymond C. Burkart, Jr.
THE LAW OFFICES OF RAYMOND C. BURKART, JR., L.L.C.
321 North Florida Street
Suite 104
Covington, LA 70433

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

Sloan L. Abernathy
DEUTSCH KERRIGAN, L.L.P.
755 Magazine Street
New Orleans, LA 70130

Frederic Theodore Le Clercq
DEUTSCH KERRIGAN
755 Magazine Street
New Orleans, LA 70130-3672

Joseph L. McReynolds
DEUTSCH KERRIGAN, LLP
755 Magazine Street
New Orleans, LA 70130

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

AFFIRMED IN PART;
REVERSED AND REMANDED
IN PART; APPEAL DISMISSED
IN PART; EXCEPTION OF NO
CAUSE OF ACTION RAISED ON
APPEAL DENIED
April 18, 2023

RDJ
The Appellant, Tige D. Scott, seeks review of the September 9, 2022 judgment
RLB
DLD of the district court, sustaining exceptions of no cause and no right of action of the

Appellees, Defendants Housing Authority of New Orleans, Robert E. Anderson,

Gregg Fortner and OneBeacon Insurance Group, sued as AIG Insurance Company,

and dismissing the majority of Mr. Scott’s claims. The district court also granted Mr.

Scott leave to amend his petition as to his unconstitutionality claim under La. Rev.

Stat. 40:539(C)(8)b) and his whistleblower claim under La. Rev. Stat. 23:967.

Pursuant to our de novo review, we affirm the September 9, 2022 judgment in

part and uphold the district court’s sustaining of the Appellees’ exceptions of no

right of action and dismissal of Mr. Scott’s claims: 1) under the Police Officer’s Bill

of Rights, La. Rev. Stat. 40:2531, et seq.; 2) for alleged violations of rights,

procedures and protections afforded to classified civil service employees under La.

1

Const. art. X, § 1, et seq.; and 3) for alleged violations of La. Rev. Stat. 42:1169 (the

whistleblower statute contained in the Code of Governmental Ethics).

Furthermore, we affirm the district court’s ruling, sustaining the Appellees’

exception of no cause of action as to Mr. Scott’s tort claims for negligence and

breach of duties. However, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of these claims

and remand this matter for further proceedings, with instructions to the district court

to allow Mr. Scott leave to amend his tort claims for negligence and breach of duties

pursuant to La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 934.

Additionally, we lack jurisdiction to consider that portion of the judgment

sustaining the exception of no cause of action of the Appellees as to Mr. Scott’s

unconstitutionality claim under La. Rev. Stat. 40:539(C)(8)b), and allowing him

leave to amend said claim. Therefore, we dismiss Mr. Scott’s appeal in part.

Lastly, we decline to consider the Appellees’ exception of no cause of action

raised on appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Scott was a HANO police officer whose employment was terminated in

October 2016. In August 2017, he subsequently filed suit against HANO, its insurer,

AIG Insurance Company, and his former supervisors, Robert E. Anderson, the

Director of Public Safety/Chief for HANO, and Gregg Fortner, the Executive

Director for HANO.

In his petition, Mr. Scott alleges he was terminated by Appellees Anderson

and Fortner in retaliation for reporting abuses he observed while working for HANO.

He alleges he first observed abuse on June 7, 2016, when he saw a HANO police

officer hit a handcuffed prisoner. Mr. Scott pled he reported this incident to his

supervisor.
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Approximately two months later, in August 2016, Mr. Scott avers that he was

placed on administrative leave for stress and depression after two of his half-siblings

died within days of each other. He subsequently applied for a position with the

Harahan Police Department. Mr. Scott alleged that during his interview with the

Harahan Police Department, he discussed the June 2016 incident and related that he

believed the HANO officer involved used excessive force.

Mr. Scott further pled that he was instructed to report to an August 30, 2016

HANO meeting, which he believed was being held so that he could update his

supervisors on his treatment for stress. Mr. Scott asserts that he attended the meeting

with Appellee Anderson, as well as Lt. Tyrone Martin and Kelly Walker, a HANO

Human Resources officer. Mr. Scott alleged that while in the meeting, Appellee

Anderson accused him of not being related to his two deceased half-siblings and

demanded additional proof of their relationship. In response, Mr. Scott alleged, he

was surprised by Appellee Anderson’s accusation and demanded to be able to hire

an attorney to defend him against the allegation. Mr. Scott maintains he was

subsequently suspended.

On September 13, 2016, according to Mr. Scott, Appellee Fortner sent a letter

terminating him for insubordination for leaving the August 30th meeting and refusing

to answer questions. Mr. Scott pled that the letter further informed him that he would

be terminated because he was unfit for duty due to stress. Mr. Scott alleged that he

was given five business days to file a grievance letter, or he would be terminated on

September 20, 2016. Mr. Scott pled that he filed a grievance letter, wherein he

claimed that he was truthful when he notified his supervisors he was stressed as a

result of the deaths of his two siblings and that he was denied due process and status

as a “whistle blower” for reporting two incidents.
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He pled that although he and HANO representative Latasha Nicholas had

several phone conversations about rescheduling the termination hearing, he avers

that HANO did not notify him of a new hearing date and did not inform him of his

rights as a police officer under the Police Officer’s Bill of Rights, La. Rev. Stat.

40:2531, et. seq. He asserts that he later received an October 10, 2016 letter from

Appellee Fortner, informing him that he was terminated as an at will employee for

“acts of insubordination constituting misconduct and fitness for duty,” pursuant to

the HANO Employee Personnel Manual. Mr. Scott pled that his termination violated

La. Rev. Stat. 40:2531, et seq. He further pled that he was ordered to return all

HANO property that was issued to him, which caused him “much embarrassment,

humiliation, loss of reputation, and mental anguish among his peers in the law

enforcement community.”

Mr. Scott averred that the Appellees terminated him and failed to provide him

with due process protections due to him as a police officer under the Police Officer’s

Bill of Rights, La. Rev. Stat. 40:2531-2535, and as a classified state civil service

employee, under La. Const. art. X, § 1, et seq. He additionally alleged the Appellees

fired him in retaliation for reporting police misconduct in violation of the protection

afforded to whistleblowers under La. Rev. Stat. 42:1169 and La. Rev. Stat. 23:967.

He further asserted that the Appellees were negligent and breached various duties

owed to him. Lastly, he sought punitive damages from the Appellees.

In response to his petition, the Appellees filed exceptions of no cause of action

and no right of action, and alternatively, lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On

September 9, 2022, a hearing was held on the Appellees’ exceptions. On the same

date, the district court rendered judgment, sustaining the exceptions of no right of

action and no cause of action and dismissing Mr. Scott’s claims: 1) under the Police
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Officer’s Bill of Rights, La. Rev. Stat. 40:2531, et seq.; 2) for alleged violations of

rights, procedures and protections afforded to classified civil service employees

under La. Const. art. X, § 1, et seq.; and 3) for alleged violations of La. Rev. Stat.

42:1169. Furthermore, the district court granted the Appellees’ exceptions of no

cause of action and dismissed Mr. Scott’s claims for “negligence” and “breach of

duties;” as well as for punitive damages.

In addition to sustaining the foregoing exceptions, the district court sustained

the Appellees’ exceptions of no cause of action in response to Mr. Scott’s claims

under the general whistleblower statute of La. Rev. Stat. 23:967, and seeking to

declare La. Rev. Stat. 40:539(C)(8)(b) unconstitutional pursuant to the Louisiana

Constitution. However, the district court allowed Mr. Scott to amend his petition

within 30 days to cure the grounds for both exceptions of no cause of action. This

timely appeal followed.

After filing the instant appeal, Mr. Scott timely filed his First Supplemental

and Amending Petition. The Appellees responded by filing an exception of no cause

of action in this Court.

Mr. Scott raises three assignments of error on appeal:1

1) the district court erred when it sustained the
Appellees’ exceptions of no cause of action and
no right of action and dismissed with prejudice
his claims for damages for violations of: a)
rights, guarantees, and protections pursuant to
La. Rev. Stat. 40:2531, et seq., Police Officer’s
Bill of Rights; b) rights, guarantees, and
protections afforded civil service employees
pursuant to La. Const., art. X, § 1, et seq., and
State Civil Service Rules; c) rights, guarantees,
and protections afforded to state whistleblowers

1 Mr. Scott did not raise the dismissal of his claim for punitive damages as an assignment of error

on appeal.
5

pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 42:1169; d) duties
based on intentional acts or negligence;

2) the district court erred in sustaining the
Appellees’ exception of no cause of action and
no right of action seeking contribution from
HANO to the State Civil Service System; and

3) the district court erred in sustaining the
Appellees’ exceptions of no cause of action and
no right of action and dismissing Mr. Scott’s
petition for declaratory judgment regarding the
constitutionality of La. Rev. Stat.
40:539(C)(8)(b) on its face and as applied to
HANO.

We will first discuss the district court rulings on the Appellees’ exceptions of

no right of action.

EXCEPTIONS OF NO RIGHT OF ACTION

Mr. Scott seeks review of the district court’s judgment sustaining the

Appellees’ exceptions of no right of action and dismissal of his claims for: 1)

violations of rights, guarantees, and protections under the Police Officer’s Bill of

Rights, La. Rev. Stat. 40:2531, et seq.; 2) violations of rights, guarantees, and

protections afforded civil service employees pursuant to La. Const., art. X, § 1, et

seq., and State Civil Service Rules; 3) for a declaratory judgment regarding the

constitutionality of La. R.S. 40:539(C)(8)(b) on its face and as applied to appellee

HANO; and 4) violations of rights, guarantees, and protections afforded to state

whistleblowers pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 42:1169.

Standard of Review

Exceptions of no right of action are raised by a peremptory exception, which

functions “to have the plaintiff's action declared legally nonexistent, or barred by

effect of law, and hence this exception tends to dismiss or defeat the action.” La.

Code Civ. Proc. arts. 923 and 927. The function of an exception of no right of action,
6

however, “is to determine whether the plaintiff belongs to the class of persons to

whom the law grants the cause of action asserted in the suit.” Reese v. State Dep't of

Pub. Safety & Corrs., 03-1615, pp. 2-3 (La. 2/20/04), 866 So.2d 244, 246. The

mover carries the burden of proof on the exception. Leone v. Ware, 17-638, p. 4

(La. App. 3 Cir. 5/2/18), 246 So.3d 833, 835.

When appellate courts review a trial court's ruling on an exception of no

right of action, the focus should be “on whether the particular plaintiff has a right to

bring the suit and is a member of the class of persons that has a legal interest in the

subject matter of the litigation, assuming the petition states a valid cause of action

for some person.” Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 10-2267, 10-

2272, 10-2275, 10-2279, 10-2289, p. 7 (La. 10/25/11), 79 So.3d 246, 256. The court

begins its analysis on an exception of no right of action “with an examination of the

pleadings.” Leone, 17-638, p. 3, 246 So.3d at 835 (quoting Howard v. Adm'rs of

Tulane Educ. Fund, 07-2224, pp. 17-18 (La. 7/1/08), 986 So.2d 47, 60).

A de novo standard of review applies to a trial court's ruling sustaining an

exception of no right of action. St. Pierre v. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc.,

12-0545, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/24/12), 102 So.3d 1003, 1009. Because exceptions

of no right of action present questions of law, appellate review “involves

determining whether the trial court was legally correct in sustaining such

exceptions.” Id.

For the reasons discussed below, pursuant to our de novo review, we find the

district court properly sustained the Appellees’ exceptions of no right of action.

Police Officer’s Bill of Rights

Mr. Scott pled that his rights under the Police Officer’s Bill of Rights, La.

Rev. Stat. 40:2531, et seq., were violated because HANO failed to: notify him of his
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rights as a police officer; provide him notice of a his last hearing date; and afford

him an opportunity to provide witnesses and examine HANO’s witnesses during the

course of its investigation, in addition to failing to provide him other protections.

He further pled that the Appellees did not grant him the statutory minimum standards

guaranteed to him as a police officer when he was fired in retaliation for disclosing

two incidents of police misconduct. However, this Court has held that the Police

Officer’s Bill of Rights is inapplicable to HANO officers.

In Smith v. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, 17-0038 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/28/17),

––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2017 WL 3426018, a HANO police officer, Mr. Smith, sued

the same Appellees involved in the instant case, as well as a fellow HANO officer,

after being fired. Mr. Smith alleged he was wrongfully terminated without civil

service protections and that he was terminated because he was a whistleblower.

Smith, 17-0038, pp. 1-2, 2017 WL 3426018, *1.

The defendants filed numerous exceptions, including an exception of no cause

of action pertaining to a claim Mr. Smith raised pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The

district court sustained the exception and dismissed Mr. Smith’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claim. Smith, 17-0038, pp. 1-3, 2017 WL 3426018, *1. On appeal, the Smith Court

rejected an ancillary argument raised by Mr. Smith: as a whistleblower, he was

wrongfully denied the protections provided by the Police Officer’s Bill of Rights.

The Court explained that the definition of a “police employee” provided in

La. Rev. Stat. 40:2531 excludes HANO officers:

La. Rev. Stat. 40:2531 applies:

only to police employees as defined by Rev. Stat.
40:1372(5), Louisiana P.O.S.T. certified probation
and parole officers employed by the Louisiana
Department of Public Safety and Corrections,
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division of probation and parole, and to those law
enforcement officers employed by any municipality
and campus police employed at any state-supported
college or university who are under investigation ....

La. R. S. 40:1372(5) provides that a “ ‘[p]olice employee’
means any employee who is assigned to police work as a
peace officer pursuant to R. S. 40:1379.” Further, La. R.
S. 40:1379 outlines the duties and powers of state police
employees. Mr. Smith does not belong to the class of
persons protected by La. R. S. 40:2531. He was not a state
police employee, a “police employee,” a “probation and
parole officer”, or a law enforcement officer employed by
a municipality or state-supported college/university. See
La. R. S. 40:2531, 40:1372(5), and 40:1379. HANO is “a
public body, corporate and politic, previously established,
or to be established, by a municipality or a parish ...
exercising necessary and essential governmental
functions for the purposes ... in matters of statewide
concern, although its operations are local in nature.” La.
R. S. 40:384(16). See also La. R. S. 40:383. As such, he is
not entitled to the protections outlined in the Police
Officer's Bill of Rights. [Emphasis added].

Smith, 17-0038, p. 9, 2017 WL 3426018, *5. Similarly, we find that as a

HANO police officer, Mr. Scott does not have a right of action under the Police

Officer’s Bill of Rights because he does not belong to the class of persons protected

by La. Rev. Stat. 40:2531. This assignment of error is without merit.

Civil Service Claims and La. Rev. Stat. 40:539(8)(b)

Mr. Scott asserts that he has the right to bring civil service claims under La.

Const. art. X, § 1, et seq.2 In his petition, he pled that during the course of HANO’s

2 La. Const. art. X, § 1 provides:

State Civil Service. The state civil service is established and
includes all persons holding offices and positions of trust or
employment in the employ of the state, or any instrumentality
thereof, and any joint state and federal agency, joint state and
parochial agency, or joint state and municipal agency, regardless of
the source of the funds used to pay for such employment. It shall not
include members of the state police service as provided in Part IV
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investigation, he was not afforded the opportunity to provide witnesses and examine

HANO’s witnesses, nor was he given other protections “guaranteed Civil Service

employees by the State Department of Civil Service.” He further pled that he

believed “the position of a HANO police officer and his/her supervisors who enforce

the police powers of Louisiana reserved to the States by U.S. Constitution are

classified civil service positions as defined in La. Const. art. X § 2 and La. R.S.

40:539(8)(a).” He averred that HANO’s policy of excluding HANO officers from

civil service protection combined with the application of La. Rev. Stat. 40:539(8)(a)

violate La. Const. art. X § 2. Lastly, he pled that he was terminated without being

afforded his right to appeal the disciplinary action guaranteed by La. Const. arts. X

§ 8, 10 and 12.

HANO employees are specifically excluded from the state civil service

pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 40:539(8)(b), which provides:

(b) Notwithstanding any provision of Subparagraph (a) of
this Paragraph or of any other law to the contrary, the
Housing Authority of New Orleans shall not be considered
to be an instrumentality of the state for purposes of Article
X, Section 1(A) of the Constitution of Louisiana, and
employees of the authority shall not be included in the
state civil service.

While we recognize that Mr. Scott challenges the constitutionality of La. Rev.

Stat. 40:539(8)(b), he does not currently have a right to levy a state civil service

claim.

Additionally, Mr. Scott assigns as error the district court’s sustaining of the

Appellees’ exception of no right of action and no cause of action as to his claim of

of this Article or persons holding offices and positions of any
municipal board of health or local governmental subdivision.

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the unconstitutionality of La. Rev. Stat. 40:539(8)(b), and the dismissal of this claim.

Mr. Scott misinterprets the September 9, 2022 judgment, which only sustained the

Appellees’ exception of no cause of action regarding said claim and granted him

leave to amend this claim within 30 days of the date of its judgment. The district

court did not dismiss Mr. Scott’s unconstitutionality claim. Furthermore, for the

reasons discussed later in this opinion, we lack jurisdiction to consider that portion

of the judgment allowing Mr. Scott to amend said claim.

Lastly, Mr. Scott, in his second assignment of error, asserts that the district

court erred in sustaining the Appellees’ exception of no cause of action and no right

of action, seeking contribution from HANO to the State Civil Service System.

Nevertheless, the September 9, 2022 judgment includes no such ruling. Regarding

Mr. Scott’s civil service claims, the judgment states that the Appellees’ “exceptions

of no cause of action and no right of action urged in response to Plaintiffs claims for

alleged violations of rights, procedures and protections afforded to classified civil

service employees, La. Const. art. X, § 1” are sustained and those claims are

dismissed with prejudice. Moreover, because HANO is excluded from the State

Civil Service under La. Rev. Stat. 40:539(C)(8)(b), it follows that HANO does not

and did not have an obligation to contribute to the State Civil Service System at the

time of Mr. Scott’s employ. This assignment of error is without merit.

Mr. Scott does not have a right of action to raise classified civil service claims

under La. Const. art. X, § 1, et seq. These assignments of error are without merit.

Whistleblower Protection

In his petition, Mr. Scott pled that he filed a grievance letter with HANO

wherein he alleged that he raised various claims, including that he was “denied status

as a ‘whistle blower’ for reporting two incidents . . . .” He further alleged that the
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Appellees committed two violations of La. Rev. Stat. 42:1169 by: terminating him

from his employment without affording him “his rights as a whistle blower and to

appeal the disciplinary action” and failing to grant him “the minimum standards

guaranteed” under La. Rev. Stat. 42:1169, thereby making his termination an

absolute nullity. Additionally, he pled that he lodged a complaint with the Louisiana

Ethics Commission.

Mr. Scott avers that he can raise a whistleblower claim under La. Rev. Stat.

42:1169, et seq., because the statute protects public employees from reprisals when

they report information they reasonably believe indicates a violation of law or rule,

or any acts of impropriety related to the scope of duties of public employment. He

asserts that as a HANO police officer, he is a public employee who can file a claim

for damages as a whistleblower because he is a wrongfully terminated state

employee and is entitled to reinstatement and to receive any lost income and benefits

for the period he was terminated, under La. Rev. Stat. 42:1169(B)(2)(a). Mr. Scott

misinterprets his rights under La. Rev. Stat. 42:1169.

La. Rev. Stat. 42:1169 is a statute that comprises a part of the Code of

Governmental Ethics, La. Rev. Stat. 42:1101, et seq. The Code of Governmental

Ethics establishes the Board of Ethics and further provides that it has the power to

enforce the provisions contained in the Code of Ethics. Specifically, La. Rev. Stat.

42:1132, entitled Board of Ethics, provides in pertinent part:

C. Jurisdiction. The Board of Ethics shall administer and
enforce the provisions of this Chapter3 and the rules,
regulations, and orders issued hereunder with respect to
public employees and elected officials, including final
decisions of the Ethics Adjudicatory Board. [Footnotes
omitted].

3 The chapter referred to herein is Chapter 15, entitled Code of Governmental Ethics.

12

Furthermore, La. Rev. Stat. 42:1169 provides directives for reporting acts of

reprisals to the Board of Ethics and also sets forth how the Board of Ethics will

proceed with investigating such acts. Section (B)(1)(a) of La. Rev. Stat. 42:1169

states that any acts of reprisal taken against whistleblowers shall be reported to the

Board of Ethics:

If any public employee is suspended, demoted, dismissed,
or threatened with such suspension, demotion, or dismissal
as an act of reprisal for reporting an alleged act of
impropriety in violation of this Section, the public
employee shall report such action to the board.

Moreover, La. Rev. Stat. 42:1169(C) sets forth the investigation process for

the Board of Ethics:

The board shall provide written notice of the
commencement of an investigation of a report of a
violation of this Section to the agency head of the
employee, or if the agency head is the defendant, then to
an agency head of the governmental entity that supervises
the agency, or if none, then to the governing authority of
the governmental entity not less than ten days prior to the
date set for the investigation. If the board determines,
following an investigation, that it shall offer a consent
opinion or conduct a public or private hearing to receive
evidence and determine whether any violation of this
Section has occurred, the board shall provide written
notice of the hearing or consent opinion to the agency head
of the employee, or if the agency head is the defendant,
then to an agency head of the governmental entity that
supervises the agency, or if none, then to the governing
authority of the governmental entity not less than sixty
days prior to the date set for the action by the board. The
employee's agency shall cooperate in every possible
manner in connection with any investigation conducted by
the board. The agency shall be considered to be an
indispensable party to any investigation, hearing, or
consent opinion and may have legal counsel, cross-
examine witnesses, call witnesses, and present evidence
on its behalf.

Considering that it is within the Board of Ethics’ purview to “administer and

enforce” the Code of Ethics and that the purpose of reporting claims to the Board of
13

Ethics is for the board itself to investigate the reported claims, Mr. Scott does not

have the right to directly bring an action for an alleged violation of La. Rev. Stat.

42:1169. Mr. Scott’s statutory remedy is to allow the Board of Ethics to complete

its investigation of the complaint he lodged pursuant to the procedures set forth

within the Code of Ethics. The district court did not err in granting the Appellees’

exception of no right of action and dismissing Mr. Scott’s whistleblower claim under

La. Rev. Stat. 42:1169. This assignment of error is without merit.

Finally, for the reasons discussed above, we affirm the district court’s

judgment sustaining the Appellees’ exceptions of no right of action and the dismissal

of the following claims of Mr. Scott: 1) under the Police Officer’s Bill of Rights, La.

Rev. Stat. 40:253, et seq.; 2) for alleged violations of rights, procedures and

protections afforded to classified civil service employees under La. Const. art. X, §

1, et seq.; and 3) violations of rights, guarantees, and protections afforded to state

whistleblowers pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 42:1169. Because we affirm the district

court’s dismissal of these claims, we pretermit discussion of Mr. Scott’s assignments

of error pertaining to the sustaining of the Appellees’ exceptions of no cause of

action and the dismissal of these identical claims. Those assignments of error are

rendered moot.

EXCEPTIONS OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION

Below we address Mr. Scott’s assignments of error pertaining to the district

court’s rulings sustaining the Appellees’ exceptions of no cause of action as to his

claims for intentional acts and negligence as well as seeking to declare La. Rev. Stat.

40:539(C)(8)(b) unconstitutional.

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Intentional Acts and Negligence

Mr. Scott seeks review of the district court’s ruling, sustaining the Appellees’

exception of no cause of action and dismissing his tort claims for negligence and

breach of duties. In his petition for damages, Mr. Scott pled that the Appellees were

liable for negligence and breach of duties as a result of various actions he asserts

they failed to take as well as for wrongfully terminating him in retaliation for

disclosing that a HANO officer violated citizens’ civil rights and acted

unprofessionally with minors.4 He asserted that HANO is liable under the theory of

respondeat superior.

The Appellees, in response, assert they are entitled to general tort immunity

under La. Rev. Stat. 9:2798.1, entitled Policymaking or discretionary acts or

omissions of public entities or their officers or employees, which provides in

pertinent part:

A. As used in this Section, “public entity” means
and includes the state and any of its branches,

4 Mr. Scott alleged that HANO: failed to document in policies and procedures consistent with the
State of Louisiana’s laws and Constitution; failed to include Mr. Scott and HANO police officers
in a classified position under the jurisdiction of the State Civil Service System; failed to grant Mr.
Scott all of the rights and privileges guaranteed to him under the laws and Constitution of the State
of Louisiana; wrongfully terminating him without due process and granting him whistleblower
status; failing to protect his rights as a whistleblower and a peace officer; failing to properly
supervise Appellees Anderson and Fortner; failing to prevent a retaliatory firing; and any other
acts of negligence and breach of duties established at trial.

He pled that Appellee Anderson: failed to guarantee him his rights provided under Louisiana law
and its Constitution; failed to timely and properly investigate his complaints and grant him
whistleblower status; failed to timely take corrective action to protect by his rights under Louisiana
law; failed to properly supervise HANO police officers; fired him in retaliation; and any other acts
of negligence and breach of duties established at trial.

Lastly, he pled that Appellee Fortner: failed to guarantee him his rights provided under Louisiana
law and its Constitution; wrongfully terminated him without due process and protection as a
whistleblower; fired him in retaliation; failing to properly supervise Appellee Anderson; failed to
document policies and procedure placing HANO police officers under the State Civil Service
Commission’s jurisdiction; failed to document policies and procedure guaranteeing Mr. Scott and
HANO police officers minimum due process standards and whistleblower protection procedures
to be followed by HANO personnel when investigating HANO police officers; and any other acts
of negligence and breach of duties established at trial.
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departments, offices, agencies, boards,
commissions, instrumentalities, officers,
officials, employees, and political subdivisions
and the departments, offices, agencies, boards,
commissions, instrumentalities, officers,
officials, and employees of such political
subdivisions.

B. Liability shall not be imposed on public entities
or their officers or employees based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform their policymaking or discretionary
acts when such acts are within the course and
scope of their lawful powers and duties.

C. The provisions of Subsection B of this Section
are not applicable:

(1) To acts or omissions which are not
reasonably related to the legitimate
governmental objective for which the
policymaking or discretionary power
exists; or

(2) To acts or omissions which constitute
criminal, fraudulent, malicious,
intentional, willful, outrageous,
reckless, or flagrant misconduct.

The Appellees assert that Mr. Scott failed to allege in his petition any acts by

the Appellees that would fall into the exception from general tort immunity

described in La. Rev. Stat. 9:2798.1(C)(2). In other words, they aver he failed to

plead that the Appellees engaged in “criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional,

willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct” acts or omissions. We disagree

in part.

A district court’s ruling on an exception of no cause of action is reviewed by

appellate courts using the de novo standard of review because the exception raises a

question of law and the district court's decision is based only on the sufficiency of

the petition. Herman v. Tracage Dev., L.L.C., 16-0082, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir.
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9/21/16), 201 So. 3d 935, 939. All well-pleaded allegations of fact are accepted as

true. Jackson v. City of New Orleans, 12-2742, p. 24 (La. 1/28/14), 144 So. 3d 876,

895. “[T]he issue at the trial of the exception is whether, on the face of the petition,

the plaintiff is legally entitled to the relief sought.” Montalvo v. Sondes, 93-2813, p.

6 (La. 5/23/94), 637 So.2d 127, 131. “Liberal rules of pleading prevail in Louisiana,

and when it can reasonably do so, a court should maintain a petition to allow a

plaintiff to present his case.” S.K. Whitty & Co. v. Laurence L. Lambert & Assocs.,

576 So. 2d 599, 601 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1991).

Only well-pled allegations of fact that are accepted as true. Strategic Med. All.

II v. State, 22-0051, p. 6 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/4/22), 2022 WL 16707127. “The

adjective “well-pled” refers to properly pled allegations conforming to the system of

fact pleading embodied in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. It does not include

allegations deficient in material detail, conclusory factual allegations, or allegations

of law.” Id. Additionally, we have held that general immunity under La. Rev. Stat.

9:2798.1 extends to HANO and its officers. Smith, 17-0038, p. 10, 2017 WL

3426018, *5.5

We find that Mr. Scott alleged in a conclusory manner his tort claims for

negligence and breach of duties. Nevertheless, pursuant to our de novo review, we

further find that his allegations of retaliatory firing against the Appellees indicate

that their actions or omissions may constitute “malicious, intentional, [and] willful”

misconduct, to which the Discretionary Acts Doctrine does not apply under La. Rev.

Stat. 9:2798.1(C)(2). Therefore, we affirm the district court’s ruling sustaining the

5 [W]hen dealing with matters outside the realm of the civil service system, HANO is considered
an instrumentality of the state.” Smith, 17-0038, p. 6, 2017 WL 3426018, *3 (citing See Dep't of
State Civil Serv. v. Hous. Auth., 95-1959, p. 5 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/10/96), 673 So.2d 726, 729).
Thus, HANO is considered a “public entity” as defined by La. Rev. Stat. 9:2798.1 (A).
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Appellees’ exception of no cause of action as to these claims. However, we reverse

the district court’s dismissal of these claims, finding that Mr. Scott should be granted

leave to file an amended petition to cure the grounds for the Appellees’ exception,

if possible, pursuant to La. Civ. Code Civ. Proc. art. 934.6 Thus, we remand this

matter in part, for the district court to allow Mr. Scott leave to amend his tort claims

for negligence and breach of duties.

Amended Claims

As stated above, the district court granted the Appellees’ exceptions of no

cause of action as to Mr. Scott’s claims of unconstitutionality under La. Rev. Stat.

40:539(C)(8)b) and his whistleblower claim under La. Rev. Stat. 23:967, but allowed

him to amend his petition as to these claims. Mr. Scott assigns as error the district

court’s ruling pertaining to his La. Rev. Stat. 40:539(C)(8)b) unconstitutionality

claim. However, we lack jurisdiction to consider this issue.

“A judgment granting an exception of no cause of action, but providing leave

to amend the petition is not a final judgment or an interlocutory judgment subject to

appeal. Rather, such a judgment merely permits an amendment within the delay

allowed by the trial court as provided by La. C.C.P. art. 934.” McGaha v. Franklin

Homes, Inc., 21-0244, p. 45 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/4/22), 335 So.3d 842, 869-70.

(internal citations omitted). Applying the holding of McGaha to the instant matter,

we find the September 9, 2022 judgment is not final as it pertains to sustaining the

Appellees’ exception of no cause of action as to Mr. Scott’s unconstitutionality claim

under La. Rev. Stat. 40:539(C)(8)b) because he was granted leave to amend this

6 When the grounds of the objection pleaded by the peremptory exception may be removed by

amendment of the petition, the judgment sustaining the exception shall order such amendment
within the delay allowed by the court. La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 934.

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claim. Therefore, we cannot address Mr. Scott’s assignment of error regarding his

La. Rev. Stat. 40:539(C)(8)b) unconstitutionality claim. Moreover, we dismiss Mr.

Scott’s appeal in part because we lack jurisdiction to consider this remaining

assignment of error.

EXCEPTION OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION RAISED ON APPEAL

On appeal, the Appellees re-urge their exception of no cause of action in

response to Mr. Scott’s amended petition. They contend Mr. Scott merely added

two sentences to Paragraph 1(A)(2) of his original petition, asserting that HANO is

liable to Mr. Scott under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, yet he still failed to state a cause of

action concerning the alleged unconstitutionality of La. Rev. Stat. 40:539(C)(8)(b).

As explained above, the district court still has jurisdiction over that portion of

the September 9, 2022 judgment, allowing Mr. Scott to amend his petition.

Consequently, we decline to consider the exception, finding it more appropriate to

allow the district court to review the amended petition and consider any exceptions

the Appellees may raise thereto.7

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the September 9, 2022 judgment in part

and uphold the district court’s grant of the Appellees’ exceptions of no right of action

and dismissal of Mr. Scott’s claims: 1) under the Police Officer’s Bill of Rights, La.

Rev. Stat. 40:2531, et seq.; 2) for alleged violations of rights, procedures and

protections afforded to classified civil service employees under La. Const. art. X, §

7 Review of the Appellees’ exception is discretionary under La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 927 (B) and

La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 2163. Article 927(B) of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure permits
an appellate court to notice an exception of no cause of action on their own motion. Moreover, La.
Code Civ. Proc. art. 2163 further provides that the “appellate court may consider the peremptory
exception filed for the first time in that court, if pled prior to a submission of the case for a decision,
and if proof of the exception appears of record. ” [Emphasis added].
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1, et seq.; 3) for alleged violations of La. Rev. Stat. 42:1169 (the whistleblower

statute contained in the Code of Governmental Ethics); and 4) for “negligence” and

“breach of duties.”

We further affirm in part the district court’s ruling, sustaining the Appellees’

exception of no cause of action as to Mr. Scott’s tort claims for negligence and

breach of duties. However, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of these claims

and remand this matter in part for further proceedings, with instructions to the district

court to allow Mr. Scott leave to amend his tort claims for negligence and breach of

duties pursuant to La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 934.

Moreover, we dismiss Mr. Scott’s appeal in part because we lack jurisdiction

to consider that portion of the judgment sustaining the exception of no cause of

action of the Appellees as to Mr. Scott’s unconstitutionality claim under La. Rev.

Stat. 40:539(C)(8)b), and allowing him leave to amend that claim.

Lastly, the Appellees’ exception of no cause of action raised on appeal is

denied.

AFFIRMED IN PART;
REVERSED AND REMANDED
IN PART; APPEAL DISMISSED
IN PART; EXCEPTION OF NO
CAUSE OF ACTION RAISED ON
APPEAL DENIED
April 18, 2023

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