2023-B-00028 Precedential Processed

In Re: Keelus Renardo Miles

Louisiana Supreme Court · Filed April 25, 2023

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Opinion text

Supreme Court of Louisiana
April 25, 2023
Chief Deputy Clerk of Court
For the Court
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
IN RE: KEELUS RENARDO MILES
No. 2023-B-00028
_ _
_ _ _ _
I
N RE: Disciplinary Counsel - Applicant Other; Findings and Recommendations
(Formal Charges);
_ _ _ _ _ _
April 25, 2023
Suspension imposed. See per curiam.
Hughes, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Crichton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
Griffin, J., dissents and would impose a lesser suspension.
SJC
JLW
JTG
WJC
JBM
04/25/2023 "See News Release 020 for any Concurrences and/or Dissents."

S
UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
NO. 2
023-B-0028
I
N RE: KEELUS RENARDO MILES
AT
TORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
P
ER CURIAM
Th
is disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Keelus Renardo Miles , an
attorney license d to practice law in Louisiana.
PRI
OR DISCIPLINARY HISTORY
Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in 2005. In 2014, he
participated in the diversion program and attended the Louisiana State Bar
Association’s Trust Accounting School to address an overdraft in his client trust
account. In 2019, we accepted a joint petition for consent discipline and publicly
reprimanded respondent for neglecting a legal matter, failing to communicate with
a client, and failing to timely refund an unearned fee. In re: Miles, 19 -1279 (La.
10/21/19), 280 So. 3d 1135 (“Miles I”).
Against this backdrop, we now turn to a consideration of the misconduct at
issue in the present proceeding.
UNDE
RLYING FACTS
In July 2013, Charles and Gwendolyn Washington sustained serious injuries
in a vehicle -pedestrian accident. Shortly thereafter, the Washingtons retained
respondent to represent them on a 15% contingency fee basis. In the course of the
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representation, res pondent collected a total of $229,530 on behalf of the
Washingtons, as follows:
1. State Farm provided the Washingtons with UM and medical payments
coverage. In 2014, State Farm paid its full policy limits of UM coverage in
two checks, each in the amount of $15,000, payable to respondent and Mr. or
Mrs. Washington. Nine checks, totaling $9,530, were issued in 2013 payable
to respondent and Mr. or Mrs. Washington for medical payments. Respondent
endorsed the State Farm checks on behalf of the Washingtons, claiming to the
ODC that he had verbal authority from his clients to do so. However, the
Washingtons maintain that they did not authorize respondent to sign their
names on the checks. Furthermore, the Washingtons were unaware of the
issuance of the medical payments checks, and they only learned of the
issuance of the UM checks from State Farm, not respondent.
2. Agricultural Workers Mutual Auto Insurance Company (“AgWorkers”)
provided liability insurance to the tortfeasor. Respondent placed Mr. and Mrs.
Washington’s signatures on the releases in favor of AgWorkers, improperly
notarized those signatures, and transmitted the releases to AgWorkers. The
Washingtons maintain that they did not authorize respondent to sign their
names on the releases. Furthermore, the Washingtons were unaware that any
releases had been signed until they were shown copies by the ODC. In 2013
and 2014, AgWorkers paid its full policy limits of liability coverage in two
checks, each in the amount of $50,000, payable to respondent and Mr. or Mrs.
Washington. Respondent endorsed the AgWorkers checks on behalf of the
Washingtons, claiming to the ODC that he had verbal authority from his
clients to do so. However, the Washingtons maintain that they did not
authorize respondent to sign their names on the checks. Furthermore, it was

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not until 2018 that Mr. and Mrs. Washington learned from defense counsel,
not respondent, that their claims against AgWorkers had been paid.
3. A lawsuit filed on behalf of the Washingtons against the City of Winnfield
settled in July 2018 for the sum of $90,000. The Washingtons confirm that
they signed their names to the release in favor the defendant and that
respondent gave them the settlement check issued by Louisiana Municipal
Risk Management Agency, which they in turn deposited into their bank
account.1
Respondent did not maintain the funds he received from State Farm and
AgWorkers, totaling $139,530, in his client trust account. Between 2014 and 2018,
respondent paid a total of $92,000 to Mr. and Mrs. Washington from his operating
account. Banking records also establish respondent’s misuse of the trust account in
the form of cash withdrawals and repeated online transfers to his personal account.
In October 2014, respondent advised Mrs. Washington that he was holding
funds in his trust account to pay medical expenses. Respondent later informed the
ODC that he thought he had paid some of the Washingtons’ medical bills, but he
provided no documentation to substantiate this assertion. In March 2015, Mrs.
Washington received a text message from respondent containing an image of five
checks totaling $957.89 and payable to third-party medical providers. Only two of
these checks could be confirmed as having been received by the provider. The
remainder of the Washingtons’ medical expenses were satisfied by their own
medical insurance, by payments received by the providers directly from the
Washingtons, and by adjustments to charges in accordance with the providers’
contracts with the Washingtons’ medical insurer.

1 The ODC does not allege any misconduct relating to the $90,000 settlement check. This
information is included solely to provide a complete picture of the funds received by respondent
on behalf of the Washingtons.

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At the end of the legal representation, and after deducting a 15% attorney’s
fee from the gross proceeds respondent received on behalf of the Washingtons, the
sum of $11,742.61 could not be accounted for and was not being held in respondent’s
trust acc ount. On October 19, 2021, respondent, through counsel, delivered a
cashier’s check to the Washingtons in this amount.
In October 2019, the Washingtons filed a complaint against respondent with
the ODC. Respondent did not file an answer to the complaint, necessitating the
issuance of a subpoena to compel his response and the production of specific
documentation. Respondent responded to the subpoena in January 2020 and
answered the complaint. He also supplied some, but not all, of the requested
documents.2 Respondent subsequently gave a sworn statement to the ODC in
November 2020.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
In April 2021, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent arising out of
his representation of the Washingtons. The ODC alleged that respondent’s conduct
violated Rules 1.5(c) (written contingency fee agreement, disbursement statement),
1.15(a) (safeguarding client funds, recordkeeping, conversion), 1.15(d) (failure to
timely remit funds to a client or third party), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the
ODC in its investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct),
and 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

2 The ODC requested client and banking r ecords associated with respondent’s representation of
the Washingtons. Respondent produced his clients’ medical records and some banking records;
however, he failed to provide the ODC with a signed contingency fee agreement or any settlement
disbursement statements. In his initial response, respondent offered that some of the requested
records may have been lost in the catastrophic flood of August 2016.

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Respondent did not answer the formal charges, and the factual allegations
contained therein were deemed admitted. In July 2021, respondent’s counsel filed
an unopposed motion to be heard in mitigation, which was granted.

Hearing Committee Report
Following the mitigation hearing, the hearing committee noted that the factual
allegations set forth in the formal charges were deemed admitted upon respondent’s
failure to answer the charges. The committee also noted that respondent later
admitted to the deemed admitted facts, and the matte r proceeded to a hearing in
mitigation only.
After further considering the testimony and evidence presented at the
mitigation hearing, the committee determined the testimony confirmed what was set
forth by the ODC in the formal charges. The committee further found that witnesses
described respondent as “a very generous and capable person who was engaged in a
very unstructured practice of law.” Several witnesses, and even respondent himself,
made statements regarding his subpar accounting practices. The committee found
that respondent’s careless handling of the Washingtons’ settlement funds was most
notable because he failed to place the funds into his trust account and never provided
a true accounting of the disbursal of the funds. Nevertheless, the ODC and
respondent stipulated that the Washingtons have since been made whole and are not
due any restitution.
The committee further found that respondent’s testimony made it apparent he
and the Washingtons had an unconventional attorney/client relationship.
Nevertheless, respondent failed to exercise ethical restraint as well as common sense
when it came to providing legal advice and proper representation to the
Washingtons. He forged their signatures on checks and releases, improperly
notarized documents, and did not implement the use of a written contingency fee

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agreement. During his testimony, respondent stated that he knew he should not have
endorsed checks or signed notarized documents on his clients’ behalf but that he was
lax in his judgment.
The committee then found both the ODC and respondent raised concern that
there may have been some miscommunication or failure to act on the part of
respondent’s previous counsel, and it was this failure to act that prompted the ODC’s
allegation of a Rule 8.1(c) violation in the formal charges. Because the ODC has
not confirmed to what extent, if any, respondent’s previous counsel contributed to
respondent’s failure to cooperate, the committee decided respondent should not be
found in violation of Rule 8.1(c).
Based on the deemed admitted facts and the committee’s additional findings
set forth above, the committee determined respondent violated Rules 1.5(c), 1.15(a),
1.15(d), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professiona1Conduct. For the reasons
indicated above, the committee declined to find a violation of Rule 8.1(c).
The committee then determined respondent negligently, knowingly, and
intentionally violated duties owed to his clients, causing them potential harm through
his failure to effectively manage and oversee his trust account. The committee noted,
however, that respondent’s conduct would have had a greater impact on the public
and the legal profession had he not made his clients whole. After considering the
ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sancti ons, the committee determined the
baseline sanction is suspension.
In aggravation, the committee found a prior disciplinary record and noted
respondent’s stipulation “that he did not follow proper accounting procedures while
managing his practice.” In mitigation, the committee noted that “[r]espondent owes
no restitution to any of his clients” and “[r]espondent, as well as the ODC,
established that he cooperated with the ODC after it was discovered that his previous
counsel of record had not provided an answer to the filing of the formal charges.”

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Under these circumstances, the committee recommended respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for two years.
Neither respondent nor the ODC filed an objection to the committee’s report.
Therefore, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G), the disciplinary board
submitted the committee’s report to the court for review.
After considering the matter, we issued an order directing respondent and the
ODC to submit written briefs addressing whether the sanction recommended by the
committee is appropriate. Both parties filed briefs in response to our order.

DISCUSSION
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.
Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has
been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),
18 So. 3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and
recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the
manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:
Caulfield, 96 -1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue , 93 -2865 (La.
3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.
Our review of the record reveals that respondent failed to maintain necessary
client and financial records, misused his client trust account, converted client funds,
failed to timely remit funds to his clients and their third-party medical providers, and
signed his clients’ names to the backs of settlement checks and releases without their
authority and then notarized the signatures. This misconduct amounts to a violation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct as found by the hearing committee.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a
determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining

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a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain
high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173
(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and
the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520
(La. 1984).
The record further supports a finding that respondent knowingly, if not
intentionally, violated duties owed to his clients, the public, and the legal profession.
While his conduct harmed the Washingtons, we acknowledge that they have now
been made whole, lessening their injury. The potential harm to the profession was,
nevertheless, significant.
In determining the appropriate baseline sanction for respondent’s misconduct,
we look to the ABA’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. After reviewing
same, we find the following Standards apply: (1) Standard 4.11, which indicates
disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and
causes injury or potential injury to a client; and (2) Standard 4.62, which indicates
suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client and causes
injury or potential injury to the client. Based on these ABA Standards, the baseline
sanction here ranges from suspension to disbarment.
Further delving into the ABA Standards, we next look at relevant factors in
aggravation and mitigation. In aggravation, the record supports a prior disciplinary
record and substantial experience in the practice of law. Mitigating factors present
are personal or emotional problems (the flooding of respondent’s home in 2016) and
remorse.
Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction under the specific
circumstances presented here, we find that respondent’s most serious misconduct is

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his conversion of client fun ds coupled with his improper signing of his clients’
names to checks and releases. Because the instant case was presented in the context
of a deemed admitted filing, the hearing committee did not have the opportunity to
make detailed factual or credibility findings. Nonetheless, the committee’s
references to respondent’s “unstructured practice of law” and his “unconventional
attorney/client relationship with the Washingtons” strongly suggests the committee
believed his actions were the result of negligence rather than intent. Moreover, it is
undisputed that after charges were filed,3 respondent made full reimbursement to his
clients in the amount of $11,742.61, which was the sum agreed to by the parties .
Respondent is remorseful for his conduct and recog nizes the need for additional
training and supervision in the future.4
Based on the foregoing, we find the appropriate sanction here is a three-year
suspension from the practice of law.

DECREE
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee,
and considering the record and the briefs filed by the parties, it is ordered that Keelus
Renardo Miles, Louisiana Bar Roll number 29723, be and he hereby is suspended
from the practice of law for a period of three years . All costs and expenses in the
matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX,

3 Admittedly, respondent did not make reimbursement until two years after the filing of a
disciplinary complaint and six months after the ODC filed formal charges. On the other hand,
respondent points out that due to his poor accounting practices, it was actually possible the clients
were overpaid.
4 In brief, respondent agreed to accept probation follow ing his suspension. However, we do not
typically impose a period of probation in cases where the actual period of suspension is greater
than one year, as such issues and any other relevant factors “are best addressed if and when the
lawyer applies for rei nstatement.” See, e.g., In re: Southall , 14-2441 (La. 3/17/15), 165 So. 3d
894
; In re: Welcome, 02 -2662 (La. 1/24/03), 840 So. 2d 519; and In re: Harris, 99- 1828 (La.
9/17/99), 745 So. 2d 1172.

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§ 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this
court’s judgment until paid.