State of Louisiana v. Charles L. Williams

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2024-K-0591

VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
CHARLES L. WILLIAMS *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
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APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 549-728, SECTION “D”
Judge Kimya M. Holmes,
******
Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott
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(Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase,
Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott)

LOBRANO, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT

Jason R. Williams
District Attorney
Brad Scott
Assistant District Attorney
Chief of Appeals
Patricia Amos
Assistant District Attorney
ORLEANS PARISH
619 South White Street
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR RELATOR, STATE OF LOUISIANA

Jennifer L. Hull
2601 Tulane Avenue
Suite 700
New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT, CHARLES WILLIAMS

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED
OCTOBER 24, 2024

NEK
The State of Louisiana (“the State”) seeks review of the trial court’s August
TGC
16, 2024 pretrial ruling excluding other crimes evidence under La. C.E. art. 404(B).

For the following reasons, we grant the State’s writ and reverse the trial court’s

ruling.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 1, 2020, Charles Williams (“Defendant”) was charged with one

count of felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile – a violation of La. R.S. 14:80 – as

it relates to G.B. for the time period between August 13, 2012 and August 13,

2015.1,2 Additionally, Defendant was charged with one count of enticing G.B., who

was under eighteen years old, into prostitution by placing, persuading, encouraging

or causing the entrance of G.B. into prostitution, either by force, threats, promises,

or by any other device – a violation of La. R.S. 14:86 – for the time period between

August 13, 2015 and September 21, 2019.

Several pre-trial motions and notices were filed in this case. However,

pertinent to this writ application, the State filed State’s First Notice of Intent to Offer

1 As provided for in Rules 5-1 and 5-2 of the Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, the initials of

the minor child and other parties will be used in this matter in lieu of their names in order to ensure
the confidentiality of the minors.
2 Defendant is the father of G.B.’s brother.

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Evidence of Similar Crimes, Wrongs, and Acts by the Defendant at the Time of Trial

Under La. Code of Evidence Article 404(B) (“Notice”) on July 24, 2024, which

Defendant opposed. Through its Notice, the State attempted to introduce evidence

pertaining to allegations made by G.B.’s sister on October 8, 2018, regarding a

sexual encounter she had with Defendant on that same date.

According to G.B.’s sister, on October 8, 2018, Defendant picked her up from

her house and brought her to his residence so that she could do work for his small

business and earn extra money for her school dance expenses. As she sat on the sofa

at Defendant’s house, Defendant began rubbing on her back and kissing her. From

there, Defendant performed oral sex on her and eventually proceeded to vaginally

penetrate her. G.B.’s sister started crying, and Defendant ceased his sexual actions.

Defendant drove her home and gave her money. During the drive home, G.B.’s sister

texted her friend about what occurred, and the friend reported the encounter to G.B.’s

sister’s family. Once at home, her family confronted her about the information her

friend disclosed to them, and one of the family members called 911. At the time of

this incident, G.B.’s sister was seventeen years old.

After learning of Defendant’s sexual encounter with G.B.’s sister on October

8, 2018, G.B. reported Defendant’s abuse to law enforcement on October 15, 2018.

According to G.B., Defendant began sexually abusing her when she was fourteen

years old, and their sexual activity continued until the age of twenty. As an adult,

G.B. would receive money from Defendant after sex, and she continued having sex

with Defendant to prevent him from sexually assaulting her younger sisters.

As part of the investigation into G.B.’s sister and G.B.’s allegations,

Defendant was interviewed by the investigating detective. Regarding the encounter

with G.B.’s sister, he admitted to touching, kissing, performing oral sex, and

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vaginally penetrating her. However, he stopped when she started crying and stated

she did not give him the impression “that [was] something she didn’t want to do.”

Shifting to G.B.’s allegations, Defendant admitted to having a sexual relationship

with G.B., but stated she was seventeen when they started having sex. Defendant

also admitted to having a close relationship with G.B. and that he sometimes gave

her money. Defendant claimed G.B.’s allegations are revenge for his sexual

encounter with her sister.

In connection with the Notice, the State was seeking to introduce evidence

related to Defendant’s sexual encounter with G.B.’s sister, which included affidavits

for arrest warrants – along with the actual arrest warrants – connected with

Defendant’s arrest for crimes against G.B. (first-degree rape and enticing

prostitution) and G.B.’s sister (third-degree rape)3, and Defendant’s video-recorded

statement to the investigating detective.

The trial court conducted a hearing on August 5, 2024 regarding the State’s

Notice and took the matter under advisement. Eleven days later, the trial court ruled

to exclude the evidence that was the subject of the State’s Notice. Defendant now

seeks supervisory review of the trial court’s ruling excluding the La. C.E. art. 404(B)

evidence.

DISCUSSION

“A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of other crimes evidence will not

be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Horn, 2022-01722, p. 1 (La.

3 Defendant was arrested for third-degree rape of G.B.’s sister; however, the State chose not

proceed with the prosecution of this offense.

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2/14/23), 354 So.3d 1222, 1223 (citation omitted). “Because an abuse-of-discretion

standard almost always requires an appellate court to defer to the trial court’s

admittedly discretionary ruling, in order to obtain a reversal of such a discretionary

ruling, a complaining party is usually required to show that the trial judge’s ruling

was based upon a mistaken application of law.” State v. Lee, 2011-0398, p. 6 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 1/30/12), 83 So.3d 1191, 1196. “When a trial judge’s ruling is based

upon a legal mistake, the ruling is no longer entitled to deference by the reviewing

court.” Id.

The State asserts the trial court erred in excluding other crimes evidence under

La. C.E. art. 404(B), thus not admitting into evidence Defendant’s October 8, 2018

sexual encounter with G.B.’s sister. Louisiana Code of Evidence Article

404(B)(1)(a) states:

Except as provided in Article 412 or as otherwise provided by law,
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by
the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable
notice in advance of trial, of the nature of any such evidence it intends
to introduce at trial for such purposes, or when it relates to conduct that
constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of
the present proceeding.

Specifically, the State argues that the October 8, 2018 sexual encounter with G.B.’s

sister is admissible under Article 404(B) to prove identity or modus operandi and

res gestae. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we agree with the trial

court that identity and modus operandi are inapplicable as Defendant’s identity was

known to G.B. and G.B.’s sister, and the State failed to establish how this evidence

would show Defendant’s motive. See La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1).

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“Generally, courts may not admit evidence of other crimes to show defendant

is a man of bad character who has acted in conformity with his bad character.” State

v. Taylor, 2001-1638, p. 10 (La. 1/14/03), 838 So.2d 729, 741. “However, under La.

C.E. art. 404(B)(1) evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts may be introduced when

it relates to conduct, formerly referred to as res gestae, that ‘constitutes an integral

part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding.’” Id. “Res

gestae events constituting other crimes are deemed admissible because they are so

nearly connected to the charged offense that the state could not accurately present

its case without reference to them.” Id.

The Louisiana Supreme Court stated in State v. Colomb:

The test of integral act evidence is . . . not simply whether the state
might somehow structure its case to avoid any mention of the
uncharged act or conduct but whether doing so would deprive its case
of narrative momentum and cohesiveness, “with power not only to
support conclusions but to sustain the willingness of jurors to draw the
inferences, whatever they may be, necessary to reach an honest
verdict.”

1998-2813 (La. 10/1/99), 747 So.2d 1074, 1076. The State maintains the evidence

of the Defendant’s sexual encounter with G.B.’s sister is admissible as res gestae

because it was the reason G.B. disclosed her abuse to their family and reported the

abuse to the police, thus integral to the “narrative momentum and cohesiveness” of

the State’s case.

In its August 16, 2024 ruling, the trial court stated:

As an initial threshold matter, this Court does not find that the act
constitutes res gestae, as it is not necessary to "tell the story of the
crime" or for completeness. While the State certainly would like to
introduce it in order to explain why G.B. (older) ultimately disclosed
the purported sexually assaultive behavior for which Mr. Williams is
on trial, it is not a part of the "story of the crime." The encounter
between the defendant at the bar and G.B. (younger) took place after
the charged conduct, not closely in time or simultaneously thereto.

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However, In State v. Barnes, the Fifth Circuit held admissible, under the res gestae

exception, evidence of defendant’s inappropriate behavior with the victim’s sister –

which the disclose of such behavior prompted the victim to report her abuse to their

father. 2011-80 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/13/11), 92 So.3d 9. In admitting the victim’s

sister’s testimony regarding her abuse under the res gestae exception, the Fifth

Circuit stated:

This context in which [the victim’s sister] first disclosed the abuse is
integral to the “narrative momentum and cohesiveness” of the State's
case against defendant. This information was necessary for the jury to
understand the ‘story of the crime’ in its ‘immediate context of
happenings in time and place.’

Id. at p. 8, 92 So.3d at 16.

Analogous to the Barnes case, G.B. was prompted to disclose Defendant’s

abuse after G.B.’s sister disclosed her encounter with the Defendant. The context of

G.B.’s disclosure of Defendant’s abuse is integral to the jury’s understanding of the

“story of the crime” and the reasons for her delayed reporting – G.B. did not tell

anyone about the abuse because she was afraid and told Defendant she would

continue the sexual encounters with him as long as he did not go after her younger

sisters.

Further, while the trial court highlighted the fact that Defendant’s encounter

with G.B.’s sister occurred after the charged conduct with G.B. and “not closely in

time”, Louisiana jurisprudence does not support excluding other crimes (or acts)

evidence based on the remoteness of various offenses to the charged offense. In State

v. Altenberger, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:

Remoteness in time, in most cases, is only one factor to be considered
when determining whether the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect. Generally, a lapse in time will go to
the weight of the evidence, rather than to its admissibility.

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....

... the time between the other crimes [or acts] evidence and the offense
charged is but one factor to be considered when balancing probative
value, prejudicial effect, and relevancy. Length of time between the
offenses should not exclude otherwise admissible evidence unless the
lapse strips the testimony of probative value. While there must be some
connexity between the crime charged and the other acts or crimes, the
mere passage of time will not necessarily defeat admissibility. State v.
Jackson, 625 So.2d 146, 149–51 (La.1993).

2013-2518, p. 9 (La. 4/11/14), 139 So.3d 510, 516 (emphasis added). Therefore,

evidence of Defendant’s encounter with G.B.’s sister should not be deemed

inadmissible based on the fact that the encounter occurred after the charged conduct

with G.B.

Even if other crimes (or acts) evidence is deemed admissible under the res

gestae exception of La. C.E. art. 404(B), it must still pass the balancing test of La.

C.E. art. 403, which states, “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,

or waste of time.” In applying the La. C.E. art. 403 balancing test to the context of

other crimes evidence, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:

[I]n those situations in which the evidence of other crimes [or acts] is highly
relevant to the determination of a particular issue bearing on guilt or innocence
of the defendant as to the crime on trial, such evidence is allowed because its
independent relevancy to a material issue (other than defendant’s bad
character) is of such a high degree that its probative value outweighs the
prejudicial effect.

State v. Humphrey, 412 So.2d 507, 520 (La. 1981). The evidence of the Defendant’s

sexual encounter with G.B.’s sister is relevant to provide the context of G.B.’s

delayed disclosure of Defendant’s abuse and is integral to the case at bar. This res

gestae evidence is highly probative and relevant to independent material issues –

other than Defendant’s bad character – such as G.B.’s credibility. As such, we find

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that the probative value of Defendant’s sexual encounter with G.B.’s sister is not

substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice.

Accordingly, while a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of other crimes

(or acts) evidence is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review, we find the

trial court’s ruling was based upon a mistaken application of law and thus, abused

its discretion in excluding evidence of Defendant’s sexual encounter with G.B.’s

sister.

DECREE

Based on the foregoing reasons, we grant the State’s writ application and

reverse the trial court’s August 16, 2024 ruling.

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED

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