Kayla M. Neville Versus John W. Redmann, Law Office of John W. Redmann, LLC, and Xyz Insurance Company

KAYLA M. NEVILLE NO. 22-CA-175

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

JOHN W. REDMANN, LAW OFFICE OF JOHN COURT OF APPEAL
W. REDMANN, LLC, AND XYZ INSURANCE
COMPANY STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 816-050, DIVISION "N"
HONORABLE STEPHEN D. ENRIGHT, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING

December 31, 2022

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
Stephen J. Windhorst, and Hans J. Liljeberg

REVERSED AND REMANDED
SJW
HJL

CONCURS WITH REASONS
FHW

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
KAYLA M. NEVILLE
Michael G. Bagneris
John O. Pieksen, Jr.

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
JOHN W. REDMANN AND THE LAW OFFICE OF JOHN W. REDMANN,
LLC
Melissa M. Lessell
Karen P. Holland
Beverly A. Delaune
Blair E. Boyd

WINDHORST, J.

In this appeal, defendants/appellants, John W. Redmann and the Law Office

of John W. Redmann (collectively “Redmann”), seek review of the trial court’s

judgment granting partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff/appellee, Kayla

Neville (“Ms. Neville”). For the following reasons, we reverse that judgment.

Ms. Neville filed a legal malpractice suit against Redmann, alleging that her

request for a medical review panel, in an underlying medical malpractice case in

which Redmann represented her, was untimely filed resulting in the dismissal of her

medical malpractice claim with prejudice. Redmann seeks appellate review of the

trial court’s granting of a partial summary judgment in favor Ms. Neville finding

Redmann liable for legal malpractice, and reserving the issue of damages for future

consideration. In its judgment, pursuant to the doctrines of law of the case and res

judicata, the trial court found this court’s writ disposition in that underlying case,

which found her claim had prescribed, was judicially binding in this case upon

Redmann, and therefore determined Redmann liable for legal malpractice for the

untimely filing of her medical malpractice claim. We find the trial court erred as a

matter of law in applying the doctrines of law of the case and res judicata because

the instant case involves different parties.

BACKGROUND and PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This legal malpractice case arises from Ms. Neville’s potential medical

malpractice claim following surgery to repair an injury she sustained to her right

forearm while working at Walt Disney World. Because the instant legal malpractice

case is based on Redmann’s representation of Ms. Neville in the underlying medical

malpractice case, it is necessary to discuss the factual circumstances that gave rise

to the underlying cause of action as well as the legal malpractice claim.

22-CA-175 1

Medical Malpractice Suit

In June 2016, Ms. Neville allegedly tore her triceps tendon in her right arm

while working as an intern at Walt Disney World in Orlando, Florida. Ms. Neville

reported her injury to her employer and workers’ compensation proceedings were

initiated on May 25, 2017, that did not resolve until sometime between June 2019

and February 2020, according to the petition for workers’ compensation benefits and

corresponding documents.

In October 2016, Ms. Neville returned to New Orleans, and her treatment was

transferred to Dr. Felix Savoie (“Dr. Savoie”) at Tulane Institute of Sports Medicine.

In February 2017, after the conservative treatment plan failed to produce the desired

outcome, Dr. Savoie recommended surgery to repair her right elbow triceps tendon.

Dr. Savoie discussed the details of the surgery as well as the risks and benefits

associated with it, including the possible need for further surgery, the risk of implant

and hardware failure, failure of repair, and partial or complete loss of function. Ms.

Neville elected to proceed with surgery, and the procedure was performed on

February 13, 2017.

Ms. Neville continued post-operative treatment with Dr. Savoie through

August 2017. Dissatisfied with her progress, Ms. Neville sought a change of

provider through Disney. By August 30, 2017, Ms. Neville began treating with Dr.

Claude Williams (“Dr. Williams”). On November 20, 2017, Dr. Williams

recommended surgery to remove the suture anchors from Ms. Neville’s olecranon.

In notes from Ms. Neville’s November 2017 examination, Dr. Williams indicated

that based on the MRI images “[Ms. Neville] appears to have had an excellent repair

of the triceps tendon which has healed very well…I explained that now that the

tendon is healed the suture anchors which were necessary for the repair are no longer

required and can be removed. …”

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Surgery with Dr. Williams was performed on December 12, 2017. In March

2018, Dr. Williams explained to Ms. Neville that in one month, he expected her to

“achieve maximum medical improvement.” By April 2018, it was determined that

Ms. Neville had reached maximum medical improvement and that she had a partial

permanent impairment. Ms. Neville continued to experience pain, and a third surgery

was recommended, which was subsequently performed on September 18, 2018.1

Redmann’s Representation of Ms. Neville

In July 2018, Ms. Neville consulted with Redmann regarding her injury and

the subsequent medical treatment she received with Dr. Savoie. According to John

Redmann’s affidavit, during the initial consultation, Ms. Neville indicated that she

had filed a workers’ compensation claim that Thomas Vaughn, a Florida attorney,

was handling on her behalf. Ms. Neville then retained Redmann to represent her in

pursuit of a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Savoie.

On December 12, 2018, Redmann, on behalf of Ms. Neville, filed a request

for a Medical Review Panel (“MRP”) proceeding with the Patient Compensation

Fund, which named Dr. Savoie and Omega Hospital as defendants. The request

states that:

Ms. Neville alleges that medical malpractice occurred during a
surgery on February 13, 2017, while under the care of Dr. Savoie and
while on the premises of Omega Hospital but did not become aware
of said malpractice until December 17, 2017, when a corrective
surgery was performed and/or on July 18, 2018, when a permanent
disability impairment in her right arm was diagnosed.

The request also stated that Ms. Neville underwent a second corrective surgery to

address nerve and bone damage allegedly caused by the initial surgery performed by

Dr. Savoie.

Thereafter, Ms. Neville filed a petition to institute discovery in the trial court.

However, after initial discovery by the parties and Redmann’s continued review of

1 According to her medical records, Ms. Neville continued to treat with Dr. Williams through 2020.

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Ms. Neville’s claim, Redmann concluded that her case would ultimately not be

successful.

In February 2019, Redmann discussed its assessment of Ms. Neville’s case

with Ms. Neville by telephone. During the call, Ms. Neville expressed that she still

wanted to pursue her claim for medical malpractice. As a result, it was decided that

Redmann would withdraw from representing Ms. Neville, and Ms. Neville would

find new counsel to represent her. The conversation was memorialized in a February

20, 2019 letter addressed to Ms. Neville. A second letter, dated March 1, 2019, was

sent regarding Redmann’s withdrawal from representation and was successfully

delivered on March 5, 2019. Notice of its withdrawal from representation was also

sent to the Patient Compensation Fund. After August 9, 2019, Redmann took no

further action on Ms. Neville’s behalf.

Successor Counsel’s Representation of Ms. Neville

On September 19, 2019, Dr. Savoie filed a peremptory exception of

prescription in the medical malpractice suit. Dr. Savoie alleged that Ms. Neville’s

MRP request was prescribed as it was filed approximately 13 months after Ms.

Neville allegedly learned, in November 2017, of her potential medical malpractice

claim. In support of his exception, Dr. Savoie submitted copies of Ms. Neville’s

request for MRP, a two-page excerpt of Ms. Neville’s medical records from her

November 16, 2017 clinic visit with Dr. Savoie, and Ms. Neville’s certified medical

records relating to her treatment with Dr. Williams. Omega Hospital also filed an

exception of prescription in November 2019, which adopted the arguments Dr.

Savoie asserted in his exception. Omega Hospital also alleged that any error of

Omega Hospital had prescribed because its treatment of Ms. Neville ended following

her February 2017 surgery.

Ms. Neville, through new counsel at Bagneris, Pieksen, & Associates, LLC

(“successor counsel”), filed her opposition to Dr. Savoie’s exception in December

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2019.2 Ms. Neville’s opposition alleges that she filed her MRP request within one

year of “discovering that the screws previously inserted into her olecranon (ulnar

humeral joint) w[]ere not absorbable screws as she had been informed.” The

opposition also alleged that her MRP request was filed within one year of “the

removal of the non-dissolvable and non-absorbable screws.” Additionally, Ms.

Neville alleged her case required retrieval of the evidence from the second surgery

to confirm the malpractice, analogizing her tort claim to a “foreign object case” in

which an inappropriate object was left in a patient. Ms. Neville did not attach any

evidence in support of her opposition.

At the hearing on the exceptions, in February 2020, Dr. Savoie introduced the

request for a MRP and the excerpts of Ms. Neville’s medical records relative to her

treatment with Drs. Savoie and Williams.3 By contrast, Ms. Neville did not

introduce any documentary evidence or call any witnesses to testify in support of her

claim that her MRP request was timely filed. The trial court denied the exceptions,

concluding that Ms. Neville would not have known of any potential medical

malpractice claim until the screw was removed because “simply by being told the

screw didn’t absorb” would not necessarily alert her to a potential claim.

Dr. Savoie sought this court’s supervisory review in April 2020. This court

ordered Ms. Neville to file an opposition on or before April 20, 2020. Successor

counsel filed a four-page opposition to Dr. Savoie’s writ application with a request

to supplement as successor counsel did not receive this court’s order until April 17,

2020; however, no supplemental filing was submitted.4 This court subsequently

denied the writ for failure to comply with the Uniform Rules in May 2020.

2 Ms. Neville did not file an opposition to Omega Hospital’s exception of prescription.

3 At the hearing, Omega introduced evidence in support of its exception of prescription and argued that
because Ms. Neville failed to file an opposition to its exception, the exception should be granted as
unopposed.
4 Ms. Neville’s opposition to Dr. Savoie’s writ application alleged that “only after the screw was retrieved”
could she have had “the necessary knowledge to definitively assert a medical malpractice claim.” Ms.
Neville did not submit any portion of the record or evidence to support her assertions in opposition to the
writ application.

22-CA-175 5

However, this court granted Dr. Savoie’s subsequently filed motion to reconsider,

requesting an opportunity to supplement his writ application due to complications

resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic and the Governor extending legal deadlines.

In June 2020, Dr. Savoie filed an amending and supplemental writ application,

but no supplemental response was submitted on Ms. Neville’s behalf. This court,

on June 30, 2020, granted Dr. Savoie’s writ application, reversed the trial court’s

denial of Dr. Savoie’s exception of prescription and dismissed Ms. Neville’s medical

malpractice claim. Ms. Neville filed a writ of certiorari with the Louisiana Supreme

Court, which was denied on November 4, 2020.

Ms. Neville’s Legal Malpractice Suit

On March 25, 2021, Ms. Neville filed the instant legal malpractice suit against

Redmann for untimely filing her medical malpractice suit, which resulted in her

claim being dismissed with prejudice. On September 21, 2021, Ms. Neville filed a

motion for partial summary judgment that alleged “there is no genuine issue of fact

regarding defendant’s legal malpractice, which has been conclusively established as

a matter of law.” Ms. Neville argued that this court’s June 30, 2020 writ, which held

that her medical malpractice suit prescribed as of November 17, 2018, was a binding

judicial determination which made her December 12, 2018 MRP request untimely.

Relying on the legal theories of res judicata and the law of the case doctrine, Ms.

Neville argued that she is “entitled to summary judgment on liability.” In support

of her motion, Ms. Neville attached copies of this court’s June 30, 2020 writ granted

in No. 20-C-127, and the Louisiana Supreme Court’s November 4, 2020 denial of

certiorari in No. 20-CC-968.

Redmann opposed the motion for summary judgment, arguing that as a matter

of law, the doctrines of res judicata and law of the case do not apply. Further,

Redmann claimed that genuine issues of material fact remain as to causation and

damages, making summary judgment inappropriate. In support of its opposition,

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Redman filed a number of exhibits.5 The matter was heard on December 14, 2021,

and on January 27, 2022, the trial court issued a judgment granting Ms. Neville

summary judgment on liability, but reserving the issue of damages for later

determination. The trial court issued written reasons, stating:

The prescription issue in the present motion is the identical
prescription issue already decided by the Louisiana Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. Given the precedential and binding nature of
this Fifth Circuit ruling, the principles of the law of the case doctrine
and res judicata, and this Court's review of the law and evidence, this
Court holds that defendants untimely filed the request for Medical
Review Panel, allowing Ms. Neville's medical malpractice claim
against Dr. Savoie to prescribe and consequently be dismissed with
prejudice. It is undisputed that defendants were Ms. Neville's legal
counsel in November/December 2018 and that defendants did not
file the request for Medical Review Panel until December 12, 2018.
The Court holds that under the undisputed facts and the applicable
law, the plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue
of liability against defendants. The defendants' untimely request for
Medical Review Panel was a breach of defendants' duty to Ms.
Neville to timely file the request.

Redmann filed the instant appeal seeking review of the trial court’s January

27, 2022 judgment granting Ms. Neville’s motion for partial summary judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly granted summary

judgment in favor Ms. Neville in this legal malpractice suit. Appellate courts review

summary judgments de novo using the same criteria as the trial courts to determine

whether summary judgment is appropriate. Lapuyade v. Rawbar, Inc., 18-474 (La.

App. 5 Cir. 12/27/18), 263 So.3d 508, 511-12. “Therefore, appellate courts must ask

the same questions as the district court: whether there is any genuine issue of material

fact, and whether mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 512.

5 Redmann attached to its opposition and introduced at the hearing on summary judgment the following: Ms.
Neville’s December 12, 2018 request for a MRP; Redmann’s February 20, 2019 withdrawal from
representation letter; Ms. Neville’s May 2017 and July 2018 petition for workers’ compensation benefits; Dr.
Savoie’s September 16, 2019 exception of prescription; Omega’s November 10, 2019 exception of
prescription; Ms. Neville’s December 23, 2019 opposition to the exception of prescription; the February 7,
2020 exception hearing transcript; the trial court’s March 4, 2020 judgment denying the exceptions; Dr.
Savoie’s April 6, 2020 writ application; Ms. Neville’s April 20, 2020 opposition to the writ application; this court’s
May 13, 2020 denial of Dr. Savoie’s writ application for noncompliance; Dr. Savoie’s May 19, 2020 motion for
reconsideration; this court’s May 26, 2020 granting of rehearing; Dr. Savoie’s June 12, 2020 first supplemental
and amending application for rehearing; this court’s June 30, 2020 granting of Dr. Savoie’s writ application.

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LAW and ANALYSIS

Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 966 A(1), a party may move for summary judgment

on all or part of the relief requested. After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a

motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and

supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that

the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966 A(3). The

burden of proof rests with the mover, unless the mover will not bear the burden of

proof at trial on the issue before the court on summary judgment. La. C.C.P. art. 966

D(1). In that instance, the mover need only show the court the absence of factual

support for one or more essential elements of the adverse party’s claim. Id. The

burden is then on the adverse party to establish factual support sufficient to

demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. A court’s determination of whether a

genuine issue of material fact exists requires reference to the applicable substantive

law. Hacienda Holding Co., L.L.C. v. Home Bank, 20-189 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/30/20),

309 So.3d 435, 445 (citing Stephens v. Southern Sweeping Servs., 03-826 (La. App.

5 Cir. 11/25/03), 862 So.2d 197, 199). A summary judgment may be rendered

dispositive of a particular issue, theory of recovery, cause of action, or defense, in

favor of one or more parties, even though the granting of the summary judgment does

not dispose of the entire case as to that party or parties. La. C.C.P. art. 966 E.

To prevail in a legal malpractice claim, the plaintiff must prove: (1) an attorney-

client relationship; (2) the attorney was negligent in his representation of his client;

and (3) the negligence caused plaintiff’s loss. Willis v. Meilleur, 11-705 (La. App. 5

Cir. 5/31/12), 96 So.3d 1259, 1270, citing Costello v. Hardy, 03-1146 (La. 1/21/04),

864 So.2d 129, 138. Failure to prove one of these elements is fatal to the claim. Id. A

plaintiff can have no greater rights against attorneys for the negligent handling of a

claim than are available in the underlying claim. Costello, 864 So.2d at 138.

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In this legal malpractice case, in order to prove she is entitled to summary

judgment on liability, Ms. Neville must prove there are no genuine issues of material

fact as to all three elements of legal malpractice. Liability cannot be proved simply

by Ms. Neville establishing Redmann breached the standard of care, or that he was

negligent in his representation of her. She must also prove that she suffered

damages, and that Redmann’s alleged negligent representation caused her loss. See

Fortenberry v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 15-418 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/4/15), 179 So.3d 729, 735,

in which the court found that “liability does not attach until it is shown that the

plaintiff suffered damages for which she would have recovered but for the attorney’s

mishandling of the suit, and where the attorney establishes a material issue of fact

regarding the plaintiff's underlying damages, summary judgment was granted in

error.” See also MB Indus., LLC v. CNA Ins. Co., 11-303 (La. 10/25/11), 74 So. 3d

1173, 1187, in which the Louisiana Supreme Court held that it is not enough to

simply show that the defendant attorney acted negligently, but the plaintiff must also

introduce evidence that the negligence caused plaintiff’s loss.

Ms. Neville’s motion for partial summary judgment states that “there is no

genuine issue of material fact regarding [Redmann’s] legal malpractice” and that “she

is entitled to a summary judgment on liability, based on the precedential and

preclusive nature of [this Court’s June 30, 2020 writ disposition in the underlying

proceeding].” The trial court granted summary judgment on liability based on the

doctrines of law of the case and res judicata, while reserving the issue of damages—

an essential element in a legal malpractice case—for subsequent consideration.

Further, La. C.C.P. art. 966 F mandates that summary judgment may be

rendered or affirmed only as to those issues set forth in the motion under

consideration by the court at that time. Rhodes v. AMKO Fence & Steel Co.,

LLC, 21-19 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/28/21), 329 So.3d 1112, 1123. Louisiana

summary judgment law has restricted the trial court’s ability to render a

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summary judgment to those issues set forth in the motion under consideration.

Cutrone v. Eng. Turn Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 19-0896 (La. App. 4 Cir.

3/4/20), 293 So.3d 1209, 1215; Bryant v. Premium Food Concepts, Inc., 16-0770

(La. App. 1 Cir. 4/26/17), 220 So.3d 79, 83, writ denied, 17-0873 (La. 9/29/17),

227 So.3d 288 (court of appeal limited consideration to issues raised in motion

for summary judgment and refused to consider any similar elements required by

other laws that may be applicable to the case). A court cannot render a motion

for summary judgment dismissing a claim which has not been challenged by the

pleading. Steib v. Lamorak Ins. Co., 20-0424 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/3/21), writ

denied, 21-453 (La. 6/8/21), 317 So.3d 326.

La. C.C.P. art. 966 C(4) mandates that “[i]n all cases, the [trial] court shall

state on the record or in writing the reasons for granting or denying the motion.”

De novo review generally “involves examining the facts and evidence in the

record, without regard or deference to the judgment of the trial court or its

reasons for judgment.” Cutrone, 293 So.3d at 1216. Certain circumstances,

however, present a carved-out exception to the general rule that a trial court’s

reasons are not relevant. Id. Stated otherwise, a trial court’s reasons for

judgment are relevant when there is a question posed regarding the trial court’s

scope of review. Id. In this case, the reasons for judgment indicate that the trial

court’s consideration of the issues were limited to those raised in Ms. Neville’s

motion, the doctrines of “law of the case” and res judicata.

For purposes of summary judgment in this case, there is a significant

difference between a finding of negligence and a finding of liability. In a legal

malpractice action, negligence is one of three elements that must be proved in order

for a plaintiff to prevail; whereas, liability requires proof of all three elements in

order for the plaintiff to succeed. Thus, although it is possible that plaintiff may

successfully prove she is entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of

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negligence without establishing the third element of a legal malpractice claim, the

same cannot be said for liability. Although it is plausible that Ms. Neville’s plea in

her motion for partial summary judgment to rule on the issue of “liability,” was in

fact calling on the trial court to evaluate the issue of negligence, the argument was

never raised in reply to Redmann’s opposition, which argued that liability requires

proof of all three elements, including causation. Therefore, because Ms. Neville’s

motion asks the trial court to rule on the issue of liability, and not negligence, we

consider on de novo review the full scope of the liability issue, with fresh

consideration of the exhibits, applicable law, and arguments raised by both parties.

It is undisputed that there was an attorney-client relationship between Ms.

Neville and Redmann in this matter. Ms. Neville is next required to prove Redmann

was negligent in its representation of her in the underlying action for medical

malpractice. She must prove that Redmann failed to exercise at least that degree of

care, skill, and diligence which is exercised by prudent practicing attorneys in his

locality. MB Indus., LLC, 74 So.3d at 1184.

Ms. Neville claims the act of negligence in this case was Redmann’s failure

to timely file her medical malpractice claim. In support of her motion for partial

summary judgment, Ms. Neville produced a copy of this court’s June 30, 2020 writ

and the Louisiana Supreme Court’s November 4, 2020 denial of certiorari on the

exception of prescription in the underlying medical malpractice suit. In an

unpublished writ disposition, based on the record before us at the time, this court

held that Ms. Neville had constructive knowledge of a potential medical malpractice

claim as of November 16, 2017, and she had until November 16, 2018, to file a claim

in order to avoid prescription. Ms. Neville did not file her claim until December 12,

2018. This court granted Dr. Savoie’s writ application and dismissed with prejudice

Ms. Neville’s medical malpractice claim. Ms. Neville asserts that this court’s

finding that the deadline for filing was missed in the underlying action is a binding

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judicial determination, and further establishes prima facie evidence of Redmann’s

negligence sufficient to support summary judgment on liability.

Opposing Ms. Neville’s motion for partial summary judgment, Redmann

contends that as a matter of law this court’s decision in the underlying proceeding

on the timeliness of the MRP request has no force or effect in the present legal

malpractice case. Specifically, Redmann avers that the doctrines of law of the case

and res judicata do not apply because Redmann was not a party to the underlying

proceeding.

The trial court concluded that both legal theories applied and granted Ms.

Neville’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, and reserved the

issue of damages for a later determination. We therefore address the application of

both legal doctrines in this case.

Law of the Case Doctrine

The “law of the case” doctrine relates to:
(a) the binding force of trial court rulings during later stages of the trial;
(b) the conclusive effects of appellate rulings at the trial on remand; and
(c) the rule that an appellate court will ordinarily not reconsider its own
rulings of law on a subsequent appeal in the same case.

Petition of the Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 278 So.2d 81, 83 (La. 1973);

Day v. Campbell-Grosjean Roofing & S. M. Corp., 260 La. 325, 256 So.2d 105

(1971); Bonar v. Bonar, 00-232 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/29/00), 768 So.2d 194, 198. The

purpose for application of the law of the case principle is the avoidance of indefinite

relitigation of the same issue; the desirability of consistency of the result in the same

litigation; and the efficiency; and the essential fairness to both sides, of affording a

single opportunity for the argument and decision of the matter at issue. Petition of

Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 278 So.2d at 83. For this reason, the law

of the case doctrine precludes reconsideration of issues that were previously fully

litigated. Jeff Mercer, L.L.C. v. State, Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 14-1751 (La. App.

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1 Cir. 6/5/15), 174 So.3d 1180, 1185. However, the doctrine applies only to those

parties who were parties to the case when the former appellate decision was rendered

and who thus had their day in court. Gooding v. Merrigan, 15-200 (La. App. 5 Cir.

11/19/15), 180 So.3d 578, 580 (quoting Pumphrey v. City of New Orleans, 05-979

(La. 4/04/06), 925 So.2d 1202, 1207). The law of the case doctrine is discretionary.

Herrera v. Beatrice Gallegos & USAgencies Cas. Ins., 14-935 (La. App. 5 Cir.

10/28/15), 178 So.3d 164, 168. The law of the case doctrine is not applicable in

cases of palpable error or when, if the law of the case were applied, manifest injustice

would occur. Id.

Furthermore, the law of the case doctrine only applies to rulings rendered

within the same case, not those rendered in two separate lawsuits. See Reed v.

Louisiana Horticulture Commission, 21-657 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/21), 341 So.3d

66, 70, writ denied, 22-284 (La. 4/12/22), 336 So.3d 89. (“The law of the case

doctrine . . . is the proper procedural principle for describing the relationship between

prior judgments by trial and appellate courts rendered within the same case.”)

Ms. Neville claims that under the law of the case doctrine, this court having

previously found that the MRP request was untimely in the medical malpractice suit,

precludes determination of the timeliness issue in the present legal malpractice

action. On the other hand, Redmann argues that the law of the case doctrine does

not apply because the medical malpractice action involved different parties. We

agree with Redmann.

This court’s June 30, 2020 decision is not binding on Redmann because

Redmann was not a party to the underlying action. The law of the case doctrine only

applies to those parties who were parties to the case when the relevant decision was

rendered. The medical malpractice action involved Ms. Neville and party

defendants, Dr. Savoie and Omega Hospital. By contrast, this legal malpractice

action involves Ms. Neville and party defendants (appellants herein), Mr. Redmann,

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the Law Office of John W. Redmann, and the North River Insurance Company.

Because Redmann was not a party to the underlying action for medical malpractice

when our June 30, 2020 decision was rendered, we find the law of the case doctrine

does not apply. We further find that law of the case does not apply because the

ruling was rendered in a different case.

Furthermore, even if this court were to find that it applies, doing so would be

manifestly unjust. As previously stated, the purpose of the doctrine’s application is

to avoid relitigation of the same issue; to promote consistency of result in the same

litigation, and to promote efficiency and fairness to both parties by providing a single

opportunity for argument and decision of the disputed issue. Because Redmann was

not a party to the underlying suit, it did not appear or have an opportunity to

participate in the litigation that resulted in the granting of Dr. Savoie’s exception of

prescription. Thus, Redmann did not have its day in court. To apply the doctrine in

this legal malpractice case would result in manifest injustice.6

For these reasons, we find that the trial court erred as a matter of law in

applying the law of the case doctrine to grant Ms. Neville summary judgment.

Doctrine of Res Judicata

Ms. Neville also asserts that this court’s June 30, 2020 writ disposition is

binding precedent based on the doctrine of res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata

is set forth in La. R.S. 13:4231, et seq. Pursuant to 13:4231, a subsequent action is

precluded when all of the following are satisfied:

(1) the judgment is valid; (2) the judgment is final; (3) the parties are
the same; (4) the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit
existed at the time of final judgment in the first litigation; and (5) the
cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit arose out of the
transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first
litigation.

6 Redmann additionally argues that it would be manifestly unfair to use law of the case to establish liability
against Redmann, where Successor Counsel represented Ms. Neville in the underlying proceeding on the
exception that ultimately resulted in an adverse ruling “during his watch.”

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Chauvin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 14-0808 (La. 12/9/14), 158 So.3d 761, 765 (citation

omitted); Muhammad v. Office of the DA for St. James, 16-9 (La. App. 5 Cir.

4/27/16), 191 So.3d 1149, 1155. In addition, res judicata is strictly construed, and

“any doubt concerning its applicability is to be resolved against the party raising the

objection.” Id.

Res judicata does not apply in this case. La. R.S. 13:4231 requires that Ms.

Neville show that the parties in the underlying medical malpractice case are the same

as in the instant legal malpractice case. In Burguieres v. Pollingue, 02-1385 (La.

2/25/03), 843 So.2d 1049, 1054, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated “there must be

‘identity of parties’ before the doctrine of res judicata can be used to preclude a

subsequent suit. This requirement does not mean that the parties must have the same

physical identity, but that the parties must appear in the same capacities in both

suits.” Id. As explained above, the parties in the medical malpractice action are not

the same in this action. Although Ms. Neville is the plaintiff in both actions,

Redmann was not a party in the underlying action in any capacity. Redmann

correctly argues that it was neither a third-party defendant, nor were its interests

represented in defending against the claim. Therefore, Ms. Neville has failed to

prove that the identity of the parties is the same in both suits.

Because all elements of res judicata must be present for this doctrine to apply,

the lack of the same parties in the two suits is fatal to her motion for summary

judgment. Accordingly, we find that the trial court also erred in granting summary

judgment on the basis that the doctrine of res judicata applied.

Because we conclude that the judgment granting partial summary judgment

should be reversed based on the above, we find that it not necessary for this court to

opine on the additional issues raised by defendants in opposition to the summary

judgment motion. “It is well-settled that courts will not decide abstract, hypothetical

22-CA-175 15

or moot controversies, or render advisory opinions with respect to such

controversies.” Perschall v. State, 96-0322 (La. 7/1/97), 697 So.2d 240, 251.

DECREE

For the reasons stated above, we reverse the trial court’s judgment granting

partial summary judgment in favor of Ms. Neville and deny that motion and remand

this case for further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED

22-CA-175 16

KAYLA M. NEVILLE NO. 22-CA-175

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

JOHN W. REDMANN, LAW OFFICE OF COURT OF APPEAL
JOHN W. REDMANN, LLC, AND XYZ
INSURANCE COMPANY
STATE OF LOUISIANA

WICKER, J., CONCURS WITH REASONS

While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in

granting summary judgment in this case, respectfully, I write separately to address

my appreciation of the issue presented for consideration on summary judgment.

Specifically, I agree with the majority’s discussion of the doctrines of law of the case

and res judicata and finding that the trial court erred in applying those doctrines to

grant partial summary judgment. However, while the majority concludes that

because these doctrines do not apply, we need not address the “additional issues”

raised by Redmann in opposition to partial summary judgment. In my opinion, the

arguments raised in Redmann’s opposition are properly before this Court and should

be addressed at this time. Respectfully, I write separately to both elucidate further

on the law of the case and res judicata doctrines and to address the arguments raised

in Redmann’s opposition as it relates to the issue of liability.

First, I agree that the law of the case doctrine does not apply because: (1) the

defendants, John W. Redmann and the Law Office of John W. Redmann

(collectively “Redmann”), were not parties to the underlying medical malpractice

proceeding; and (2) the doctrine of law of the case only applies to rulings rendered

within the same case. I also agree that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply

22-CA-175 1

because, as mentioned, Redmann was not a party to the underlying suit. However,

I also point out that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply because the cause of

action in this legal malpractice case did not arise out of the same transaction or

occurrence that was the subject matter of the medical malpractice case. Res judicata

“precludes relitigation of claims and issues arising out of the same factual

circumstances as a previous suit when there is a valid final judgment.” Blackburn

v. Green, 18-583 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/27/19), 266 So.3d 546, 551. While the timeliness

of the Medical Review Panel (“MRP”) request is a consideration in both cases, the

cause of action in the legal malpractice case is not the subject matter of the medical

malpractice case. The medical malpractice action arose from Dr. Savoie’s treatment

of Ms. Neville; whereas, this legal malpractice action arises from Redmann’s

representation of Ms. Neville. Res judicata is strictly construed and all elements

must be met in order for the doctrine to apply. See La. R.S. 13:4231; also

Muhammad v. Off. of Dist. Att'y for Par. of St. James, 16-9 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/27/16),

191 So. 3d 1149, 1155 (“The doctrine of res judicata is stricti juris, and any doubt

concerning the application of res judicata must be resolved against its application”).

Therefore, as a matter of law, res judicata does not apply because, as stated by the

majority, Ms. Neville cannot prove that the parties are the same. Further, however,

Ms. Neville cannot prove that the cause of action asserted in the second suit arose

out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first litigation.

I turn now to the matters which the majority chose not to address. The

majority’s decision to pretermit discussion of the merits of Redmann’s opposition

relies on, in my view, a misinterpretation of the issue presented for consideration on

partial summary judgment. Further, in my view, resolution and discussion of the

merits of Redmann’s opposition is material to understanding why the trial court erred

in granting Ms. Neville’s motion for partial summary judgment.

22-CA-175 2

Ms. Neville’s motion for partial summary judgment states that “there is no

genuine issue of material fact regarding [Redmann’s] legal malpractice” and that

“she is entitled to a summary judgment on liability, based on the precedential and

preclusive nature of [this Court’s June 30, 2020 writ disposition in the underlying

proceeding].” The trial court granted summary judgment on liability, while

reserving the issue of damages for later consideration.

La. C.C.P. art. 966(F) mandates that summary judgment may be rendered

or affirmed only as to those issues set forth in the motion under consideration by

the court at that time.” A review of Ms. Neville’s motion shows that she asked

the trial court to rule on the issue of liability. Ms. Neville’s motion for partial

summary judgment asserts that there are no genuine issues of material fact on

the issue of liability. The doctrines of law of the case and res judicata are simply

the legal grounds upon which she relies to assert that a prior decision of this

Court in a separate lawsuit establishes Redmann’s liability. However, Ms.

Neville’s motion erroneously conflates liability and negligence, which are two

distinct inquiries with different considerations. Therefore, finding that the

doctrines of law of the case and res judicata do not apply only partially resolves

the issue of liability.

As the majority discussed, in order to prove liability in a legal malpractice

case, the plaintiff must establish: (1) an attorney-client relationship; (2) the attorney

was negligent in his representation of his client; and (3) the negligence caused

plaintiff’s loss. Willis v. Meilleur, 11-705 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/31/12), 96 So.3d 1259,

1270 (citing Costello v. Hardy, 03-1146 (La. 1/21/04), 864 So.2d 129, 138). The

trial court’s judgment, which found summary judgment in favor of Ms. Neville as to

liability, while remaining silent as to the question of causation and while also

reserving the issue of damages, is contrary to what the law requires Ms. Neville to

22-CA-175 3

prove.

As the majority opines “for purposes of summary judgment in this case, there

is a significant difference between a finding of negligence and a finding of liability.”

In a legal malpractice action, negligence is but one of the three elements that a

plaintiff must prove in order to prevail; whereas, liability requires the plaintiff prove

all three elements in order to prevail. As the majority states while “it is possible that

plaintiff may successfully prove she is entitled to partial summary judgment on the

issue of negligence or breach of the standard of care without establishing the third

element of a legal malpractice claim… the same cannot be said for liability.”

Although it is plausible that Ms. Neville’s plea in her motion for partial

summary judgment to rule on the issue of “liability,” was in fact calling on the trial

court to evaluate the issue of negligence, the argument was never raised in reply to

Redmann’s opposition, which argued that liability requires proof of all three

elements, including causation. Therefore, because Ms. Neville’s motion asks the

trial court to rule on the issue of liability, and not negligence, in my opinion, our de

novo review calls upon us to consider the full scope of the liability issue, with fresh

consideration of the exhibits, applicable law, and arguments raised by both parties.7

As the mover, Ms. Neville has the initial burden of establishing that Redmann

7 Because an appellate court's standard of review of a judgment granting summary
judgment is de novo, we are not constrained to only a review of the trial court’s reasoning.
Bertaut v. Corral Gulfsouth, Inc., 16-93 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/21/16), 209 So.3d 352, 359.
“A de novo review ‘involves examining the facts and evidence in the record, without regard
or deference to the judgment of the trial court or its reasons for judgment.’” Hooper v.
Hero Lands Co., 15-929 (La. App. 4 Cir. 03/30/16), 216 So.3d 965, 973-74. Although
reasons for judgment may be informative, they are not determinative of the legal issues
to be resolved on appeal. Id. Moreover, appellate courts review judgments, not reasons
for judgments, and an appellate court’s reasoning for its decision on appeal may differ
“than those assigned by the district judges.” Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-571, 09-584, 09-
585, 09-586 (La. 04/01/11), 61 So.3d 507, 572. “An appellate court's de novo review of
the trial court's ruling on summary judgment is generally from the same viewpoint as that
of the trial court, but with a fresh consideration of the exhibits and application of the law.”
Allday v. Newpark Square I Off. Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 20-358 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/18/21), 327
So.3d 566, 573 (emphasis added).

22-CA-175 4

was negligent in its representation of her. If Ms. Neville established prima facie

evidence of negligence, the burden of proof then shifted to Redmann to show

genuine issues of material fact exist precluding summary judgment. In this case,

Redmann established that law of the case and res judicata do not apply, and therefore

that Ms. Neville cannot rely on these doctrines to prove negligence. However,

Redmann also presented evidence and set forth facts demonstrating that genuine

issues of material fact remain as to causation and damages that the trial court failed

to consider, as evidenced by its judgment reserving the issue of damages while still

finding Ms. Neville proved liability.

In Fortenberry v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 15-418 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/4/15), 179 So.3d

729, the plaintiff brought a legal malpractice action against the attorney she retained

to represent her in a personal injury case arising from a motor vehicle accident. The

plaintiff alleged that the defendant attorney failed to file her petition for damages in

a timely manner. The plaintiff subsequently moved for partial summary judgment

against the defendant attorney, which the trial court granted “as to liability only.”

Id. at 731. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the trial court’s granting of

summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff failed to refute the defendant attorney’s

evidence relating to the third prong of a legal malpractice claim.

The Fortenberry court held that:

where liability for legal malpractice does not attach until it is shown
that the plaintiff suffered damages for which she would have recovered
but for the attorney's mishandling of the suit, and where the attorney
establishes a material issue of fact regarding the plaintiff's underlying
damages, summary judgment was granted in error.

Id. at 735. Moreover, in that the defendant attorney was not the moving party on

summary judgment, the appellate court held that “he does not have to show that [the

plaintiff]’s suit will certainly fail at trial. He only needs to show that there are

22-CA-175 5

material factual disputes regarding an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim….”

Id.

On summary judgment, the plaintiff in Fortenberry submitted her own

affidavit, the attorney-client contract, the petition showing that the defendant

attorney filed her claim five days past the prescriptive period, as well as a letter from

the defendant regarding prescription. The defendant attorney opposed the motion for

summary judgment with affidavits and deposition testimony of witnesses to the

accident that indicated that the plaintiff was not inside her vehicle at the time of the

accident; she showed no sign of or complained of any injury; and she was “‘affable’

in her demeanor and checking to see if [others] were okay.” Id. The Third Circuit

concluded that the defendant attorney presented sufficient evidence to establish a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff was in the vehicle at the

time her vehicle was rear-ended. Additionally, the appellate court cited the

plaintiff’s failure to refute the defendant’s evidence with any evidence of her own or

show that she could prevail at trial on the issue of damages and therefore found

summary judgment inappropriate.

The instant case is procedurally and factually similar to Fortenberry. In order

for liability to attach for legal malpractice, Ms. Neville is required to show she

“suffered damages for which she would have recovered but for [Redmann’s]

mishandling of the suit,” and that Redmann has failed to present evidence to

establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Ms. Neville’s

underlying damages. Although Redmann need only establish that one of the

essential elements of Ms. Neville’s legal malpractice claim presents an issue of

material fact, Redmann has presented evidence to show that genuine issues of

material fact exist as to the cause of the dismissal of the medical malpractice case as

well as whether Ms. Neville could prove damages at trial.

22-CA-175 6

First, Redmann submits that there are genuine issues of material fact as to the

cause of the dismissal of Ms. Neville’s medical malpractice suit. Redmann

maintains that the issue of causation necessarily involves an evaluation of

comparative fault in this case and consideration of whether the actions and inactions

of Successor Counsel contributed to any alleged damages Ms. Neville claims she

suffered. Redmann points to the record in the medical malpractice case to

demonstrate that Successor Counsel failed to present any evidence in the trial court

in opposition to the exception of prescription to show that the MRP request was

timely filed. The five-page opposition is devoid of any supporting documentation.

In particular, Redmann cites to the absence of medical records, affidavits, or any

other evidence supportive of Successor Counsel’s arguments on the prescription

issue.

The opposition to the exception of prescription alleged that the MRP request

was filed within one year of Ms. Neville discovering that the screws previously

inserted in her olecranon “were not absorbable screws as she had been informed”

and within one year of the screws’ subsequent removal. Redmann maintains that

these arguments “could have been bolstered by inclusion of any evidence” including:

an affidavit from Dr. Williams, the full medical record of Ms. Neville’s treatment

with Dr. Williams8; Dr. Williams’ December 2018 Operative Note, describing what

he observed in the second surgery; evidence of Ms. Neville’s treatment following

the second surgery; and affidavits of Ms. Neville and her father, who attended the

November doctors’ visits with Ms. Neville. Moreover, Redmann avers that

8 Redmann alleges that Dr. Savoie introduced only portions of the medical records into

the record. In this legal malpractice case, Redmann introduced into the record the full
medical record of Ms. Neville’s treatment with Dr. Williams. Redmann alleges that in the
underlying medical malpractice case, Successor Counsel, at minimum, should have
included Dr. Williams’ post-operative note that showed what was discovered during
surgery, if not the full medical record. According to Redmann, because Successor
Counsel raised fact-based arguments to support the timeliness of Ms. Neville’s MRP
request, the failure to support its fact-based arguments with any evidence is significant.

22-CA-175 7

deposition testimony of Ms. Neville and Drs. Savoie and Williams would have been

useful in presenting a more robust case for opposing the exception of prescription.

Similarly, Redmann contends that Successor Counsel “omitted a crucial

[legal] argument” that the prescriptive period for filing the MRP request was

interrupted by the then-still pending workers’ compensation litigation. Redmann

contends that case law suggests that a worker’s compensation proceeding that is

pending in another state can interrupt prescription of a plaintiff’s medical

malpractice claim in Louisiana, relying on Jarrell v. W. Jefferson Med. Ctr., 06-889

(La. App. 5 Cir. 3/13/07), 956 So.2d 5. While I make no determination as to the

merits of this legal issue, a review of relevant case law demonstrates that circuits in

this state are split as to whether a timely filed suit against a solidarily liable non-

healthcare provider (e.g. Ms. Neville’s workers’ compensation claim) interrupts

prescription of claims against a qualified healthcare provider subject to Louisiana’s

Medical Malpractice Act (e.g. Ms. Neville’s medical malpractice claim). See Novak

v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov't, unpub., 2011 WL 3489857, (W.D. La.

3/03/11). The fact that the body of caselaw on the issue is unclear, demonstrates that

whether this argument could have, in Redmann’s words, “saved the day” creates

another genuine issue of material fact, illustrating that summary judgment is

inappropriate. Moreover, in the underlying medical malpractice case, after Dr.

Savoie sought supervisory review with this Court, Successor Counsel failed to

submit any evidence to support its opposition, despite requesting an opportunity to

supplement and failing to do so before this Court initially denied the writ application

and after granting Dr. Savoie’s motion for reconsideration.

The exception of prescription in the underlying medical malpractice case was

filed after Redmann had withdrawn from representation of Ms. Neville. The record

on the exception of prescription is comprised of evidence Successor Counsel

22-CA-175 8

developed. Consequently, this Court’s June 30, 2020 writ disposition in underlying

action, Redmann argues, was predicated on what was presented to us, which lacked

supporting evidence and robust legal arguments to adequately challenge Dr.

Savoie’s exception of prescription.

I make no any factual determinations as to whether the actions of Successor

Counsel contributed in any way to Ms. Neville’s alleged loss. Nevertheless, any

determination of liability in this legal malpractice case will necessarily include

consideration of the actions of Successor Counsel in opposing the exception of

prescription. To find otherwise, would deprive Redmann of his day in court to have

the fact-finder fully evaluate the totality of the circumstances. Issues that require

“the determination of [the] reasonableness of acts and conduct of parties under all

facts and circumstances of the case,” like those presented here, “cannot ordinarily

be disposed of by summary judgment.” Biggs v. Cancienne, 12-0187 (La. App. 1

Cir. 9/21/12), 111 So.3d 6, 10. Likewise, “questions of negligence are generally

inappropriate for disposition by summary judgment.” Id. In this case, Redmann has

presented sufficient evidence that calls into question whether Successor Counsel

could have done more to protect against a finding of prescription, particularly where

no evidence was submitted in the trial court or on supervisory review.

Therefore, while I make no factual determination on the issue of whether

Successor Counsel took reasonable measures to adequately defend Ms. Neville

against the exceptions of prescription and the writ to this Court in the underlying

proceeding, Ms. Neville failed to present any evidence that refutes Redmann’s

assertions, which is supported by evidence in the record, that issues of material fact

22-CA-175 9

exist as to whether any alleged loss on Ms. Neville’s part was the sole doing of

Redmann.9

Considering the limited record in the underlying medical malpractice case and

the lack of discovery in the instant legal malpractice case, Redmann presents

sufficient facts supported by the record that demonstrate a genuine issue of material

fact exists as to the cause of Ms. Neville’s underlying claim against Dr. Savoie. In

fact, by demonstrating issues remain as to the cause of Ms. Neville’s alleged loss,

Redmann also proves that a genuine issue of material fact also exists as to whether

adequate discovery was conducted in the underlying medical malpractice case. For

these reasons, in my opinion, adequate discovery was not completed prior to the trial

court entering summary judgment in favor of Ms. Neville, and therefore, in granting

summary judgment on liability at this stage of the litigation was premature.

Moreover, a material issue of fact exists as to whether Ms. Neville can

establish she suffered damages in her underlying claim against Dr. Savoie. Redmann

offered the affidavit of Mr. Redmann, a copy of the letter of withdrawal of

representation Redmann sent Ms. Neville, and relevant medical records on the

damages issue. Mr. Redmann’s affidavit and the letter of withdrawal indicate that

after continued evaluation of Ms. Neville’s claim, Redmann determined that the

likelihood she would prevail in her claim against Dr. Savoie was low. Redmann also

communicated its assessment to Ms. Neville in a telephone conversation. In

addition, the relevant medical records evidence that the risks associated with the

surgery were disclosed to Ms. Neville, including the failure of a surgical screw to

dissolve. After Redmann explained its appreciation of the likelihood of prevailing

on her medical malpractice claim, Ms. Neville expressed her desire to continue to

pursue her claim, at which point Redmann withdrew from representation. Based on

9 “A summary judgment may be rendered or affirmed only as to those issues set forth in

the motion under consideration by the court at that time.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(F).

22-CA-175 10

the foregoing, while this Court has no opinion as to whether Ms. Neville could

successfully prove damages at trial, in my opinion, Redmann has presented

unrefuted evidence sufficient to show genuine issues of material fact remain as Ms.

Neville’s alleged damages.

By relying upon its legally erroneous application of the law of the case

doctrine and res judicata, the trial court also failed to consider the unrefuted

evidence Redmann produced to establish genuine issues of material fact exist as to

the cause of Ms. Neville’s loss and her ability to prove damages. For these reasons,

as well as those addressed by the majority, summary judgment inappropriate.

In light of the foregoing, I agree with the majority that the doctrines of law of

the case and res judicata do not apply; however, in my opinion, Ms. Neville’s motion

for partial summary judgment calls for resolution of the issue of liability. In that the

trial court’s judgment is internally inconsistent and therefore, on its face, legal error,

in my opinion this Court would also have been well-served to address the merits of

Redmann’s opposition, which is material to a full understanding of why the trial

court’s judgment granting Ms. Neville’s motion for partial summary judgment was

legal error.

22-CA-175 11

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
INTERIM CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
ROBERT A. CHAISSON LINDA M. WISEMAN
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
HANS J. LILJEBERG
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR. FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

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NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
DECEMBER 31, 2022 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

22-CA-175
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE STEPHEN D. ENRIGHT, JR. (DISTRICT JUDGE)
JOHN O. PIEKSEN, JR. (APPELLEE) MICHAEL G. BAGNERIS (APPELLEE) BEVERLY A. DELAUNE (APPELLANT)
KAREN P. HOLLAND (APPELLANT) MELISSA M. LESSELL (APPELLANT)

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