State of Louisiana Versus Perry J. Haydel, Jr.

STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 24-KA-487

VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT

PERRY J. HAYDEL, JR. COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF LOUISIANA

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 21-4489, DIVISION "M"
HONORABLE SHAYNA BEEVERS MORVANT, JUDGE PRESIDING

September 24, 2025

FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER
JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker,
John J. Molaison, Jr., and Timothy S. Marcel

MULTIPLE OFFENDER ADJUDICATION AFFIRMED;
SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING;
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED
FHW
JJM
TSM

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,
PERRY J. HAYDEL, JR.
Katherine M. Franks

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr.
Monique D. Nolan
Thomas J. Butler
Norma B. Broussard
Molly M. Massey

WICKER, J.

Defendant Perry J. Haydel, Jr. seeks review of his multiple offender

adjudication and sentence following the revocation of his probation with the 24th

Judicial District Court Specialty Court Program. Haydel’s appellate counsel has

filed an appellate brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396,

18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) and State v. Jyles, 96-2669 (La. 12/12/97), 704 So.2d 241

(per curiam) seeking to withdraw as counsel of record for Haydel, asserting that after

thoroughly reviewing the district court record, she could find no non-frivolous issues

to raise on appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm Haydel’s multiple offender

adjudication. However, because we find errors patent related to sentencing, we

vacate Haydel’s multiple offender sentence and remand this matter to the trial court

for resentencing. We further grant Haydel’s appointed appellate counsel’s motion

to withdraw.

BACKGROUND

On July 29, 2021, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of

information charging Defendant, Perry J. Haydel, Jr., with seven counts of simple

burglary in violation of La. R.S. 14:62.1 Haydel initially pled not guilty to all counts;

however, upon his acceptance into 24th Judicial District Court Swift and Certain

Specialty Court Program, he withdrew his initial plea and entered a plea of guilty as

charged. The trial court then deferred the imposition of sentence pending Haydel’s

successful completion of the specialty court program and placed him on active

supervised probation for five years. At that time, the trial court informed Haydel

that, if he failed to successfully complete the specialty court program, the court

would revoke his probation and impose a sentence of imprisonment on all counts,

and further that the District Attorney would have the option of seeking an

1
All seven counts of simple burglary were related to breaking into cars parked in two different
used car lots.
24-KA-487 1

enhancement of his sentence as a second-felony offender under Louisiana’s Habitual

Offender Law, La. R.S. 15:529.1.

On August 2, 2023, after Haydel failed to comply with the requirements of

the specialty court program, the trial court revoked his probation and sentenced him

to imprisonment for seven years at hard labor on counts one, two, and three; and ten

years at hard labor on counts four, five, six, and seven—all to be served concurrently.

Thereafter, on June 12, 2023, the District Attorney filed a multiple offender bill of

information against Haydel, seeking enhancement of his sentence as a second-felony

offender under La. R.S. 15:529.1.

On August 16, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the multiple bill. During

the hearing, Haydel stipulated to all allegations asserted in the multiple bill and then

entered a plea of guilty admitting his status a second-felony offender. After

accepting Haydel’s guilty plea, the trial court vacated his original sentence and

resentenced him as a second-felony offender to eighteen years imprisonment at hard

labor, without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. Following the

multiple bill hearing, Haydel filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence, which

the trial court denied.

A year later, on August 20, 2024, Haydel filed a pro se uniform application

for post-conviction relief and requested authorization to file an out-of-time appeal

pursuant to State v. Counterman, 475 So.2d 336 (La. 1985). In his application,

Haydel identified his multiple offender adjudication and enhanced sentence of

eighteen years imprisonment as the judgment of conviction being appealed. On

August 29, 2024, the trial court granted Haydel’s request for an out-of-time appeal

and assigned appellate counsel to represent him.

ANALYSIS

Haydel’s appellate counsel has filed a brief in conformity with the procedure

outlined in State v. Bradford, 95-929 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/25/96), 676 So.2d 1108,

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asserting that she has thoroughly reviewed the trial court record and can find no non-

frivolous issues to raise on appeal and further requests an errors patent review.

Accordingly, appellate counsel requests to withdraw as counsel of record for Haydel

pursuant to Anders and Jyles. The State responds that appellate counsel has “cast an

advocate’s eye” over the record in accordance with Anders and Jyles and determined

there were no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal. The State asks this Court to

affirm Haydel’s multiple offender adjudication and sentence. The State also agrees

that appellate counsel should be allowed to withdraw as counsel of record.

Anders Brief

In Anders, the United States Supreme Court held that appointed appellate

counsel may request permission to withdraw if she finds the case to be wholly

frivolous after a conscientious examination of it. 386 U.S. at 744. In State v. Smith,

this Court further held that the request must be accompanied by “a brief referring to

anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal” so as to provide the

reviewing court “with a basis for determining whether appointed counsel have fully

performed their duty to support their clients’ appeals to the best of their ability” and

to assist the reviewing court “in making the critical determination whether the appeal

is indeed so frivolous that counsel should be permitted to withdraw.” 18-142

(La. App. 5 Cir. 8/29/18), 253 So.3d 1314, 1318 (citing McCoy v. Wis. Ct. App.,

Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 439; 108 S.Ct. 1895, 1902; 100 L.Ed.2d 440 (1988); see also

State v. Hunter, 19-579 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/24/20), 299 So.3d 1217. The Louisiana

Supreme Court further explained in Jyles that an Anders brief must demonstrate by

full discussion and analysis that appellate counsel “has cast an advocate’s eye over

the trial record and considered whether any ruling made by the trial court, subject to

the contemporaneous objection rule, had a significant adverse impact on shaping the

evidence presented to the jury for its consideration.” 704 So.2d at 241.

24-KA-487 3

The appellate court is similarly obligated to conduct its own independent

review of the record to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Bradford,

676 So.2d at 1110. Specifically, the appellate court must review (1) the bill of

information, to ensure that the defendant was properly charged; (2) all minute

entries, to ensure that the defendant was present at all crucial stages; (3) all pleadings

in the record; and (4) all transcripts, to determine whether any ruling provides an

arguable basis for appeal. State v. Wingerter, 05-697, p. 5 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/14/06),

926 So.2d 662, 664. If, after an independent review, the appellate court determines

there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, it may grant appellate counsel’s motion

to withdraw and affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence. Id. But, if the

appellate court finds any legal point arguable on the merits, then it may either deny

appellate counsel’s motion and order her to file a brief arguing those legal points, or

grant the motion and appoint substitute appellate counsel for the defendant. Id.

In this case, appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief setting forth the

procedural history, the limited facts, and the circumstances surrounding Haydel’s

guilty plea as a multiple offender. She confirms that the trial court advised Haydel

of his Boykin trilogy of rights, that Haydel completed the waiver form, and that he

knowingly and voluntarily entered a guilty plea as a multiple offender. The waiver

form shows that Haydel pleaded guilty to the offenses listed in the bill of

information, and that he was informed that his enhanced sentence as a multiple

offender would be eighteen years at hard labor. Counsel indicates that count one

was enhanced under a multiple bill, and that a nunc pro tunc minute entry later

corrected the enhanced sentence to allow parole and to order all sentences to run

concurrently.2 She concludes that the corrected sentences remain legal and do not

2
See errors patent discussion for further discussion of these points.
24-KA-487 4

give rise to non-frivolous issues on appeal. The State agrees and urges this Court to

grant appellate counsel’s request to withdraw.

Appellate counsel notified Haydel that she filed an Anders brief as well as a

motion to withdraw, and further informed him of his right to file a pro se brief in

this appeal and the deadline to do so. This Court likewise notified Haydel about his

counsel’s Anders brief and of his right to file a pro se brief by the deadline of

December 12, 2024. Haydel did not file a pro se brief. Since Haydel has identified

only his multiple offender adjudication and enhanced sentence as the judgment of

conviction being appeal, our independent review of this record in accordance with

Anders is similarly limited.

The State filed a multiple offender bill of information alleging Haydel to be a

second-felony offender. Haydel and his counsel appeared at the multiple bill

hearing; so, Haydel’s presence does not present any issues that would support an

appeal. Moreover, Haydel stipulated to the allegations in the multiple bill and he

entered a plea of guilty as second-felony offender. Generally, when a defendant

pleads guilty, he waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings leading up

to the guilty plea, and is precluded from review of such defects either by appeal or

post-conviction relief. State v. Turner, 09-1079, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/27/10),

47 So.3d 455, 459. Also, once a defendant is sentenced, only those guilty pleas that

are constitutionally infirm may be withdrawn by appeal or post-conviction relief.

State v. McCoil, 05-658, p. 7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/27/06), 924 So.2d 1120, 1124. A

guilty plea is constitutionally infirm if it is not entered freely and voluntarily, if the

Boykin colloquy is inadequate, or when a defendant is induced to enter the plea by a

plea bargain or what he justifiably believes was a plea bargain and that bargain is

not kept. Id. As it pertains to a multiple offender hearing, however, such

proceedings “should not be considered part of the record for purposes of the error

patent review[;] a defendant must assign as error any perceived defect in the

24-KA-487 5

proceedings to preserve appellate review of the claimed error.” State v. Moore,

2012-0102, p. 2 (La. 5/25/12), 90 So.3d 384, 385 (per curiam). Here, Haydel entered

an unqualified guilty plea, and therefore all non-jurisdictional defects are waived.

The record nevertheless shows that Haydel was sufficiently advised of his multiple

offender rights and that his guilty plea was constitutionally firm.

Haydel reviewed the multiple offender bill of information and the waiver of

rights form with his counsel, and executed the waiver of rights form admitting that

he was a second-felony offender. In addition to Haydel’s signature, the waiver of

rights form was also signed by his counsel and the trial court. The multiple offender

waiver of rights form, in conjunction with the colloquy between the trial court and

Haydel, indicates Haydel understood that by stipulating to the allegations in the

multiple bill, he was giving up his right to “plead not guilty,” his right to a hearing,

and his right to remain silent throughout the hearing. The transcript reflects that

Haydel indicated he understood all the legal consequences of stipulating to the

multiple bill and wished to stipulate to being a second-felony offender. He affirmed

that he was satisfied with his counsel’s and the court’s efforts to explain the rights

he was waiving and the consequences of his plea; and further confirmed that he had

not been forced, coerced, or threatened into stipulating to the multiple bill. The trial

court accepted Haydel’s stipulation to the multiple bill as knowingly, intelligently,

freely, and voluntarily made. By stipulating to the multiple bill, Haydel waived his

right to a hearing and any possible non-jurisdictional defects were also waived.

Haydel was also advised of the potential sentencing range as a second-felony

offender in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art 556.1, as well as the actual sentence that

the trial court would impose. Although the trial court misadvised Haydel that the

minimum penalty that could be imposed was eight years imprisonment instead of

the actual amount of four years, the trial court did advise Haydel that it would impose

a sentence of eighteen years imprisonment upon acceptance of his guilty plea. The

24-KA-487 6

advisement of the agreed upon sentence was sufficient for compliance with

La. C.Cr.P. art. 556.1. State v. Craig, 10-854, p. 7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/24/11),

66 So.3d 60, 64. Additionally, the trial court advised Haydel that he would receive

a sentence of eighteen years at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or

suspension of sentence. The waiver of rights form, however, correctly reflected that

Haydel was informed his sentence would be without benefit of probation and

suspension of sentence only. This error does not therefore present a non-frivolous

issue for appeal. See La. R.S. 15:301.1(A) (providing that statutory restrictions on

eligibility for parole, probation, or suspension of sentence are deemed to be

contained in the sentence, even if not expressly stated).

Lastly, Haydel’s sentence does not present issues for appeal. The enhanced

sentence falls within the sentencing range prescribed by statute. La. R.S. 14:62;

La. R.S. 15:529.1. Moreover, the enhanced sentence was imposed pursuant to, and

in conformity with, the terms of the plea agreement set forth in the record at the time

of the plea. La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.2(A)(2) precludes a defendant from seeking review

of a sentence imposed in conformity with a plea agreement that was set forth in the

record at the time of the plea. State v. Washington, 05-211, p. 5 (La. App. 5 Cir.

10/6/05), 916 So.2d 1171, 1173. Additionally, this Court has consistently

recognized that La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.2 precludes a defendant from seeking review of

an enhanced sentence to which the defendant agreed. State v. Williams, 12-299,

p. 11 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/11/12), 106 So.3d 1068, 1075, writ denied, 13-109 (La.

6/21/13), 118 So.3d 406.

Based on the foregoing, we find that Haydel’s multiple offender stipulation,

his guilty plea as a second-felony offender, and the sentence imposed pursuant to the

plea agreement present no issues for appeal. Appellate counsel’s brief adequately

demonstrates by full discussion and analysis that counsel has reviewed the

24-KA-487 7

proceedings and cannot identify any basis for a non-frivolous appeal. An

independent review of the record supports counsel’s assertion.

Errors Patent

We have reviewed the record for errors patent in accordance with Article 920

of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337

(La. 1975), and State v. Weiland, 556 So.2d 175 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1990). Our review

reveals errors patent in the multiple bill proceeding that require us to vacate Haydel’s

sentences and to remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing. Specifically,

the trial court imposed an indeterminate sentence by failing to specify which one of

Haydel’s seven counts of simple burglary was considered for enhancement under

the multiple bill.

It is required that a defendant receive a determinate sentence for each offense

upon which he is convicted. La. C.Cr.P. art. 879. This Court has held that a sentence

is indeterminate when the trial court does not clearly designate which conviction is

being enhanced under the habitual offender statute. See State v. MacCracken, 02-

1163 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/29/03), 845 So. 2d 1104, writ denied, 2003-1474 (La.

12/12/03), 860 So. 2d 1150; State v. Fish, 00-922 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/30/01), 782

So.2d 1087, writ denied, 2001-0548 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 337. This type of error

falls under the scope of errors patent review, as it is discoverable by mere inspection

of the record without the need to examine evidence, pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920.

If a sentence is indeterminate, the appellate court is required to vacate the sentence

and remand for resentencing. See State v. Clennon, 98-1370, p. 8 (La. App. 5 Cir.

6/30/99), 738 So.2d 161, 165; State v. Stack, 97-1176, pp. 9–10 (La. App. 5 Cir.

4/15/98), 710 So.2d 841, 845.

For instance, in State v. Fish, the defendant was convicted of aggravated

criminal damage to property and purse snatching. 782 So.2d at 1088. Following the

determination that the defendant was a second-felony offender, the trial court stated,

24-KA-487 8

“your previous sentence is vacated,” without any specification regarding to which

count he was referring and then imposed the enhanced sentence. Id. at 1092. On

appeal, this Court stated that, “although it appears that the trial court meant to impose

the enhanced sentence on the purse snatching count, since that was the count referred

to in the habitual offender bill of information, the indefinite reference to ‘your

sentence is vacated’ makes that assumption uncertain and the Defendant’s sentence

on the remaining count indeterminate.” Id. This Court vacated the defendant’s

enhanced sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. Id.

Similarly, in State v. MacCracken, the defendant was convicted of illegal

possession of stolen things and five counts of purse snatching. 845 So.2d at 1107.

The State filed a multiple bill against the defendant but failed to specify which of

the five counts of purse snatching was being considered for sentence enhancement.

Id. at 1115–16. The trial court likewise failed to specify the count when it vacated

the defendant’s previous sentence and imposed an enhanced sentence. Id. at 1116.

On appeal, this Court stated that, “it appears from the record that, although the trial

court meant to impose the enhanced sentence on one of the purse snatching counts,

since that was the conviction referred to in the multiple bill, the indefinite reference

to the ‘sentence of twenty years previously imposed is vacated’ does not specify

which of the five counts of purse snatching is being enhanced.” Id. This Court

vacated the defendant’s enhanced sentence and remanded the case for resentencing

with instructions that the trial court clarify which of the defendant’s convictions was

being considered for the multiple offender proceedings. Id.

Here, after the trial court revoked Haydel’s probation and sentenced him on

all seven counts of simple burglary, the State filed a multiple bill of information

seeking an enhanced penalty for Haydel as a second-felony offender. The multiple

bill did not specify which one of the seven counts the State sought to enhance. At

the multiple bill hearing, Haydel stipulated to all allegations asserted in the multiple

24-KA-487 9

bill. The waiver of rights form he signed though, did not specify which count was

being enhanced. It provided only that Haydel “plead guilty to the charge outlined in

the bill of information.” During the Boykin colloquy, the trial court likewise did not

specify which count was being enhanced and it asked Haydel only if he wished to

“plead guilty to the charge outlined in the bill of information, attached to this form,

charging you, pursuant to Louisiana Statute 15:529.1, with having the listed prior

felony conviction record and being a double offender under the provisions of this

law.” Then, once Haydel pled guilty to the multiple bill, the trial court vacated his

original sentence and resentenced him as a second-felony offender, again, without

any specification regarding which count. The trial court stated, “I hereby sentence

you to vacate your sentence previously rendered on August 2nd, 2023, and I hereby

sentence you to a period of 18 years at hard labor without benefit of probation or

suspension of sentence.” The trial court did not specify the count to be vacated or

enhanced. As a result, it appears as though the trial court vacated all seven of

Haydel’s sentences and then imposed a single, enhanced sentence for all seven

counts together.

While the minute entries and commitment orders provide some clarity, they

are nevertheless inconsistent with the hearing transcript. Generally, where there is

an inconsistency between the minutes or commitment and the transcript, the

transcript prevails. State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983). The multiple bill

hearing minute entry and commitment order—and the subsequent amended versions

of both—state that Haydel pled guilty to being a second-felony offender specifically

as to count one; that the trial court vacated his original sentence specifically as to

count one; and that the trial court resentenced him to eighteen years imprisonment

specifically as to count one. Although the trial court’s corrections demonstrate what

its intent was when sentencing Haydel, those corrections are by no means perfect,

nor do they resolve all confusion as to the terms of Haydel’s confinement.

24-KA-487 10

Therefore, we find the multiple offender sentence is indeterminate as Haydel was

convicted of seven counts of simple burglary yet only a single sentence was imposed.

We find that the trial court erred since the record fails to indicate which of Haydel’s

seven convictions was enhanced. Thus, we accordingly vacate that sentence and

remand the case to the trial court for resentencing, with the instruction that the trial

court specify which of Haydel’s seven sentences are to be enhanced.

Because of our finding that the sentence must be vacated, the other errors in

the sentencing—i.e., the failure to articulate whether the sentences are to be served

concurrently or consecutively and the error in the habitual commitment order

referring to the wrong date of probation revocation—require no further action by

this Court.

DECREE

For the forgoing reasons, we affirm Haydel’s multiple offender adjudication,

we vacate his sentence, and we remand this matter to the trial court for resentencing.

We further grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw.

MULTIPLE OFFENDER ADJUDICATION AFFIRMED;
SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR
RESENTENCING; MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED

24-KA-487 11

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. TRAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX
www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
SEPTEMBER 24, 2025 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL
PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

24-KA-487
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE SHAYNA BEEVERS MORVANT (DISTRICT JUDGE)
CHAD M. IKERD (APPELLANT) KATHERINE M. FRANKS (APPELLANT) MONIQUE D. NOLAN (APPELLEE)
THOMAS J. BUTLER (APPELLEE)

MAILED
HONORABLE PAUL D. CONNICK, JR.
(APPELLEE)
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
MOLLY M. MASSEY (APPELLEE)
NORMA B. BROUSSARD (APPELLEE)
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEYS
TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
200 DERBIGNY STREET
GRETNA, LA 70053