Succession of Augustus D. Stansbury, Jr.

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
State of Louisiana
__________

No. 26-CA-371
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SUCCESSION OF AUGUSTUS D. STANSBURY, JR.

ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA
NO. 864-207, DIVISION "F"
HONORABLE MICHAEL P. MENTZ, JUDGE PRESIDING

September 22, 2026

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY
CHIEF JUDGE

Panel composed of Judges Susan M. Chehardy,
Jude G. Gravois, and Stephen J. Windhorst

APPEAL DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

SMC
JGG
SJW

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT,
DEBORAH RIGGIO STANSBURY
Ryan S. McBride

CHEHARDY, C.J.

Appellant, Deborah Riggio Stansbury, appeals the April 22, 2026 judgment

granting partial possession of decedent’s separate property. Because this is an

interlocutory judgment rather than a final appealable judgment, we dismiss the

appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, without prejudice. However, because the

motion and order for suspensive appeal was filed within 30 days of the date the

judgment was issued, we consider the motion for appeal to be a notice of intent to

seek writs and the order as setting a return date, and appellant has 30 days from the

date of this opinion to file a supervisory writ application in this Court.

Facts and Procedural History

This matter arises from a “Joint Verified Petition for Partial Possession” filed

in a succession proceeding by Monique Stansbury and Augustus D. Stansbury, III,

who are heirs of the decedent, Augustus D. Stansbury, Jr. The surviving spouse and

administratrix of the succession, Deborah Riggio Stansbury (Ms. Stansbury),

opposed the petition. After a March 17, 2026 hearing, the district court took the

matter under advisement and, on April 22, 2026, rendered judgment in favor of the

heirs’ assignee, Beacon Capital, LLC, and against Ms. Stansbury in her personal

capacity as surviving spouse and as administratrix of the succession.1 The court

placed Beacon “in possession of the immovable property subject to the outstanding

mortgage” on the Oaklawn Drive property in Metairie, as described in the

Judgment.

In Reasons for Judgment, the trial court noted that Beacon was “only

seeking to be placed into partial possession of the succession which is the

decedent’s separate property.” Beacon maintained that the separate property was

1
A January 27, 2026 Order issued by the trial court substituted Beacon “as the proper party
plaintiff for the Heirs, the Assignors, Augustus D. Stansbury, III, Monique Eharb, and Brent
Stansbury,” based on their January 23, 2026 Assignment of Succession Rights transferring all of
their right, title, and interest in the Succession of Augustus D. Stansbury, Jr.

26-CA-371 1

being mismanaged. Ms. Stansbury argued that the property should remain under

administration to satisfy succession debts, including her “reimbursement claim”

against the separate property. The trial court concluded that Beacon is “entitled to

be placed in possession of the Oaklawn Property” and found “sufficient amounts in

the succession to satisfy debts.”2 The court explained that any claims for

reimbursement “are a separate proceeding from the petition for possession and

should be pursued as part of the administration of the estate.”

On May 18, 2026, Ms. Stansbury suspensively appealed the April 22, 2026

judgment of partial possession. On June 19, 2026, the trial court signed an Order

granting the appeal. On July 16, 2026, the suspensive appeal was converted to a

devolutive appeal.

Meanwhile, on April 25, 2026, three days after the judgment at issue was

rendered, Beacon filed a “Motion to Remove Administratrix (pursuant to CCP

3182)” requesting that Ms. Stansbury be removed “for cause.” On July 23, 2026,

after a hearing on the Motion, the court ordered Ms. Stansbury to “open a

succession account” within ten days of the Judgment.3

Law and Analysis

La. C.C.P. art. 2974 provides:

Appeals from orders or judgments rendered in succession
proceedings shall be governed by the rules applicable to appeals
in ordinary proceedings, except that an order or judgment
confirming, appointing, or removing a succession
representative, or granting an interim allowance under Article
3321 shall be executed provisionally, notwithstanding appeal.

2
The trial court also ruled that the mortgage on the property at issue was a “community debt”
and that each party would be held liable for fifty percent of such debt.
3
The trial court also ordered her to produce various documents including pension plans, IRAs,
retirement accounts, bank records, tax returns, any property removed from the Oaklawn property,
an annual accounting, and proof of reimbursements. The parties were to “meet within 45 days to
attempt to resolve all reimbursement claims.” During the hearing on the motion, the trial court
indicated that if the reimbursement issue could not be resolved, it would be set for trial.

26-CA-371 2

The first clause of La. C.C.P. art. 2974 confirms that appeals from orders and

judgments rendered in successions shall be governed by the rules applicable to

appeals in ordinary proceedings. Succession of Cotaya, 24-38 (La. App. 5 Cir.

12/5/24), 409 So.3d 860, 863 (citing Succession of Ally, 22-16 (La. App. 5 Cir.

12/31/22), 354 So.3d 1248, 1250). Thus, La. C.C.P. articles 1841, 1915, and 2083

apply to judicial review of succession judgments “the same as they apply to

judgments in other proceedings.” Id. (citing Ally, 354 So.3d at 1250). Appellate

jurisdiction extends only “to final judgments and interlocutory judgments when

expressly provided by law.” Id.; La. C.C.P. art. 2083. The Louisiana Legislature

amended La. C.C.P. art. 1915, effective August 1, 2025, eliminating the trial court’s

authority to designate judgments as final and appealable. Article 1915(A), as

amended, now provides an exclusive list of judgments from which an appeal may

be taken as a matter of right, including when a suit is dismissed as to fewer than all

parties, or when liability is adjudicated. See La. C.C.P. art. 1915(A)(1) and (5). The

express right to an immediate appeal under succession articles is also limited to

certain judgments including: (1) appointing or removing a succession

representative under Articles 2122 and 2974; (2) homologating a tableau of

distribution pursuant to Article 3308; and (3) homologating a final account under

Article 3337. See Cotaya, 409 So.3d at 864.

In Succession of O'Krepki, 17-130 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/25/17), 229 So.3d

647, decided before the recent amendment to Article 1915, this Court dismissed the

appeal of a judgment placing a legatee in possession of four legacies, where

outstanding contested issues remained in the consolidated case. Because the trial

court “rendered a partial judgment as to less than all of the issues of the parties,”

and it was not designated as a final judgment “after an express determination that

there is no just reason for delay,” this Court concluded that the judgment was “not

a final judgment under La. C.C.P. art.1915,” and was not appealable “as one ‘in

26-CA-371 3

which appeals are given by law’ under La. C.C.P. art.2083.” Id. at 649 (citing

Claiborne Medical Corp. v. Siddiqui, 12-759 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/28/13), 113 So.3d

1109, 1112; Laviolette v. Dubose, 07-916 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/25/08), 983 So.2d 160,

162). The appeal was therefore dismissed without prejudice and remanded for

further proceedings. Id.

More recently, in Succession of Flake, 22-91 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/30/22), 353

So.3d 1004, this Court determined that a judgment was “unclear as to whether it

pertain[ed] to all of the succession property or just the immovable property”

because it did not “specifically set forth the property at issue.” Id. at 1008. After

discussing O’Krepki, this Court concluded that because the judgment did not

pertain to all of decedent’s property and was not designated as a partial, final

judgment under Article 1915(B), it was not a final judgment, and appellate

jurisdiction was therefore lacking. Id.

In Succession of Cannon, 14-0826 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/25/15), 166 So.3d

1107, which the First Circuit also decided before the amendment to Article 1915,

the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s designation of a

judgment as final for purposes of immediate appeal, insofar as it constituted a

partial judgment of possession as to the Succession’s shares in a business. Id. at

1110 (citing R.J. Messinger, Inc., 04-1664 (La. 3/2/05), 894 So.2d 1113, 1122).

In short, notwithstanding the recent amendment to La. C.C.P. art. 1915, the

jurisprudence supports the conclusion that the April 22, 2026 judgment of partial

possession is not immediately appealable, as it does not appear to apply to all of

decedent’s property. The judgment indicates that “the matter arises from a Petition

for Partial Possession,” and the district court confirms that Beacon is “only seeking

to be placed into partial possession of the succession which is decedent’s separate

26-CA-371 4

property.”4 Under this Court’s analysis in Flake, supra, a ruling that does not

encompass all of the decedent’s property is not a final, appealable judgment.

Moreover, there appear to be “outstanding contested issues,” as evidenced

by the motion to remove Ms. Stansbury as administratrix and the July 23, 2026

judgment ordering her to open a succession account and produce various

documents. Finally, the judgment does not fall within the exclusive list of final

judgments set forth in current Article 1915(A), nor in any of the succession

Articles expressly affording an immediate appeal.

CONCLUSION

We dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, without prejudice.

Because the motion for appeal was filed within 30 days of the date the judgment

was issued, we consider the motion and order for appeal to be a notice of intent and

an order setting a return date. Appellant is therefore granted 30 days from the date

of this opinion to file a supervisory writ application in this Court.

APPEAL DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

4
The “Estimative Sworn Detailed Descriptive List of Assets and Liabilities for Augustus D.
Stansbury, Jr.” includes the immovable separate property at issue as well as immovable
community property and movable properties.

26-CA-371 5

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL

CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ
FREDERICKA H. WICKER
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST LINDA M. TRAN
JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.
FIRST DEPUTY CLERK
SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL
TIMOTHY S. MARCEL FIFTH CIRCUIT
MELISSA C. LEDET
JUDGES 101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF
POST OFFICE BOX 489
GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054 (504) 376-1400

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www.fifthcircuit.org

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY
SEPTEMBER 22, 2026 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL
PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

26-CA-371
E-NOTIFIED
24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT (CLERK)
HONORABLE MICHAEL P. MENTZ (DISTRICT JUDGE)
RYAN S. MCBRIDE (APPELLANT) CHARLES V. CUSIMANO, III (APPELLEE)
KATIE M. CUSIMANO (APPELLEE)

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