Cited by

(1962), the essence of the inquiry in such case is “whether the risk and harm encountered by the [defendant] fall within the scope of protection of the statute.” In our view the statute was enacted to protect a driver who may be coming out of an intersection onto the highway into the path of a veh

v. American Beverage Co., , (1962); Felt v. Price, 240 La.

(1962), our Supreme Court rejected the contention that where an accident is caused by the combined negligence of two or more parties, only the last is liable.

v. American Beverage Co., , (1962); Felt v. Price, 240 La.

appellants maintain that such alleged violation of the applicable statute was negligence per se, and that it also constituted a proximate or legal cause of the accident thus rendering Hackworth and Richard liable herein.

32:141 is a safety measure designed to protect life and property, , .

Perhaps the most noted recent case involving the question of "cause" is Dixie Drive It Yourself System New Orleans Company, Inc. v. American Beverage Company, et al., , (1962), in which the Louisiana Supreme Court held the violation of a highway safety statute was negligence per se and a cause-in-fact of a vehicular collision and resulting injuries.

(1962), if the accident which happened in this case was among the things which the statute was designed to prevent, her negligence in that respect would be a cause-in-fact of the accident, and bar her recovery.

(1962) ; Pierre v. Allstate Insurance Company, 257 La.

v. American Beverage Co., , (1962), he is negligent per se, and since the accident which happened was the very thing which the statute was intended to prevent, this negligence was a legal or proximate cause of the accident.

(1962), the proper “inquiry is whether the risk and harm encountered by the [defendant] fall within the scope of protection of the statute.

v. American Beverage Co., , (1962), an action for damages, plaintiff relied primarily upon complaints of negligence against the driver of an obstructing RC Cola truck.

The failure to comply with its requirements is not negligence per se, as in a case of violation of a highway safety statute, , (1962).

Dixie Drive-It-Yourself System, , (1962); Herget v. Saucier, 223 La.

In this respect Girley relies upon Dixie Drive It Yourself System of New Orleans, , .

Although subject to many and varied definitions, , (1962), as follows: “Negligent conduct is a cause-in-fact of harm to another if it was a substantial factor in bringing about that harm.

v. American Beverage Co., , (1962), this amounts to negligence which was a cause-in-fact of the accident.

(Ct.La.App., 2d Cir., 1969).

Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys., , (1962).

Additionally, , , is authority for the rule that mere violation of a statute does not per se constitute a proximate cause of an accident.

v. American Beverage Co., , (1962), in construing LSA-R.S.

In determining whether the violation of the statute was a proximate cause of the accident in question, , (1962), cited by both plaintiffs and defendants, provides us with a workable formula.

the Supreme Court has added the "substantial factor" test as a means of determining cause in fact.

Our Supreme Court has held that the violation of a safety measure is negligence per se, and that “this negligence is actionable if it was a legal cause of the collision.” , (1962).

Dixie Drive It Yourself System, , (1962); Rowe v. Travelers Insurance Company, 253 La.

32:141 is applicable and believe that there is a misapplication of the Dixie Drive It Case, , .

32:141 is applicable and believe that there is a misapplication of the Dixie Drive It Case, , .

for the proposition that the operator of Plaintiff’s vehicle was contributorily negligent.

(1962); Mire v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, (La.App.

We would be inclined to agree with the Trial Judge that such parking was “too remote an act to figure in the death of plaintiffs’ father” were it not for the decision of the Supreme Court in Dixie Drive It Yourself System New Orleans Co., , .

This was pointed out and emphasized in a case cited by defendants, , .

(1962) our Supreme Court established guidelines applicable here for a determination of legal cause.

(1962), and the subsequent case of Vidrine v. General Fire & Casualty Co., La.App., 168 So.

In Dixie Drive It Yourself System, New Orleans Co. v. *872 American Beverage Company, , (1962) it was said: “The statute was designed to protect life and property on the highways.

(1962); Note, 23 La.L.Rev.

(1962), and succeeding jurisprudence.

(1962), and other cases, as authority for that argument.

Article 966, namely whether plaintiff was confronted with a sudden emergency and whether the obstruction of the highway for the period testified to by defendant Spears constituted *739 a , .

625 , ; Bodan v. American Employers’ Insurance Company, La.App., , or as stated by the Supreme Court in Dixie Drive It Yourself System New Orleans Co. v. American Beverage Company, et al., , , unless it amounts to a cause in fact of the accident.

In support of its contention that Mr. Wascom was guilty of contributory negligence, , ; and Launey v. Smith, La.App., .