Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Gaspard v. LeMaire, 158 So. 2d 149.

655 citing documents.

Dupre v. Exxon Pipeline Co. 638 So. 2d 1118 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1994
(1963); Ballard v. National Indem.
Makin v. Continental Insurance Co. 638 So. 2d 460 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1994
(1963); Ballard v. National Indem.
Smith v. LOUISIANA HEALTH & HUMAN RES. 637 So. 2d 1177 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1994
Nevertheless, , (1963) through Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., and through Reck to the present case is that the discretion vested in the trier of fact is "great," and even vast, so that an appellate court should rarely disturb an award of general damages.
Sattler v. Hammond 640 So. 2d 570 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1994
Nevertheless, , (1963) through Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., and through Reck to the present case is that the discretion vested in the trier of fact is “great,” and even vast, so that an appellate court should rarely disturb-an award of general damages.
Langlinais v. Figueroa 636 So. 2d 983 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1994
(1963); Ballard v. National Indem.
Longman v. Allstate Ins. Co. 635 So. 2d 343 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1994
Nevertheless, , (1963) through Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., and through Reck to the present case is that the discretion vested in the trier of fact is "great," and even vast, so that an appellate court should rarely disturb an award of general damages.
Simpson v. State Through DOTD 636 So. 2d 608 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1994
through Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., have been fraught with uncertainty.
Russell ex rel. Wunstell v. Kossover 634 So. 2d 72 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1994
Nevertheless, , (1963) through Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., and through Reck [v. Stevens, ] to the present case is that the discretion vested in the trier of fact is ‘great,’ and even vast, so that an appellate court should rarely disturb an award of general damages
Nugent v. Continental Cas. Co. 634 So. 2d 406 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1994
Nevertheless, , (1963) through Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., and through Reck to the present case is that the discretion vested in the trier of fact is "great," and even vast, so that an appellate court should rarely disturb an award of general damages.
Rick v. STATE, DOTD 630 So. 2d 1271 La. 1994
Nevertheless, , (1963) through Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., and through Reck to the present case is that the discretion vested in the trier of fact is "great," and even vast, so that an appellate court should rarely disturb an award of general damages.
Chenniliaro v. Kaufman & Broad Home Sys. 636 So. 2d 246 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1994
Nevertheless, , (1963) through Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., and through Reck [ v. Stevens, ] to the present case is that the discretion vested in the trier of fact is "great," and even vast, so that an appellate court should rarely disturb an award of general damage
Sinor v. National Cas. Co. 633 So. 2d 720 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1993
Nevertheless, , (1963) through Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., and through Reck [ ] to the present case is that the discretion vested in the trier of fact is "great," and even vast, so that an appellate court should rarely disturb an award of general d
Foret v. Terrebonne Towing Co., Inc. 632 So. 2d 344 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1993
Nevertheless, , (1963) through Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., and through Reck [v. Stevens, ] [(La.1979)] to the present case is that the discretion vested in the trier of fact is "great," and even vast, so that an appellate court should rarely disturb an award of general dama
Hill v. Sampson 628 So. 2d 81 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1993
Nevertheless, , (1963), through Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., and through Reck [ v. Stevens, ] to the present case is that the discretion vested in the trier of fact is "great," and even vast, so that an appellate court should rarely disturb an award of general damag
Sandidge v. State ex rel. Department of Transportation & Development 626 So. 2d 560 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1993
(1963); Ballard v. National Indem.
Theriot v. Allstate Ins. Co. 625 So. 2d 1337 La. 1993
Nevertheless, , (1963) through Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., and through Reck to the present case is that the discretion vested in the trier of fact is "great," and even vast, so *1341 that an appellate court should rarely disturb an award of general damages.
Feigler v. Transit Management of Southeast Louisiana, Inc. 626 So. 2d 385 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1993
(1963); Ballard v. National Indem.
Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp. 623 So. 2d 1257 La. 1993
(1963); Ballard v. National Indem.
Berthelot v. Leday 606 So. 2d 1 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1992
Ducote v. State 583 So. 2d 590 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1991
963 , *592 (1964); , (1963).
Walton v. Bellard 581 So. 2d 307 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1991
Barnett v. Globe Indem. Co. 557 So. 2d 300 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1990
*302 Although the Barnetts cite some cases in which the negligence of the driver of an automobile was imputed to the owner/passenger based on an agency theory or on the owner's theoretical right to control the operation of the vehicle, , (1963) when it observed: It is unrealistic to hold in the present day uses of motor vehicles that the occupant of a motor vehicle has factually any control or right of control over the driving of the operator.
Clouatre v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 557 So. 2d 696 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1989
Adams v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford 543 So. 2d 480 La. 1989
1973); , (1963); Felt v. Price, 240 La.
Landry v. State Farm Ins. Co. 529 So. 2d 417 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1988
Pattison v. BF Goodrich Co. 522 So. 2d 1212 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1988
Reck v. Stevens, supra; , (1963).
Vanzant v. New Orleans Public Service 517 So. 2d 1252 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1987
Moreover, , : It is unrealistic to hold in the present day uses of motor vehicles that the occupant of a motor vehicle has factually any control or right of control over the driving of the operator.
Clark v. State Farm Ins. Co. 520 So. 2d 860 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1987
Gaspard *863 v. Lemaire, , (1963).
Hammer v. Combre 503 So. 2d 624 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1987
our Supreme Court held that having observed the automobile approaching from the rear, a failure to look the second time before commencing a left turn maneuver, is a dereliction of duty which had a causal connection with the accident.
Johnson v. Beavers 496 So. 2d 1251 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1986
Bonner v. United States Fire Ins. Co. 494 So. 2d 1311 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1986
Hebert v. First Guar. Bank 493 So. 2d 150 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1986
1979), the late Justice Albert Tate, Jr., for the Court, reiterated the well-established principle found in the Civil Code that in the assessment of general damages "much discretion must be left to the [trial] judge or jury," , (1963) as "the fountainhead decision of modern jurisprudence interpreting and applying this [article 1934(3)] code provision."
Smith v. Mahfouz 489 So. 2d 409 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1986
Swann v. City-Parish 492 So. 2d 1225 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1986
1979), the Supreme Court, per Tate, J., reiterated the well-established codal rule that in the assessment of general damages, "much discretion must be left to the [trial] judge or jury," , (1963) as "the fountainhead decision of modern jurisprudence interpreting and applying this [article 1934(3)] code provision."
Savoie v. Rayco Shipbuilders & Repair, Inc. 484 So. 2d 764 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1986
the Supreme Court, per Tate, J., reiterated the well-established codal rule that in the assessment of general damages, “much discretion must be left to the [trial] judge or jury,” , (1963) as “the fountainhead decision of modern jurisprudence interpreting and applying this [article 1934(3) ] code provision.” 373 So.2d at 499 .
Mitchell v. Wall 482 So. 2d 817 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1986
4th Cir.1977), writ denied (1977) quoting
Reuther v. Landreneau 480 So. 2d 376 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1985
(1963) held that "unless a plaintiff could be held responsible, as a matter of law, for the torts of the person whose negligence is sought to be charged to him the doctrine of imputed negligence cannot be applied."
Plaisance v. Epherson 466 So. 2d 485 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1985
Perrette v. City of Slidell 465 So. 2d 63 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1985
Hayes v. Commercial Union Assur. Co. 459 So. 2d 1245 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
(1963) is the fountainhead decision of modern jurisprudence interpreting and applying this code provision."
Elliott v. Merritt 457 So. 2d 1216 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
(1963), wherein the Supreme Court stated: [T]he negligence of one person cannot be imputed to another person not guilty of personal negligence in the absence of a legal obligation on the part of the latter to respond for the fault of the former.
Ward v. La. & Ark. Ry. Co. 451 So. 2d 597 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1984
Arena v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc. 441 So. 2d 73 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
Davenport v. Nixon 434 So. 2d 1203 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
Samanie v. Bourg 434 So. 2d 149 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1983
In arriving at a , (1963); Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., (La.
Turner v. Kentie 422 So. 2d 493 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1982
Louisiana Civil Code Article 1934(3) provides in pertinent part: “In the assessment of damages under this rule, as well as in cases of offenses, quasi offenses, and quasi contracts, much discretion must be left to the judge or jury.”
Owens v. Hartford Insurance Co. 420 So. 2d 1193 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1982
Chauvin v. Gammon Enterprises, Inc. 420 So. 2d 752 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1982
which states: “The use of such a scale of prior awards, made for merely generically similar medical injuries, has been expressly and repeatedly disapproved by Gaspard [v. LeMaire, , ] and the succeeding jurisprudence.
Dairyland Insurance v. Joseph 412 So. 2d 636 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1982
(1963), the trial court was in error in imputing the negligence of the son-in-law to Joseph.
Paige v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America 404 So. 2d 1319 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1981
(1963), through Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., we deem our responsibility on this appeal is “.