Broussard v. Heebe's Bakery, Inc.
Also decided on this docket: La., December 2, 1971 254 So. 2d 617
Broussard v. Heebe's Bakery, Inc., 268 So. 2d 656 (La. 1972).
Cited by
- Rance v. Harrison Co., Inc. 737 So. 2d 806 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1999
- Kirkland v. Riverwood Intern. USA, Inc. 681 So. 2d 329 La. 1996
- Moore v. RLCC Technologies, Inc. 668 So. 2d 1135 La. 1996
- Vickers v. Cajun Concrete Services, Inc. 634 So. 2d 68 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1994
- Davenport v. Texaco, Inc. 623 So. 2d 123 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1993
- McCorkle v. Gulf States Utilities Co. 457 So. 2d 682 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
- Lewis v. Exxon Corp. 441 So. 2d 192 La. 1983
- Lewis v. Exxon Corp. 417 So. 2d 1292 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1982
- Sassau v. Louisiana Workover Service, Inc. 418 So. 2d 16 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1982
- Slaughter v. Georgia Casualty & Surety Co. 415 So. 2d 312 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1982
- James v. Ace Freight Line, Inc. 411 So. 2d 652 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1982
- Klohn v. Louisiana Power & Light 406 So. 2d 577 La. 1981
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Broussard v. Heebe's Bakery, Inc. 254 So. 2d 284
- Thibodaux v. Sun Oil Co. 218 La. 453
- Guillory v. Farrar 182 So. 2d 158
- Cerie v. Malone 125 So. 2d 254
Opinion text
SUMMERS, Justice (dissenting). I agree with those expressions of the-majority opinion that the injured employee-of the contractor does not have two causes of action against the principal, one for compensation and the other in tort. Under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the-jurisprudence of this State, the exclusive-remedy of the employees of the contractor- *576 .against the principal is for workmen’s compensation, and there is no remedy in tort against the principal. However, I would not disturb the findings of the trial judge and the court of appeal on the issue of fact involved. See La.App., 254 So.2d 284 . I would conclude that the relationship between Heebe and Wolf is that of principal and contractor, and plaintiff can only recover workmen’s compensation. Heebe is not a “third person” under the Act subject to an action in tort. There is no intimation whatsoever that the relationship between Heebe and Wolf was designed solely to circumvent tort liability. When such a case is presented those facts will readily warrant the imposition of tort liability against the “third party”. Thibodaux v. Sun Oil Co., 218 La. 453 , 49 So.2d 852 (1950); Guillory v. Farrar, 182 So.2d 158 (La.App.1966); Cerie v. Malone, 125 So.2d 254 (La.App.1960). I respectfully dissent.