Robert Jackson Davidson and Linda Wilburn Davidson v. Allan Neil Castillo and Castillo Investigation & Research, Inc.

Judgment rendered August 14, 2019.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 52,727-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

ROBERT JACKSON DAVIDSON Plaintiffs-Appellees
AND LINDA WILBURN
DAVIDSON

versus

ALLAN NEIL CASTILLO AND Defendants-Appellants
CASTILLO INVESTIGATION &
RESEARCH, INC.

*****

Appealed from the
Forty-Second Judicial District Court for the
Parish of DeSoto, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 78487

Honorable Charles B. Adams, Judge

*****

LAW OFFICE OF BRYCE J. DENNY, LLC Counsel for Appellant,
By: Bryce J. Denny Allan Neil Castillo

AYRES, SHELTON, WILLIAMS, Counsel for Appellees
BENSON & PAINE, LLC
By: Lee H. Ayres
Ryan P. Telep

*****

Before MOORE, GARRETT, and STONE, JJ.

GARRETT, J.

This case arises from a dispute between the plaintiffs, Robert and

Linda Davidson, and the defendant, Allan Neil Castillo, over dissolution of a

business they formerly operated together. Castillo appeals from a trial court

judgment finding him to be in constructive contempt of court for a second

time and imposing penalties upon him. For the following reasons, we affirm

the trial court judgment.

FACTS

In December 2004, Robert and Linda Davidson formed a business

with Castillo known as Lagniappe and Castillo Research and Investigations,

LLC (“L&C”). The company performed background checks. The

Davidsons owned 50% of the business and Castillo owned 50%.

Disagreements developed as to how to run the business and the frequency of

distributions. By May 2017, the parties were not able to work together.

Castillo formed Castillo Investigations and Research, Inc. (“CIR”). The

Davidsons alleged that Castillo began diverting business to his company and

took money owed to L&C. On June 2, 2017, the Davidsons filed a petition

seeking dissolution of L&C, partition of immovable property, and damages.

Castillo and CIR were named as defendants. The Davidsons sought

appointment of a liquidator and suggested that the company’s accountant,

Deborah D. Dees, be appointed by the court to perform this function.

After a hearing, the parties agreed to an order of dissolution and to the

appointment of Dees as liquidator, which was signed and filed on July 6,

2017. Regarding the authority given to Dees, the order stated, in part:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that, as liquidator, Deborah D. Dees, CPA, has all
authority as permitted pursuant to La. R.S. 12:1335 et seq. and

any other applicable law to act on behalf of L&C, including, but
not limited to the following:

a) To request and require any members of L&C to return
any and all assets of L&C to her possession and control,
including but not limited to assets such as financial records,
check books, bank records, deposit slips, bank statements,
invoices, accounts receivable, accounts payable, general
ledgers, accounting journals, customer lists, customer files,
credit card statements, background search requests, electronic
accounting records, electronic accounting software (e.g.
Quickbooks), invoices, contracts, furniture, fixtures, and any
other assets of any kind;

....

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that all plaintiffs and defendants in this litigation
shall fully cooperate with all reasonable requests of the
liquidator, Deborah D. Dees. This obligation includes but is not
limited to the obligation to provide her any and all assets of
L&C within five (5) business days of her request. If any
plaintiff or defendant fails to cooperate with Deborah D. Dees,
then she shall report such failure to this Honorable Court, which
will consider any and all appropriate sanctions and remedies to
be imposed against the non-cooperating party.

On August 4, 2017, the Davidsons filed their first motion for

contempt against Castillo, claiming that he failed to comply with the order to

turn over records and equipment, he used software designed for L&C, he

established a new business with a misleading name, and his attorney was not

cooperative in complying with the order of dissolution. A hearing was held

in September 2017, and Castillo was found to be in contempt of court. He

was directed to provide the liquidator with documents and information

necessary to establish the accounts receivable of L&C, and to deliver any

incoming checks for L&C to the liquidator. He was granted a purge period,

until September 19, 2017, to provide the materials requested by the

liquidator. After conferences with the court and the parties, in October

2017, the Davidsons filed a motion to reopen the evidence on the contempt

2

motion and to reset the sentencing hearing. They alleged that, after Castillo

turned over records, it was determined that he was in possession of more

than $11,000 that belonged to L&C. The trial court granted the motion.

An additional hearing on the motion for contempt was held on

November 13, 2017. The trial court determined that Castillo intentionally

delayed the delivery of L&C assets to the liquidator in violation of the

dissolution order and his behavior was contemptuous. The court ordered

Castillo to pay a fine of $500 and be imprisoned for ten days. The term of

imprisonment was suspended, and Castillo was ordered to pay “all of the

costs of the liquidator, when that amount is finally determined, and to pay

the attorney’s fees and court costs of the plaintiffs for the pursuit of these

contempts, totaling $10,708.00 within 72 hours or report for his 10 days’

imprisonment.” Castillo did not appeal from this contempt adjudication.

On November 13, 2017, Dees billed $24,070.71 for her services up to

that date.

On March 16, 2018, the Davidsons filed a second motion for

contempt, claiming that Castillo failed to timely turn over bank statements;

information from his accounting firm; access to his accounting software,

FreshBooks; and access to his billing system. They claimed that Castillo

was still in possession of funds owed to L&C, and that Castillo failed to pay

the liquidator’s fee.

On April 23, 2018, the trial court signed an order directing Castillo to

pay the liquidator for fees and expenses from June 29 through November 13,

2017, in the amount of $24,070.71, on or before April 27, 2018. Castillo’s

accountant, Anthony Juneau, Jr., was ordered to produce the general ledger,

monthly bank reconciliations from June 1 through December 31, 2017,
3

monthly profit and loss statements from June 1 through December 31, 2017,

and monthly balance sheets from June 1 through December 31, 2017, for

CIR. The order specified that, if Juneau did not produce the records by

April 27, 2018, a subpoena would be issued requiring his appearance and

production of the documents at the hearing on the second motion for

contempt.

On April 30, 2018, Dees billed an additional $13,206 for her services.

A hearing on the second motion for contempt was held on June 21,

2018. The Davidsons’ lawyer argued that the motion was based upon

Castillo’s flagrant disregard of four things: (1) the order of dissolution

entered in July 2017; (2) the instructions on the record at the first contempt

hearing; (3) the order following the hearing in November 2017, when the

evidence was reopened on the first motion for contempt; and (4) the order

issued by the trial court on April 23, 2018, requiring Castillo to pay the

liquidator’s fees and to produce specified documents from his accountant,

Juneau. The Davidsons’ attorney noted that not all of the requested

information had been turned over to the liquidator and that Castillo paid the

liquidator’s first bill in a piecemeal fashion, making the last payment on

June 8, 2018. The Davidsons asked the trial court to hold Castillo in

contempt a second time, withdraw the suspension of sentence, order him to

serve ten days in jail, and order him to pay the liquidator’s second invoice

and any subsequent invoices presented within a reasonable time.

At the hearing, Juneau testified. He stated that Castillo never showed

him the dissolution order appointing the liquidator and specifying that

records requested by the liquidator were to be produced within five days.

Castillo never conveyed to him any sense of urgency in producing any of the
4

records for CIR. In February 2018, Juneau was made aware of the request

for the general ledger, bank reconciliations, monthly profit and loss

statements, and balance sheets. Juneau said that Castillo had the bank

statements and Juneau did not have general ledger information. He stated

that preparation of the 2017 records was delayed because amounts related to

Castillo’s gambling required the filing of an amended tax return for 2016.

Juneau said that accurate figures for 2017 could not be determined until the

problems with 2016 were resolved. Juneau testified that monthly profit and

loss statements or balance sheets could not be produced because they were

never prepared for CIR. Juneau eventually received a subpoena for the

financial information and timely produced what records he had. Juneau said

that, from June through December 2017, Castillo took draws totaling

$131,374.43 from CIR.

Dees, the liquidator, testified regarding the difficulties she

experienced in getting information from Castillo to dissolve L&C. She was

concerned that Castillo was diverting funds from L&C to CIR. Several

instances were discovered where that happened. In December 2017, Castillo

cut off her access to CIR’s accounting software, FreshBooks. Eventually,

her access was restored. She stated that Castillo never produced some of the

financial information requested. The information was received only after a

subpoena was issued to Castillo’s accountant. Dees also outlined the delays

in getting payment from Castillo on the initial invoice for her services. At

first, Castillo’s lawyer said she would get a check. Then she was told that

she would only be paid after the dissolution was complete. She then

received a series of partial payments. The second bill, for $13,206, was

5

submitted two months before the hearing and Castillo had not paid anything

on that.

Castillo testified that he had several conversations with Juneau about

getting materials together for the liquidator. He thought that Juneau was

supposed to produce everything he had to the trial court. Castillo said that

when Dees was cut off from access to FreshBooks for a time, that was done

by a technology consultant, Jack Haines. Castillo claimed he had no control

over that issue and Dees had to work the problem out with Haines.

Castillo was asked about his ability to pay the liquidator. He stated

his income for 2017 was $198,000, and that he takes draws of $9,000 to

$11,000 per month from CIR. However, he has to pay for his parents’

house, his own expenses, and child support. He also said he thought he did

not have to pay the liquidator’s bill until after all the work to dissolve L&C

was completed. Castillo admitted that he did not pay the liquidator’s initial

bill of $24,070.71 within five days of receipt of the invoice. He claimed that

he did not have the money and that he took out a loan for $10,000 to pay

half of the amount due.

After examination by his attorney and cross-examination by the

Davidsons’ attorney, the trial court stated that the door had been opened

regarding Castillo’s ability to pay Dees and the court needed to ask some

questions. After questions regarding Castillo’s business expenses, the

following colloquy occurred:

THE COURT: Now what about we’re still – Ms. Dees still has
a bill of thirteen two oh six and been pending since April 30th.
Are you gonna try to tell me that you don’t think you owe that
until I, you know, come to the threshold of holding you in
contempt?

6

THE WITNESS: No, sir. But I did not know and I’ve asked
[my lawyer] too when did I need to pay it. Because I would
pay but I don’t know if it’s due right now. I mean –

THE COURT: You don’t know if it’s due right now?

....

THE WITNESS: Now paying her, I don’t have an issue with it.

THE COURT: Do you understand, Mr. Castillo, that the costs
of the liquidator is a lot more than it had to be?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And why do you think that is?

THE WITNESS: I’m trying to give everything I can, Judge.

THE COURT: Mr. Castillo, it’s because of your behavior.

THE WITNESS: Well I mean I’ve tried – and they’re mixing
all of this up. You know, it’s –

THE COURT: I’ve already found you in contempt once.

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I suspended it.

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Gave you a purge opportunity and you
ultimately, after having had to come back to the court for an
additional couple of times in the contempt, you final[ly] cured
it.

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And here we are. And you’re still not paying.

THE WITNESS: I mean I’ll pay it. It’ll be paid.

THE COURT: Oh it’s [sic] be paid one way or another but
after you serve your ten days in jail, Mr. Castillo. The
previously suspended sentence of ten days of contempt is
hereby imposed upon you. You’re in contempt. You’re not
doing what you’re suppose [sic] to be doing.

MR. DENNY [counsel for Castillo]: Your honor, I was just
going to say, I wasn’t quite through but apparently –
7

THE COURT: Mr. Denny, what time do you have?

MR. DENNY: 6:06.

THE COURT: 6:06 p.m. We can go over this and we’ve had
pretrial conferences over it, we’ve gone on about it but I’ve
heard enough. And Mr. Castillo is in contempt of court. He
failed to comply with the Court’s orders and I have worked
with him as much as I could. You’re remanded to the custody
of the Sheriff.

After discussing with Castillo’s lawyer about considering a bond or a

purge amount, the trial court expressed concern over the fact that the

liquidator had not been paid. The trial court said:

[T]here still is a thirteen thousand two hundred and six dollar
liquidator invoice. The liquidator was appointed by the Court
and at the direction of the Court and the Court can’t appoint
people if the Court can’t make provisions for payment of those
services.

After ordering that the numerous exhibits referenced during the

testimony be admitted into evidence, the trial court had the following

conversation with Castillo’s attorney:

THE COURT: Did you have anything else you intended to
submit?

MR. DENNY: No.

THE COURT: That I have precluded you from submitting?

MR. DENNY: Well I was actually going to, it may not make a
big difference to the Court, but I mean he did give me his
personal accounts and I’m the one that told him not – I didn’t
produce them. I had them because I didn’t think they were
responsive.

THE COURT: I’m not of the opinion that the personal account
information or the lack of it being disclosed. I’m not
considering that at all to be an element of contempt.

MR. DENNY: Okay.

Although Castillo spent the night of June 21, 2018, in jail, the next

day he petitioned the trial court for a stay of the sentence on the contempt
8

ruling pending review by this court. The trial court granted the stay.

Castillo originally intended to seek review of the trial court ruling by filing a

writ application with this court. Castillo’s counsel later determined that an

appeal would be appropriate in this matter. On appeal, Castillo presents

several assignments of error.

PREVENTING THE DEFENDANT
FROM PRESENTING HIS CASE

Castillo argues that the trial court erred in rendering judgment before

the defendant was finished presenting his side of the case. This argument is

without merit.

Legal Principles

La. C.C.P. art. 191 states:

A court possesses inherently all of the power necessary for the
exercise of its jurisdiction even though not granted expressly
by law.

La. C.C.P. art. 1631(A) provides:

The court has the power to require that the proceedings shall be
conducted with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious
manner, and to control the proceedings at the trial, so that
justice is done.

The trial court has great discretion in directing the manner in which

proceedings are conducted, and only upon a showing of a gross abuse of that

discretion will the appellate court intervene. Succession of Houston, 52,181

(La. App. 2 Cir. 8/15/18), 253 So. 3d 836, writ denied, 2019-0458 (La.

5/20/19); Teague v. Teague, 44,005 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/25/08), 999 So. 2d

86.

La. C.E. art. 611 states, in pertinent part:

A. Control by court. Except as provided by this Article and
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 773, the parties to a
proceeding have the primary responsibility of presenting the
9

evidence and examining the witnesses. The court, however,
shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to:

(1) Make the interrogation and presentation effective for the
ascertainment of the truth;

(2) Avoid needless consumption of time; and

(3) Protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.

The relevant portion of La. C.E. art. 103 states:

A. Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon
a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial
right of the party is affected, and

(1) Ruling admitting evidence. When the ruling is one
admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to admonish
the jury to limit or disregard appears of record, stating the
specific ground of objection; or

(2) Ruling excluding evidence. When the ruling is one
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made
known to the court by counsel.

Discussion

Castillo contends that the cessation of the proceedings before he

finished presenting his side of the case constitutes reversible error.

Castillo’s attorney asserts that he was denied the opportunity to conduct

redirect examination of his client after the trial court’s questioning. The

attorney also argues that he was considering whether to re-call Dees in order

to explore whether she was biased. According to the attorney, once the court

ruled, finding Castillo in contempt, he was “on the spot” and did not have

time to determine whether to re-call Dees. Castillo contends that Dees’

testimony showed that she was becoming an advocate for the Davidsons and

“counsel should not have been deprived of the opportunity to explore this

issue at the hearing.” Castillo also considered asking Dees to separate her

charges for the contempt work from her charges for the liquidation work.
10

We first note that Castillo never raised an objection to the trial court’s

action in halting the proceedings and finding him in contempt of court.

Instead, although Castillo’s lawyer indicated he was not finished, he did not

object and did not tell the trial court that he intended to question his client

further or re-call Dees. Rather, when asked if he had anything else to offer,

Castillo indicated that he did not. Without a valid contemporaneous

objection to the trial court’s action, arguably, this assignment of error is not

properly before us.

However, even considering the merits, Castillo has failed to show that

the trial court abused its discretion in its conduct of the proceedings.

Castillo’s attorney did not inform the court that he had additional questions

to pose to his client. Castillo’s lawyer also does not argue what the

questioning would have included or how he was prejudiced by the

termination of the proceedings without additional questioning. The

argument by Castillo’s attorney that he was prevented from conducting a

redirect examination of his client is not supported by the record.

Regarding the decision as to whether to re-call Dees, Castillo does not

contend that he actually intended to re-call the witness and was deprived of

the opportunity to question her further. He merely urges on appeal that he

was contemplating re-calling her. The defense makes a hollow argument

that it was deprived of the opportunity to show that Dees was biased.

Castillo contends that the allegation of bias on the part of Dees was based

upon her testimony that she thought Castillo still possessed funds belonging

to L&C, but she could not prove that. He claims this statement shows that

Dees was acting as an advocate for the Davidsons. The record shows that

Castillo consented to the appointment of Dees as liquidator in this matter.
11

Further, the testimony by Dees, that she thought that Castillo had additional

funds belonging to L&C, was brought out on questioning by Castillo’s

lawyer. In discussing how customers of L&C were slow in paying, Dees

was asked by Castillo’s counsel, “And have you decided at this point

whether you’ve collected as much as you’re gonna collect or do you know at

this point?” Dees said, “I’ve come to a conclusion, yes sir.” When asked

what the conclusion was, Dees said, “Conclusion is that I still think that

there’s some money probably available at Castillo but I can’t prove it. And I

think I should move on.” Dees said she could not prove that money was

available because she did not have all the information to prove it, such as the

backs of deposit slips for June and July. Castillo’s attorney did not pursue

any questioning about alleged bias at that point and continued questioning

the witness about financial records and amounts paid by customers of L&C.

At the end of his questioning, Castillo’s lawyer asked for a moment, which

was granted. The lawyer then said that he had no further questions.

The record clearly shows that Castillo was not deprived of the

opportunity to cross-examine Dees on the issue of bias or any other issue.

Dees was called as a witness for the Davidsons. After being questioned by

their counsel, Dees was thoroughly cross-examined by Castillo’s attorney.

The trial court then asked Dees some questions and Castillo’s attorney was

allowed to ask additional questions. Castillo was afforded ample

opportunity to question this witness regarding any bias. He also had the

opportunity to ask her to separate the charges for her contempt work and the

liquidation work, but he failed to do so. Castillo simply was not deprived of

the right to cross-examine Dees. Therefore, the trial court’s action in

terminating the proceedings did not infringe on Castillo’s rights. The facts
12

of this case are distinguishable from those in which a party is entirely

precluded from cross-examining a witness. See and compare Smith v. Scott,

577 So. 2d 809 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1991); Labadot v. Labadot, 328 So. 2d 747

(La. App. 4 Cir. 1976).

As stated above, a trial court has the power to conduct the proceedings

with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner. The trial court may

also exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating

witnesses and presenting evidence so as to avoid the needless consumption

of time. Based upon our review of the record, we do not find that the trial

court’s actions in the conduct of this matter constituted a gross abuse of the

trial court’s great discretion in directing the manner in which the

proceedings were conducted.

FACTUAL BASIS FOR CONTEMPT

Castillo urges that the trial court erred in rendering a judgment of

contempt without specifying the factual basis for that determination, in a

judgment or in open court, as required by La. C.C.P. art. 225(B). This

argument is without merit.

Legal Principles

A contempt of court is any act or omission tending to obstruct or

interfere with the orderly administration of justice, or to impair the dignity of

the court or respect for its authority. Contempts of court are of two kinds,

direct and constructive. La. C.C.P. art. 221.

La. C.C.P. art. 224 provides, in pertinent part:

A constructive contempt of court is any contempt other than a
direct one.

Any of the following acts constitutes a constructive contempt of
court:
13

....

(2) Wilful disobedience of any lawful judgment, order,
mandate, writ, or process of the court;

.....

(10) Any other act or omission punishable by law as a contempt
of court, or intended to obstruct or interfere with the orderly
administration of justice, or to impair the dignity of the court or
respect for its authority, and which is not a direct contempt.

La. C.C.P. art. 225(B) provides:

If the person charged with contempt is found guilty the court
shall render an order reciting the facts constituting the
contempt, adjudging the person charged with contempt guilty
thereof, and specifying the punishment imposed.

The provisions of C.C.P. art. 225(B) are mandatory and must be

strictly construed. Havener v. Havener, 29,785 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/20/97),

700 So. 2d 533; Brown v. Brown, 493 So. 2d 671 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1986).

The failure of a trial court to recite facts constituting contempt mandates a

reversal of a judgment of contempt. Havener v. Havener, supra. However,

even when the district court fails to recite the facts constituting contempt in a

written order, the jurisprudence has recognized that this requirement is

satisfied if such facts are recited by the district court in open court. In re

Succession of LeBouef, 2013-0209 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/9/14), 153 So. 3d 527;

Garrett v. Andrews, 1999-1929 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/22/00), 767 So. 2d 941.

DISCUSSION

The hearing in this case concerned a motion for contempt alleging that

Castillo failed to comply with the trial court’s July 2017 order of dissolution;

the instructions given in the first contempt hearing; the order entered by the

trial court after the November 2017 hearing, set forth above; and the trial

court’s order issued on April 23, 2018, ordering Castillo to pay $24,070.71

14

in liquidator’s fees, to produce the general ledger, bank account

reconciliations, monthly profit and loss statements, and monthly balance

sheets. The testimony by Dees showed that Castillo did not promptly pay

the liquidator’s fees or produce the requested financial information. Juneau

testified that he never saw the trial court order and Castillo did not convey to

him a sense of urgency in producing the financial records ordered by the trial

court. The court also noted that Castillo still owed $13,206 in new

liquidator’s fees that were billed on April 30, 2018. Castillo had previously

been ordered to pay the liquidator’s fees and the trial court found that he had

failed to do so. The court pointed out that the liquidator’s fees were higher

than they had to be because of Castillo’s behavior. The record was replete

with instances in which Castillo failed to cooperate with the liquidator and

provide financial information as he had been ordered to do by the trial court.

The written judgment of contempt, signed on July 3, 2018, ordered

Castillo to pay the liquidator’s fees within five business days of the

judgment and to pay all future invoices within five business days of receipt

of future invoices. Castillo was ordered to provide Dees, within five

business days of the judgment, copies of all personal bank account

statements from June 1, 2017, through December 31, 2017, where those

accounts were used to pay the expenses of CIR, or revenue and funds of CIR

were deposited, along with complete copies of all cancelled checks and

deposit slips on any bank account utilized or maintained by CIR, as well as

any additional documents that CIR requested from the bank regarding its

bank accounts from June 1, 2017, through December 31, 2017.

The oral reasons and the written judgment show that Castillo was

found in contempt for failure to promptly pay liquidator’s fees and produce
15

the requested financial records as previously ordered by the trial court.

Therefore, this record establishes a factual basis for the judgment of

contempt.1

COSTS OF THE LIQUIDATOR

Castillo argues that the trial court erred in rendering a judgment

holding him liable for all costs, including all future costs, of the liquidator.

He urges that this requirement is overbroad and inappropriate. He claims the

proper remedy would be for the liquidator to separate her fees relating to the

contempt from the liquidation and he should only have to pay the fees

relating to the contempt. This argument is without merit.

Legal Principles

Regarding the penalties for contempt of court, La. R.S.

13:4611(1)(d)(i) provides:

Except as otherwise provided for by law:

(1) The supreme court, the courts of appeal, the district courts,
family courts, juvenile courts and the city courts may punish a
person adjudged guilty of a contempt of court therein, as
follows:

(d)(i) For any other contempt of court, including disobeying an
order for the payment of child support or spousal support or an
order for the right of custody or visitation, by a fine of not more
than five hundred dollars, or imprisonment for not more than
three months, or both.

A proceeding for contempt in refusing to obey the trial court’s orders is not

designed for the benefit of the litigant, though infliction of a punishment

may inure to the benefit of the mover in the rule. The object of the

proceeding is to vindicate the dignity of the court. Martin v. Martin, 37,958

1
This case is distinguishable from instances in which the reasons for a finding of
contempt cannot be ascertained from the record. See and compare Havener v. Havener,
supra; Brown v. Brown, supra; Garrett v. Andrews, supra; Gautreau v. Gautreau, 97-612
(La. App. 3 Cir. 10/8/97), 702 So. 2d 851.
16

(La. App. 2 Cir. 12/10/03), 862 So. 2d 1081, writ not cons., 2004-0481 (La.

3/12/04), 869 So. 2d 807.

Discussion

Castillo urges that, by ordering him to pay all the liquidator’s fees in

this matter, the trial court imposed upon him a fine for contempt of court that

exceeds the maximum $500 fine provided in La. R.S. 13:4611. Castillo

notes that the original order of contempt ordered him to pay “all of the costs

of the liquidator when that amount is finally determined.” However, he

maintains that the first motion for contempt prayed for the court to order

Castillo to “be solely responsible for all of the liquidator’s fees and expenses

incurred as a result of his failure to comply with this Court’s Order [of

dissolution] dated July 6, 2017.” Castillo urges that the first motion for

contempt did not request that he pay all the liquidator’s fees, regardless of

whether the fees and expenses would have been incurred in the normal

course of the liquidation. He asserts that the language of these orders and

pleadings caused him to believe that he was only required to pay the

liquidator’s fees “at the point when they are determined to be caused by the

contempt and payable.”

Based upon our review of the record, we are not persuaded that

Castillo’s interpretation of the trial court order is accurate. The requirement

that Castillo pay all of the liquidator’s fees does not constitute the imposition

of an excessive fine in violation of La. R.S. 13:4611. The order of

dissolution signed by the trial court on July 6, 2017, set forth the obligations

of the parties, including cooperating with the reasonable requests of the

liquidator. If a party failed to cooperate, the liquidator was to report the

noncompliance to the trial court, as she did in this case, regarding both
17

instances of contempt. The trial court was then empowered, by virtue of the

dissolution order, to “consider any and all appropriate sanctions and

remedies to be imposed against the non-cooperating party.” This provision

in the dissolution order gave the trial court the authority to order Castillo to

pay all the liquidator’s fees. In response to Castillo’s failure to promptly

turn over assets and financial information as required by the dissolution

order, he was found in contempt of court for the first time and ordered to pay

“all of the costs of the liquidator, when that amount is finally determined.”

This order did not differentiate between liquidator’s fees attributable to the

liquidation and those attributable to the contempt. Castillo did not object to

the entry of that order in the trial court and he did not appeal the order.

Therefore, the court’s order that Castillo pay all the liquidator’s fees is not

before this court for review.

However, Castillo argues that the order did not specify that he had to

pay the liquidator’s fees as they became due. In the Davidsons’ second

motion for contempt, they allege that, at the time of the entry of the first

judgment of contempt, the trial court imposed upon Castillo a fine of $500

and a jail sentence of ten days, but suspended the jail sentence on the

condition of payment of all the liquidator’s fees and attorney fees and costs.

According to the Davidsons’ pleading, at that time, the liquidator’s fees were

undetermined, but the trial court ordered that they be paid once they were

determined. The record shows that, since the entry of that judgment, the

liquidator submitted two separate invoices for payment of fees, accompanied

by detailed records documenting how the charges were determined. Castillo

finally paid the first invoice shortly before the hearing for the second motion

for contempt, but had not paid the second invoice in the amount of $13,206.
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In the second contempt judgment, which is currently before us on this

appeal, the trial court ordered Castillo to pay that invoice within five

business days from the entry of the judgment and to pay all future invoices

of the liquidator within five business days of the receipt of said future

invoices.2 The imposition of this requirement was within the trial court’s

authority to impose sanctions for noncompliance with reasonable requests of

the liquidator conferred in the order of dissolution. Upon the facts presented

here, we find no error in the trial court judgment requiring Castillo to pay the

liquidator’s fees.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court judgment

finding the defendant, Allan Neil Castillo, to be in constructive contempt of

court, ordering him to serve ten days in jail, and ordering him to pay the

future costs of the liquidator.3 Costs in this court are assessed to Allan Neil

Castillo.

AFFIRMED.

2
Castillo erroneously states in his brief that the trial court ordered him to “pay all
bills within five business days (not business days after receipt, but five business days
generally.)” The order specifically states that future invoices are to be paid within five
business days of receipt.

3
We note that the contempt judgment also ordered Castillo to pay the Davidsons’
attorney fees, court costs, and related expenses and to produce certain financial records
and documents. That portion of the judgment was not appealed and also remains a viable
portion of the trial court judgment.
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