State of Louisiana v. Robin Darrell Allen

Judgment rendered December 15, 2021.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 54,153-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

ROBIN DARRELL ALLEN Appellant

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Appealed from the
Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Bossier, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 228,447A

Honorable Michael O. Craig, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Douglas Lee Harville

J. SCHUYLER MARVIN Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

JOHN M. LAWRENCE
DALE N. MONTGOMERY, II
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before GARRETT, STEPHENS, and ROBINSON, JJ.

GARRETT, J.

The defendant, Robin Darrell Allen, was tried and convicted on a

charge of molestation of a juvenile. He was sentenced to eight years at hard

labor, to be served consecutively with any other sentence. The defendant

appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine

and allowing admission of evidence of other crimes which were more

serious than the conduct with which he was charged. We affirm the

defendant’s conviction and sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1997 and 1998, Allen babysat his daughter (who was born in late

1991) on several occasions while her mother, from whom Allen was

divorced, attended evening educational classes. According to the daughter’s

trial testimony, on one such occasion, she caught him watching a

pornographic video. He showed the video to her and masturbated in front of

her. On other occasions, he digitally penetrated her vagina and engaged in

oral sex with her. She told her mother about the video but not the sexual

contact. Thereafter, Allen was not allowed to be around her except in the

presence of another adult.

In about 2006, when the daughter was 15 years old, she came into

contact with Allen on a more regular basis. She visited him at his Minden

home when his girlfriend was present. Twice the daughter was at the

Minden house when the girlfriend was absent. On both occasions, Allen

engaged in sexual intercourse with her. Several years later, after the

daughter married, she told her mother all that had transpired between her and

Allen; her mother corroborated the conversation. At the time, the daughter

did not want to press charges.

In 2018, there was an incident when Allen entered the daughter’s

home uninvited. She contacted the police and told them everything Allen

had done to her. She met with Allen while wearing audio and video

surveillance equipment. During their conversation, he made extremely

explicit admissions pertaining to the inappropriate sexual conduct between

them that occurred when she was a teenager, including the fact that they had

sexual intercourse on his girlfriend’s bed. The police, who were surveilling

them for the daughter’s protection, took Allen into custody. Thereafter, he

was interviewed by Detective Tim Wooten of the Bossier Parish Sheriff’s

Office and gave a video-recorded statement. During the interview, Allen

stated that he was molested as a child, and he admitted molesting a 10-year-

old girl when he was about 14 years old. He denied ever touching or having

sex with his daughter. He also denied watching pornography with her and

said that he was unaware of her watching him masturbate. He said his

daughter had walked in on him while he was using the bathroom. When

informed of her exact claims, he said, “It is what it is,” and that it was his

word against hers. At the conclusion of the interview, the detective

informed Allen that he was seizing his cellphone. After initially denying

that he knew the passcode, Allen finally gave the passcode to the detective

and admitted that there was “a bunch” of pornography on his cellphone.

The record indicates that, in addition to molestation of a juvenile,

Allen was charged with several other offenses including unauthorized entry

of an inhabited dwelling and possession of pornography involving a

juvenile. As to the molestation charge, there were four different bills of

information filed. Two of them included charges pertaining to Allen’s

daughter and another victim. The charge pertaining to the other victim was
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eventually dismissed at the beginning of trial. The final bill of information,

which was filed just prior to the commencement of trial, addressed only the

charge pertaining to the daughter and stated that the offense occurred

between January 1, 1997, and December 31, 1998.

On October 7, 2020, Allen filed two motions in limine to exclude

“evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts.” One dealt with other crimes

mentioned in conversations between Allen and the daughter on a tape-

recorded phone call and on the hidden camera video. The other motion

recited that Allen had pending charges of unauthorized entry of an inhabited

dwelling, molestation of a juvenile, and possession of child pornography. It

stated that he gave a recorded statement to law enforcement which contained

information on other crimes he committed as a juvenile, as well as other

crimes “years apart” from the currently charged offenses. Both motions

sought exclusion of other crimes Allen committed that were “far apart in

time” from the currently charged cases and asserted that they should not be

admitted pursuant to the balancing test of La. C.E. art. 403.

Trial was set for October 12, 2020. Allen rejected a plea offer of

molestation of a juvenile with a 10-year sentencing cap; he was willing to

plead guilty to only the unauthorized entry charge. The state announced its

intention to try the defendant on the molestation and pornography charges.

However, the trial court granted Allen’s motion to sever, and trial proceeded

on just the molestation charge.

On October 13, 2020, the trial court heard Allen’s two motions in

limine. As to the motion pertaining to the hidden audio/video recording, the

defense argued that allowing evidence as to the 2006/2007 acts of sexual

intercourse would unduly prejudice Allen as to the 1997/1998 molestation
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charge. The state contended that, while prejudicial, the prejudice was

outweighed by the substantive value of showing that Allen was an

opportunist when it came to the daughter and that he would engage in this

sort of behavior when left alone with her. The trial court denied the motion,

finding that it was the same victim and showed a modus operandi or pattern.

As to the motion pertaining to Allen’s recorded statement to the police, the

trial court ruled that mention of other victims was inadmissible, as was

reference to Allen’s crimes as a juvenile. An agreement was reached

whereby the state would pause and forward through mention of crimes

involving other victims while playing the statement for the jury.

Evidence was presented on October 14, 2020. In addition to the

daughter and her mother, Detective Wooten also testified. The audio/video

recording of the daughter’s conversation with Allen was played for the jury

during her testimony, while Allen’s redacted video-recorded statement to

Detective Wooten was played during the detective’s testimony. The

defendant did not testify or present any evidence. The jury returned a

unanimous verdict of guilty as charged.

Allen filed motions for new trial and for post-verdict judgment of

acquittal, in which he contended that the jury should not have been allowed

to hear the other crimes evidence against him. In the latter, he also argued

that the testimony was inconsistent. Both motions were denied prior to

sentencing on January 14, 2021. The trial court sentenced Allen to serve

eight years at hard labor, to be served consecutively with any other sentence.

Allen appealed, contending that the trial court erred in admitting La.

C.E. art. 412.2 evidence that was more serious than the conduct with which

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he was charged and that the evidence was unduly prejudicial given its

remoteness in time to the charged act.

LAW

The defendant was charged pursuant to La. R.S. 14:81.2. At the time

of the alleged offense, it read, in relevant part, as follows:

A. Molestation of a juvenile is the commission by anyone over
the age of seventeen of any lewd or lascivious act upon the
person or in the presence of any child under the age of
seventeen, where there is an age difference of greater than two
years between the two persons, with the intention of arousing or
gratifying the sexual desires of either person, by the use of
force, violence, duress, menace, psychological intimidation,
threat of great bodily harm, or by the use of influence by virtue
of a position of control or supervision over the juvenile. Lack
of knowledge of the juvenile’s age shall not be a defense.

B. Whoever commits the crime of molestation of a juvenile
shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, or
imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not less than one nor
more than ten years, or both, provided that the defendant shall
not be eligible to have his conviction set aside or his
prosecution dismissed in accordance with the provisions of
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 893.

C. Whoever commits the crime of molestation of a juvenile
when the offender has control or supervision over the juvenile
shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars, or
imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not less than one nor
more than fifteen years, or both, provided that the defendant
shall not be eligible to have his conviction set aside or his
prosecution dismissed in accordance with Code of Criminal
Procedure Article 893.

La. C.E. art. 404(B) sets forth the general rule regarding other crimes

or acts:

B. Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. (1) Except as provided in
Article 412, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by
the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide
reasonable notice in advance of trial, of the nature of any such
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evidence it intends to introduce at trial for such purposes, or
when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the
act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding.

La. C.E. art. 412.2, which addresses admission of evidence of similar

crimes, wrongs, or acts in sex offense cases, states:

A. When an accused is charged with a crime involving sexually
assaultive behavior, or with acts that constitute a sex offense
involving a victim who was under the age of seventeen at the
time of the offense, evidence of the accused’s commission of
another crime, wrong, or act involving sexually assaultive
behavior or acts which indicate a lustful disposition toward
children may be admissible and may be considered for its
bearing on any matter to which it is relevant subject to the
balancing test provided in Article 403.

B. In a case in which the state intends to offer evidence under
the provisions of this Article, the prosecution shall, upon
request of the accused, provide reasonable notice in advance of
trial of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at
trial for such purposes.

C. This Article shall not be construed to limit the admission or
consideration of evidence under any other rule.1

Admission of the evidence still turns on the balancing test provided by

La. C.E. art. 403, which reads:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, or waste of time.

A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of other crimes evidence

will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. This same standard is

applied to rulings on the admission of other crimes evidence and evidence

under La. C.E. art. 412.2. State v. Robertson, 51,521 (La. App. 2 Cir.

8/16/17), 243 So. 3d 1196. The introduction of inadmissible other crimes

evidence results in a trial error subject to harmless error analysis on appeal.

1
This statute was enacted in 2001 and amended to its present version in 2004.
6

State v. Floyd, 51,869 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/27/18), 250 So. 3d 1165, writ

denied, 18-1292 (La. 2/25/19), 266 So. 3d 288; State v. Davis, 44,656 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 11/18/09), 26 So. 3d 802, writ denied, 09-2768 (La. 6/25/10), 38

So. 3d 355. In this context, the proper analysis for harmless error review is

“to determine whether the guilty verdict actually rendered at trial was surely

unattributable to the erroneous admission of La. C.E. art. 412.2 evidence.”

State v. Kurz, 51,781 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/18), 245 So. 3d 1219, writ

denied, 18-0512 (La. 1/18/19), 262 So. 3d 285, and writ denied, 18-0529

(La. 3/25/19), 267 So. 3d 598, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1624, 203 L. Ed. 2d

905 (2019).

DISCUSSION

In his sole assignment of error, Allen argues that the trial court erred

in admitting the evidence that he engaged in sexual intercourse with his

daughter when she was a teenager because it was more serious than the

conduct with which he was charged, molestation of the girl when she was

between the ages of five and seven. The victim testified that in 1997/1998

Allen masturbated in front of her, digitally penetrated her, and had her

perform oral sex on him. According to Allen, her testimony that he also had

vaginal intercourse with her twice in 2006/2007 (and presumably his own

recorded admissions to these acts) violated La. C.E. art. 403, as their

prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value. He requests that his

conviction be reversed, his sentence vacated, and the matter remanded for

further proceedings. In support of his argument, he cites State v. Jackson,

625 So. 2d 146 (La. 1993). However, he concedes that the jurisprudence has

ruled that the amendments to La. C.E. art. 412.2 have rendered the Jackson

analysis outdated. Nonetheless, he maintains that the only relevance for the
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other offenses is to show him to be a man of bad character and to undermine

the presumption of innocence with overly prejudicial evidence.

In its brief, the state contends that Allen was convicted by evidence

properly admitted pursuant to La. C.E. art. 412.2. It asserts that the evidence

admitted under that article passed the balancing test of La. C.E. art. 403.

Furthermore, the state points out that such admissibility determinations

should not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion and that La. C.E.

art. 412.2 does not limit admissibility of prior acts only to those identical or

similar in nature. We agree with the state.

In the Jackson case cited by Allen, which was rendered in 1993, a

defendant was charged with molesting his granddaughters by kissing them

and fondling their breasts. His prior actions of committing the same acts

against his daughters were deemed admissible, but alleged prior acts of

raping a daughter, showing his penis to another daughter, and fondling their

vaginas were inadmissible because they were “dissimilar and more serious

than the current criminal charges” and their prejudicial effect would

outweigh their probative value. Subsequently, the legislature enacted La.

C.E. art. 412.2. The jurisprudence has interpreted the statute as being

enacted to loosen restrictions on “other crimes” evidence and to allow

evidence of “lustful disposition” in cases involving sexual offenses. See

State v. Wright, 11-0141 (La. 12/6/11), 79 So. 3d 309; State v. Floyd, supra.

Furthermore, La. C.E. art. 412.2 does not limit the admissibility of prior acts

only to those identical or similar in nature. State v. Manson, 52,311 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 259 So. 3d 1172.

As noted above, in Allen’s statement to Detective Wooten, he denied

committing the instant offense and said it was his word against his
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daughter’s. All of the evidence of sexually assaultive acts that the trial court

allowed the state to present in the instant case involved the same victim.

The trial court excluded any other evidence. Under La. C.E. art. 412.2 and

the current jurisprudence, there was no requirement that the evidence meet a

stringent similarity requirement for admissibility. While prejudicial, the acts

were substantially probative to demonstrate Allen’s opportunistic propensity

to engage in sexual activity with his daughter on occasions when he had

unsupervised access to her. We find that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in ruling that the evidence was admissible. This assignment of

error lacks merit.

ERROR PATENT

Review of the record reveals several errors patent. First, the

defendant’s motion for new trial was denied at the sentencing hearing.

There was no 24-hour sentencing delay or waiver of same as required by La.

C. Cr. P. art. 873. However, Allen did not object to the failure to observe

the 24-hour sentencing delay after the denial of the motion for new trial and

there is no showing of prejudice. Therefore, the trial court’s failure to

observe the sentencing delay was harmless error. State v. Lewis, 53,122 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 1/15/20), 289 So. 3d 661.

The trial court did not properly advise Allen of the prescriptive period

for seeking post-conviction relief (“PCR”), as required by La. C. Cr. P. art.

930.8(C). Therefore, we advise Allen, by way of this opinion, that no

application for PCR shall be considered if it is filed more than two years

after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under La.

C. Cr. P. arts. 914 or 922. State v. Kelly, 52,731 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/26/19),

277 So. 3d 855, writ denied, 19-01845 (La. 6/3/20), 296 So. 3d 1071.
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The record indicates that the trial court failed to provide Allen with

written notice of the sex offender registration requirements set forth in La.

R.S. 15:540, et seq. Molestation of a juvenile is defined as a sex offense

under La. R.S. 15:541. La. R.S. 15:543 requires that the trial court provide

written notice of the registration and notification requirements to a defendant

convicted of a sex offense and that an entry be made in the court minutes

stating that the written notification was provided to the defendant.

Accordingly, we remand this matter to the trial court for the purpose of

providing the appropriate written notice to Allen of the sex offender

registration requirements on his conviction and for the filing of written proof

of such notice in the record of the proceedings. State v. Pittman, 51,602 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 4/11/18), 244 So. 3d 830, writ denied, 18-0701 (La. 10/15/18),

253 So. 3d 1307.

We also note the following error on the defendant’s uniform

sentencing commitment order: in Section “B. SENTENCE,” the form

indicates that he pled guilty (“PG”), whereas there was a guilty verdict

(“Verdict”). On remand, the trial court is ordered to correct this error.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the conviction and sentence of the defendant, Robin Darrell

Allen. We remand this matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of

providing the defendant with the appropriate written notice of the sex

offender registration requirements. The trial court is further directed to

correct the defendant’s uniform sentencing commitment order as specified

above.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED; REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

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