Succession of Manmohan Singh Dhaliwal Succession of Kailash K. Dhaliwal

Judgment rendered March 1, 2023.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 54,932-CA
No. 54,933-CA
(Consolidated Cases)

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

No. 54,932-CA No. 54,933-CA

SUCCESSION OF MANMOHAN SUCCESSION OF
SINGH DHALIWAL KAILASH K. DHALIWAL
Plaintiff-Appellee Plaintiff-Appellee

****

Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana
Trial Court Nos. 2010-4412
and 2015-1413

Honorable Alvin R. Sharp, Judge

*****

MAHINDERPAL “PAUL” SINGH In Proper Person,
DHALIWAL Intervenor/Appellant

HUDSON, POTTS & BERNSTEIN, LLP Counsel for Appellees,
By: Margaret H. Pruitt Succession of
Jan P. Christiansen, III Manmohan Singh
G. Adam Cossey Dhaliwal,
Succession of Kailash K.
Dhaliwal,
Simran Dhaliwal Emaus

KARMINDERAL “KARL” S. DHALIWAL In Proper Person,
Appellee

DHILLON SOOKHAM DHALIWAL In Proper Person,
Appellee
*****

Before THOMPSON, HUNTER, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

MARCOTTE, J

These consolidated appeals arise from the Fourth Judicial District

Court, Parish of Ouachita, the Honorable Alvin R. Sharp presiding.

Mahinderpal Singh Dhaliwal (“Paul”), in proper person, appeals two

judgments denying: 1) his objection to the final accounting and tableau of

distribution in his father’s succession and the accountings in his mother’s

succession; 2) his motion to recuse and/or disqualify the succession

representative; and 3) and his motion to subpoena and depose succession

counsel. For the following reasons the trial court’s rulings are affirmed.

This is the fifth appeal involving the Dhaliwal family. See Dhaliwal

v. Dhaliwal (Dhaliwal I), 48,034 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/11/13), 124 So. 3d 470,

writ denied, 13-2931 (La. 2/21/14), 134 So. 3d 1165; Dhaliwal v. Dhaliwal

(Dhaliwal II), 49,973 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/25/15), 184 So. 3d 773, writ

denied, 16-0236 (La. 4/4/16), 190 So. 3d 1204; Dhaliwal v. Dhaliwal

(Dhaliwal III), 52,507 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/19), 265 So. 3d 1188, writ

denied, 19-00700 (La. 9/6/19), 278 So. 3d 373; and Dhaliwal v. Dhaliwal

(Dhaliwal IV), 54,502 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/15/22), 342 So. 3d 402.

The following facts are taken from the prior appeals. Members of the

Dhaliwal family own multiple convenience stores in Ouachita Parish. Dr.

Manmohan S. Dhaliwal (“Manmohan”) and Dr. Kailash K. Dhaliwal

(“Kailash”) had two sons, Karl and Paul. Karl is married to Dhillon

Sookham (“Sookham”); they have a daughter, Simran Dhaliwal Emaus

(“Simran”). Manmohan died intestate in June 2010, and his widow, Kailash,

was named administrator of his succession. Following Manmohan’s death,

litigation over the convenience stores commenced.

Kailash and Manmohan’s succession sued Karl and Sookham for a

detailed accounting of the convenience store joint venture allegedly

involving Karl and his parents, as well as recovery of damages. The trial

court granted summary judgment in favor of Karl and Sookham, as well as

an exception of prescription they filed. In Dhaliwal I, we reversed both

rulings and remanded for further proceedings.1

Thereafter, Kailash, who was elderly, informed her attorneys, Robert

A. Lee (“Atty. Lee”) and Sedric E. Banks (“Atty. Banks”), that she wished

to dismiss her lawsuit against Karl and Sookham, who at some point had

become her caretakers. In 2011, Paul entered Chapter 7 bankruptcy;

Clifford Conine was the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee. Attys. Lee and Banks

sought and received appointment as special counsel to investigate what

interest Paul – and, by extension, the bankruptcy trustee – might have in the

lawsuit. Kailash filed a motion to substitute counsel, which was granted

after the trial court met with Kailash privately and determined that she had

full mental capacity and was not unduly influenced. Her motion to dismiss

her claims in the case was granted; however, the claims she filed against

Karl and Sookham on behalf of Manmohan’s succession were not dismissed.

Attys. Lee and Banks petitioned to intervene, asserting various claims

against Kailash, Karl, and Sookham for conspiracy to breach the fiduciary

duty owed by Kailash as the succession representative, collusion, and

tortious interference. Kailash filed a motion to dismiss the petition for

intervention and a motion to disqualify her former attorneys from

1
Paul filed a petition of intervention in which he sought to join with the plaintiff
in demanding his portion of the same relief against the defendants. The trial court denied
the request to intervene. That ruling was not an issue in Dhaliwal I.
2

representing Paul and Conine in the lawsuit. The trial court granted

Kailash’s motion to disqualify her former attorneys from representing Paul

and the trustee in the case. It also granted the motion to dismiss the petition

to intervene, in part, and denied the motion in part, stating Attys. Lee and

Banks could claim their privilege arising from the contingency fee contract

on any funds ultimately awarded to the plaintiff.

Attys. Lee and Banks then filed a “Petition for Direct Action, Oblique

Action and Revocatory Action,” against Kailash, Karl, and Sookham

claiming that Kailash’s dismissal of her individual lawsuit against Karl and

Sookham resulted in her being unable to pay her attorney fees under their

contingency contract. Kailash filed a peremptory exception of no cause of

action, which was denied by the trial court. Karl and Sookham filed

declinatory and peremptory exceptions of lis pendens, res judicata,

prescription, no right of action, no cause of action, and vagueness. The trial

court granted the exceptions of no right of action and no cause of action.

Attys. Lee and Banks appealed the judgments dismissing their lawsuits

against Kailash, Karl, and Sookham, as well as the judgment granting the

motion to disqualify them as attorneys for Paul and Conine. We affirmed

the trial court judgments. See Dhaliwal II. Atty. Banks was later disciplined

by the Louisiana Supreme Court’s Office of Disciplinary Counsel regarding

his actions in the matter. See In re Banks, 22-0073 (La. 5/13/22), 339 So. 3d

1152.

Following Kailash’s death in April 2015, Karl was initially named

independent administrator in his mother’s succession, but was removed.

Simran was then named independent administrator in Kailash’s succession

and succession representative in Manmohan’s succession. In that capacity,
3

Simran filed a motion to dismiss Manmohan’s succession’s lawsuit against

Karl and Sookham. As an heir to the succession, Paul filed an opposition to

the motion to dismiss. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the

motion to dismiss, finding that there was not enough evidence that an oral

joint venture existed, that the suit was doomed to fail, and that proceeding

with the lawsuit would waste the successions’ assets. Paul appealed. We

affirmed the trial court’s judgment. See Dhaliwal III.

In May 2016, the bankruptcy judge signed an order providing that,

upon the closing of Paul’s case, the bankruptcy estate’s interest in Paul’s

claims in his father’s succession would not be abandoned and that the trustee

was authorized to reopen the bankruptcy case if a meaningful judgment was

rendered in the bankruptcy estate’s favor.

In August 2020, Paul, acting in proper person and proceeding in

forma pauperis, filed a “Re-stated Petition” in both of his parents’

successions and in Kailash’s suit against Karl and Sookham. Named as

defendants were Karl, Sookham, Simran (as succession representative of

both her grandparents’ successions), and the attorneys for his parents’

successions, Margaret Blackwell Pruitt, G. Adam Cossey, and J.P.

Christiansen (“the Attorneys”). He stated that he filed a petition in 2016 to

annul his mother’s will and since then he had discovered “additional facts

and multiple causes of action.” Specifically, Paul made the following claims

against the defendants:

1) Simran: breach of fiduciary duty and loyalty, conspiracy to
commit the same, and fraud and ill practices;

2) Succession attorneys Margaret Blackwell Pruitt and G.
Adam Cossey: the same as alleged against Simran, as well as
legal malpractice; and

4

3) Karl: fraud, conspiracy, and undue influence.2

Paul also claimed that Simran and the Attorneys failed their statutory

accounting duties, mismanaged the successions, allowing the successions’

assets to deteriorate and lose value, paid needless expenses to maintain the

successions’ assets, and failed to close both successions as soon as possible.

Paul made numerous allegations against Karl, who cared for their

mother while Paul served a 23-month prison term for violating federal

immigration law. According to Paul, Kailash was a “captive” of Karl and

that due to Karl’s “domineering control” of her, her will should be annulled.

Paul also accused the Attorneys of having documents, including banking

records, that demonstrated that their parents owned the family business in

three equal shares with Karl and that Karl converted cash from their parents’

bank accounts. He asserted that Attys. Cossey and Pruitt secretly served as

“dogs in the manger” in his parents’ successions, while actually representing

Karl as their real client. He contended that the Attorneys and Simran

breached a fiduciary duty owed to him as an heir in his father’s succession

and a legatee in his mother’s succession.3

The Attorneys filed peremptory exceptions of no right of action, no

cause of action, and res judicata to the Re-Stated Petition, which were

sustained following a hearing. The trial court then issued written reasons for

judgment in which it stated that, since Paul filed for bankruptcy after his

2
In 2015, Paul filed a lawsuit against Karl, Simran, the Attorneys, and the
Attorneys’ law firm in which he raised many of the same claims. The suit, Paul
Dhaliwal versus Karminder Dhaliwal, trial court docket no. 2015-3432, was dismissed
with prejudice after the trial court sustained exceptions of no cause of action, no right of
action, and res judicata. Paul did not appeal that decision.
3
Paul was a legatee under his mother’s will wherein he was bequeathed only a
partial interest in real estate located in Jackson, Mississippi.
5

father’s death, all of his asserted rights arising from the father’s succession

constituted property of the Chapter 7 Trustee. Additionally, the trial court

found that only the succession representative had a right to assert a claim

belonging to the succession. As a result, Paul had neither a right of action

nor a cause of action.

The trial court signed judgments in the three cases dismissing Paul’s

claims against the Attorneys with prejudice and without leave to amend at

Paul’s cost, and Paul appealed solely those judgments.4 We affirmed the

trial court’s judgments finding that: 1) any right of action Paul possessed to

file a claim in Manmohan’s succession belonged to the bankruptcy trustee;

and 2) Paul could not bring claims against the succession attorneys, because

it is the succession representative that is the proper plaintiff while a

succession is under administration. See Dhaliwal IV.

On March 10, 2021, Simran filed the following in her grandparents’

respective successions:

1) a final accounting in Manmohan’s succession which
included liabilities in the form of attorney fees owed to the
Attorneys, related to the administration of Manmohan’s
succession and Dhaliwal II. The liabilities exceed the assets in
Manmohan’s succession;

2) an accounting in Kailash’s succession which included
liabilities in the form of attorney fees owed to the Attorneys
related to the administration of Kailash’s succession and
Dhaliwal II. The accounting includes a note stating that a prior
accounting showed that Manmohan’s succession owed
Kailash’s succession $15,138.22, but the asset was deleted from
the accounting, as Manmohan’s succession lacked sufficient
funds to pay the debt.

3) a final tableau of distribution in Manmohan’s succession, in
which funds garnered from the sale of immovable property

4
Similar exceptions were filed by Simran on behalf of the successions, and they
were also sustained by the trial court.
6

belonging to his estate were distributed. Those distributions
included:

a) $10,500 to Karl for funeral expenses;

b) $41,043.03 to the Attorneys for fees related to
administration of the estate; and

c) $41,960.54 to the Attorneys for fees related to
Dhaliwal II.

The tableau included a note that the final accounting in
Manmohan’s succession showed that attorney fees owed
to the Attorneys related to Dhaliwal II totaled more than
$57,562.32, and that those fees were reduced by
$17,711.07 due to lack of funds in the estate; and

4) a first tableau of distribution in Kailash’s succession which
disbursed funds belonging to her estate to pay various debts
including:

a) $14,550.25 to the Attorneys for fees related to
administration of Kailash’s succession; and

b) $15,110 to the Attorneys for fees related to Dhaliwal
II.

On March 11, 2021, the trial court signed a judgment homologating

the final tableau in Manmohan’s succession.

On March 19, 2021, Paul filed in both successions a document styled,

“Objection to Final Accounting and Tableau of Distribution Filed March 10,

2022, and Motion to Recuse and/or Disqualify Succession Counsel for

Concealed Incurable Conflict of Interest; Collection/Payment of Unearned

Legal Fees; Willful Accounting Failures; Conspired Breach of Fiduciary

Duty; and Obstruction, if Not Spoliation of Prima Facie Evidence, Namely

Succession Counsels’ Emails with Karl Dhaliwal, Together with Inter Alia

Supporting Memorandum.” In that document Paul objected to the attorney

fees listed in both estates’ accountings, arguing that the Attorneys did not

include hourly billing statements in his parents’ successions. Paul alleged

7

fraud and ill practices, and said that the Attorneys were prohibited from

recovering due to the “unclean hands doctrine.” Paul sought: 1) a “proper

accounting” of monies deposited in the Attorneys’ accounts pertaining to the

two successions or Karl; 2) “disgorgement and denial of all fees” to the

Attorneys and Simran; and 3) attorney fees.

Paul also sought to have Simran removed as the succession

representative and the Attorneys removed as succession counsel, for breach

of fiduciary duty, fraud, and ill practices. Paul asserted that Simran and the

Attorneys:

1) failed to provide yearly accountings in his parents’
successions and that “source documents are missing, along with
succession assets.” Paul then stated, “No details are provided,
including without limitation, receipts, deposit slips, bank
account statements, reconciliations, loan histories, ledger
sheets, appraisal of commercial properties, expert reports,
reconciliations, etc., thereby rendering the ‘final’ accounting
meaningless”;

2) conspired to engage in and conceal conflicts of interest by:

a) secretly representing Karl and obtaining his approval
to sue Paul in Dhaliwal II;

b) attempting to collect unearned fees which were not
disclosed in the successions’ accountings and making
imprudent expenses “which will be more particularly
shown with discovery”;

c) omitting succession assets and claims in accountings;

d) accepting “secret payments of attorney fees and court
costs”;

e) converting succession assets and failing to prevent
loss, waste, and abuse of succession assets; and

f) “Spoliated, if not obstructed [Paul’s] right to prima
facie evidence of fraud, ill practice and willful violation
of conflict rules, namely email communications
[between] Atty. Pruitt and Karl [regarding] timeline of
dismissal of my fiduciary suit.”

8

Simran filed an opposition in both successions stating that Paul’s

claims made in his objection to the accountings were barred by res judicata.

Simran argued that Paul’s re-argued claims were considered and denied in

Paul’s 2015 suit against Karl, Simran, and the Attorneys and in Dhaliwal IV.

Simran attached a petition filed by Paul in Dhaliwal v. Dhailiwal, dated

November 10, 2015, in which he named Karl, Simran, and the Attorneys as

defendants, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty, collusion, and “mental

torture.” In the petition, Paul also complained about the Attorneys’ fees

related to Kailash’s succession.

Simran also argued that the failure to file annual accountings in either

succession is not grounds for removal of a succession representative.

Simran stated that Kailash’s succession is under independent administration

and an independent administrator is not required to file an interim

accounting. Simran argued that Paul never filed a motion to demand an

annual accounting, as provided in La. C.C.P. art. 3331. In the case of

Manmohan’s succession, Simran stated that she was required to file an

annual accounting, but her failure to do so is not grounds for her removal as

succession representative, because the trial court did not order her to do so.

Paul replied and stated that he had repeatedly asked for accountings in

both successions “to no avail.” He stated that his parents’ home and his

father’s car were left to deteriorate and lose value. Paul also claimed that

funds from the succession were “accidentally” deposited in Simran’s

personal account, showing that she has not prudently managed the

successions.

On March 22, 2021, the trial court signed a judgment homologating

the first tableau of distribution in Kailash’s succession.
9

On April 5, 2021, Paul filed a request in both successions for Atty.

Pruitt to be issued a subpoena duces tecum ordering her to produce emails

between herself and Karl related to the successions and her billings in the

successions, documents related to legal fees Karl paid to her, and documents

detailing any funds paid to the Attorneys’ law firm related to court costs paid

in the successions. The Attorneys complied with Paul’s request and

provided him with their bills related to the successions.

On April 19, 2021, Paul filed in both successions a “Motion to

Compel Discovery on Objections to Final Accounting and Discovery on

Objections to Tableau of Distribution with Supporting Memorandum.” In

that motion, Paul stated that he was entitled to depose the Attorneys relative

to their billings in his parents’ successions and any monies received from

Karl. Simran opposed the motion to compel stating that it was not the

correct procedural posture under La. C.E. art. 508 and Paul could not meet

that burden required by Article 508. The Attorneys asked that the trial court

sanction Paul.

On June 1, 2021, Paul filed a “Motion and Memorandum to Compel

Discovery and for La. Code of Evidence Article 508 Hearing to Depose

Succession Counsel.” Paul argued that La. C.E. art. 508 was inapplicable,

because succession counsel did not have “clean hands,” and were not

entitled to legal fees “while practicing and concealing conflicts of interest

and collusion.” Paul stated that court documents showed that the Attorneys

paid more than $30,000 in court costs “to Karl on my behalf,” but there is no

documentation showing from where that money came. Paul again alleged

that Atty. Pruitt and Karl improperly communicated regarding the

successions and that Atty. Christiansen represented Karl in an unrelated suit.
10

Simran opposed Paul’s motion arguing that Paul could not meet the

burden provided in La. C.E. art. 508 in order to depose succession counsel,

because: 1) it is barred by res judicata, as Paul raised the same claims in an

earlier suit; 2) the “clean hands” doctrine is inapplicable to the case; 3)

Paul’s questioning of succession counsel would delve into confidential

matters between Simran, the successions’ representative and client of the

Attorneys; 4) Paul has never been able to show evidence of conflict,

collusion, breach of fiduciary duty, or cover up, and his claims are

speculative; and 5) the information he seeks may be obtained through other

means, such as deposing Simran, which Paul had not done. Simran again

asked for an award of sanctions.

Paul replied and argued that his claims were not barred by res

judicata, because the trial court had not ruled on whether the Attorneys can

be paid legal fees for “violating professional rules…including ignoring

annual succession accounting fees, collusion, forgeries, etc.” Paul stated,

“Cross-examination of succession counsel on their itemized hourly billings

and ‘privileged’ documents/communications proves such wrongdoing.”

Paul contended that there was no legal support for Simran’s argument that

the clean hands doctrine was inapplicable or that the matters were

confidential when the Attorneys “violated professional rules.”

Paul then sought to depose Simran and requested that she produce

bank records and cancelled checks related to the successions and provide

reasons why certain deposits and payments were made. On July 30, 2021,

Paul filed a motion to hold Simran in contempt and to compel discovery

regarding the successions’ accountings. Paul stated that Simran refused to

11

comply with a subpoena duces tecum issued on July 14, 2021, which ordered

her to provide documents “missing from responses to my discovery.”

On September 7, 2021, Paul filed a request with the trial court for a

subpoena duces tecum ordering the Louisiana Supreme Court Office of

Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) to provide him with cancelled checks signed

by Karl payable to the Attorneys and/or their law firm, and all

communications pertaining to the same. He also requested that an additional

subpoena duces tecum be issued to Simran to provide documents related to:

1) any agreement regarding attorney fees in the successions; 2) any

cancelled checks, receipts, or evidence of payments to Atty. Pruitt signed by

Karl; 3) any documentation of the payment of court costs related to the

successions; 4) all responsive documents to written discovery requests

Simran “has been working on for [the] past few months”; and 5)

communications, notes, and files pertaining to conflicts of interest of the

Attorneys.

The ODC objected to the subpoena arguing confidentiality, that

complying with the subpoena was burdensome, and that the documents are

in the possession of Paul’s counsel, Atty. Banks, or Atty. Banks’ counsel,

Attorney Joseph Ward, or were a matter of public record. The ODC did

provide email threads between Atty. Pruitt and Robert Kennedy, which

included copies of 11 checks, some of which were introduced into evidence

at Atty. Banks’ disciplinary hearing. The checks are made out to Atty. Pruitt

and are signed by Kailash and Karl. The checks are dated prior to Kailash’s

death. The account holders are listed as Karl and Kailash. The checks state

that they are for “1200.010.”

12

On September 27, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on the various

motions. Simran testified regarding the estate accounting in Manmohan’s

succession. Paul questioned her about whether she got court approval for

repairs made to her grandparents’ home. Paul also questioned Simran about

the checks signed by Kailash and Karl made out to the Attorneys. Simran

was unfamiliar with the checks and stated that those were regarding

Manmohan’s succession. Atty. Pruitt clarified that the number “1200.010”

was related to the Attorneys’ representation of Kailash in Dhaliwal I and not

to either succession. Atty. Pruitt stated that she represented Kailash in that

case, which is why it is not reflected in any succession accounting. Atty.

Pruitt stated that she has not been paid for any of the work she has done in

any succession proceeding. The trial court sustained the objections filed by

the ODC and took the other matters under advisement.

On October 17, 2021, the trial court signed a judgment denying Paul’s

“Objection to Final Accounting and Tableau of Distribution Filed March 10,

2021” and his “Motion to Recuse and/or Disqualify Succession

Representative and Succession Counsel.” On November 9, 2021, pertinent

to these appeals, the trial court signed a judgment denying Paul’s “Motion to

Compel Discovery and for Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 508 Hearing

to Depose Succession Counsel.” Paul now appeals.

DISCUSSION

Assignment of Error No. One: Whether the trial court erred when it denied
appellant’s objections to the successions’ accountings, “which did not meet
the requirements of La. C.C.P. art. 3333, and homologated vague, false,
incomplete, and inaccurate accountings with no supporting documents.”

Paul again argues that his mother’s succession does not include a

detailed descriptive list. Paul states that neither of his parents’ successions

13

shows documentation required by La. C.C.P. art. 3333 and does not show

the source of the funds and identity of the persons receiving payments from

the successions. Paul contends that Simran never produced receipts for any

repairs made to her grandparents’ home, the costs were not produced in any

accounting, and she did not get court approval to make the repairs. Paul

complains that there is no documentation regarding a $15,138.22 debt that

Manmohan’s succession owes Kailash. Paul again argues that Simran

mismanaged her grandparents’ succession and allowed the assets in both to

decrease in value.

Appellees argue that Paul has improperly raised an objection to the

accountings under La. C.C.P. art. 3333, because he did not first raise that

argument with the trial court and cannot do so for the first time on appeal.

Appellees argue that, as an independent administrator in Kailash’s

succession, Simran was not required to file an accounting or detailed

descriptive list. Appellees state that the accountings are complete and the

record shows how the accountings track the changes in accounts and

property, including assets and liabilities.

Appellees explain that the accounting in Manmohan’s succession

included a liability in the amount of $30,276.43, which was a mortgage on

Manmohan’s community property home that he shared with Kailash, making

it a community obligation. The debt was originally not classified as a

community debt and was fully satisfied by Kailash’s succession. A later

accounting in Manmohan’s succession then contained a liability owed to

Kailash’s succession for $15,138.22, which represents 50% of the

$30,276.43 community obligation. Appellees state that Simran was not

14

required to get court approval simply to list the debt on the final accounting

of Manmohan’s succession.

La. C.C.P. art. 3333 states:

An account shall show the money and other property received
by and in the possession of the succession representative at the
beginning of the period covered by the account, the revenue,
other receipts, disbursements, and disposition of property
during the period, and the remainder in his possession at the
end of the period.

Paul’s argument that Simran did not include “source documents” in

the final accounting in Manmohan’s succession does not constitute an

objection under La. C.C.P. art. 3333, as that article does not require that such

documents be included in any accounting. Paul did not raise an objection to

the accountings under La. C.C.P. art. 3333 with the trial court, and he cannot

do so for the first time with this court. As a general rule, appellate courts

will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. JPS Equip., LLC

v. Cooper, 50,506 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/24/16), 188 So. 3d 1106.

Paul’s argument that Simran paid an unauthorized debt to Kailash’s

succession is unfounded. The accounting from both successions show that a

community debt was erroneously classified as a separate obligation and was

paid in full by Kailash’s succession. The error was corrected and 50% of the

amount was included as an obligation owed to Kailash’s succession in later

accountings. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error No. Two: Whether the trial court erred when it
approved and homologated a final accounting which did not include a
“credit” for attorney fees “secretly” paid to the succession counsel with
“unclean hands” by engaging in: “aiding and concealing conflicts of interest,
false accounting, breach of fiduciary duty, as well as, violation of statutory
duties of a succession representative.”

Paul argues that the attorney fees shown in the accounting are

incomplete and the record includes no attorney fee agreement. Paul again
15

asserts that the unclean hands doctrine is applicable here for breaches of

professional and fiduciary duties. Paul references nine “secret” checks that

were paid to Atty. Pruitt by Karl which were not included in any accounting.

Paul states that some of the checks are unaccounted for, and the trial court

erred in approving the accounting without seeing an attorney agreement or

the total amount of attorney fees received. Paul alleges that his mother’s

signature was forged on the checks provided by ODC. Paul claims that the

Attorneys mailed billings to Karl at his home address “in order to obtain

Karl’s approval of what was done (and charged for) in the suit against him,

before such bills were paid.” Paul alleges that Atty. Pruitt lied in discovery

responses.

Appellees argue that the unclean hands doctrine has no application to

the issues on appeal, because the doctrine concerns the nullity of contracts,

legal counsel is not a plaintiff in these succession proceedings, and there is

no alleged breach of contract claim. Appellees contend that lack of a written

contract for legal representation does not invalidate the accountings, because

an oral contract for legal representation is valid.

Appellees contend that Paul does not have standing to challenge the

existence of a contract for legal representation in these successions, because

he is not a party to the contract; it is only the administrator who may bring

such a claim, and Simran does not deny the existence of an oral contract for

legal representation with the Attorneys. Appellees point out that Paul did

not cross-examine Simran about the contract for legal representation during

the September 27, 2021, hearing. Appellees further point out that Paul never

sought to challenge the appropriateness of the fees and the representation.

16

Appellees state that the successions have been before this court five

times, there were two additional lawsuits in which either succession was a

party, and Paul filed numerous objections and continuances in the

successions, which explains the legal fees.

Appellees aver that there have never been secret payments in the

form of nine checks from Karl to the Attorneys in his father’s succession.

The Attorneys state that there were nine checks in the amount of $7,500,

paid by Kailash during her lifetime to the Attorneys for personally

representing her in Dhaliwal I.

The clean hands doctrine, also referred to as the unclean hands

doctrine, is recognized as a defense in Louisiana. The doctrine holds that a

person cannot maintain an action if, in order to establish his cause of action,

he must rely in whole or in part, on any illegal or immoral act or transaction

to which he is a part. See Bossier Par. Sch. Bd. v. Pioneer Credit Recovery,

Inc., 49,525 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/15), 161 So. 3d 1007.

The unclean hands doctrine is inapplicable here. The Attorneys have

a contract for legal representation with Simran as the successions’

representative. Furthermore, the Attorneys are not parties to these

proceedings. Paul references nine “secret” checks, but the only checks

produced are those that Kailash wrote during her lifetime to the Attorneys as

payment for legal representation in Dhaliwal I. Kailash was free to spend

her money how she wanted to during her lifetime, and the funds represented

by those checks do not form part of her estate. Paul argues that the checks

are evidence of collusion between Karl and the Attorneys simply because

Karl signed the checks with Kailash and the payments to the Attorneys came

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out of their joint account. The existence of the checks does not amount to

evidence of fraud or collusion. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignment of Error No. Three: Whether the trial court erred when it denied
appellant’s motion for leave to subpoena and depose succession counsel
limited to their billings.

Paul argues that he should be able to depose the Attorneys regarding

their billings to the successions and why the attorney fees already paid were

not credited to the succession. Paul argues his mother is deceased, so

attorney-client privilege does not apply.

Appellees state that the trial court was correct to deny Paul’s 508

motion, because the deposition sought confidential information protected by

attorney-client privilege, the information is not essential to his claim, and the

information may be obtained through the deposition of non-attorneys.

Appellees contend that La. C.E. art. 508 strictly limits the issuance of

subpoenas to compel the testimony of an attorney where the information

sought was obtained in the course of representation of a client. Appellees

argue Paul’s Article 508 motion is barred by res judicata and represents

Paul’s attempt to relitigate claims of fraud and collusion on behalf of the

Attorneys in the 2015 case where Paul sued his brother.

Appellees also argue there is no basis for Paul’s fraud allegations

which would justify granting a 508 motion. Appellees further argue that the

death of a client does not terminate attorney-client privilege unless the issue

involves a decedent’s capacity to make a donation, an issue that is not before

the court.

La. C.E. art. 508(A) states:

Neither a subpoena nor a court order shall be issued to a lawyer
or his representative to appear or testify in any civil or juvenile
proceeding, including pretrial discovery, or in an administrative
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investigation or hearing, where the purpose of the subpoena or
order is to ask the lawyer or his representative to reveal
information about a client or former client obtained in the
course of representing the client unless, after a contradictory
hearing, it has been determined that the information sought is
not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege or
work product rule; and all of the following:

(1) The information sought is essential to the successful
completion of an ongoing investigation, is essential to the
case of the party seeking the information, and is not
merely peripheral, cumulative, or speculative.

(2) The purpose of seeking the information is not to
harass the attorney or his client.

(3) With respect to a subpoena, the subpoena lists the
information sought with particularity, is reasonably
limited as to subject matter and period of time, and gives
timely notice.

(4) There is no practicable alternative means of obtaining
the information.

In ruling upon discovery matters, the trial court is vested with broad

discretion, and, upon review, an appellate court should not disturb such

rulings absent a clear abuse of discretion. Liles v. Great W. Cas. Ins. Co.,

54,565 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/13/22), 342 So. 3d 1160.

Here, Paul has alternative means of garnering the privileged

information he seeks rather than deposing the Attorneys. He could have

sought the billing information through Simran, but he did not do so prior to

filing his 508 motion. Furthermore, what Paul seeks is speculative, because

he has shown no evidence of fraud or collusion on the part of the Attorneys,

Simran, or Karl. There is nothing in the record to suggest that this is

anything but a fishing expedition in which Paul hopes to unearth favorable

evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion here and this

assignment of error lacks merit.

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Assignment of Error No. Four: Whether the trial court erred when it denied
appellant’s motion to recuse and/or disqualify succession counsel and the
succession representative for violations of fiduciary duties and statutory
obligations.

Paul argues that Simran should be removed as succession

representative, because she: 1) failed to file a detailed descriptive list for

several years in Kailash’s succession; 2) allowed her grandparents’ house to

remain unoccupied and her grandfather’s car to deteriorate and lose value; 3)

failed to file annual accountings every year in each succession; 4) failed to

close the succession as soon as advisable; 5) failed to disclose assets and

payments made on behalf of the successions, including “secret” attorney

fees; and 6) failed to get court approval to pay expenses in each succession.

Paul also states that Simran has a conflict of interest, because she is or was

an employee of her father and Paul is her uncle. Paul does not state what

relief he wants from this court.

Appellees argue that allegations of breach of fiduciary duty against

Simran as administrator are res judicata. Appellees state that Paul alleged in

his “Re-Stated Petition” that Simran breached her fiduciary duties by failing

to timely file accountings and engaging in conflicts of interest and collusion.

Appellees contend that Simran filed an exception of res judicata in response,

which was granted and which Paul did not appeal. Appellees also state that

Paul did not argue his motion to remove Simran as estate representative at

the September 27, 2021, hearing and his assignment of error should be

stricken.

Appellees argue that Simran preserved her grandparents’ home by

renting it to persons who performed caretaking duties after Kailash vacated

the property in 2015, and it sold in 2020. Appellees again state that failing

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to file a detailed descriptive list or accounting is not a breach of fiduciary

duty and does not warrant removal of Simran as administrator. Appellees

argue Simran was not ordered to file an accounting by the trial court.

Appellees argue that Simran has worked prudently to close Manmohan’s

succession, and the failure to close the succession as soon as possible is due

to Paul’s various motions, objections, continuances, and appeals. Appellees

ask that this court affirm the trial court’s rulings.

Paul has on multiple occasions alleged fraud, breach of fiduciary duty,

and ill practices on the part of the Attorneys and Simran without showing

any proof. Apart from his claims that Simran did not file a detailed

descriptive list every year in Kailash’s succession and his objections to the

Attorneys’ billings on the most-recently filed accountings in both

successions, his claims were previously raised and considered by the trial

court and this court. See Dhaliwal IV. He is barred from raising them again,

and they will not be considered by this court. The issue regarding the

Attorneys’ fees was discussed above. This court will now consider solely

Paul’s argument that Simran should have been removed as succession

representative, because she did not file a detailed descriptive list in Kailash’s

succession.

Absent an abuse of discretion, the district court's decision regarding

removal of a succession representative will not be disturbed on appeal. In re

Succession of LeBouef, 13-0209 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/9/14), 153 So. 3d 527.

Kailash’s succession is under independent administration. The

independent administration of estates is governed by La. C.C.P. arts. 3396,

et seq. La. C.C.P. art. 3396.5 provides that an independent administrator

shall have all the rights, powers, authorities, privileges, and duties of a
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succession representative, but without the necessity of delay for objection, or

application to, or any action in or by, the court. Before the succession can

be closed, a judgment of possession rendered, and the independent

administrator discharged, there shall be filed an inventory or sworn detailed

descriptive list of assets and liabilities of the estate verified by the

independent administrator. La. C.C.P. art. 3396.18(A). An independent

administrator is not required to filed a detailed descriptive list prior to the

close of the succession unless ordered to do so by the court.

Simran was appointed independent administrator in her grandmother’s

succession, and as such she has the freedom to act in Kailash’s succession

without first getting approval from the trial court. She is not required to file

a detailed descriptive list until prior to the closing of her grandmother’s

succession. Kailash’s succession remains open and still under

administration.

This court finds Paul’s complaints regarding attorney fees and the fact

that neither succession has closed to be disingenuous. Every time he files a

repetitive motion or petition with the trial court, succession counsel must

respond, which increases the attorney fees and further delays the closing of

each succession. The trial court did not abuse its discretion here, and this

assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgments are affirmed.

Costs are assessed to the appellant.

AFFIRMED.

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