Claudia Payne v. Aaron Lawrence, The Lawrence Law Firm, LLC & Christopher Gilbert

Judgment rendered August 27, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 56,416-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

CLAUDIA PAYNE Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

AARON LAWRENCE, THE Defendants-Appellees
LAWRENCE LAW FIRM, LLC &
CHRISTOPHER GILBERT

*****
Appealed from the
Third Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Lincoln, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 63,785

Honorable Jenifer Ward Clason, Judge

*****

THE BURRELL LAW FIRM, LLC Counsel for Appellant
By: Dwayne A. Burrell
Allen Burrell

BREITHAUPT DUBOS & WOLLESON Counsel for Appellee,
By: Patrick S. Wolleson Christopher Gilbert

GIBSON LAW PARTNERS, LLC Counsel for Appellees,
By: James H. Gibson Aaron Lawrence and The
Lawrence Law Firm,
LLC
LAW OFFICES OF RUSSELL A.
WOODARD, JR., LLC
By: Russell A. Woodard, Jr.

*****

Before STEPHENS, THOMPSON, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

THOMPSON, J.

Christopher Gilbert and some friends were on a dock at a waterfront

bar and restaurant in Lincoln Parish, when he nearly drowned after a friend

pushed him into the water during horseplay. While Gilbert was hospitalized

his somewhat estranged mother retained an attorney, Claudia Payne, who

immediately undertook aggressive efforts on her social media accounts to

create publicity about the incident and promote her involvement. Payne

promoted a narrative suggesting criminal activity on the part of the friend

who pushed Gilbert into the water and identified race as a potential factor in

the incident. Payne solicited broader media coverage and participated in a

resulting interview on a local television station, repeating her carefully

crafted narrative of race-based motives and exaggerating circumstances

regarding the already serious incident. Upon his discharge from the hospital,

Gilbert determined that he disagreed with Payne’s theory of his case and

ended her representation of him. Payne’s activist approach to the incident

and assertions she represented Gilbert after her termination continued,

however. Gilbert’s new attorney then issued a statement that corrected the

narrative put forth by Payne, to which Payne filed a lawsuit claiming

defamation against Gilbert and his new attorney. In response, Gilbert and

his attorney filed a special motion to strike, pursuant to Louisiana’s anti-

SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation) statute, La. C.C.P.

art. 971, which protects free speech in connection with a public issue,

arguing that their press release regarding the drowning and resulting

publicity was true. The trial court granted the special motion to strike,

dismissed Payne’s claims, and awarded attorney fees to Gilbert and his

attorney. Payne now appeals the trial court’s ruling granting the special

motion to strike. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s ruling

and increase the attorney fee award to account for this appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 14, 2024, Christopher Gilbert (“Gilbert”), a 26-year-old

black male, went to Rhett’s Tails and Shells, a bar and restaurant located on

Lake D’Arbonne in Farmerville, Louisiana, with a group of friends from his

workplace. Gilbert was a recent graduate of Louisiana Tech University; he

earned his master’s degree in biology and had plans to attend medical

school. Gilbert and his friends were drinking on the dock of the restaurant.

When they began horseplaying around, Gilbert’s friend Cassidy playfully

pushed him off the dock and into the lake. Unfortunately, the water was

deeper than expected and Gilbert sank to the bottom due to his limited

swimming ability.

When he did not immediately surface, Gilbert’s friends believed he

was pulling a prank. They quickly realized he was not joking, and the

friends frantically went into the water to find him. Despite their efforts,

Gilbert’s friends could not find him. Another patron of the restaurant dove

in the lake, found Gilbert at the bottom, and pulled him to the surface. The

record indicates it was estimated Gilbert was underwater for approximately

3-5 minutes. Gilbert was resuscitated with CPR on the dock, and he was

airlifted to Ochsner/LSU in Shreveport. After 3 weeks in the hospital,

including time spent in the ICU, Gilbert fortunately made a full recovery and

was ultimately discharged on May 5, 2024.

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The day after the incident, on April 15, 2024, Gilbert’s friends visited

him in the hospital in Shreveport. There, they encountered Gilbert’s

biological mother, Yolanda George, who, unbeknownst to them, was

somewhat estranged from Gilbert. The record shows Yolanda held a hostile

racial animus toward Gilbert’s diverse group of friends. While speaking

with Yolanda, Gilbert’s friend Cassidy mentioned that she was the one who

had playfully pushed him into the lake. Yolanda began speaking out on her

personal social media, claiming Cassidy should be arrested because she

knew Gilbert could not swim when she pushed him into the lake. Yolanda

posted on Facebook seeking an “activist attorney” to obtain justice for her

son. The Facebook page of Claudia Payne (“Payne”), an attorney officed in

Ruston, Louisiana, was tagged in Yolanda’s request by multiple individuals.

Payne was the one who then initiated connected with Yolanda and accepted

her theory of the case without further inquiry and did not contact any

witnesses to determine what may actually have occurred leading to Gilbert’s

injury. At this time, Gilbert was sedated on a ventilator in the ICU at

Ochsner/LSU hospital.

The next day, Payne contacted the Farmerville Police Department and

spoke with Detective Lamar Guillot, who prepared a report detailing his

conversation with Payne. The report states that Payne asked if Cassidy had

been arrested and demanded that she be arrested immediately. Payne

informed Det. Guillot of a press release that she was preparing, in which she

intended to announce that Cassidy had been arrested, and that Farmerville

Police therefore needed to locate Cassidy and arrest her immediately. Det.

Guillot explained he did not have probable cause to make an arrest, and he

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would not be strong-armed into making an arrest. Det. Guillot’s report also

noted that one hour after speaking with him, Payne started posting “reckless

lies on Facebook which in turn produces (sic) a social media firestorm.”

The “press release” Payne mentioned to Det. Guillot was in fact a

Facebook post published by Payne to her followers – the first of four posts

in rapid succession relating to Gilbert’s accident. In addition to publishing

photos of Gilbert in the hospital on a ventilator, Payne also posted that

Cassidy is “white” (in reality, Cassidy is Native American); Gilbert was

underwater for 20 minutes; no one from the friend group jumped into the

lake to try to find Gilbert; and stated, “there is no positive opinion about his

recovery.” These wildly false assertions and allegations were either

completely unverified or were knowingly false when made. The post also

called for Cassidy’s arrest and hypothesized, apparently to create racial

tension and division, that if a white woman had been pushed into a lake by a

black male, an arrest would certainly have been made. Apparently

attempting to generate publicity about an incident she had still not

investigated, and to create publicity and raise her own social media and

public persona, Payne also tagged KSLA News’ Facebook account to her

post. Payne’s first Facebook post was published less than 24 hours after the

incident, during a time in which Payne had not spoken to a single eyewitness

or to Gilbert to verify her incendiary allegations. The record shows that

Payne’s Facebook post was shared 1700+ times, reacted to 1200+ times, and

commented upon 570+ times. If Payne’s objective was to generate publicity

without a concern for truthfulness or accuracy, her efforts met with

immediate success.

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Meanwhile, Yolanda, Gilbert’s biological mother, was also posting on

her personal Facebook page, characterizing Gilbert as a victim of systemic

racism. In truth, however, Gilbert and Yolanda were mostly estranged from

each other and while Gilbert was incapacitated, Yolanda enjoyed no legal

authority or power of attorney to act on his behalf. Payne apparently

accepted without question that Yolanda had some legal authority to speak

and act for her adult son, Gilbert, and in conjunction with her undertook

efforts and collaborated on and promoted a media campaign focused on a

civil rights agenda with Gilbert’s case. Yolanda instantly injected herself

into Gilbert’s unfortunate situation and, as Payne cloaked herself as an

activist, instigating, fanning, and then capitalizing on a theory of racial

injustice and intrigue.

After putting into motion her agenda days earlier, it was not until

April 19, 2024, when Payne had her first contact with Gilbert. Gilbert had

no independent recollection of the drowning incident. He was still in the

ICU, on a ventilator, and heavily medicated with powerful narcotics and

other drugs including fentanyl, ketamine, morphine, dilaudid, and

oxycodone.

Over a week after their initial meeting, on April 29, 2024, Payne

presented her contingency fee agreement to Gilbert for a premises liability

case against Rhett’s Tails and Shells, the restaurant whose dock Gilbert was

on at the time of the incident. Payne presented this fee agreement through

Yolanda. Gilbert remained in the ICU and heavily medicated. Payne was

not present when Yolanda presented the agreement to Gilbert for his

signature and cannot testify about what, if anything, Yolanda said to Gilbert

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regarding the agreement or his understanding of it. The agreement did not

expressly authorize a civil rights campaign, publicizing the ordeal, or

pursuing an arrest of Cassidy. These efforts were completely conceived and

implemented by Payne without knowledge or approval by Gilbert, and

appear to, at least in part, have had the intention of raising awareness of

Payne’s law practice and profile as an activist in the community and nation

as opposed to advancing Gilbert’s stated desires and best interest.1

The day after the contingency fee agreement for the premises liability

case was signed, Payne gave a recorded interview to KSLA News. Payne

was asked about the incident and the friends’ horseplay, and she responded:

“In the legal field we characterize things the way we see fit. Of course they

are saying horseplay. We are saying that it was a criminal intentional push

in the lake.”

1
Christopher Gilbert’s affidavit, Section 22, provides in pertinent part:

From my own investigation, I realized that, to further the interest of my
estranged mother (Yolanda George) in pursuing a claim on her behalf,
Claudia Payne had obviously adopted her racial bias and hostility toward
my diverse group of friends. Ms. Payne injected a racial motive into my
April 14th incident without my permission, publicly accusing my friends
in local and national media interviews, through her own social media
accounts, and through aggressive complaints to law enforcement, of
committing a racially motived crime against me, which is untrue. I also
learned that Claudia Payne had not spoken to any of the eyewitnesses.
After researching Claudia Payne’s accusations about my friends now
spread across the internet, after seeing a photographs of myself while in
ICU and hooked up to a ventilator which was released by to the media by
Claudia Payne without my permission, and after seeing that Claudia Payne
had publicly stated to the media without my permission that I was brain-
dead or brain damaged, I knew I had to do something to correct the false
narrative. Due to Claudia Payne’s media campaign, my friends were
being publicly labeled as racists, resulting in harassment and even death
threats on their social media messaging accounts. My planned medical
career was in jeopardy due to Claudia Payne releasing a photograph and
depicting me in the media as brain-dead — which was totally untrue and
without any medical basis.

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On May 5, 2024, Gilbert was discharged from the hospital. Payne did

not communicate with Gilbert on that date. Payne continued her fervent

internet activity, including “liking” her co-counsel’s Instagram post that

Gilbert suffered “brain damage.”

The very next day, on May 6, 2024, multiple articles were posted on

various websites including Bossip.com and the New York Post website, with

headlines indicating a hate crime had occurred and alleging that Gilbert

suffered brain damage. MSN, Yahoo News, and Vibe published articles

indicating Payne’s description of the incident as “racially motivated.”

That same day, Gilbert ended Payne’s representation of him as his

attorney and contacted his new attorney, Aaron Lawrence (“Lawrence”).

Despite having her representation of Gilbert terminated, Payne was

undeterred and continued her campaign and contacted “The Breakfast Club:

The World’s Most Dangerous Morning Radio Show” to discuss the incident,

shockingly still claiming to be Gilbert’s attorney, which she knew at the time

to be false. Meanwhile, Gilbert created his own GoFundMe page to assist

with his significant medical bills arising from his treatment and lengthy stay

in the hospital and ICU. On his GoFundMe page, Gilbert described the

incident as an “accident.” The record shows that his mother, Yolanda, began

to send hurtful text messages to Gilbert, revealing her hopes to monetize his

incident for herself, and shaming him for going against her wishes. The

apparent team of Payne and Yolanda were undeterred in promoting their

narrative of events for their own benefit, in direct contravention of Gilbert’s

desires and truthful firsthand description of the events.

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On May 11, 2024, Gilbert’s new attorney and longtime friend,

Lawrence, issued a press release intended to correct the narrative of the

incident that Payne had orchestrated via her social media posts and her

interviews with the local news media, which had now apparently achieved

their intended result and received national attention, bringing Payne

prominently along with it. The press release was entitled “RE: Official

Clarification & Statement on Behalf of Chris Gilbert.” The press release

provided, in pertinent part:

Since the accident, an attorney by the name of Claudia Payne,
through what we believe was improper solicitation, has
represented Mr. Gilbert without his authorization or full consent.
Miss Payne has made a series of inflammatory and factually
incorrect statements to the press, alleging that the incident was a
racially motivated hate crime and that the friend who pushed Mr.
Gilbert should be charged with attempted negligent homicide –
a charge that doesn’t exist within Louisiana legal statutes. Miss
Payne has continued to propagate this narrative despite the lack
of evidence and contrary information provided by law
enforcement investigations and medical staff. Her claims that
Mr. Gilbert was submerged for 20 minutes, was at some point
brain dead, and suffered organ failure are not only grossly
exaggerated but also medically unsubstantiated. Furthermore,
the release of private photos of Mr. Gilbert during his
hospitalization and the ongoing assertion of a premeditated plan
by his coworkers to cause him harm are wholly without merit and
are considered by Mr. Gilbert and his current counsel to be both
offensive and legally concerning. Mr. Gilbert has expressed that
he has never authorized Ms. Payne to make such statements, nor
has he authorized the release of his hospital photos. He
unequivocally denies all the claims made by Claudia Payne and
wishes to make clear that the events of that fateful day were an
accident and not the result of malicious intent.

That evening, Payne posted a response to the press release on her

Facebook page, claiming that Gilbert had been influenced to accept a story

that ignored inequities that persist in the system, and that this was “bigger

than Mr. Gilbert.” Payne continued to appear unwilling or unable to accept a

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narrative based on truth, rather than on her hastily and racially charged

theory of intentional injury and exaggerated permanent injuries of Gilbert.

On May 14, 2024, the nationally syndicated podcast The Breakfast

Club discredited and mocked Gilbert using Payne’s false narrative, stating

he was with his “all white” friends who pushed him into the lake knowing he

could not swim and none of them tried to help him. They stated that Gilbert

was brain dead and underwater for 10 minutes. They called his friends

“terrible friends” and referred to Gilbert as “AquaMan.” Unfortunately for

Gilbert, this broadcasted attack had its origins in Payne’s false assertions and

publicity-seeking allegations, rather than efforts undertaken by capable legal

counsel for a client’s best interest or truth.

On May 15, 2024, Payne again posted on Facebook directing her

followers to The Breakfast Club podcast that discussed Gilbert. In her post,

Payne also mentioned Lawrence, calling him a “bottom-tier” attorney and “a

joke.” Lawrence, an honorably discharged United States Marine with active

conflict deployments, appears to have exercised great restraint by not

pursuing his own defamation claims against Payne for such reckless and

harmful comments.

In contrast, on May 20, 2024, 15 days after Gilbert was discharged

from the hospital, Payne filed a defamation lawsuit against him and

Lawrence alleging the Press Release they published countering her narrative

of the incident contained four defamatory statements:

1. Defendants knew Payne never made claims that Gilbert was “brain
dead.”

2. Defendants falsely implied that Payne alluded to this being a
premeditated racially motivated hate crime.

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3. Gilbert knew that Payne had full authority to represent him for the
April 14, 2024 incident.

4. Defendants falsely implied that Payne preyed on Gilbert and
represented him without his consent or through improper
solicitation.

Lawrence and Gilbert jointly moved to strike and dismiss Payne’s

claims under La. C.C.P. art. 971. Gilbert and Lawrence included supporting

affidavits with their motion from Lawrence, Gilbert, Gilbert’s six friends

present during the incident, a legal nursing expert, and a reputational harm

expert. Gilbert and Lawrence also included multiple exhibits, authenticated

with the affidavits: news articles, the Farmerville Police Report, Payne’s

contingency fee contract, Payne’s Facebook posts, Payne’s Petition for

Signatures Demanding Arrest and Prosecution, and text messages.

Lawrence and Gilbert also prayed for attorney fees which are authorized

under La. C.C.P. art. 971(B) and submitted affidavits and billing statements

from their attorneys.

After a hearing, the trial court dismissed Payne’s lawsuit. The trial

court determined the statements in Lawrence’s press release were true,

Payne produced no evidence of malice, and Payne suffered no damages.

The trial court also granted in part and denied in part Gilbert’s motion for

attorney fees and costs. The trial court fixed Gilbert’s attorney fees at

$24,776.70, and Lawrence’s at $26,991.

Payne now appeals the trial court’s judgment dismissing her claims

and the award of attorney fees to Gilbert and Lawrence.

DISCUSSION

The right to free speech is guaranteed in the constitutions of both the

United States and Louisiana. The First Amendment to the United States

10

Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law … abridging the

freedom of speech, or the press[.]” The Louisiana Constitution art. 1, § 7

states that “[n]o law shall curtail or restrain the freedom of speech or of the

press. Every person may speak, write, and publish his sentiments on any

subject, but is responsible for abuse of that freedom.”

In 1999, the Louisiana legislature found that “there had been a

disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of

the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for redress of

grievances.” La. C.C.P. art. 971. These lawsuits are referred to as strategic

lawsuits against public participation (or “SLAPP”). The legislature enacted

Article 971 intending to encourage continued participation in matters of

public significance and to prevent participation from being chilled through

an abuse of judicial process. Wainwright v. Tyler, 52,083 (La. App. 2 Cir.

6/27/18), 253 So. 3d 203; Lee v. Pennington, 02-0381 (La. App. 4 Cir.

10/16/02), 830 So. 2d 1037, writ denied, 02-2790 (La. 1/24/03), 836 So. 2d

52. The legislature enacted Article 971 as a procedural device to be used in

the early stages of litigation to screen out meritless claims brought primarily

to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech

and petition for redress of grievances. Quinlan v. Sugar-Gold, 53,348 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 3/11/20), 293 So. 3d 722, writ denied, 20-00744 (La. 10/6/20),

302 So. 3d 536. A special motion to strike is a “specialized defense motion

akin to a motion for summary judgment.” Lamz v. Wells, 05-1497 (La. App.

1 Cir. 6/9/06), 938 So. 2d 792.

La. C.C.P. Art. 971 provides in pertinent part:

(A)(1) A cause of action against a person arising from any act of
that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free

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speech under the United States or Louisiana Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion
to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established a probability of success on the claim.

(2) In making its determination, the court shall consider the
pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts
upon which the liability or defense is based.

(3) If the court determines that the plaintiff has established a
probability of success on the claim, that determination shall be
admissible in evidence at any later stage of the proceeding.

B. In any action subject to Paragraph A of this Article, a prevailing
party on a special motion to strike shall be awarded reasonable
attorney fees and costs.

Article 971 further authorizes a stay on all discovery proceedings in

the action upon the filing of the special motion, and the stay remains in place

until notice of entry of the order ruling on the motion. La. C.C.P. art.

971(D). Finally, Article 971 defines an “[a]ct in furtherance of a person’s

right of petition or free speech under the United States or Louisiana

Constitution in connection with a public issue” to include “any written or

oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public

forum in connection with an issue of public interest.” La. C.C.P. art.

971(F)(1)(c).

Louisiana jurisprudence interprets Article 971 as requiring a two-part,

burden-shifting analysis. Wainwright, supra. The mover must first establish

that the claims against him arise from an act by him in the exercise of his

right of petition or free speech under the United States or Louisiana

Constitution in connection with a public issue. Id. If the mover makes a

prima facie showing that his comments were constitutionally protected and

in connection with a public issue, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to

demonstrate a probability of success on the claim as the second part of the

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analysis. In cases where more than one claim is alleged in the petition, the

courts examine the probability of success of each claim individually. If the

plaintiff can demonstrate a probability of success on any of his claims, then

the special motion to strike must fail. Shelton v. Pavon, 17-0482 (La.

10/18/17), 236 So. 3d 1233.

The granting of a special motion to strike presents a question of law.

Questions of law are reviewed de novo, with the judgment rendered on the

record, without deference to the legal conclusions of the tribunals below.

Quinlan, supra.

Assignments of Error

Payne assert the following five assignments of error (verbatim):

Assignment of Error Number 1: The trial court erred as a matter of law in
designating Claudia Payne a limited purpose public figure based solely on
her social media presence and initial public advocacy, where the defamatory
statements arose from a private legal dispute.

Assignment of Error Number 2: The trial court erred in concluding that
Plaintiff failed to meet her burden under Article 971, despite her prima facie
showing that the challenged statements were defamatory per se and made
with at least negligence, if not actual malice.

Assignment of Error Number 3: The trial court erred by improperly
weighing evidence, resolving factual disputes, and assessing credibility –
including disputes over Gilbert’s sedation status, the legitimacy of Payne’s
attorney-client relationship, and reputational harm – at the motion to strike
stage.

Assignment of Error Number 4: The trial court erred in failing to analyze or
consider the “predatory attorney” statement, despite its inclusion in the
Petition and its clear defamatory implication.

Assignment of Error Number 5: The trial court abused its discretion by
awarding excessive attorney fees and costs unsupported by
contemporaneous billing records or proof of reasonableness, in violation of
La. C.C.P. art. 971 (B) and established jurisprudence requiring strict
construction of fee-shifting statutes.

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The first four assignments of error are all related to Payne’s claims of

defamation and the application of Article 971; therefore, we will address

them contemporaneously below.

Defamation and Special Motion to Strike

Payne argues that the trial court erred in designating her as a limited-

purpose public figure by erroneously linking her general social media

presence and initial advocacy to the statements Gilbert and Lawrence made

in their press release. Payne argues that the defamatory statements did not

stem from any public controversy but involved private accusations regarding

legal representation and client authorization unrelated to the public incident.

Payne also argues that the trial court improperly relied on unsupported

factual conclusions about her visibility and the number of followers on

social media, specifically the 70,000 figure she provided in her petition.

Payne asserts that her follower count she listed was an “aggregate from

multiple platforms, not solely tied to the posts (on Facebook) at issue.”

Payne argues that the record established she acted on behalf of her client

with authorization and did not seek to become a public figure.

Payne further argues that even if she were properly deemed a public

figure, the trial court erred by weighing credibility and determining actual

malice at the motion to strike stage. She asserts that by weighing evidence,

including affidavits and medical records, the trial court improperly made

factual findings prematurely. Payne also asserts Gilbert and Lawrence’s

statements that Payne was a “predatory attorney”2 engaged in improper

2
The record shows that Rhett’s Tails and Shells, a non-party to this lawsuit, made
its own Facebook post identifying Payne as a “predatory attorney.” The record does not
establish that Gilbert or Lawrence referred to Payne as a “predatory attorney.”

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solicitation, that she lacked common sense, and represented Gilbert without

authority, are examples of defamation per se.

Defamation is a tort that involves the invasion of a person’s interest in

his or her reputation and good name. Sassone v. Elder, 626 So. 2d 345 (La.

1993); Wainwright, supra. A statement is defamatory if it tends to harm the

reputation of another so as to lower the person in the estimation of the

community or to deter others from associating or dealing with the person or

otherwise exposes the person to contempt or ridicule. Kennedy v. Sheriff of

East Baton Rouge, 05-1418 (La. 7/10/06), 935 So. 2d 669; Wainwright,

supra.

There are four elements necessary to establish a claim for defamation:

1) a false or defamatory statement concerning another, 2) an unprivileged

publication to a third party, 3) fault (negligence or greater), and 4) resulting

injury. La. C.C. art. 2315; Kennedy, supra; Wainwright, supra. If even one

of the required elements of the tort is lacking, the cause of action fails.

Wainwright, supra; Quinlan, supra. The fault requirement is malice, actual

or implied. Wainwright, supra. Actual malice is generally established by

showing that the defendant either knew that the statement was false or acted

with reckless disregard for the truth. Costello v. Hardy, 03-1146 (La.

1/21/04), 864 So. 2d 129.

In determining the standard of liability in defamation claims, the

Louisiana Supreme Court makes a distinction between plaintiffs who are

public officials or public figures and private individuals. Kennedy, supra.

In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d

686 (1964), the United States Supreme Court found that the First

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Amendment prohibits a public official from recovering damages arising

from a defamatory falsehood published in relation to his or her official

conduct, unless the public official proves that statement was made with

“actual malice.” This protection was granted to speech discussing public

officials because defamation would have a chilling effect on constitutionally

valuable speech. Kennedy, supra. The New York Times decision imposed

the requirement for a high degree of fault in defamation actions brought by

public officials and shifted the heightened burden of proof of fault to the

public official. Kennedy, supra.

The case of Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S. Ct. 1975, 18

L. Ed. 2d 1094 (1967), extended the standard of liability to include public

figures, i.e. non-public officials who are intimately involved in the resolution

of important public questions or who, by reason of their fame, shape events

in areas of concern to society at large. A person may become a public figure

because they have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public

controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789

(1974). An individual who voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a

particular controversy becomes a public figure for this limited range of

issues because they have invited attention and comment and assume special

prominence in the resolution of public questions. Gertz, supra; Wainwright,

supra.

The aggressive and constant social media presence that Payne has

curated and fueled for herself and her law practice was intended to elevate

her name recognition and engagement with the general public. Payne has

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actively engaged in serving as her own paparazzo, cataloging and

publicizing every aspect of her legal practice and asserted prowess and

successes. Payne is not communicating behind a paywall, on a limited

platform, or with only subscribers or clients reading blogs or articles on her

law firm website. To the contrary, Payne is consistently generating and

posting messages to anyone with a computer or smartphone and access to

any of the massive social media platforms. Payne has diligently worked to

promote her presence and engagement as a prominent member of the public

discussing public topics. Payne has sought to establish a reputation for

herself as a zealous activist and nurtured and expanded her audience to

include, engage, and interact with thousands of individuals.

We find the trial court did not err in concluding that Payne is a limited

purpose public figure. In her roles as an activist, as an attorney, and as an

activist attorney, Payne regularly helped manufacture and then injected

herself into a public controversy. Payne created and then fanned the

controversy surrounding Gilbert’s drowning through her extensive social

media presence, which then received the sought-after attention of multiple

local and national news sources. By design, Payne became a public figure

by thrusting herself into the forefront of a public controversy and inviting

public comments. Payne’s defamation claims are exclusively tied to Gilbert

and Lawrence’s response to the topic she elevated to a matter of public

concern.

Payne, as a public figure, must establish actual malice in order for her

defamation action to succeed. The actual malice standard is not met merely

through showing ill will or “malice” in the ordinary sense of the word.

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Actual malice may not be inferred from evidence of personal spite, an

intention to injure, or a bad motive. Tarpley v. Colfax Chronicle, 94-2919

(La. 2/17/95), 650 So. 2d 738. Actual malice must be proven with

convincing clarity. Kennedy, supra.

Payne provided no evidence that Lawrence and Gilbert were highly

aware that the statements in their press release were false, or that there was

proof with convincing clarity of actual malice. Payne offered no evidence to

support a factual finding that Gilbert acted out of malice in seeking new

legal counsel to represent him and correct the false media narrative created

by Payne surrounding his drowning accident. Lawrence clearly did not act

out of malice by conducting his own investigation and research on Gilbert’s

behalf to correct the false narrative and issue a public statement.

The trial court correctly articulated its reasons for its ruling, which

included that the Press Release contained the truth, there was no malice

shown by Gilbert or Lawrence in issuing the Press Release, and Payne

suffered no damages. Payne had no factual basis or informed consent from

Gilbert to craft a racially charged narrative around his drowning accident

and publish her thoughts on her vast social media platforms. Payne did not

have any evidence of a criminal act on the part of Gilbert’s friends at the

time she published her statements but made and repeated those statements

frequently. Payne promoted race-based criminal accusations on her social

media platform and sought out media opportunities to pressure law

enforcement into making an arrest to support her narrative. Payne’s

professional judgment was influenced by a desire for self-promotion as an

“activist attorney” fighting systemic racism, even though racism did not

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apply to Gilbert’s accident or its investigation, which objectively should

have been readily apparent to Payne. We acknowledge that Payne

proceeded with the understanding of representing “the family” on behalf of

Gilbert; however, Payne had professional duties to all her prospective

clients, most importantly to Gilbert.

Accordingly, because Payne has failed to prove actual malice with

regard to the statements made by the defendants in the Press Release, she did

not establish a probability of success on his claim for defamation. These four

assignments of error are without merit, and the trial court was correct in

granting defendants’ special motion to strike Payne’s petition.

Attorney Fees

Payne’s fifth assignment of error relates to the award of attorney fees.

As noted herein, the trial court, after a hearing, fixed Gilbert’s attorney fees

at $24,776.70, and Lawrence’s at $26,991. On appeal, Payne argues that the

attorney fee award is excessive. In response, Gilbert and Lawrence assert

that the trial court’s award of attorney fees should be affirmed and request an

increase in the attorney fee award associated with this appeal in the amount

of $10,000, plus all costs.

In any action subject to La. C.C.P. art. 971(A), a prevailing party on a

special motion to strike shall be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs.

La. C.C.P. art. 971(B); Quinlan, supra. As a general rule, attorney fees are

not allowed in Louisiana unless they are authorized by statute or provided

for by contract. State, Dept. of Transp. & Dev. v. Wagner, 10-0050 (La.

5/28/10), 38 So. 3d 240; Quinlan, supra.

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This court has held that the general rule regarding additional attorney

fees for work done on appeal is that an increase in attorney fees is usually

allowed where a party was awarded attorney fees by the trial court and is

forced to and successfully defends an appeal. In Quinlan, supra, this court

found that where a plaintiff appealed the trial court’s grant of the

defendant’s special motion to strike pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 971, the

defendant was entitled to an increase of attorney fees for the work done on

appeal when defendant prevailed.

Here, Payne was unsuccessful in obtaining relief on appeal, and the

appeal necessitated substantial additional work by counsel for the defendants

associated with review of the transcript, drafting of memoranda, and

traveling to and presenting oral arguments, all of which have their genesis in

Article 971. The trial court meticulously considered the issue of and amount

in awarding attorney fees and was not manifestly erroneous in reaching its

conclusions on either. As such, Payne’s fifth assignment of error is likewise

without merit, and pursuant to the mandatory attorney fee language in La.

C.C.P. art. 971(B), we find Gilbert and Lawrence are entitled to an increase

in attorney fees for this appeal. We find that the total requested amount of

$10,000 plus all costs is a reasonable attorney fee award for defendants for

the necessary work on appeal by their respective counsel, and award

additional attorney fees of $5,000.00 each to Gilbert and Lawrence.

CONCLUSION

The trial court’s judgment dismissing Payne’s claims with prejudice is

affirmed. The trial court’s attorney fee award is increased by the amount of

$10,000, for the necessary work on appeal by appellees’ respective counsel,

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awarding $5,000 each to Gilbert and Lawrence. Costs of this appeal are

assessed to appellant, Claudia Payne.

AFFIRMED.

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