Bryan Mitnaul v. Michael J. Petrosh, Jr. & Andrea M. Rabalais Petrosh

Judgment rendered October 1, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 56,485-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

BRYAN MITNAUL Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

MICHAEL J. PETROSH, JR. & Defendants-Appellees
ANDREA M. RABALAIS
PETROSH

*****

Appealed from the
Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Bossier, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 167,372

Honorable Allie A. Stahl, Judge

*****

ALL AMERICAN LAW FIRM OF LA Counsel for Appellant
By: Wade T. Visconte

HOGAN LOVELLS US, LLP
By: Robert B. Duncan

DOWNER, JONES, MARINO & Counsel for Appellees
WILHITE, LLC
By: Allison A. Jones

*****

Before PITMAN, STEPHENS, and HUNTER, JJ.

PITMAN, C. J.

Plaintiff-Appellant Brian Mitnaul appeals the district court’s granting

in part of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Michael J.

Petrosh and Andrea M. Rabalais Petrosh. Andrea filed an answer and

requests that this court modify the judgment to dismiss the remaining claim

against her. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court’s

granting of summary judgment, thereby denying the relief Mitnaul sought on

appeal. We grant Andrea’s motion, reversing the district court in part,

granting summary judgment in part and dismissing with prejudice Mitnaul’s

defamation claim against her.

FACTS

On November 12, 2021, Mitnaul filed a petition for damages against

the Petroshes. He stated that he was employed as the Director of the

Cathedral Music Ministry at St. Mark’s Cathedral (“St. Mark’s”) where the

Petroshes were members. He alleged that he witnessed inappropriate actions

by the Petroshes and that their misconduct resulted in the Bishop banning

them from the grounds of St. Mark’s. Mitnaul stated that the Petroshes, in

retaliation, harassed and intentionally inflicted harm and emotional distress

upon him by making false and defamatory accusations that he engaged in an

illegal sexual relationship with one or more teenage boys who were part of

St. Mark’s and that he was a pedophile. He sent the Petroshes a cease and

desist letter in 2020, and he alleged that they attempted to circumvent this

demand by submitting an anonymous complaint (the “Letter”) to the

Louisiana State Police (“LSP”), the Louisiana Attorney General’s Office, the

Bossier Parish Sheriff’s Office and the Bossier City Police Department that

claimed he was guilty of an illegal sexual relationship with a minor (the

“Minor”). He stated that the LSP conducted an investigation, which was

closed without further action when it was determined that there was no

evidence of any illegal sexual relationship involving him and the Minor.

Mitnaul argued that the Petroshes intentionally inflicted emotional distress

upon him; made blatantly false statements against him that could have

resulted in loss of his current employment and ineligibility for future

employment; made defamatory accusations with the intent of having law

enforcement arrest him; intentionally inflicted severe psychological and

emotional harm; pursued criminal allegations based upon known false

accusations; intentionally attempted to destroy his personal and professional

relationships; and engaged in spreading slanderous statements causing

severe emotional duress. He contended that he was entitled to recover

damages for past, present and future medical expenses; past, present and

future mental pain and suffering; loss of enjoyment of life; loss of future

employment potential; medical bills for his inpatient psychiatric

hospitalization; attorney fees; and all damages that may be discovered.

On August 30, 2024, the Petroshes filed a motion for summary

judgment and argued that Mitnaul did not have sufficient evidence to

support his claims against them. They admitted that Andrea mailed the

Letter to the LSP, the Louisiana Attorney General and local law enforcement

but argued that it expressed her opinion of a “delicate situation” of Mitnaul

“being inappropriately close to a minor child.” They noted that although the

LSP investigation did not find that Mitnaul’s behavior with the Minor was

criminal, it did find that the relationship was inappropriate and instructed

Mitnaul to cease all contact with the Minor. Based on the text of the Letter,

the LSP’s report and the discovery that had been conducted, the Petroshes
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requested that the district court summarily dismiss Mitnaul’s claims against

them. They noted that Mitnaul admitted he had no evidence that Michael

sent the Letter; and, therefore, they argued that Mitnaul has no claim against

Michael. Regarding Mitnaul’s defamation claim against Andrea, they

contended that Mitnaul cannot show any statement she made was false or

defamatory or that the Letter was published to an unprivileged (non-law

enforcement) third party. Regarding his claim of intentional infliction of

emotional distress against Andrea, they argued that Mitnaul had not

presented any evidence that her actions reached the lofty standard of extreme

or outrageous conduct.

On October 23, 2024, Mitnaul filed an opposition to the motion for

summary judgment. He alleged that the Petroshes were attempting to halt

this action before he was able to complete the discovery necessary to fully

uncover the scope of their conduct. He argued that even without additional

discovery, the current evidentiary record would be sufficient to permit a trier

of fact to grant judgment in his favor on his claims of defamation and

intentional infliction of emotional distress. He stated that the Letter was

defamatory per se and disagreed with the Petroshes’ argument that it merely

expressed Andrea’s opinions and concerns. He also found fault with the

Petroshes’ argument that the Letter is privileged as a tip to law enforcement

and contended that Andrea did not follow proper procedures to report child

abuse but broadly spread her baseless accusations to private citizens in

addition to law enforcement. He argued that her actions demonstrated

malice and bad faith and constituted an outrageous act, as required for a tort

of intentional infliction of emotional distress, that threatened his reputation,

livelihood, freedom and mental health. Mitnaul also argued that it is highly
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unlikely that Michael was not involved in the defamatory and emotionally

distressing actions of his wife.

On November 4, 2024, the Petroshes filed a reply to Mitnaul’s

opposition. They argued that Mitnaul should not be able to weaponize his

own discovery inactivity to avoid summary judgment. They contended that

Mitnaul had not proven that Michael was in any way associated with the

drafting or mailing of the Letter, that the Letter contained factually untrue or

non-opinion-based statements or that Andrea sent the Letter to any non-law

enforcement party. They also alleged that Mitnaul did not prove any

outrageous conduct on their behalf or that they desired to inflict severe

emotional distress upon him. As Mitnaul had not submitted any evidence to

prove these things, the Petroshes argued that the district court should grant

summary judgment in their favor.

A hearing on the motion for summary judgment was held on

November 8, 2024. On January 7, 2025, the district court filed a partial final

judgment and written reasons for judgment. It granted in part and denied in

part the Petroshes’ motion for summary judgment. It granted their motion as

to Mitnaul’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and

dismissed these claims with prejudice. It granted their motion as to

Mitnaul’s claim of defamation against Michael and denied their motion as to

Mitnaul’s defamation claim against Andrea. It dismissed all of Mitnaul’s

claims against Michael with prejudice. Regarding Mitnaul’s defamation

claim against Michael, the court noted that it heard no evidence of his

involvement with the Letter and determined that there is no issue of material

fact as to Michael not writing or distributing the Letter. Regarding

Mitnaul’s defamation claim against Andrea, the court found that material
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issues of fact exist as to whether the language in the Letter is a false

statement and whether Andrea published the Letter to an unprivileged party.

Regarding Mitnaul’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress,

the court found that summary judgment was appropriate because Andrea’s

actions did not rise to the level of outrageous or extreme behavior.

Mitnaul filed a motion for suspensive appeal. Andrea filed an answer

to the appeal and requested a modification, revision or reversal of the

judgment in part, asking this court to dismiss Mitnaul’s defamation claim

against her.

DISCUSSION

Defamation Claim Against Andrea

The Petroshes argue that the district court erred when it denied

summary judgment on Mitnaul’s claim of defamation against Andrea. They

contend that the words of the Letter were not defamatory because they were

based on her opinion. They state that any factual statements contained in the

Letter were verified by the LSP when it found that the relationship between

Mitnaul and the Minor was “inappropriate.” They also argue that the words

of the Letter are protected pursuant to the conditional privilege of reporting

crimes. They contend that Andrea should be protected from liability

because she communicated the suspected crimes to law enforcement

agencies and did not make an unprivileged publication to a third party.

Mitnaul argues that the district court correctly denied the motion for

summary judgment as to his defamation claim against Andrea. He contends

that the Letter was not an opinion but, rather, a defamatory, unfounded

allegation of criminal activity.

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A party may move for a summary judgment for all or part of the relief

for which he has prayed. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(1). After an opportunity for

adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the

motion, memorandum and supporting documents show that there is no

genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3).

The burden of proof rests with the mover. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1).

If the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial, the mover’s burden on

the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the

adverse party’s claim but, rather, to point out to the court the absence of

factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s

claim. Id. The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support

sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that

the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, an

adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleading,

but his response must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial. La. C.C.P. art. 967(B). If he does not so respond, summary

judgment, if appropriate, shall be rendered against him. Id.

A fact is material when its existence or nonexistence may be essential

to plaintiff’s cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery.

Peironnet v. Matador Res. Co., 12-2292 and 12-2377 (La. 6/28/13),

144 So. 3d 791. A fact is material if it potentially ensures or precludes

recovery, affects a litigant’s ultimate success or determines the outcome of

the legal dispute. Hines v. Garrett, 04-0806 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So. 2d 764.

A genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree. Id. If
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reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for a

trial on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate. Id.

Appellate courts review motions for summary judgment de novo,

using the same criteria that govern the district court’s determination of

whether summary judgment is appropriate. Noland v. Lenard, 55,342 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 11/15/23), 374 So. 3d 1133, writ denied, 23-01670 (La. 2/14/24),

379 So. 3d 32.

Because of the chilling effect on the exercise of free speech,

defamation actions have been found particularly susceptible to summary

judgment. Kennedy v. Sheriff of E. Baton Rouge, 05-1418 (La. 7/10/06),

935 So. 2d 669. Summary adjudication is a useful procedural tool and an

effective screening device for avoiding the unnecessary harassment of

defendants by unmeritorious actions which threaten the free exercise of

rights of speech and press. Id.

Defamation is a tort that involves the invasion of a person’s interest in

his or her reputation and good name. Costello v. Hardy, 03-1146 (La.

1/21/04), 864 So. 2d 129. The four elements necessary to establish a

defamation cause of action are (1) a false and defamatory statement

concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault

(negligence or greater) on the part of the publisher; and (4) resulting injury.

Id. If even one of the required elements of the tort is lacking, the cause of

action fails. Id.

Defamatory words are, by definition, words that tend to harm the

reputation of another so as to lower the person in the estimation of the

community, to deter others from associating or dealing with the person or

otherwise expose a person to contempt or ridicule. Costello v. Hardy, supra.
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Words that convey an element of personal disgrace, dishonesty or disrepute

are defamatory. Id. The question of whether a communication is capable of

a particular meaning and whether that meaning is defamatory is ultimately a

legal question for the court. Id. The question is answered by determining

whether a listener could have reasonably understood the communication,

taken in context, to have been intended in a defamatory sense. Id.

In Louisiana, defamatory words have traditionally been classified into

two categories: those that are defamatory per se and those that are

susceptible of a defamatory meaning. Costello v. Hardy, supra. Words that

expressly or implicitly accuse another of criminal conduct, or which by their

very nature tend to injure one’s personal or professional reputation, even

without considering extrinsic facts or surrounding circumstances, are

considered defamatory per se. Id. When a plaintiff proves publication of

words that are defamatory per se, the elements of falsity and malice (or

fault) are presumed but may be rebutted by the defendant. Id. The element

of injury may also be presumed. Id. When the words at issue are not

defamatory per se, a plaintiff must prove, in addition to defamatory meaning

and publication, the elements of falsity, malice (or fault) and injury. Id.

Even when a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of the essential

elements of defamation, recovery may be precluded if the defendant shows

either that the statement was true or that it was protected by a privilege,

absolute or qualified. Costello v. Hardy, supra.

Louisiana courts have recognized that the public has an interest in

possible criminal activity being brought to the attention of the proper

authorities and have extended a qualified privilege to remarks made in good

faith. Kennedy v. Sheriff of E. Baton Rouge, supra. Vital to our system of
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justice is that there be the ability to communicate to law enforcement the

alleged wrongful acts of others without fear of civil action for honest

mistakes. Id. It would be self-defeating for society to impose civil liability

on a citizen for inaccurately reporting criminal conduct with no intent to

mislead. Id., quoting Arellano v. Henley, 357 So. 2d 846 (La. App. 4 Cir.

1978).

Although Mitnaul’s allegations suggest that this is a case of

defamation per se, a reading of the Letter shows that Andrea did not

expressly or implicitly accuse him of criminal conduct. In his petition,

Mitnaul states that the Letter “claim[s] that [he] was guilty of an illegal

sexual relationship with an underage boy.” In the Letter, however, Andrea

writes to law enforcement to report suspicious behavior by Mitnaul and

request an investigation.1 Therefore, Mitnaul must prove all the elements of

defamation.

1
In the Letter, Andrea states, in pertinent part:

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is well known for their “if
you see something, say something” campaign. With that in mind I am
going to tell you about something I see. I have no idea how you and your
team receive the tips that lead to the arrest and conviction of these
criminals, but I can only guess that others, like myself, watch a situation
develop over time and eventually come to feel that something is not right.
***
Over the last 4-5 years, I and others have watched from a distance as . . .
Mitnaul, has persistently “groomed” a young boy. . . .

Mr. Mitnaul is an openly gay 65-year-old man that has had an ongoing and
inappropriate relationship with [the Minor] since he was 11 or 12 years
old. As part of his duties at St. Mark’s Cathedral, Mr. Mitnaul serves as
the children’s choir director. He also gives private instruction in organ.
[The Minor] is in the choir and is an organ student of Mr. Mitnaul. While
[through] an investigation of the relationship between Mr. Mitnaul and
[the Minor] all suspicions could be dismissed with the explanation that
Mr. Mitnaul is simply teaching [the Minor], many people familiar with the
situation have concluded that Mr. Mitnaul has enticed this young man into
a relationship with him by showing him the attention he obviously lacks in
his home life.
***
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As the movers, the burden was on the Petroshes to point out the

absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to Mitnaul’s

claim of defamation. Through their motion for summary judgment and

supporting documents, they demonstrate that the words of the Letter were

not false or defamatory. Andrea’s purpose in writing the Letter was not to

harm Mitnaul’s reputation or to expose him to ridicule—her purpose was to

notify law enforcement of a seemingly inappropriate relationship between

Mitnaul and the Minor. Despite his allegations against the Petroshes,

Mitnaul failed to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence

of a genuine issue of material fact regarding the element of a false and

defamatory statement concerning another. As Mitnaul failed to make a

prima facie showing of the essential elements of defamation, we need not

determine whether the statements made by Andrea in the Letter were

protected by privilege.

Through our de novo review of the record, we determine that there are

no genuine issues as to material fact regarding Mitnaul’s defamation claim

against Andrea. We, therefore, grant Andrea’s request to modify, revise or

reverse the judgment in part, granting summary judgment as to Mitnaul’s

claim of defamation against her and dismissing this claim with prejudice.

Accordingly, this assignment of error has merit.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress Claim Against Andrea

Mitnaul argues that the district court erred in granting summary

judgment and dismissing the claim of intentional infliction of emotional

I strongly believe something very sinister is going on here. I encourage
you to use all the resources available to you to fully investigate the
possibility that Mr. Mitnaul is engaging in sexual activities with a minor
or collecting online pornographic images of this young boy and/or others.
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distress against Andrea. He contends that the court erred in finding that

Andrea’s dissemination of the Letter that contained false allegations of

criminal activity by him was not sufficiently outrageous to constitute

intentional infliction of emotional distress. He argues that filing a false

report that someone is a pedophile is the very definition of extreme and

outrageous. He also states that Andrea’s knowledge that he is particularly

susceptible to emotional distress is a factor to be considered, and he notes

that the Letter indicated he was suicidal and bipolar.

The Petroshes argue that the district court correctly found that the

Letter was not objectively outrageous as to sustain a cause of action for

intentional infliction of emotional distress. They contend that the LSP’s

finding that Mitnaul’s relationship was “inappropriate” quashes any outrage.

One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally causes

severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional

distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.

White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205 (La. 1991). Thus, in order to

recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must

establish (1) that the conduct of the defendant was extreme and outrageous;

(2) that the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe; and

(3) that the defendant desired to inflict severe emotional distress or knew

that severe emotional distress would be certain or substantially certain to

result from his conduct. Id. The conduct must be so outrageous in

character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of

decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized

community. Id. The distress suffered must be such that no reasonable

person could be expected to endure it. Id.
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Our de novo review of the record confirms that the district court

correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the Petroshes and dismissed

Mitnaul’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against

Andrea. Through their motion for summary judgment and its supporting

documents, the Petroshes demonstrated that the conduct of writing the Letter

regarding concerns of inappropriate behavior with a child and sending it to

law enforcement to encourage an investigation was not extreme and

outrageous. As discussed above, Andrea wrote the Letter to alert law

enforcement to inappropriate and potentially criminal acts by Mitnaul

involving a minor. This does not constitute outrageous and extreme

behavior. The determination that such actions are outrageous and extreme

could create a chilling effect on the reporting of potential child abuse for fear

of civil liability. Further, Andrea did not, as alleged by Mitnaul, accuse him

of being a pedophile. Instead, she referenced a previous case where he

accused a former employer of spreading a rumor that he was a pedophile.

Mitnaul produced no factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a

genuine issue of material fact regarding the outrageousness of Andrea’s

writing of the Letter and its dissemination to law enforcement.

Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Claims Against Michael

Mitnaul argues that the district court erred in granting summary

judgment and dismissing his claims against Michael. He contends that a

reasonable trier of fact could have found that Michael participated in the

malicious activities of his wife and that the court made an improper

credibility determination in Michael’s favor when determining that no

material issues exist as to his involvement.
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The Petroshes argue that the district court correctly granted summary

judgment as to Michael. They note that Mitnaul admitted he had no

evidence that Michael drafted or sent the Letter; and, thus, Michael cannot

be liable for the contents of the Letter.

Our de novo review of the record confirms that the district court

correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the Petroshes and dismissed

Mitnaul’s claims of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional

distress against Michael. As the movers, the burden was on the Petroshes to

point out the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to

Mitnaul’s claims. They did so by admitting that Andrea, not Michael, wrote

and sent the Letter. Mitnaul failed to produce factual support sufficient to

establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding

Michael’s involvement that forms the basis of the defamation and intentional

infliction of emotional distress claims.

Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Ongoing Discovery

Mitnaul argues that the district court erred in granting in part the

Petroshes’ motion for summary judgment before he had a sufficient

opportunity to complete his ongoing discovery efforts. He alleges that the

Petroshes attempted to delay discovery and that their responses were

incomplete and evasive. He states that his discovery efforts are now focused

on third-party sources and that the district court’s granting of partial

summary judgment has deprived him of completing this discovery.

The Petroshes argue that Mitnaul had adequate time for discovery and

that he stated he had ample support for his claims. They contend that their

objections to his discovery efforts were made in good faith.
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The requirement in La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3) that a summary

judgment should be considered only after “an opportunity for adequate

discovery” has been construed to mean that there is no absolute right to

delay action on a motion for summary judgment until discovery is complete.

Thomas v. Bayonne, 54,205 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/13/22), 339 So. 3d 71.

Rather, the requirement is only that the parties have a fair opportunity to

carry out discovery and to present their claim. Id. When addressing the

adequacy of discovery on a motion for summary judgment, courts take into

consideration the following relevant factors: (1) whether the party was ready

to go to trial; (2) whether the party indicated what additional discovery was

needed; (3) whether the party took any steps to conduct additional discovery

during the period between the filing of the motion and the hearing on it; and

(4) whether the discovery issue was raised in the district court before the

entry of the summary judgment. Id.

The mere contention of an opponent that he lacks sufficient

information to defend the motion and needs additional time to conduct

discovery is insufficient to defeat the motion. Dean v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 51,243 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/5/17), 217 So. 3d 611. The district

court has the discretion to render a summary judgment or to require further

discovery. Id.

The abuse of discretion standard is used to determine whether the

district court allowed adequate time for discovery. Thomas v. Bayonne,

supra.

Mitnaul filed his petition for damages in November 2021, and the

Petroshes filed their motion for summary judgment in August 2024. Mitnaul

had almost three years to conduct discovery prior to the filing of the motion
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for summary judgment. He had additional time to conduct discovery

between the filing of the motion for summary judgment and the hearing on

the motion in November 2024. Despite his allegations that the Petroshes

impeded his discovery attempts, he failed to indicate what additional

discovery he needed. The district court did not abuse its discretion by

rendering summary judgment rather than requiring further discovery.

Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s granting of

summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Michael J. Petrosh and

Andrea M. Rabalais Petrosh regarding Plaintiff-Appellant Brian Mitnaul’s

claims of defamation against Michael and of intentional infliction of

emotional distress against both Michael and Andrea. We grant Andrea’s

motion, reverse the district court’s denial of summary judgment regarding

Mitnaul’s defamation claim against her, grant summary judgment in her

favor and dismiss with prejudice Mitnaul’s claim against her. Costs of this

appeal are assessed to Plaintiff-Appellant Brian Mitnaul.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; MOTION

GRANTED; SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED IN PART;

DEFAMATION CLAIM DISMISSED.

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