In the Matter of Two (2) Canines Seized from Susan Graham, Rayville, Louisiana

Judgment rendered August 27, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 56,497-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

IN THE MATTER OF TWO (2) Defendant-Appellant
CANINES SEIZED FROM
SUSAN GRAHAM, RAYVILLE,
LOUISIANA

*****

Appealed from the
Fifth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Richland, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 50,077

Honorable Stephen Gayle Dean, Judge

*****

JAMES EDWARD PATTON, II Counsel for
Defendants-Appellants,
Susan Graham and
In the Matter of Two
Canines Seized from
Susan Graham

AMANDA MICHELE WILKINS Counsel for
Assistant District Attorney Plaintiff-Appellee,
State of Louisiana

*****

Before PITMAN, ROBINSON, and HUNTER, JJ.

HUNTER, J.

Defendant, Susan Graham, appeals a district court judgment which

granted the State’s motion to seize two of her dogs, declared the dogs

dangerous and an immediate threat to public health and safety, and ordered

them to be humanely euthanized at defendant’s cost. For the following

reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

Defendant, Susan Graham, is the owner of nine or ten dogs. In 2022,

one of Graham’s dogs bit a meter reader who worked for the local water

company.1 The Richland Parish Sheriff’s Office (“RPSO”) issued Graham

summons for unlawful ownership of a dangerous dog. She pled guilty to the

violation and was placed on misdemeanor probation. Under the terms of her

probation, Graham was required to post warning signs around her premises

and to keep her dogs either on leashes or within appropriate secure

enclosures.

On January 22, 2025, Graham and her next-door neighbor, Julie

Smith, were outside their respective residences. Two of Graham’s dogs,

named Yellow and Red, were in the yard with Graham; the dogs were

neither on a leash nor enclosed in a secure enclosure. Graham asked Julie

for a cigarette, and Julie went inside her residence to retrieve the cigarette.

Meanwhile, Molly, Julie’s seven-year-old daughter, arrived home by school

bus and went inside her home. Moments later, Molly exited her residence

carrying the cigarette her mother had directed her to give to Graham. As

Molly approached Graham, Yellow and Red attacked the child, inflicting

1
The dog accused of biting the meter reader was not involved in the attack on the
child in the instant case.

multiple serious bites. Julie heard Molly’s screams, ran outside, and

managed to rescue Molly from the dogs. Graham was standing nearby but

did not attempt to intervene, claiming she did not see the dogs bite Molly or

hear the child’s screams. Molly suffered serious injuries, including

lacerations and puncture wounds to both arms and her right leg. She was

transported via ambulance to St. Francis Medical Center in Monroe,

Louisiana, where she underwent treatment for the dog bites.

Deputy Jonathan Bryan, of the RPSO, was dispatched to the scene.

He encountered Julie, who described the dogs involved in the attack as a

brown mixed-breed dog and a yellow mixed-breed dog.

The following day, Dustin King, Julie’s husband, contacted the RPSO

and reported that he had seen one of Graham’s dogs, which he described as a

“blonde” mixed breed, running around his yard without a leash. By the time

Deputy Bryan arrived, the dog had been returned to its kennel. The deputy

spoke to Graham, who admitted she had allowed one of her dogs outside

without a leash to “use the restroom”; however, Graham denied allowing the

dog to enter the neighbors’ yard. During her conversation with Deputy

Bryan, Graham stated her brown and white dog was one of the dogs that

attacked Molly the day before.2 Graham also told Deputy Brown that two of

her dogs, Yellow and Red, were the only two dogs outside with her when

Molly was bitten. Subsequently, King, who was not present when the dogs

bit Molly, pointed out the dogs he believed were involved. Deputy Bryan

2
During her testimony at the hearing, Graham stated she did not recall identifying
the dog to Deputy Bryan.

2

noticed two dogs, a brown and white dog and a blond or yellow dog, were in

kennels on Graham’s property. The deputy took photographs of them.3

The RPSO issued a summons to Graham, citing her with unlawful

ownership of dangerous dogs. Yellow and Red were seized, and Graham

and her daughter drove them to a local veterinary clinic where they have

been held since that time.

On January 27, 2025, the State of Louisiana, through the District

Attorney for the Fifth Judicial District, filed a “Motion and Order for Seizing

and to Set Hearing to Dispose of Vicious Dogs,” pursuant to La. R.S.

14:102.18 and 14:102.13; Graham was named as the defendant. The State

sought a declaration that the dogs were vicious and a determination “that

when unprovoked and in an aggressive manner, ha[ve] inflicted bodily

injury on a human being.” The State also requested that the dogs be

euthanized “because they are a threat to public safety.” The trial court

ordered Graham to appear and show cause why the dogs “should not be

declared vicious and disposed of according to law.”

A hearing was held on January 30, 2025. Following the hearing, the

trial court declared the dogs to be dangerous dogs that were an immediate

threat to public health and safety. More specifically, the court found that the

State met its burden of proving the dogs were “dangerous dogs,” as defined

in La. R.S. 14:102.14, because, when unprovoked, they bit a person causing

injury. The court stated as follows:

***
Counsel for Graham argues that the State must prove there was
no provocation of the dogs by Molly and that no testimony was
offered by the State to do so. The Court reads the wording of

3
It was later revealed that the blond/yellow dog that Deputy Bryan photographed
was a different dog, Milo, which was not involved in the attack.
3

the statute differently. The wording “when unprovoked, in an
aggressive manner” implies that it would be assumed that there
would ha[ve] been no provocation to the dogs unless otherwise
proven or implied from the circumstances.

The Court found no definition of “provocation” in the
applicable statutes governing the prosecution of this matter.
“Provocation” in its normal use of the word is defined as “an
action or statement that is intended to make someone angry,”
“an action that is intended to cause a reaction, esp. anger or
annoyance.” See Cambridge Dictionary. Implicit in the term is
the intent to cause a reaction. Graham, apparently the only
eyewitness to the attack other than Molly herself, testified to no
actions by Molly that could have reasonably been considered
“provocative” as she approached just prior to the attack. There
was no indication from Graham’s testimony that Molly’s
actions in running towards Graham and her dogs were anything
but normal childish actions which conceivably may have
surprised the dogs, but nothing in the testimony or other
evidence gives rise to an inference or any indication that Molly
provoked the dogs in any way. The fact that the dogs attacked
Molly without being provoked and bit her several times before
her mother arrived at the scene clearly demonstrates to the
Court that the dogs were acting “in an aggressive manner” as
contemplated by the statute.
***

The trial court ordered the dogs to be “humanely euthanized” in

accordance with La. R.S. 14:102.16(C) and 102.18(D) and (E), stating:

[I]t is apparent to the Court that the two subject dogs, Yellow
and Red, are not only dangerous dogs but that they pose an
immediate threat to public safety and health: this is evident
from the dogs act[ing] aggressively in attacking a child without
provocation, along with the fact that their owner completely
disregards the mandates of law in allowing these dogs to be
unleashed and outside of a secure enclosure at the time of the
attack and that she admittedly is physically unable to intervene
to stop the dogs [if they] should attack a neighbor or member of
the public. Unfortunately, Graham has demonstrated that she is
unwilling to act responsibly while keeping these dogs on her
premises, despite her having previously been found to be the
owner of a dangerous dog while residing at the same property
on which the attack in this case occurred. She has ignored the
obvious need to keep her dogs inside her dwelling or within
secure enclosures when found outside her dwelling. Although
she admitted knowing that she would be unable to catch or
control the dogs when they were loose, she was not responsible
enough to even leash the dogs while they were outside her

4

dwelling or outside a secured enclosure in order to at least
attempt to restrain them if needed.
***
[C]onsidering Graham has failed repeatedly to properly restrain
or enclose her dogs to prevent them from attacking persons,
especially children, living nearby or entering her property, the
Court does not believe that she will follow any directives of the
Court or comply with conditions the Court may establish for the
restraint and confinement of the subject dogs as provided by
law. For these reasons and for the reasons explained above, the
Court finds that the subject dogs pose an immediate threat to
public health and safety in accordance with the provisions of
R.S. 14:102.16.
***

The trial court further cast Graham with all costs and expenses of keeping

the dogs, including the expenses of euthanizing and properly disposing of

them.

Graham appeals.

DISCUSSION

Graham contends the trial court erred in finding that her dogs are

dangerous dogs. She argues La. R.S. 14:102.14 defines a “dangerous

dog” as a “any dog which, when unprovoked, bites a person causing an

injury.” More specifically, Graham takes issue with the trial court’s use of a

dictionary to define the term “provocation.” According to Graham, the

statute does not state the provocation must be intentional, and Molly could

have unintentionally provoked the dogs by running toward Graham. She

argues the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in interpreting the term

“provoke” to mean an intentional act. Graham asserts she is entitled to a de

novo review because the incorrect interpretation of the word tainted the

entire proceeding.

A court of appeal may not set aside a trial court’s findings of fact in

the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. Kinnett v.

5

Kinnett, 20-01134 (La. 10/10/21), 332 So. 3d 1149. However, where the

trial court makes a legal error that interdicts the fact-finding process, the

manifest error standard is no longer applicable, and the appellate court may

conduct an independent de novo review of the record. Hicks v. USAA

General Indem. Co., 21-00840 (La. 3/25/22), 339 So. 3d 1106. A legal error

occurs when a trial court applies incorrect principles of law, and such errors

are prejudicial. Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So. 2d 731.

Generally, when the trial court makes errors that are prejudicial, such that

they materially affect the outcome of the trial and deprive a party of

substantial rights, and if the record is otherwise complete, the appellate court

will conduct its own de novo review of the record. Melerine v. Tom’s

Marine & Salvage, LLC, 20-00571 (La. 3/24/21), 315 So. 3d 806.

La. R.S. 14:3 provides:

The articles of this Code cannot be extended by analogy so as
to create crimes not provided for herein; however, in order to
promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, all of its
provisions shall be given a genuine construction, according to
the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in
connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose
of the provision.

Further, as a general matter, criminal statutes are given a genuine

construction according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual

sense, in context, and with reference to the purpose for the provision. La.

R.S. 14:3; State v. Interiano, 03-1760 (La. 2/13/04), 868 So. 2d 9; State v.

Muschkat, 96-2922 (La. 3/4/98), 706 So. 2d 432; State v. Griffin, 495 So. 2d

1306 (La. 1986).

A “dangerous dog” is defined as “any dog which, when unprovoked,

bites a person causing an injury.” La. R.S. 14:102.14(A)(2). However, the

6

statute does not define the terms “unprovoked,” “provoked,” or

“provocation.”

In State v. Jenkins, 338 So. 2d 276 (La. 1976), the defendant claimed

he was prejudiced by the use of the dictionary definition of the word

“threat.” The Supreme Court rejected the argument, stating:

We note, first of all, that unless the legislature has attached a
particular meaning to a term different from that usually
understood in common parlance the common definition of the
word will be presumed to be the one intended. State v. Saibold, 213 La. 415, 34 So. 2d 909 (1948); State v. Robertson, 241 La.
249, 128 So. 2d 646 (1961). In these two cases, this Court
looked to Webster’s Dictionary to determine the common
meaning of statutory language, and, absent special
circumstances, we see nothing wrong with this method of
interpreting laws.

Id. at 282.

Applying these principles to the instant case, we find the trial

court did not apply incorrect principles of law or make any prejudicial

errors of law. The trial court did not create a wholly new definition of

the word but rather used the dictionary to ascertain the generally

prevailing meaning of a common term. Consequently, we fail to see

any legal error on the part of the trial court regarding its use of the

dictionary definition of the term “provocation.” In the absence of any

legal error on the part of the trial court, we decline to conduct a de

novo review of this matter. Therefore, we find the trial court’s factual

findings are subject to the manifest error standard of review.

Under the manifest error standard of review, the issue to be resolved

by a reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but

whether the factfinder’s conclusion was a reasonable one. Stobart v. State

through Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 617 So. 2d 880 (La. 1993); Cosse v. Allen-

7

Bradley Co., 601 So. 2d 1349 (La. 1992); Housley v. Cerise, 579 So. 2d 973

(La. 1991); Sistler v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 558 So. 2d 1106 (La. 1990).

Even though an appellate court may feel its own evaluations and inferences

are more reasonable than the factfinder’s, reasonable evaluations of

credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon

review where conflict exists in the testimony. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d

840 (La. 1989); Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1978).

However, where documents or objective evidence so contradict the

witness’s story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible

on its face, that a reasonable factfinder would not credit the witness’s story,

the court of appeal may find manifest error or clear wrongness even in a

finding purportedly based upon a credibility determination. Rosell, supra.

Nonetheless, the reviewing court must always keep in mind that if the trial

court or jury’s findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its

entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse, even if convinced that had it

been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence

differently. Housley v. Cerise, supra; Sistler v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,

supra.

A “dangerous dog” includes “[a]ny dog which, when unprovoked,

bites a person causing an injury.” La. R.S. 14:102.14(A)(2). In every case

where a dog is established to be a dangerous dog, the court shall enter an

order declaring the dog to be dangerous and shall direct the owner of the dog

to comply with conditions established for the restraint and confinement of

the dog as provided by law. La. R.S. 14:102.13(D). Alternatively, a dog

determined by the court to be a dangerous dog may be humanely euthanized

8

if it is determined that the dog poses an immediate threat to public health

and safety. La. R.S. 14:102.16(C).

Furthermore, La. R.S. 14:102.18 provides, in pertinent part:

A. Any law enforcement officer or animal control officer may
seize any dog which when unprovoked, in an aggressive
manner, causes the death of or inflicts bodily injury on a human
being. Any dog seized pursuant to the provisions of this Section
may be impounded pending the outcome of the hearing held in
accordance with this Section.
***
D. A dog determined by the court to have, when unprovoked, in
an aggressive manner, caused the death of or inflicted bodily
injury on a human being may be humanely euthanized by the
animal control agency, a licensed veterinarian, or a qualified
technician.
***

In the instant case, Deputy Bryan testified that on January 22, 2025,

he was dispatched to a property regarding a dog bite complaint. When he

arrived, he encountered Molly’s mother, Julie Smith, who told him she was

inside her house when she heard Molly screaming. She ran outside,

observed two of Graham’s dogs attacking Molly, ran over and freed Molly

from the dogs, and carried her inside. Deputy Bryan testified he observed

lacerations underneath Molly’s left armpit and on the back of her left arm

and puncture wounds on her right leg and arm. Molly was transported to St.

Francis Medical Center in Monroe via ambulance. Deputy Bryan further

testified he determined Graham was the owner of the dogs involved in the

attack, and he issued a summons to her for two counts of ownership of a

vicious dog.

Additionally, Deputy Bryan stated he was dispatched back to

Graham’s property the following day for a report of one of her dogs running

loose in the neighbor’s yard. He also testified that Dustin King pointed out

the two dogs he believed had bitten Molly. Deputy Bryan stated he
9

interviewed Graham, who admitted to letting one of her dogs out “to use the

restroom” on her property, but she denied that the dog ventured onto King’s

property. Deputy Bryan also testified Graham informed him “it was the

brown and white dog alone that attacked [Molly] the previous day.”

Suzanne Smith, Graham’s daughter, testified she lives near her

mother, and she is familiar with her mother’s dogs. Smith stated she had

never seen Yellow or Red behave aggressively toward anyone, and her

children had never been afraid of them. She also testified she took

photographs of her mother’s property the day before the hearing; the

photographs depicted “Beware of Dog” signs displayed in various locations

around the property.4

Melissa Overman, Suzanne Smith’s best friend, testified that she

visited Graham nearly every day, and she was familiar with the dogs,

including Yellow and Red. She also stated Yellow and Red would bark

when she arrived, but she had never witnessed them acting aggressively

toward anyone. Overman testified the dogs were familiar with her, and she

described their barks as “playful,” but not vicious. She further testified

Yellow generally stays in the house with Graham, but Graham lets her

outside “to use the bathroom.” Overman admitted that she had never

observed Yellow being on a leash when Graham let her outside.

Graham testified that Red and Yellow were outside in the yard with

her at the time of the attack, and she admitted they were not on leashes. She

stated she was not in any condition to catch the dogs if they became excited

4
Smith also identified her mother’s dogs depicted in the photographs. One of the
photographs, taken by Deputy Bryan the day after the attack, depicted a dog named
“Milo,” which looked similar to Yellow.
10

and “took off.” She also testified she heard the dogs barking, but she did not

see them bite Molly or hear Molly screaming. Graham insisted she “was

there the whole time”; however, she claimed she did not know how Molly

received the dog bites depicted in the photographs. She stated her dogs are

not aggressive, Yellow and Red are “loving dogs,” and she had never seen

them bite or act aggressively toward anyone. Graham also testified that she

did not believe Molly intentionally provoked the dogs, but she may have

“scared” them by running across the yard. According to Graham, she could

not recall identifying Yellow and Red as the dogs that attacked Molly.5

After Graham’s testimony, the State called Deputy Jacob Stansbury to

testify as a rebuttal witness. He testified he and another deputy were

dispatched to Graham’s property to seize and impound the dogs involved in

the attack on Molly. He stated he and the other deputy did not know which

dogs were to be seized when they arrived at the property. Therefore, they

spoke to Graham and asked her which dogs were involved in the incident.

Deputy Stansbury testified that Graham indicated which dogs were involved,

and she and her daughter put the dogs into her vehicle and drove them to the

veterinary clinic. When asked how the deputies knew which two dogs were

to be seized and impounded, Deputy Stansbury replied as follows:

Well, we just – we took *** Ms. [Graham’s] account. We asked
her, you know, which dogs [were involved]. Obviously, there
[were] multiple dogs. Once – once she told us which dogs ***
and we got them to Morris Vet, I captured two photos, one of
each dog that was quarantined. And the pictures were shown to,
I believe, the victim’s mother. And the mother clarified that
those were the dogs that in fact attacked her.

5
Graham introduced exhibits, which showed she had kennels and several
“Beware of Dog” signs on her property. One of the signs faced the property occupied by
Molly’s family.
11

Pursuant to R.S. 14:102.18, the State was required to prove (1) the

dogs inflicted bodily injury or caused the death of a human being; (2) the

dogs were unprovoked; and (3) the dogs inflicted the bodily injuries in an

aggressive manner. Based on our review of the record, we find the evidence

supports the trial court’s conclusion that the dogs, Yellow and Red, in an

aggressive manner, inflicted bodily injury on a human being, Molly. The

trial court evaluated the evidence and concluded Molly did not provoke the

dogs to bite her. There was no evidence that Molly, a child running to give

Graham a requested cigarette from her mother, provoked the dogs to attack

her, either intentionally or unintentionally. The dogs were in the yard,

unleashed, at the time of the attack, and Graham admitted she habitually lets

the dogs out into the yard without leashes. The evidence also established

that despite the attack on Molly, Graham admitted that she had let at least

one of her dogs outside, unleashed, the very next day to “use the restroom.”

In finding that the dogs pose an immediate threat to public health and safety

and ordering them to be euthanized, the trial court appropriately considered

Graham’s total disregard of the prior mandate to keep her dogs leashed or in

secure enclosures. The trial court stated:

***
[C]onsidering that Graham has failed repeatedly to properly
restrain or enclose her dogs to prevent them from attacking
persons, especially children, living nearby or entering her
property, the Court does not believe that she will follow any
directives of the Court or comply with conditions the Court
may establish for the restraint and confinement of the subject
dogs as provided by law. For these reasons, and for the reasons
explained above, the Court finds that the subject dogs pose an
immediate threat to public health and safety[.]
***

We agree. Consequently, we find the trial court’s findings – the dogs,

Yellow and Red, attacked Molly without provocation, and they inflicted
12

bodily injury on her in an aggressive manner – were not manifestly

erroneous or clearly wrong. Additionally, considering the appropriate

standard of review and the entirety of the record, we are constrained to

conclude that the trial court did not manifestly err in finding that the dogs,

Yellow and Red, pose an immediate threat to public health and safety and

ordering them to be humanely euthanized.

Graham also argues the trial court erred in overruling her objections

and allowing Deputy Bryan to render hearsay testimony as to what Molly’s

mother Julie, and her husband, Dustin King, told him during the

investigation of the dogs’ attack. She argues neither Julie nor King testified

at the trial, and the testimony by Deputy Bryan was hearsay because it

pertained to the central issue in this case.

The Code of Evidence shall serve as guides to the admissibility of

evidence. In hearings on motions and other summary proceedings involving

questions of fact not dispositive of or central to the disposition of the case on

the merits, or to the dismissal of the case, the specific exclusionary rules of

evidence and other provisions shall be applied only to the extent that they

tend to promote the purposes of the proceeding. La. C.E. art. 1101(B)(8).

“Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make

the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the

action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

La. C.E. art. 401. All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise

provided by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of

Louisiana, this Code of Evidence, or other legislation. Evidence which is not

relevant is not admissible. La. C.E. art. 402.

13

“Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while

testifying at the present trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the

truth of the matter asserted. La. C.E. art. 801(C). Hearsay is not admissible

except as otherwise provided by the Louisiana Code of Evidence or other

legislation. La. C.E. art. 802. Whether evidence is relevant and admissible

is within the discretion of the trial court, and its rulings will not be disturbed

on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Succession of

Davisson, 50,830 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/22/16), 211 So. 3d 597, writ denied,

17-0307 (La. 4/7/17), 218 So. 3d 111; Hooker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

38,244 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/3/04), 867 So.2d 869.

When an investigating officer testifies concerning events which lead

to the arrest of a defendant, or in this case, the issuance of a summons,

statements made to the officer during the course of the investigation are not

hearsay, if they are merely offered to explain the officer’s actions. State v.

Clark, 44,612 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/23/09), 22 So. 3d 240; State v. Zeigler,

40,673 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/25/06), 920 So. 2d 949. A trial court’s error in

admitting evidence of a testifying police officer, when such testimony

arguably contains hearsay, is subject to the harmless error analysis. Id.

Our review of the record reveals Deputy Bryan testified that Molly’s

mother, Julie Smith, was the complainant on January 22, 2025, regarding the

dog attack, and Dustin King was the complainant on January 23, 2025,

regarding one of Graham’s dogs running in his yard. Over the objections of

Graham’s counsel, Deputy Bryan was allowed to testify about his

conversations with Julie and King and their recount of events. His testimony

explained his understanding of the occurrences which transpired and his

subsequent investigation of both complaints, including his interactions with
14

Graham. Deputy Bryan did not testify to the veracity of what Julie and King

told him. Rather, much of his testimony focused on the actions he took in

response to the information they provided, i.e., interviewing Graham and

subsequently issuing a summons. Based on the facts and circumstances

herein, we find the trial court did not err in denying the hearsay objections to

Deputy Bryan’s testimony.

Nevertheless, even if the trial court erred in allowing the testimony,

reversal is mandated only when there is a reasonable possibility that the

hearsay evidence surely contributed to the trial court’s ruling. In this case,

our review of the record shows the evidence was sufficient to support the

trial court’s ruling, even without consideration of the deputy’s testimony as

to the statements made by Julie and King. Even without the benefit of the

statements, the evidence established Yellow and Red attacked Molly, biting

her multiple times. Deputy Bryan saw and photographed Molly’s injuries.

Further, Graham, who denied witnessing the attack, later admitted to Deputy

Bryan that at least one of her dogs (subsequently identified as Red) was

involved. Graham also identified which dogs were in the yard with her at

the time of the attack, and she and her daughter transported the dogs to the

veterinary clinic. Consequently, we conclude any error in allowing Deputy

Bryan’s testimony, regarding statements made by Julie and King, was

harmless.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant, Susan Graham.

AFFIRMED.

15