Cited by
Opinions in Louisiana that cite State v. Elzie, 343 So. 2d 712.
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State of Louisiana v. Kevin Robert Sterling
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2024
-14 (La.1977) (observing that, in Louisiana, “we require proof of specific intent where the statutory definition of a crime includes the intent to produce or 16 See also State v. Merrill, 12-576, p. 8 (La.
- State of Louisiana v. Terri Latrelle Williams La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2024
- State Of Louisiana v. Brian Clarke La. 2022
- State of Louisiana Versus Brian Clarke La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2021
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State of Louisiana v. Troy Allen
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2020
Thus, “specific intent is required to commit the crime to possess cocaine with intent to distribute.” (La.
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State of Louisiana v. Joseph Taylor
217 So. 3d 283
La. 2016
Thus, “specific intent is required to commit the crime to possess cocaine with intent to distribute.” (La.
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State v. Williams
199 So. 3d 1205
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2016
5 Cir. 01/27/16) , ; -14 (La.1977).
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State v. Gaubert
179 So. 3d 982
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2015
As this court explained in the Frosch case, “[c]riminal mischief by tampering is a specific intent crime.” 00-1525 at p. 6, 787 So.2d at 341 (citing Krueutzer, 583 So.2d at 1163 ) (-14 (La.1977) .(“in Louisiana, we require proof of specific intent where the statutory definition of a crime includes the intent to produce or accomplish some prescribed consequence”)).
- State v. Sullivan 146 So. 3d 952 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2014
- State v. Keys 125 So. 3d 19 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2013
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State of Louisiana v. Ronald G. Acker, Jr.
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2013
An offender therefore has the requisite intent when “from the circumstances the prohibited result may reasonably be expected to follow from the offender‟s voluntary act, irrespective of any subjective desire on his part to have accomplished such result.” R.S.
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State v. Acker
111 So. 3d 535
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2013
An offender therefore has the requisite intent when “from the circumstances the prohibited result may reasonably be ex *545 pected to follow from the offender’s voluntary act, irrespective of any subjective desire on his part to have accomplished such result.” R.S.
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State v. Davis
111 So. 3d 100
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2012
An offender has the requisite general intent when “from the circumstances the prohibited result may reasonably be expected to follow from the offender’s voluntary act, irrespective of any subjective desire on his part to have accomplished such result.” (La.
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State of Louisiana v. Byran Louis Fogleman
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2012
In asserting this 5 argument, he relies on the following supreme court’s -14 (La.1977): 2 [I]n Louisiana, we require proof of specific intent where the statutory definition of a crime includes the intent to produce or accomplish some prescribed consequence (the frequent language being “with intent to .
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State v. Fogleman
98 So. 3d 964
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2012
In asserting this |fiargument, he relies on the following supreme court’s -14 (La.1977): 2 [I]n Louisiana, we require proof of specific intent where the statutory definition of a crime includes the intent to produce or accomplish some prescribed consequence (the frequent language being “with intent to ...
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State v. Scott
48 So. 3d 1080
La. 2010
(“[T]o convict the accused the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt not only that he possessed the cocaine found on his premises, but also that he did so with the specific subjective intention of possessing it in order to distribute it.”); see, e.g., State v. Knighten, 07-1061, pp. 1-2
- State of Louisiana v. Reginald J. Julien La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2010
- State v. Julien 34 So. 3d 494 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2010
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State v. Smith
23 So. 3d 291
La. 2009
2 *298 An offender therefore has the requisite intent when “from the circumstances the prohibited result may reasonably be expected to follow from the offender’s voluntary act, irrespective of any subjective desire on his pai't to have accomplished such result.” R.S.
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State v. Grant
890 So. 2d 689
La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2004
State v. Johnson, supra .
- State v. Ratliff 796 So. 2d 101 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2001
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State v. Johnson
796 So. 2d 201
La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2001
40:967; State v. Gene (La.
- State v. Miller 792 So. 2d 104 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2001
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State v. Frosch
787 So. 2d 336
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2001
5 Cir. 1991), -714 (La.1977) (“in Louisiana, we require proof of specific intent where the statutory definition of a crime includes the intent to produce or accomplish some prescribed consequence ...
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State v. Hollins
742 So. 2d 671
La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1999
the cocaine seized was powdered cocaine.
- State v. Douglas 707 So. 2d 512 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1998
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State v. Spencer
707 So. 2d 96
La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1998
40:967 A(1); State v. Daniels, supra .
- State v. Martin 694 So. 2d 1209 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997
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State v. Walker
684 So. 2d 12
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1996
State v. Bannister, 95-172 (La.App.
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Carver, Inc. v. STATE, DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORR.
672 So. 2d 1141
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1996
4/28/95), (Calogero, C.J., concurring.); see La.R.S.
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State v. Mills
665 So. 2d 489
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1995
State v. McCaleb, supra.
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State v. Bannister
658 So. 2d 16
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1995
State v. McCaleb, supra.
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City of Baton Rouge v. Ross
654 So. 2d 1311
La. 1995
" ( emphasis added ); LSA-R.S.
- State v. Cinel 646 So. 2d 309 La. 1994
- State v. Jackson 629 So. 2d 1374 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1993
- State v. Jackson 629 So. 2d 1374 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1993
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State v. Bourque
622 So. 2d 198
La. 1993
State v. Allen, [ 129 La.
- State v. Daniels 614 So. 2d 97 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1993
- State v. Tong 609 So. 2d 822 La. 1992
- State in Interest of JW 597 So. 2d 1056 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1992
- State v. McCaleb 593 So. 2d 1388 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1992
- State v. Gene 587 So. 2d 18 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1991
- State v. Gene 587 So. 2d 18 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1991
- State v. Krueutzer 583 So. 2d 1160 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1991
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State v. Rodriguez
569 So. 2d 5
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1990
From a reading of the jurisprudence, it is clear that cocaine is never sold uncut, and that the legislative prohibition applied to the sale and possession of cocaine, i.e., what is actually transported, as well as what is actually bought and sold on the street.
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Breland v. Schilling
550 So. 2d 609
La. 1989
("(G)eneral intent exists when from the circumstances the prohibited result may reasonably be expected to follow from the offender's voluntary act, irrespective of any subjective desire on his part to have accomplished such result.").
- State v. Roberts 550 So. 2d 1254 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1989
- State v. Carroll 546 So. 2d 1365 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1989
- State v. Jones 544 So. 2d 1294 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1989
- State v. Jones 544 So. 2d 636 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1989