Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Reck v. Stevens, 373 So. 2d 498.

1552 citing documents.

Dupre v. Saenger Arts Center, Inc. 508 So. 2d 837 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
a trier of fact is vested with “much discretion” in awarding damages for personal injuries and such awards will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of this discretion.
Whittington v. American Oil Co. 508 So. 2d 180 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1987
14 A.L.R.4th 313 (La., 1979), the Louisiana Supreme Court set forth the principles for analyzing the jury's exercise of discretion.
Boehm v. Bienemy 508 So. 2d 159 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1987
Detillier v. Scafco, Ltd. 507 So. 2d 829 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1987
Kyle v. City of Bogalusa 506 So. 2d 719 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc.
Davis v. Material Delivery Service, Inc. 506 So. 2d 1243 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
[8] Our initial inquiry, is whether the jury's award of $23,353.75 in general damages for this plaintiff's particular injuries and their effects upon him is a clear abuse of the jury's much discretion.
Barbin on Behalf of Barbin v. State 506 So. 2d 888 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
The initial inquiry in a general damages award "must always be directed at whether the trier court's award for the particular injuries and their effects upon this particular injured person is, a clear abuse of the trier of fact's `much discretion.'"
Wilkinson v. Town of Baker 506 So. 2d 739 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
Sexton v. Louisiana Vacuum Services, Inc. 506 So. 2d 780 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
Ard v. Samedan Oil Corporation, supra ; Carollo v. Wilson, *782 supra ; Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc.
Hill v. Lamulle 506 So. 2d 690 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1987
Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., Bourgeois v. Bill Watson's Investment, Inc., (La.App.
Adams v. Phillips 506 So. 2d 651 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
Pontiff v. Bailey 509 So. 2d 451 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1987
Wallace v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 509 So. 2d 466 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1987
Aucoin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 505 So. 2d 993 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1987
3d Cir.1985), we reviewed the Supreme Court's prescribed two-step procedure: " upon appellate review we may not disturb an award of general damages made at the trial court level without a finding of clear abuse of discretion and then only after abuse is shown through an articulated analysis and for articulated reasons.
Seaux v. Domingue 509 So. 2d 536 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
Beard v. REPUBLIC VANGUARD INSURANCE 509 So. 2d 561 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1987
Temple v. Shannon 505 So. 2d 798 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987
Wactor v. Pickens Lumber Co. 505 So. 2d 815 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987
Mesa v. Burke 506 So. 2d 121 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1987
Turning to the damage award for Cynthia, our standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in fixing the award
Joseph v. Ford Motor Co. 499 So. 2d 428 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1987
Bonnette v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance Co. 503 So. 2d 728 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
Lognion v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury 503 So. 2d 1092 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1987
however, stated the following with respect to an appellate court's reliance on prior court decisions on the issue of damages: "Before a trial court award may be questioned as inadequate or excessive, the reviewing court must look first, not to prior awards, but to the individual circumstances of the present
Foster v. Lafayette Ins. Co. 504 So. 2d 82 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987
Gormley v. Grand Lodge of State of La. 503 So. 2d 181 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1987
Barker v. City of New Orleans 503 So. 2d 536 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
Gordon v. Commercial Union Insurance Company 503 So. 2d 190 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1987
Guillotte v. Dept. of Transp. & Development 503 So. 2d 618 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1987
Hellmers v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSP. & DEVELOPMENT 503 So. 2d 174 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1987
Clement v. Torres 503 So. 2d 91 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
Bonnette v. K-Mart, Inc. 502 So. 2d 202 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1987
and the cases cited therein.
Whitacre v. Halo Optical Products, Inc. 501 So. 2d 994 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987
Guidry v. Marks 499 So. 2d 653 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1986
Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc.
Deville v. STATE EX REL. DOTD 498 So. 2d 1142 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1986
Torres v. US Fidelity and Guar. Co. 499 So. 2d 1293 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1986
Gallagher v. Favrot 499 So. 2d 1205 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1986
Thomas v. State Farm Ins. Co. 499 So. 2d 562 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1986
the Louisiana Supreme Court set forth the following two-part analysis to be used in determining the inadequacy or excessiveness of a damage award: Thus, the initial inquiry must always be directed at whether the trier court's award for the particular injuries and their effects upon this particular inju
Harris v. Pineset 499 So. 2d 499 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1986
Johnmeyer v. Creel 499 So. 2d 571 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1986
Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., (La.App.
Lindsay v. Toys 499 So. 2d 462 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1986
Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., supra ; Winterrowd v. Travelers Indemnity Company, supra ; (La.App.
Perret v. Webster 498 So. 2d 283 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1986
Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., rehearing denied January 21, 1977.
Sims v. Selvage 499 So. 2d 325 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1986
Acy v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. 499 So. 2d 262 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1986
Kelly v. Riverside Medical Center 499 So. 2d 1135 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1986
Gravois v. Succession of Trauth 498 So. 2d 140 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1986
Rachal v. Agudosi 496 So. 2d 1274 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1986
Before questioning the adequacy or inadequacy of the award, we must look first, not to the prior awards
Duplechin v. Toce 497 So. 2d 763 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1986
Thomas v. West Calcasieu-Cameron Hosp. 497 So. 2d 375 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1986
Nettles v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc. 496 So. 2d 1296 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1986
art. 2324.1, the assessment of damages in cases of quasi offenses is left to the discretion of the jury.
Guillot v. Sandoz 497 So. 2d 753 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1986
Scott v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 496 So. 2d 270 La. 1986
Co., and then "only to the extent of lowering it (or raising it) to the highest (or lowest) point which is reasonably within the discretion afforded that court."