Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475.

411 citing documents.

Caudle v. Betts 512 So. 2d 389 La. 1987
England v. S & M FOODS, INC. 511 So. 2d 1313 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987
Theriot v. Damson Oil Corp. 512 So. 2d 584 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
V. Defendants continously [sic] committed each of the above acts with the knowledge and belief that the fire that occurred and resulting injuries and/or consequences to Robert Daniel Theriot were certain or substantially certain to follow.” the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that the words “intentional act”, found in La.R.S.
Pennington v. Kyzar 510 So. 2d 697 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
Major v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. 506 So. 2d 583 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1987
Jenkins v. Whitfield 505 So. 2d 83 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1987
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 , 97 S.Ct.
Wong v. Stanley 505 So. 2d 109 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1987
the Supreme Court stated that the meaning of "intent" in the context of the exclusion of intentional acts from the workmen's compensation law is that "the defendant either desired to bring about the physical results of his act or believed they were substantially certain to follow from what he did."
Followed Stuart v. City of Morgan City 504 So. 2d 934 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
Hillery v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. 503 So. 2d 592 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
With regard to intentional torts, that the requisite “intent” is present if the person who acts either (1) consciously desires the physical result of his act, or (2) knows that the result is substantially certain to follow from his conduct.
Caudle v. Betts 502 So. 2d 146 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
the Supreme Court defined “intentional act” within the context of La.R.S.
Parker v. Cappel 500 So. 2d 771 La. 1987
This Court treated the equal protection analysis in a (La.
Smith v. Cotton's Fleet Service, Inc. 500 So. 2d 759 La. 1987
14 Malone & Johnson, supra, at § 364.
Redding v. Essex Crane Rental Corp. 500 So. 2d 880 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1986
plaintiffs are entitled to bring a 2.
Williams v. Charity Hosp. of Louisiana 499 So. 2d 1260 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1986
Fabre v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. 499 So. 2d 1239 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1986
Williams v. Gervais F. Favrot Co. 499 So. 2d 623 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1986
To the extent that appellant's constitutional attack is directed at the increased tort immunity conferred on direct employers and principals by the 1976 amendments to the compensation act, (La.
Justice v. Sylvester 499 So. 2d 590 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1986
the Supreme Court enterpreted legislative intent with clarity: The principal legislative aim of the 1976 amendment was to broaden the class of defendants to be granted immunity from suits by injured employees in tort or delict.
Crier v. Whitecloud 496 So. 2d 305 La. 1986
In Re Beychok 495 So. 2d 1278 La. 1986
Taylor v. Metropolitan Erection Co. 496 So. 2d 1184 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1986
Sessions v. Stan Weber & Associates, Inc. 491 So. 2d 54 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1986
Snow v. Gulf States Utilities Co. 492 So. 2d 31 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1986
Dugas v. International Salt Co. 489 So. 2d 480 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1986
International and Gustafson argue that the action was properly dismissed on the motion for summary judgment because the pleadings, depositions and other documents reveal that defendants’
Tampke v. Findley Adhesives, Inc. 489 So. 2d 299 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1986
In Re Beychok 484 So. 2d 912 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1986
92 , 83 L.Ed.2d 39 ; (La.App.
Simoneaux v. EI Du Pont De Nemours and Co., Inc. 483 So. 2d 908 La. 1986
I voted to grant a rehearing in Mayer, along with the two dissenting justices, to reconsider the decision, because the intentional act exception to the exclusive remedy provisions of the workmen's compensation act, applies so rarely and infrequently that the defendants in an action based on something apparently less than a genuine intentional act should be entitled to dismissal at the earliest possible stage of the proceedings.
Desselle v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 482 So. 2d 1009 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1986
[1] *1011 the guidelines for examining constitutional challenges against statutes raising substantive due process and equal protection issues were succinctly set forth as follows: "The basic framework of analysis of such a claim is well settled.
McDonald v. Gonzales 479 So. 2d 9 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1985
State v. Vice 476 So. 2d 590 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1985
EQUAL PROTECTION 2 where it stated as follows: “The basic framework of analysis of such a claim is well settled.
Gallant v. Transcontinental Drilling Co. 471 So. 2d 858 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1985
State v. Ludwig 468 So. 2d 1151 La. 1985
Hamm v. Precision Rebuilders, Inc. 470 So. 2d 308 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1985
23:1032 limits the employee’s action against his employer to recovery of workmen’s compensation benefits except where the injury resulted from an “intentional act.” The definition of an “intentional act”
Williams v. Ingredient Technology Corp. 470 So. 2d 283 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1985
so frequently cited, is that intent under R.S.
Heindel v. Harley-Davidson Motorcycles 467 So. 2d 641 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1985
Ewert v. Georgia Casualty & Surety Co. 468 So. 2d 13 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1985
the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that the words “intentional act”, as used in La.R.S.
Goodman v. Dixie MacH. Welding and Metal Works, Inc. 467 So. 2d 61 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1985
the Court, in analyzing the 1976 amendment to R.S.
McCormick v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. 464 So. 2d 826 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1985
23:1032 and as further defined by the Supreme Court in Bazley v. Tortorick, supra [ ].
Followed Sibley v. Board of Sup'rs of Louisiana State University 462 So. 2d 149 La. 1985
O'Neill v. Johns-Manville Corp. 463 So. 2d 671 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1985
which states: “Only where the actor entertained a desire to bring about the consequences that followed or where the actor believed that the result was substantially certain to follow has an act been characterized as intentional.” However, in the case of Mayer v. Valentine Sugars, Inc., (La.198
Fleming v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 461 So. 2d 614 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 8 (4th ed. 1971); Restatement (Second) of Torts, American Law Institute § 8A (1965).
Brown v. Ebasco Services, Inc. 461 So. 2d 443 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1984
interprets an intentional act under 23:1032 as follows: The meaning of intent in this context is that the defendant either desired to bring about the physical results of his act or believed they were substantially certain to follow from what he did.
Cupp v. Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Co. 459 So. 2d 1337 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1984
interpreted "intentional acts" to be the equivalent of intentional torts.
Crier v. Whitecloud 455 So. 2d 1279 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1984
Nix v. King 457 So. 2d 805 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
1278 , 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); Everette v. Goldman, [1] supra.
26 457 So. 2d 180 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1984
The court relied on the definition of an “intentional act” and determined that this defendant did not commit an “intentional act” within the meaning of La.R.S.
Babin v. Edwards 456 So. 2d 659 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
Although uniformally unsuccessful, where the Louisiana Supreme Court, adopting the definition of intent found in the Restatement of Torts, 2d, American Law Institute, Sec.
Kirklin v. Keller 453 So. 2d 667 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
The pronouncement by our Supreme Court
Jack A. Parker & Assoc., Inc. v. STATE, ETC. 454 So. 2d 162 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized a list of rights which have been found to be fundamental.
Poston v. Davis 451 So. 2d 1295 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
gave definition to the term `intentional act' in the context of the above mentioned statute: "The meaning of `intent' is that the person who acts either (1) consciously desires the physical result of his act, whatever the likelihood of that result *1298 happening from his conduct; or (2) knows that that resu
Van Alton v. FISK ELEC., INC. 451 So. 2d 1237 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1984