Cited by
Opinions in Louisiana that cite Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146.
- Hammons v. City of Tallulah 705 So. 2d 276 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997
- McCarthy v. First Financial Ins. 705 So. 2d 1137 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997
- Bison v. Primrose 705 So. 2d 249 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997
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Grissette v. Thomas
704 So. 2d 1215
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1997
and Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp., 258 La.
- Lee v. STATE, THROUGH DEPT. OF TRANSP. AND DEV. 701 So. 2d 676 La. 1997
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Delpit v. Greater Lakeside Corp.
701 So. 2d 1017
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1997
the supreme court cautioned, “The unreasonable risk of harm criterion, however, is not a simple rule of law which.may be applied mechanically to the facts of a case.” The judge must consider the facts and their relation to the ideals of justice and social utility, together with moral, social and econo
- Blanchard v. STATE, THROUGH PARKS & REC. COM'N 702 So. 2d 768 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1997
- Blanchard v. State ex rel. Parks & Recreation Commission 702 So. 2d 768 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1997
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Nichols v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
698 So. 2d 53
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1997
Celestine v. Union Oil Co. of California, 94-1868 (La.4/10/95)
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Barrino v. E. BATON ROUGE SCHOOL BD.
697 So. 2d 27
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1997
Bordelon , 93-1331 at p. 3; 640 So.2d at 478 ().
- Taylor v. Moseley 698 So. 2d 3 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1997
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Ebarb v. Guinn Bros. Inc.
691 So. 2d 228
La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997
On May 8, 1995, the landowners filed the motion for summary judgment now before this court for consideration, arguing that, (La.
- Maxwell v. Board of Trustees 692 So. 2d 641 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1997
- Lott v. Lebon 687 So. 2d 612 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1997
- Boyle v. Board of Sup'rs 685 So. 2d 1080 La. 1997
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Thomas v. Medical Center of Southwest Louisiana
685 So. 2d 706
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1996
Rabito v. Otis Elevator Co., 93-1001, 93-1002 (La.App.
- Robinson v. Dunn 683 So. 2d 894 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1996
- Migues v. City of Lake Charles 682 So. 2d 946 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1996
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Delaune v. Medical Ctr. of Baton Rouge
683 So. 2d 859
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1996
1986), however, the court reached a very contrasting result due to the difference in individual circumstances.
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Boyle v. BD. OF SUP'RS OF LA. STATE UNIV. & AGRIC. & MECHANICAL COLLEGE
672 So. 2d 254
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1996
-1150 (La.1983), and Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corporation, 258 La.
- Dorthlon v. ST. FRANCIS MED. CENTER 677 So. 2d 654 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1996
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Jones v. Peyton Place, Inc.
675 So. 2d 754
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1996
-50 (La.1983) (citations omitted).
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Pitre v. Louisiana Tech University
673 So. 2d 585
La. 1996
Socorro, 579 So.2d at 939
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Buchert v. STATE EX REL. DEPT. OF REC. & TOURISM
669 So. 2d 527
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1996
The means by which a judge can decide whether a : The unreasonable risk of harm criterion, however, is not a simple rule of law which may be applied mechanically to the facts of a case.
- Norred v. Radisson Hotel Corp. 665 So. 2d 753 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1995
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Summerall v. Ouachita Parish School Bd.
665 So. 2d 734
La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1995
Harig v. State, Board of Elementary and Secondary Education, 25,702 (La.App.
- Phipps v. Amtrak 666 So. 2d 341 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1995
- White v. Louviere 664 So. 2d 603 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1995
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Carter v. Exide Corp.
661 So. 2d 698
La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1995
The inquiry *700 into whether a risk is unreasonable is "context specific" or "fact intensive,"
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Boddie v. State
661 So. 2d 617
La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1995
Faulkner v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 25,857 (La.App.
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Morell v. City of Breaux Bridge
660 So. 2d 882
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1995
Landry v. State of Louisiana and the Board of Levee Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District [ ], supra; Entrevia v. Hood [ ], supra, (Lemmon, J., concurring)."
- Delphen v. Dept. of Transp. & Dev. 657 So. 2d 328 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1995
- Billiot v. State 654 So. 2d 753 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1995
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Celestine v. Union Oil Co. of California
652 So. 2d 1299
La. 1995
Judge Rubin also reviewed the "unreasonable risk" discussed further below, and concluded that the owner was not strictly liable under these circumstances.
- Bessard v. State, Dept. of Transp. and Development 645 So. 2d 1134 La. 1994
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Girvan v. New Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc.
646 So. 2d 481
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1994
the instructions, when read as a whole, constitute an accurate statement of the Louisiana law of negligence and strict liability, and satisfy the jurisprudential standard of review.
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Olivier v. Boudreaux
649 So. 2d 629
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1994
our Supreme Court set forth the principles applicable in determining whether a risk is unreasonable, stating: The judicial process involved in deciding whether a risk is unreasonable under Article 2317 is similar to that employed in determining whether a risk is unreasonable in a traditional negligence prob
- Faulkner v. STATE, DEPT. OF TRANSP. & DEV. 645 So. 2d 268 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1994
- Wiggins on Behalf of Wiggins v. Ledet 643 So. 2d 797 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1994
- Townsend v. Westinghouse Elevator Corporation 641 So. 2d 1022 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1994
- DiBenedetto v. Automotive Casualty Insurance Co. 638 So. 2d 385 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1994
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Bordelon v. St. Frances Cabrini Hosp.
640 So. 2d 476
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1994
Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc., (1972).
- Celestine v. Union Oil Co. of California 636 So. 2d 1138 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1994
- Sanders v. Posi-Seal Intern. 635 So. 2d 760 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1994
- Faul v. Bank of Sunset & Trust Co. 635 So. 2d 573 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1994
- Harig v. State, Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ. 635 So. 2d 485 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1994
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Kirby v. Langston's Furniture & Appliance
631 So. 2d 1301
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1994
B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, at p. 105 (1921); -50 (La.1983).
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Guilfore v. DH Holmes Co., Ltd.
631 So. 2d 491
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1994
the court framed the test as follows: 1.
- Batiste v. Bevan 634 So. 2d 893 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1993
- Theriot v. Lasseigne 624 So. 2d 1267 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1993