Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Trans-Global Alloy v. First Nat. Bank, 583 So. 2d 443.

64 citing documents.

Eddie L. Collier, III and Terrell Collier v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and … La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2024
13:4203, which provides, “Legal interest shall attach from date of judicial demand, on all judgments, sounding in damages, ‘ex delicto’, which may be rendered by any of the courts.”® Legal interest runs from the plaintiff's first judicial claim against any party responsible for ’ Citing Trans— (La.
Donald F. Flores, Jr. Versus David B. Campbell; New Era Information Technologies, LLC; And Glen M. Feucht La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2022
FHW CHEHARDY, C.J. REHEARING GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART In a timely application for rehearing, plaintiff-appellant Donald Flores, individually and on behalf of New Era Information Technologies, LLC, argues that interest should have been awarded from the date of judicial demand rather than the date of judgment, citing Trans-Global Alloy Ltd. v. First Nat’l Bank of Jefferson Par., (La.
Pat Cooper v. Lafayette Parish School Board La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2022
While it is generally true that judicial interest should accumulate from the date of breach in contract cases, as opposed to the date of judicial demand, the supreme court in Trans– has held that in ―highly complicated‖ cases where the issues are whether a breach has occurred and the appropriate damage amount, it is appropriate to award interest from the date of judicial demand.
Louis Ridgel v. Mitchell Chevalier, St. Bernard Parish Fire Department Through the St. Bernard Parish Government, and Lexington … La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2020
Bank of Jefferson Parish, -49 (La.1991)).
George Raymond Williams, M.D., Orthopaedic Surgery, a Professional Medical, LLC v. Sif Consultants of Louisiana, Inc., Risk Management … La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018
In finding that legal interest was due to the plaintiff class from the date of the first demand against CorVel on December 22, 2006, the trial court relied on the supreme court case of Trans-Global Alloy Ltd. v. First Nat’l Bank of Jefferson Parish, (La.
George Raymond Williams, M.D., Orthopaedic Surgery, L. L.C. v. Sif Consultants of La., Inc. 242 So. 3d 756 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2018
In finding that legal interest was due to the plaintiff class from the date of the first demand against CorVel on December 22, 2006, the trial court relied on the supreme court case of Trans-Global Alloy Ltd. v. First Nat'l Bank of Jefferson Parish , , (La.
Thomas v. A. Wilbert & Sons, LLC 217 So. 3d 368 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2017
Bank of Jefferson Par., -58 (La.
Boes Iron Works, Inc. v. Gee Cee Group, Inc. 206 So. 3d 938 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2016
|2sAlthough the general rule in breach of contract cases is that judicial interest runs from the date of breach, (La.
Crescent City Cabinets & Flooring, L.L.C. v. Grace Tama Development Co. 203 So. 3d 408 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2016
Bank of Jefferson Par., (La.
McMaster v. Progressive Security Insurance Co. 152 So. 3d 979 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2014
See Trans-Global Alloy, Ltd. v. First Nat’l Bank, -449 (La.1991).
Hazel Richard Savoie v. Alice T. Richard La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2014
While it is generally true that judicial interest should accumulate from the date of breach in contract cases, as opposed to the date of judicial demand, has held that in ―highly complicated‖ cases where the issues are whether a breach has occurred and the appropriate damage amount, it is appropriate to award interest from the date of judicial demand.
Savoie v. Richard 137 So. 3d 78 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2014
While it is generally true that judicial interest should accumulate from the date of breach in contract cases, as opposed to the date of judicial demand, has held that in “highly complicated” cases where the issues are whether a breach has occurred and the appropriate damage amount, it is appropriate to award interest from the date of judicial demand.
Aisola v. Beacon Hospital Management, Inc. 140 So. 3d 71 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2014
Bank of Jefferson Parish, ).
Ryan Breaux v. Louisiana Patients Compensation Fund La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2013
Moreover, after a review of the record, we do not find that the jury instructions or interrogatories “contain the kind of plain, fundamental error which might tempt us not to heed the language of article 1793.”
Hartec Corp. v. GSE Associates, Inc. 91 So. 3d 375 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2012
Bank of Jefferson Parish
Wegener v. Lafayette Insurance Co. 60 So. 3d 1220 La. 2011
Berg v. Zummo, 2000-1699 (La.4/25/01), , 716 n. 5 ().
Burns v. CLK Investments V, L.L.C. 45 So. 3d 1152 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2010
a preponderance of the evidence that the defect on which Kelly[sic] Burns tripped/fell presented an unreasonably dangerous condition?” We conclude that the Burnses can show no prejudice to their cause and that they have not shown “the kind of plain, fundamental error which might tempt us not to heed the language of article 1793.”
Arceneaux v. Amstar Corp. 969 So. 2d 755 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2007
Newman v. City of Shreveport 962 So. 2d 1075 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2007
Imperial Chemicals Ltd. v. Pkb Scania (Usa) 929 So. 2d 84 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2006
ST. MARTINVILLE v. Louisiana Tax Com'n 917 So. 2d 38 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2005
Bank of Jefferson Parish
Scaffidi & Chetta Entertainment v. University of New Orleans Foundation 898 So. 2d 491 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2005
5th Cir.1990), reversed on other grounds, “A person who conducts business in corporate form and reaps the benefits of incorporation cannot sue individually for damages incurred by the corporation.” Scaffidi and Chetta also argue that they have a right of action under the contract between UNOF and S & C because the contract contained a stipulati
Carter v. Haygood 892 So. 2d 1261 La. 2005
3 Cir. 12/26/96) , , the case relied on by that court for that proposition, is not relevant to the distinct legal issues present in dental malpractice cases.
Charles B. Ashy, Sr. v. William E. Trotter, II La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004
While it is generally true that judicial interest should accumulate from the date of breach in contract cases, as opposed to the date of judicial demand, has held that in “highly complicated” cases where the issues are whether a breach has occurred and the appropriate damage amount, it is appropriate to award interest from the date of judicial demand.
Ashy v. Trotter 888 So. 2d 344 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004
While it is generally true that judicial interest should accumulate from the date of breach in contract cases, as opposed to the date of judicial demand, has held that in "highly complicated" cases where the issues are whether a breach has occurred and the appropriate damage amount, it is appropriate to award interest from the date of judicial demand.
Boylston v. Tidwell 852 So. 2d 1256 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2003
Bank of Jefferson Parish
Bradford v. Onshore Pipeline Const. Co. 853 So. 2d 756 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2003
Further, Eland Energy contends that the decision in Corbello, supra, [16]
Davis v. Witt 851 So. 2d 1119 La. 2003
Bank of Jefferson Parish
Alcorn v. City of Baton Rouge 851 So. 2d 1194 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2003
Berg v. Zummo, 00-1699, p. 13 (La.4/25/01), , 716 n. 5
National Building & Contracting Co. v. Alerion Bank & Trust Co. 832 So. 2d 341 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2002
The First Circuit rejected this argument
Young v. First National Bank of Shreveport 794 So. 2d 128 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2001
Chittenden v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. 788 So. 2d 1140 La. 2001
Berg v. Zummo 786 So. 2d 708 La. 2001
(noting that the jury interrogatories in that case did not "contain the kind of plain, fundamental error which might tempt us not to heed the language of Article 1793"); Kose v. Cablevision of Shreveport, 32-855 (La.App.
Badalamenti v. Jefferson Guar. Bank 759 So. 2d 274 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2000
Bank of Jefferson Parish, the pledgee's duty is not to impair the collateral which it holds during the life of the pledge agreement.
Kose v. Cablevision of Shreveport 755 So. 2d 1039 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2000
Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 731 So. 2d 438 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1999
Bank of Jefferson Parish, -449 (La.1991).
Kistner v. King 726 So. 2d 68 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1998
5th Cir.1990), affirmed in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, LSA-C.C.P.
Crump v. Sabine River Authority 715 So. 2d 762 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1998
See Trans-Global Alloy Ltd. v. First Nat’l Bank of Jefferson Parish
STATE, DOTD v. August Christina & Bros., Inc. 716 So. 2d 372 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1998
5th Cir.1990), affirmed in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, LSA-C.C.P.
Casey v. Hibernia Corp. 709 So. 2d 933 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1998
Morris & Dickson Co. v. Jones Brothers Co., Inc. 691 So. 2d 882 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997
Similarly, the Supreme Court, held that interest should run from the date of judicial demand on a judgment in a breach of fiduciary duty and wrongful misrepresentation case, overturning the trial court's award of interest from the date of judgment because the damages were not ascertainable until that time.
Osborne v. Ladner 691 So. 2d 1245 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1997
Magos v. Feerick 690 So. 2d 812 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1996
Bank of Jefferson Parish
Jones v. Peyton Place, Inc. 675 So. 2d 754 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1996
STATE DEPT. OF TRANSP. & DEV. v. Scramuzza 673 So. 2d 1249 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1996
5th Cir.1990), affirmed in part, rev'd in part *1255 on other grounds, LSA-C.C.P.
Johnson v. Terrebonne Parish Sheriff's Office 669 So. 2d 577 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1996
Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace 661 So. 2d 1052 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1995
[8] Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indem., (La.
Fleming Irr., Inc. v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co. 661 So. 2d 1035 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1995
Bank of Jefferson Parish, L.R.
Garlepied Transfer, Inc. v. GUARANTY BK. & TR. CO. 656 So. 2d 728 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1995
5th Cir.1990), reversed on other grounds, this court addressed a factual situation very similar to the case at bar.
IP Timberlands Operating Co. v. Denmiss Corp. 657 So. 2d 282 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1995
IP has not challenged the award of interest on appeal, is dispositive of the question of whether interest in a breach of contract case should be awarded from the date of judgment or the date of judicial demand.