Martin Petitjean III v. City of Rayne, Louisiana

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

04-768

MARTIN PETITJEAN, III, ET AL.

VERSUS

CITY OF RAYNE, LOUISIANA

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ACADIA, NO. 75483
HONORABLE KRISTIAN DENNIS EARLES, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JOHN B. SCOFIELD
JUDGE

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Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Michael G. Sullivan, and John B. Scofield,
Judges.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

Oscar William Boswell, II
P. O. Box 3207
Lafayette, LA 70502
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants
Martin Petitjean, II, Martin Petitjean, III, Desiree Sainte Therese
Petitjean Casey, Yvette Sainte Claire Petitjean, Monique d'Youville
Petitjean Benoit, Jeanne Marie Petitjean, and Winson J. Petitjean, Jr.

Larry Thomas Richard
601 Clegg St.
Rayne, LA 70578
Counsel for Defendant-Appellee
City of Rayne, Louisiana

SCOFIELD, Judge.*

The Plaintiff-Appellants, Martin Petitjean II, Martin Petitjean III, Desiree

Sainte Therese Petitjean Casey, Yvette Sainte Claire Petitjean, Monique d'Youville

Petitjean Benoit, Jeanne Marie Petitjean, and Winson J. Petitjean, Jr. (the Petitjeans),

appeal the trial court’s denial of their motion to enforce a provision in a previous

judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In February 2000, the Petitjeans filed a suit against the City of Rayne (the City)

seeking to have the City remove certain obstructions and encroachments on their right

of passage over City property. As a result of that suit, a stipulated judgment1 was

rendered on August 12, 2002, ordering the City to remove a fence from the right of

passage; to “clear and grade the designated right of passage as a full thirty (30) foot

passage for its entire length, without any encroachment whatever from any portion

of any fence, gate or other obstruction . . . ;” “to provide a fence along the Eastern

Boundary of the right of passage”; and preventing the City from interfering with the

Petitjeans’ private railroad crossing servitude. That judgment became final on

October 22, 2002.

In October 2003, the Petitjeans filed a motion to enforce the judgment, alleging

that the City had not cleared and graded the passage way nor removed its fence from

therefrom. After a hearing, the trial court rendered judgment ordering the City to

move the gate located within the thirty foot right of passage but refused to enforce its

previous judgment requiring that the right of passage be cleared and graded. The

*
Honorable John B. Scofield participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana
Supreme Court as Judge Pro Tempore.
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That the judgment was the result of a stipulation by the parties does not alter its
effectiveness. To the contrary, because both parties agreed and stipulated to its terms and provisions,
the judgment is arguably less assailable than had it been rendered after a contested trial.

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court further ordered the costs of the proceedings to be shared between the parties.

In a minute entry, the court further explained its ruling:

[T]he gate located within the thirty (30) foot passage must be moved by
the City of Rayne in order to comply with the above-quoted language.
After a physical inspection of the subject property, the Court finds that
once the gate has been moved, any grading and/or clearing of the
property by the defendant will not be necessary.

The Petitjeans appeal this ruling asserting that the trial court erred in failing to

enforce the original judgment as written and in casting them with costs. For the

reasons set forth herein, we reverse.

DISCUSSION

The original judgment in this matter was rendered on August 12, 2002.

Nothing in the record indicates that a motion for new trial or an appeal was filed.

Therefore, according to the record, the judgment became final on October 22, 2002.

On October 3, 2003, more than eleven months after the judgment became final, the

Petitjeans moved to enforce the judgment. The trial court took that opportunity to

nullify a substantive portion of its earlier judgment.

Once the delays for appeal have expired without action, the judgment is final

and definitive. See Costello v. Hardy, 03-1146 (La. 1/21/04), 864 So.2d 129.

Louisiana Civil Code article 1951 provides that:

A final judgment may be amended by the trial court at any time, with or
without notice, on its own motion or on motion of any party:

(1) To alter the phraseology of the judgment, but not the
substance; or

(2) To correct errors of calculation.

(Emphasis added.)

A final judgment may only be amended to effect a substantive change via application

for new trial, action for nullity, or timely appeal. State ex rel. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v.

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A.P., 02-2372 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/20/03), 858 So.2d 498.

La. C.C.P. art.1951 does not permit the trial court to substantively
alter a final judgment even if the amendment merely expresses the trial
judge's actual intention. The trial court's written judgment is
controlling, even if the trial judge may have intended otherwise. Stoffer
v. Stoffer, 29,458 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/7/97), 693 So.2d 1229, 1231.

McGee v. Wilkinson, 03-1178, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/2/04), 878 So.2d 553, 554.

Improperly made substantive changes to a final judgment are absolutely null. Posey

v. Singletary, 37,425 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/24/03), 855 So.2d 853.

In Gregory v. Interim Personnel of North Louisiana, 30,808 (La.App. 2 Cir.

8/25/98), 717 So.2d 291, a workers’ compensation case, the claimant did not appeal

the workers’ compensation tribunal’s original decision, which then became final.

When the claimant moved to enforce the judgment, the workers’ compensation judge

issued an amended decision granting legal interest on the weekly compensation

payments and medical expenses which had been awarded in the original decision.

The appellate court found that the second decision providing for legal interest directly

affected the rights of the parties and thus constituted a substantive amendment to a

final decision, in violation of La.Code Civ.P. art. 1951. The appellate court found

that the second decision was void as a matter of law. It then vacated that decision and

reinstated the original judgment.

Granted, the trial court did have jurisdiction to "give effect" to its prior

judgment. La.Code Civ.P. art. 2088(7). Accordingly, the court was correct in

addressing the motion of the Petitjeans to have the City perform as required by the

earlier judgment. While the court had jurisdiction to give effect to that judgment, it

did not have the authority to substantively change it.

Louisiana.Code of Civil Procedure article 1951 allows a trial court to make

post-judgment alterations of phraseology, or to correct errors in calculations. The

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court cannot, however, change or alter the substance of the judgment. Here, there can

be no doubt that the clearing of the passage way was a substantial, if not pivotal, part

of the judgment.

Moreover, there is nothing in the judgment placing any conditions or

qualifications on the City's obligation to clear the passage way. The judgment

provided the City no escape clause because of any change which might occur in

conditions or circumstances. The City's duty to clear the passage way was

unconditional.

The time for the court to question the wisdom, scope or propriety of a provision

in the judgment was before the judgment was signed, or pursuant to a timely post-

judgment motion, not after the judgment became final.

In this case, the trial court changed a significant performance required of the

City. This constitutes a material alteration of the substance of the original, final

judgment. Therefore, it is void as a matter of law.

Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. Judgment is rendered

ordering the City to comply with the August 12, 2002 judgment as written by clearing

and grading “the designated right of passage as a full thirty (30) foot passage for its

entire length, without any encroachment whatever from any portion of any fence, gate

or other obstruction.” Having cast the City in judgment, we further reverse the trial

court’s ruling as to costs, and order all costs at both the trial and appellate levels be

paid by the City.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

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