Jon Andrew Delahoussaye v. the Roman Catholic Diocese of Lafayette

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-486

JON ANDREW DELAHOUSSAYE

VERSUS

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF LAFAYETTE,
LOUISIANA; THE MOST REVEREND CHARLES E. LANGLOIS;
CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOL OF NEW IBERIA; AND TIMOTHY UHL

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APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF IBERIA, NO.115037-H
HONORABLE LORI LANDRY, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JAMES T. GENOVESE
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, James T. Genovese, and Phyllis M. Keaty,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Allan L. Durand
235 Rue France
Lafayette, Louisiana 70508
(337) 237-8501
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant:
Jon Andrew Delahoussaye

Troy Allen Broussard
Allen & Gooch, A Law Corporation
Post Office Box 81129
Lafayette, Louisiana 70598-1129
(337) 291-1372
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees:
The Roman Catholic Diocese of Lafayette,
Louisiana, Reverend Charles E. Langlois,
Catholic High School of New Iberia, and
Timothy Uhl

GENOVESE, Judge.

Plaintiff, Jon Andrew Delahoussaye, appeals the grant of summary judgment

in favor of Defendants, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Lafayette, Louisiana (the

Diocese), Reverend Charles E. Langlois (Rev. Langlois), Catholic High School of

New Iberia (Catholic High), and Timothy Uhl (Dr. Uhl), which dismissed his

defamation suit. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2009, Mr. Delahoussaye was a member of the school board for Catholic

High. By letter dated May 12, 2009, Mr. Delahoussaye was dismissed from the

school board by its chancellor, Rev. Langlois. On May 14, 2009, the principal of

Catholic High, Dr. Uhl, read the letter from Rev. Langlois to Mr. Delahoussaye

aloud during a school board meeting. The letter read:

Dear Mr. Delahoussaye,

It seemed apparent at the last meeting of the School Board of
Catholic High School that you are determined to disrupt School
Board business.

Your accusation that the principal, Dr. Uhl, has “taken away”
$30,000.00 donated to the visitors bleachers is without
foundation. Dr. Uhl denies your accusation.

Your effectiveness as a School Board member is greatly
impaired. I don’t see how you will be able to work with the
principal, the school board, and myself.

Therefore, I am removing you from the School Board of
Catholic High effective immediately. Please do not attend the
May meeting of May 14, 2009, or any other meeting.

Sincerely,
Rev. Charles E. Langlois
Chancellor, Catholic High School

Mr. Delahoussaye filed suit for defamation and sought damages for

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants filed a motion for summary

judgment, alleging that Mr. Delahoussaye lacked sufficient factual support for his

claims. In support of his position, Mr. Delahoussaye, who works in the insurance

industry, introduced an affidavit of his father, Errol J. Delahoussaye, who likewise

works in the insurance industry, which corroborated his allegations that

Defendants’ actions had damaged his reputation and had caused him emotional

distress. Accordingly, Mr. Delahoussaye argued summary judgment was

inappropriate because genuine issues of material fact existed.

After a hearing, the trial court stated that it deemed the affidavit presented

by Mr. Delahoussaye to be “self-serving,” granted Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, and dismissed Mr. Delahoussaye’s claims with prejudice.

Mr. Delahoussaye has appealed.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Assignments of Error

On appeal, Mr. Delahoussaye asserts that the trial court erred: (1) in making

a credibility determination with regard to the affidavit he introduced; and (2) in

granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing his claim for

defamation, in spite of the fact that he introduced an affidavit from a qualified third

party which created genuine issues of fact with regard to all relevant elements of

defamation.

Standard of Review

“Appellate courts review summary judgment de novo, using the same

criteria that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is

appropriate, and in the light most favorable to the non-movant.” Yokum v. 615

Bourbon Street, L.L.C., p. 25 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So.2d 859, 876 (citing Suire v.

Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov’t., 04-1459 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 37).

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 966(A)(2) states “[t]he summary

judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive

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determination of every action,” and this “procedure is favored and shall be

construed to accomplish these ends.” “[I]f the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue of material fact,” then judgment shall be granted as a

matter of law in favor of the mover. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B) and (C).

Defendants, as the movants herein, bear the initial burden of proof and must show

that no genuine issue of material fact exists. See La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C)(2). If

Defendants successfully meet their burden, then the burden shifts to

Mr. Delahoussaye to present factual support adequate to establish that he will be

able to satisfy his evidentiary burden at trial. Id. If Mr. Delahoussaye fails to

produce the factual support necessary to establish that he will be able to satisfy his

evidentiary burden of proof at trial, then there is no genuine issue of material fact.

Id.

A fact is material if it potentially insures or precludes recovery,
affects a litigant’s ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the
legal dispute. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512, p.
27 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751. A genuine issue is one as to
which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could
reach only one conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue and
summary judgment is appropriate. Id.

Hines v. Garrett, 04-806, p. 1 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So.2d 764, 765-66.

Discussion

Mr. Delahoussaye, admittedly, has abandoned his intentional infliction of

emotional distress cause of action. The sole cause of action presently before this

court for consideration is Mr. Delahoussaye’s defamation claim.

In this case, Defendants, who are the movants in this motion for summary

judgment, do not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue of whether

defamation occurred. Our supreme court, in Cyprien v. Board of Supervisors ex

rel. University of Louisiana System, 08-1067, p. 6 (La. 1/21/09), 5 So.3d 862,

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866-67 (quoting Costello v. Hardy, 03-1146, p. 12 (La. 1/21/04), 864 So.2d 129,

139), stated the following:

Defamation is a tort which involves the invasion of a person’s interest
in his or her reputation and good name. Fitzgerald v. Tucker,
98-2313, p. 10 (La.6/29/99), 737 So.2d 706, 715; Trentecosta v.
Beck, 96-2388, p. 10 (La.10/21/97), 703 So.2d 552, 559; Sassone v.
Elder, 626 So.2d 345, 350 (La.1993). “Four elements are necessary to
establish a defamation cause of action: (1) a false and defamatory
statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a
third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the
publisher; and (4) resulting injury.” Trentecosta, 96-2388 at 10, 703
So.2d at 559 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558
(1977)). The fault requirement is often set forth in the jurisprudence
as malice, actual or implied. See, Cangelosi v. Schwegmann Bros.
Giant Super Markets, 390 So.2d 196, 198 (La.1980) (which also
considers falsity as a fifth and separate element); 12 WILLIAM E.
CRAWFORD, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: TORT LAW
§ 17.4 at 312 (2000). Thus, in order to prevail on a defamation claim,
a plaintiff must prove “that the defendant, with actual malice or other
fault, published a false statement with defamatory words which
caused plaintiff damages.” Trentecosta, 96-2388 at 10, 703 So.2d at
559 (quoting Sassone, 626 So.2d at 350).

[. . . .]

Finally, even when a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of
the essential elements of defamation, recovery may be precluded if the
defendant shows either that the statement was true, or that it was
protected by a privilege, absolute or qualified. Doe v. Grant, 01-0175,
p. 9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/29/03), 839 So.2d 408, 416, [writ denied,
03-604] (La.5/2/03), 842 So.2d 1102; Arledge v. Hendricks, 30,588,
p. 4 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/26/98), 715 So.2d 135, 139.

Mr. Delahoussaye claims that Defendants defamed him when the May 12,

2009 letter announcing his removal from the school board was read aloud at the

school board meeting on May 14, 2009. In opposition to Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, Mr. Delahoussaye, an independent insurance agent, introduced

an affidavit of his father, Errol J. Delahoussaye, who also works in the insurance

industry. The affidavit substantiated Mr. Delahoussaye’s assertions that his

reputation was damaged by Defendants’ actions, but does not address any of the

other elements of defamation, particularly the malice or other fault element.

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Defendants claim that the trial court was correct in granting their motion for

summary judgment because Mr. Delahoussaye failed to produce factual support

sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof

at trial on a defamation cause of action. We agree.

Though the affidavit of Errol J. Delahoussaye corroborates the allegation

that Mr. Delahoussaye’s reputation was damaged when the May 12, 2009 letter

announcing his removal from the school board was read aloud at the school board

meeting on May 14, 2009, the affidavit pertains only to the element of damages

and does not present factual support for the element of malice, actual or implied, or

any other fault. In order to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact that

would preclude Defendants from successfully obtaining their motion for summary

judgment, Mr. Delahoussaye must show evidence that he can carry the applicable

burden of proving all four elements of defamation as set forth in Cyprien. Here,

we find Mr. Delahoussaye did not offer proof of Defendants’ malice, actual or

implied, or other fault. Thus, it is clear that Mr. Delahoussaye would not be able to

carry his burden of proof as to all of the essential elements of the tort of

defamation; therefore, there is no question of material fact, and Defendants are

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s

grant of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court granting summary

judgment in favor of Defendants, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Lafayette,

Louisiana, Reverend Charles E. Langlois, Catholic High School of New Iberia, and

Timothy Uhl, is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to

Plaintiff/Appellant, Jon Andrew Delahoussaye.

AFFIRMED.

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