Eddie Ray Jackson v. State of Louisiana

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-842

EDDIE RAY JACKSON

VERSUS

STATE OF LOUISIANA

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APPEAL FROM THE
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISRICT COURT
PARISH OF CONCORDIA, DOCKET NO. 45574
HONORABLE GLEN W. STRONG, JUDGE AD HOC
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SYLVIA R. COOKS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, John D. Saunders, and Shannon J.
Gremillion, Judges.

REVERSED.

Charles E. Griffin, III
P.O. Box 1817
St. Francisville, LA 70775-1817
(225) 635-6890
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Eddie Ray Jackson

James D. “Buddy” Caldwell, Louisiana Attorney General
Emma Develier, Assistant Attorney General
Robert Abendroth, Assistant Attorney General
Louisiana Department of Justice
P.O. Box 94005
Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9005
(225) 326-6096
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
State of Louisiana

COOKS, Judge.

On February 16, 1993, Eddie Ray Jackson entered a plea of guilty to ―Carnal

Knowledge of a Juvenile‖ pursuant to La.R.S. 14:80. The conviction was based on

Jackson, then twenty-three (23) years old, engaging in consensual sex with a

female under the age of seventeen (17). Jackson was sentenced to three (3) years

with the Louisiana Department of Corrections. The sentence was suspended and

Jackson was placed on eighteen (18) months of active supervised probation. At the

time of sentencing, it appears Jackson was not informed that he was required to

register as a sex offender, nor was it listed as part of his probation. The probation

period was successfully completed and Jackson was released from supervision on

August 16, 1994.

On August 29, 1994, Jackson again engaged in consensual sex with a female

under the age of seventeen (17). That encounter resulted in another plea of guilty

to ―Carnal Knowledge of a Juvenile‖ pursuant to La.R.S. 14:80. Pursuant to the

plea, Jackson was sentenced to seven and one-half (7½) years with the Louisiana

Department of Corrections. The sentence was suspended and Jackson was placed

on five (5) years of active supervised probation. The requirement to register as a

sex offender was made a condition of his probation, and Jackson registered as a sex

offender on June 27, 1995. At that time, under La.R.S. 15:544, the registration

period for sex offenders was ten (10) years. Jackson successfully completed his

probation and was released from supervision on April 10, 2000.

Even after his probation ended, Jackson continued to re-register as a sex

offender until June 26, 2005, when the ten year period elapsed. In December of

2009, Jackson was informed that the State of Louisiana now designated him as a

lifetime sex offender due to his multiple convictions. This would require him to

re-register every ninety (90) days with local law enforcement and pay fees and

costs associated with registration, publication, and notice. He would also be

required to have the words ―Sex Offender’ stamped on his driver’s license and

have it re-issued annually. These requirements would remain in effect for life.

Upon receiving the notification, Jackson filed proceedings against the

Attorney General of Louisiana, the Concordia Parish Sheriff, the Concordia Parish

District Attorney, the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, the

Louisiana State Police, and the Louisiana Office of Motor Vehicles, seeking to

prohibit the State from enforcing these registration requirements against him. In

his petition, he asserted that the attempts by the State to apply the amendments to

the sex offender registration statutes, which amendments came into effect after

Jackson’s convictions, after he had satisfied his sentences, and after the ten-year

period following his initial registration had lapsed, were unconstitutionally applied

to him ex post facto. He asked for a judgment from the trial court declaring he did

not have to re-register as a sex offender. Specifically, Jackson argued the law in

effect at the time of his convictions provided only for a ten (10) year registration

period. The State noted that the law was amended subsequent to his convictions to

mandate a lifetime registration period for persons convicted of multiple sex

offenses. Jackson countered that the amendment creating the lifetime requirement

to register did not apply to him because he was convicted prior to July 1, 1997. In

support of this argument, Jackson relied on the First Circuit case of Smith v. State

of Louisiana, 09-1765 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/26/10), an unpublished opinion, writs

granted, 10-1140 (La. 9/16/11), 69 So.3d 1133, which held that Act 594 of 1999,

which amended La.R.S. 15:542.1(H) to require lifetime registration would only

apply to convictions occurring after July 1, 1997. In addition, the First Circuit

found subsequent amendments to La.R.S. 15:544 also did not apply to Smith

because their application would violate ex post facto principles. The trial court

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found the reasoning in Smith to be ―convincing,‖ and concluded it would be

―fundamentally unfair to require Mr. Jackson to register as a sex offender for life

after he has completed the registration requirements initially imposed upon him

and after having been released from his probation supervision.‖

The trial court also held to require him to complete additional probation

requirements would ―constitute additional punishment and thus would be a

violation of the ex post facto clauses of the U.S. and Louisiana Constitutions.‖ The

court then held the State was prohibited from enforcing the lifetime registration

requirements against Jackson. The State has appealed, asserting the trial court

erred in holding the provisions of the sex offense registry did not apply to a

multiple sex offender who committed his crimes prior to July 1, 1997 and in

applying the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the U.S. and Louisiana Constitutions despite

jurisprudence holding the registration and notification provisions to be non-

punitive regulatory schemes.

During the pendency of this appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued

Smith v. State of Louisiana, 10-1140 (La. 1/24/12), ___ So.3d ___, which reversed

the First Circuit’s ruling, and held ―the 1999 amendment to former La.R.S.

15:542.1, providing for a lifetime obligation to register as a sex offender, applies to

Mr. Smith as a multiple sexual offender.‖ Id. at p. 18. The supreme court also

found there was ―no violation of the ex post facto clause in the application of the

sex offender registration statutes to Mr. Smith.‖ Id. at p. 18. Finding the supreme

court’s opinion in Smith governs this matter, the trial court’s judgment prohibiting

the State from enforcing the lifetime registration requirements against Jackson is

reversed.

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ANALYSIS

In Act 388 of 1992, the Louisiana Legislature created its version of a

Megan’s Law, requiring a registration and notification scheme for persons

convicted of certain defined ―sex offenses.‖ Chapter 3-B of Title 15 consisting of

La.R.S. 15:540 through 15:549 was enacted, requiring all sex offenders to register

with the sheriff of the parish in which he resided. At the time of Jackson’s arrests

and convictions, La.R.S. 15:544 provided for a registration period of ten years for

all sex offenders.

In 1999, Act 594 of the Louisiana Legislature amended La.R.S. 15:542.1 to

increase the registration periods for certain offenders creating increased durational

periods depending on the severity of the offense and the criminal history of the

offender. Offenders with a conviction for an ―aggravated offense‖ as defined by

La.R.S. 15:541 and offenders with a prior conviction for a ―sex offense‖ were

required to register as a sex offender for life. Jackson, as a multiple offender,

would be subject under this amendment to lifetime registration.

These periods remained unchanged until 2007 when the legislature amended

the statutes to increase the baseline registration period from ten to fifteen years.

Multiple and aggravated offenders, as set forth in the 1999 amendment, are still

under a lifetime duty to register. An application clause, passed by the legislature

with this amendment, states:

Section 6. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all persons
convicted of a sex offense or a criminal offense against a victim who
is a minor, as defined in R.S. 15:541, regardless of the date of
conviction, with the exception of those persons required to register
under previous provision of law whose obligations to register have
been fulfilled and extinguished by operation of law. . .

The issue presented in this case is whether the increased duration passed in

1999, is applicable to Jackson. If it is, then he is required to register as a sex

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offender for life; if it is not, then his duty to register was fulfilled when the ten year

period elapsed in 2005.

I. Application of the July 1, 1997 Date.

The parties agree that a key issue presented in this appeal centers on the

language found in the amendment to La.R.S. 15:542.1, by Act No. 594, which

went into effect in 1999. The language of the amended statute provides:

Any person convicted of a sex offense as defined in R.S.
15:541(14.1) or a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor as
defined in R.S. 15:541(9) after July 1, 1997, shall have the duty to
register and report under the provision of this Chapter.

As it applies to the current law, the 1999 amendment requires lifetime

registration for all persons convicted of aggravated and multiple ―sex offenses,‖ if

their registration period was not extinguished by operation of law. The trial court

reasoned, relying on the First Circuit’s unpublished opinion in Smith, that the July

1, 1997 date contained within the above language applies to ―sex offense‖ as well

as ―a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor.‖ This same argument was

addressed by the supreme court in its opinion in Smith, overruling the first circuit,

stating in pertinent part:

The court of appeal found that this amended provision did not
apply to Mr. Smith because it appeared in a section in which the duty
to register was limited to convictions obtained after July 1, 1997, as
provided for in former La. Rev. Stat. 15:542.1(A), while Mr. Smith's
convictions occurred in 1995. The State contends the court below
erred because the qualifying date ―after July 1, 1997‖ in former La.
Rev. Stat. 15:542.1(A) should be construed as modifying ―of a
criminal offense against a victim who is a minor as defined in La.
Rev. Stat. 15:541(14)‖ and not as modifying ―of a sex offense as
defined in La. Rev. Stat. 15:542(E).‖ For the following reasons, we
conclude ―after July 1, 1997‖ modifies only the immediately
preceding class of offenders in the former La. Rev. Stat. 15:542.1(A),
as urged by the State, and not to the entire Subsection, as found by the
court of appeal below.

The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the
language of the statute itself. Cat’s Meow, Inc. v. City of New
Orleans, 98-0601, p. 15 (La.10/20/98), 720 So.2d 1186, 1198;

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Touchard v. Williams, 617 So.2d 885 (La.1993). Legislation is the
solemn expression of legislative will, and therefore, the interpretation
of a law involves primarily the search for the legislature’s intent. La.
Civ. Code art. 2; Barbara Landry v. Louisiana Citizens Property Ins.
Co., 07-1907, p. 20 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So.2d 66, 79; Detillier v.
Kenner Regional Med. Ctr., 03-3259, p. 3 (La.7/6/04), 877 So.2d 100,
103. La. Civ. Code art. 9 provides that, when a law is clear and
unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd
consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further
interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.
When the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be
sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text of
the law as a whole, and laws on the same subject matter must be
interpreted in reference to each other. La. Rev. Stat. 1:3; La. Civ.
Code arts. 12 and 13; Conerly v. State, 97-0871, p. 4 (La. 7/8/98), 714
So.2d 709, 711. Where two statutes deal with the same subject
matter, they should be harmonized if possible. La. Civ. Code art. 13;
Kennedy v. Kennedy, 96-0741, p. 2 (La. 11/25/96), 699 So.2d 351,
358 (on rehearing).

The pertinent language of former La. Rev. Stat. 15:542.1(A) at
issue here is:

Any person convicted of a sex offense as defined in R.S.
15:542(E) or of a criminal offense against a victim who
is a minor as defined in R.S. 15:541(9) after July 1, 1997
shall have the duty to register and report under the
provision of this Chapter (Emphasis added).

The statute references La. Rev. Stat. 15:542(E), which defines
sex offense and supplies its own pertinent date:

―Sex Offense‖ for the purpose of this Chapter means a
violation of any provision of Subpart C of Part II,
Subpart B of Part IV, or Subpart A(1) or A(4) of Part V,
of Chapter 1 of Title 14 of the Louisiana Revised statutes
of 1950, committed on or after June 18, 1992, or
committed prior to June 18, 1992, if the person, as a
result of the offense, is under the custody of the
Department of Public Safety and Corrections on or after
June 18, 1992.‖ (Emphasis added).

Given the plain language of these two statutes, we find that
―after July 1, 1997‖ does not apply to the first part of the sentence in
former La. Rev. Stat. 15:542.1(A), which subjected ―[a]ny person
convicted of a sex offense as defined in La. Rev. Stat. 15:542(E)‖ to
the registration requirements. Not only is that clause separated by the
disjunctive ―or‖, but also La. Rev. Stat. 15:542(E) contained its own
provision defining sex offenses as those committed after June 18,
1992. This rationale is supported by the fact that, unlike the definition
of sex offense in La. Rev. Stat. 15:542(E), the definition of ―criminal

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offense against a victim who is a minor‖ found in La. Rev. Stat.
15:541(14) did not provide a date. Consequently, the legislature
provided for a beginning date applicable to registrants convicted of a
―criminal offense against a victim who is a minor‖ in former La. Rev.
Stat. 15:542.1(A). Furthermore, were we to construe the qualifying
language ―after July 1, 1997‖ to apply to sex offenses under La. Rev.
Stat. 15:542(E), it would render meaningless the June 18, 1992 date
found in that very same section, thereby creating a window for sexual
offenders not subject to registration. We must assume every word of
the statute serves a purpose, because ―it will not be presumed that the
Legislature inserted idle, meaningless or superfluous language in the
statute or that it intended for any part or provision of the statute to be
meaningless, redundant or useless.‖ ABL Management, Inc. v. Board
of Sup’rs of Southern Univ., 00–0798, p. 6 (La. 11/28/00), 773 So.2d
131. 135 (citing Bunch v. Town of St. Francisville, 446 So.2d 1357,
1360 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1984)).

The timing of the legislature in creating the two pertinent
offenses, ―criminal offense against a victim who is a minor‖ and ―sex
offense,‖ further demonstrates the legislature’s intent in enacting the
statutes. The definition of ―criminal offense against a victim who is a
minor‖ set out in La. Rev. Stat. 15:541(14) was created as a category
of offender obligated to register in July 1997—the same date that La.
Rev. Stat. 15:542.1 was enacted. Prior to July 1997, there was no
registration requirement for an offender convicted of a ―criminal
offense against a victim who is a minor;‖ therefore, this date
correlates directly with the date provided in former La. Rev. Stat.
15:542.1(A). On the other hand, the definition of ―sex offense‖ found
in La. Rev. Stat. 15:542(E) was added as a category of offender
requiring registration on June 18, 1992. Logically, the July 1, 1997
date does not apply to ―sex offense‖ because it was created five years
earlier. Acts 1997, No. 1147 enacted new offenses subject to
registration requirements, but it also governed offenses previously
subject to registration requirements. Therefore, the 1997 date was
intended to ensure that registration would apply prospectively only to
the offenses formerly not required to register.

We conclude the July 1, 1997 date in former La. Rev. Stat.
15:542.1(A) is applicable only to persons convicted of a ―criminal
offense against a victim who is a minor.‖ Because Mr. Smith was
twice convicted in 1995 of qualifying sexual offenses, the 1999
amendments to former La. Rev. Stat. 15:542.1 apply to his
convictions.

Smith, at pp. 6-9.

Under the supreme court’s reasoning in Smith, the trial court’s application of

the July 1, 1997 date to both ―sex offense‖ and ―criminal offense against a victim

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who is a minor‖ is contrary to the wording of the statute. Therefore, we reverse the

trial court’s finding to the contrary.

II. Ex Post Facto Violation.

The State also argues the trial court erred in finding any additional probation

requirements would ―constitute additional punishment‖ and, thus, would be a

violation of the ex post facto clauses of the U.S. and Louisiana Constitutions. The

trial court again relied on the first circuit opinion in Smith in reaching this

conclusion. The supreme court also addressed the ex post facto clause argument in

its opinion, stating:

It is well-settled that Louisiana’s sex offender registration
requirements are not punitive, but rather, they are remedial and may
be applied retroactively without violating the prohibition of the ex
post facto clause. In State ex rel. Olivieri v. State, 00-172
(La.2/21/01), 779 So.2d 735, this court considered an ex post facto
challenge to the sex offender registration provisions. We resolved the
issue by holding the registration and notification requirements
imposed upon sex offenders to be a legitimate, non-punitive
regulatory scheme that did not impose punishment. Id. pp. 19-20, 779
So.2d at 747. Because such provisions were found to be remedial in
nature, we concluded that application of the sex offender registration
and notification laws to persons convicted before their enactment does
not violate ex post facto principles. Id. Similarly, in Doe v. Smith, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (2002), the United States Supreme Court
determined that Alaska’s lifetime registration and notification
requirements for sex offenders were non-punitive and, thus, did not
violate the ex post facto clause.

Most recently, in State v. Golston, 10-2804 (La. 7/1/11), 67
So.3d 452, this court upheld the provisions of La. Rev. Stat. 15:560-
560.6, governing Sex Offender Assessment Panels (SOAP), against a
variety of constitutional challenges. The SOAP provisions entail not
only lifetime registration, but also lifetime probation involving
electronic monitoring, repeated psychiatric evaluations, and home
computer searches. Id. In Golston this court explained that, because
the statutory scheme did not set out criminal provisions but instead
constituted a regulatory scheme, much like the registration
requirements upheld in Olivieri, it was not susceptible to a void-for-
vagueness challenge. Id. p. 16, 67 So.3d at 463.

After reviewing the foregoing jurisprudence, we find the
increase in the number of years Mr. Smith is required to spend as a
registered sex offender is not punishment. Accordingly, applying to

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Mr. Smith the 1999 amendment to former La. Rev. Stat. 15:542.1
does not violate the ex post facto clause.

Similarly, the amendments and provisions added in 2007 and
2008, as well as the 2006 legislation regarding the placement of a
restriction code on the offender's driver’s license and identification
card, are applicable to Mr. Smith without violating the ex post facto
clause. As we explained in Olivieri, p. 20, 779 So.2d at 747, the
legislative intent behind the registration statutes is to alert the public
for the purpose of public safety, a remedial intent, and not to punish
convicted sex offenders. We further explained that, while some of the
provisions of the registration statutes may be remotely similar to
historical forms of punishment, such as public humiliation, the
immediate need for public protection was a corollary of, rather than an
addendum to, the punishment of sex offenders. Id. pp. 21-22, 779
So.2d at 748. We further recognized that, although the registration
statutes imposed the burden of the public and community notification
process on convicted sex offenders, which caused them to have to
expend money they were not obligated to pay at the time they
committed their offenses, the onus placed on them by the legislation
did not constitute a separate punishment for their offense, but rather, it
imposed a condition of their release on parole or probation. Id. p. 24,
779 So.2d at 749. Therefore, we found that any costs associated with
the conditions of their release were a necessary part of the regulatory
scheme. Id. pp. 22-24, 779 So.2d at 748-49.

As we did in Olivieri, we find that the sex offender statutes, as
amended in 1999, 2006, 2007, and 2008, to the extent they are
applicable to Mr. Smith, are not so obtrusive as to deem them punitive
rather than remedial or regulatory. While the extension for life of the
time period for registration, as well as the added requirement of
notations on Mr. Smith's driver’s license or identification card, may be
harsh, may impact a sex offender’s life in a long-lived and intense
manner, and also be quite burdensome to the sex offender, we do not
find them to constitute an infringement of the principles of ex post
facto. See Olivieri, p. 24-25, 779 So.2d at 749-50.

Smith, at pp. 9-10.

Accordingly, we find our supreme court’s pronouncement in Olivieri, and

affirmed in Smith, governs our decision in this matter, and the trial court erred in

finding the registration and notification requirements imposed on Jackson were a

violation of the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Louisiana

Constitutions.

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DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court forbidding the

State of Louisiana from imposing the requirements of the sex offender registry to

Eddie Ray Jackson is reversed.

REVERSED.

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