Russell Meissner v. Millard Bradford

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

13-844

RUSSELL MEISSNER

VERSUS

MILLARD BRADFORD

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF BEAUREGARD, NO. C-2012-0909, DIVISION A
HONORABLE MARTHA ANN O‟NEAL, DISTRICT JUDGE

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MARC T. AMY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Marc T. Amy, Billy Howard Ezell, and John E. Conery, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Mitchel M. Evans, II
416 North Pine Street
DeRidder, LA 70634
(337) 462-5225
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Russell Meissner

Millard Bradford
Palmetto Creek Apartments
150 Ellis Road, Apartment C4
DeRidder, LA 70634
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
IN PROPER PERSON

AMY, Judge.

The plaintiff alleged that he and the defendant became involved in a

controversy surrounding the eligibility of two prospective coaches while serving in

leadership positions in a community youth football league. He asserted that,

during that controversy, the defendant stated to others that the plaintiff had

“problems with people of color.” The plaintiff filed this action in defamation and

alleged that he sustained damages as a result of the statement. The trial court

found in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff appeals.

Factual and Procedural Background

In 2012, when this matter arose, Russell Meissner served as the President of

the DeRidder Youth Football League. While serving in that capacity, Mr.

Meissner was informed that two prospective coaches possibly had criminal

backgrounds. Mr. Meissner explained that, although the prospective coaches

denied criminal convictions on their applications, he later confirmed the criminal

backgrounds through an inquiry with the Sheriff‟s office. Mr. Meissner stated that,

in August 2012, he brought the convictions to the attention of the League‟s Board

and that, ultimately, the Board determined that one of the prospective coaches

would not be permitted to coach. The Board determined that the other prospective

coach would be allowed to participate in a limited fashion.

Mr. Meissner explained, however, that during ensuing discussions, Millard

Bradford, a Commissioner with the League, objected to the action regarding the

prospective coaches. Mr. Meissner stated that, during what was described as an

“emergency meeting” on the subject in early September 2012, Mr. Bradford

expressed that, if the Board maintained its position, it “would be having legal

trouble and the NAACP would probably be getting involved.” According to Mr.

Meissner, he became frustrated with what he considered to be the Board members‟

actions “behind [his] back” and that he told the attendees that he “quit.” Mr.

Meissner explained that Mr. Bradford stated: “„Oh good, okay[.]‟” Mr. Meissner

confirmed his resignation stating that “„yeah, I‟m done with it, I‟ve had enough‟.”

After Mr. Meissner‟s departure, the gathering of approximately forty to fifty

attendees, as estimated by one witness, continued. Brandie Lampin, a League

Commissioner and a coach, explained that she recorded the ensuing discussion.

She stated that, during that gathering, Mr. Bradford stated that: “[H]e thinks [Mr.

Meissner] has a problem with people of color.” Ms. Lampin denied that anyone

else “endorsed” Mr. Bradford‟s statement, but that Mr. Bradford made the

statement “a few times.”

Subsequently, after his resignation as President, Mr. Meissner continued in

his coaching position with a team in the League. The following week, however,

during a team practice session, Mr. Meissner was approached by Mr. Bradford and

the new President of the League. The men were joined by two uniformed officers

in attendance at the practice. During the resulting discussion, Mr. Meissner was

informed that he had been suspended and would no longer be allowed to coach.

Mr. Meissner explained that while attending a few games after the above

incident, he “had several people bump into [him]” and tell him to “watch [his] back

and so forth” “because [he] was racist basically.” Mr. Meissner identified the

individuals as “African American males” and that they said that they knew where

he lived and that he should “watch [his] back.” Mr. Meissner explained that the

incident affected his health, reflected by what he described as increased depression,

headaches, and sleep disturbances. Mr. Meissner also reported employment

difficulties, noting that he missed work at times due to depression and that

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“everywhere [he] went people had actually heard of this occurrence.” Mr.

Meissner also explained that because of what he perceived to be threats, he and his

fiancée had moved to another community and that, although he and his fiancée

were still engaged, their previous plan to marry was “on hold for now.”

Citing these damages, Mr. Meissner filed the present matter in October

2012, naming Mr. Bradford as the defendant.1 Mr. Meissner alleged in the petition

that Mr. Bradford‟s “multiple verbal publications to third parties that Petitioner has

problems with men of color were intentionally false and defamatory per se, in that

[Mr. Bradford] alleged that Petitioner was essentially a racist[.]” The petition

further stated that such “a moniker” “would inherently tend to harm the reputation

of another so as to lower the person in the estimation in the community, and/or to

deter others from association or dealing with the person, or otherwise expose a

person to contempt or ridicule.” Mr. Meissner denied the accuracy of the subject

statement(s) and alleged that they were communicated “with a high degree of

awareness of probably falsity; and, were specifically intended to cause Petitioner

injury.”

Following a bench trial, the trial court denied the plaintiff‟s claim. In

extensive written reasons, the trial court explained that Mr. Meissner became upset

after being informed by Mr. Bradford of what Mr. Bradford felt was a further

corrective action needed with regard to the two prospective coaches. After

resigning and leaving the field, “several individuals approached Millard Bradford,

as they had found out how upset Russell Meissner was. There became a very

1
Although the League‟s insurer was initially named as a defendant as well, the
insurer was not served and was dismissed.

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heated and loud conversation, and this is what was recorded on the microcassette

recorder.” The trial court further found that:

Mr. Bradford‟s voice is very clear, and the Court can identify him. He
does say twice that petitioner “has problems with people of color.”
However, I will also point out that there is another individual . . . that
is very irate and very upset, more so than anyone else on the
recording. The Court can only imagine what was happening at the
field, as listening to the microcassette recorder, it is clear that all
parties were yelling at each other in a very heated and hot
conversation without any of them fully knowing any of the facts for
which they were complaining to each other.”

From the testimony received, it is clear that Russell Meissner
believed that Millard Bradford took the whole matter to the NAACP
instead of the NAACP calling Mr. Bradford, and Mr. Bradford telling
them that it could be handled without their involvement. Mr.
Meissner testified that he quit because he didn‟t want to be involved
with the NAACP. Mr. Meissner jumped to a conclusion of something
that did not occur.

Moreover, Mr. Bradford‟s language, while rude, heated, and
clearly during a heated conversation with other rude, unruly
individuals, was inappropriate as it applied to Mr. Meissner.

In light of those factual findings, the trial court ultimately determined that:

[C]learly, in the context of the statements made, the remarks were
nothing more than opinions and hyperbole as stated by a very irate
Millard Bradford, who was being verbally attacked by at least two and
possibly three other people. This is supported by the testimony [of
another attendee to the incident]. Mr. Meissner‟s feelings were hurt,
and he believed that he was somehow “wronged” by the defendant
due to Bradford‟s cruel statement. This, however, is not sufficient to
support petitioner‟s claim for damages due to defamation.

In alternative factual findings, the trial court determined that “[e]ven in the event

that somehow a reasonable person could find that these statements were not

opinion, there is no proof of any damages.”

Mr. Meissner appeals.

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Discussion

In his brief to this court, Mr. Meissner challenges the trial court‟s

determination that the subject statements were mere hyperbole or opinion. Rather,

Mr. Meissner argues that, even if ostensibly within the form of an opinion, that

opinion in this instance implied a statement of fact which cannot be protected by a

claimed privilege. Mr. Meissner argued that the statement, given its nature and his

claimed damages, should be viewed as defamatory per se.

As explained in Fitzgerald v. Tucker, 98-2313, p. 10 (La. 6/29/99), 737

So.2d 706, 715, defamation is a tort arising out of La.Civ.Code art. 2315 and one

that “involves the invasion of a person‟s interest in his or her reputation and good

name.” A plaintiff seeking to recover under a defamation cause of action must

prove: (1) the existence of a false and defamatory statement concerning another;

(2) unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the

part of the publisher; and (4) resulting injury. Cyprien v. Board of Sup., ex rel.

Univ. of LA Sys., 08-1067 (La. 1/21/09), 5 So.3d 862 (quoting Costello v. Hardy,

03-1146 (La. 1/21/04), 864 So.2d 129). The element of fault, is often

characterized as malice, actual or implied, in the jurisprudence. Id. Thus, in

restating the plaintiff‟s burden, the supreme court remarked that a plaintiff must

prove that the defendant, with actual malice or other fault, published a false

statement with defamatory words, causing damages to the plaintiff. Id. (quoting

Trentecosta v. Beck, 96-2388 (La. 10/21/97), 703 So.2d 552).

Notably, and relevant to our review of the trial court‟s ruling in this case, the

supreme court has explained that:

A pure statement of opinion, which is based totally on the speaker‟s
subjective view and which does not expressly state or imply the
existence of underlying facts, usually will not be actionable in

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defamation. That is because falsity is an indispensable element of any
defamation claim, . . . and a purely subjective statement can be neither
true nor false.

Bussie v. Lowenthal, 535 So.2d 378, 381 (La.1988). “The question of whether a

statement is one of fact or opinion depends upon the circumstances in which the

statement was made, and the reasonable inferences which may be drawn from a

statement of opinion will vary depending upon the circumstances of the case.”

Fitzgerald, 737 So.2d at 718.

In this case, and as set forth above, the trial court determined that Mr.

Bradford‟s statement(s) were those of opinion and were in the nature of hyperbole

given the context of the surrounding circumstances. The record supports that

determination. It is clear from the record that the League leadership and the larger

League community became entangled in the controversy surrounding the criminal

backgrounds of the two prospective coaches. That is evidenced by the multi-week

chain of events, the seeming awareness of the controversy by numerous League

community members beyond the League‟s leadership, and the apparent outreach to

the NAACP. Additionally, the trial court remarked upon the generally hostile

nature of the participants‟ conduct at the meeting at which Mr. Bradford‟s

statements were made.

In representing himself at trial, Mr. Bradford specifically explained that he

has “a great deal of respect for” Mr. Meissner and that he “never viewed [him] as a

racist of any kind.” He denied that he had “said that he was a racist” or that he had

“insinuated that he was a racist.” Mr. Bradford described himself as a “man of

peace,” “not a man of confusion.” He further stated that he initially reached out to

Mr. Meissner because he did not want to have an issue of race that had been raised

by one of the prospective coaches and that, upon attending a meeting with the

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NAACP, had assured the group that he had no “problem with trying to resolve this

issue because we do not need an issue of race” in the community.

However, in describing the incident at which the subject statement came

about, Mr. Bradford explained that when he approached Mr. Meissner at the

practice field, Mr. Meissner “just blew up[,]” and began cursing and walked off.

Mr. Bradford stated that Mr. Meissner “accused [him] of contact[ing] the

NAACP[.]” Mr. Bradford explained that he had not done so and that he told Mr.

Meissner that he owed him an apology. Mr. Bradford explained that, when Mr.

Meissner would not return, the remainder of the group continued “talking about the

issue, trying to resolve it[.]” Because he felt that members of the gathering, who

were not on the League Board should leave the scene, he asked them to leave.

Instead, however, one of the attendees began cursing and “making threats that he

was gonna do bodily harm to [him].” Mr. Bradford admitted that, when these

individuals “approached,” he “told them that Mr. Meis[s]ner has a problem with

people of color.” Mr. Bradford then stated that “in that statement I said I

apologize, once again I say he has problem with people of color[.]” In explaining

his statement at trial, he stated that “the reason being why I say that on three

different occasions to where me and Mr. Meis[s]ner have conversations that and

what I mean by that - - that he has a problem with anybody that shows authority - -

authoritation [sic] to him, that disagrees with him on anything, whether they are

black, white, green or purple.”

With this background in mind, the record evidences that the statements were

obviously opinion in nature. Those in attendance at the gathering were well aware

of, if not involved, in the underlying course of events which included at least some

element of tension related to race at its core. The trial court was not required to

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determine that the statements, made within the context of the gathering, led those

League members in attendance to feel that there were unknown, underlying facts

portraying Mr. Meissner in a more unfavorable, defamatory light. Rather, the trial

court permissibly viewed the incident merely as a publication of the speaker‟s

opinion during the course of a heated exchange.

As the record supports the trial court‟s determination, we find that Mr.

Meissner‟s argument on appeal lacks merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs

of this proceeding are assessed to the plaintiff-appellant, Russell Meissner.

AFFIRMED.

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