Herman Lee Hooper v. Louisiana Pigment Company, Lp

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

19-816

HERMAN LEE HOOPER

VERSUS

LOUISIANA PIGMENT COMPANY, LP

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2013-1665
HONORABLE G. MICHAEL CANADAY, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Shannon J. Gremillion, and Candyce G.
Perret, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Rudie R. Soileau, Jr.
Jackey White South
T. Houston Middleton, IV
Lundy, Lundy, Soileau & South, LLP
501 Broad Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 439-0707
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Louisiana Pigment Company, LP

Somer G. Brown
Richard E. Wilson
Cox, Cox, Filo, Camel & Wilson, LLC
723 Broad Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 436-6611
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Herman Lee Hooper

GREMILLION, Judge.

The defendant-appellant, Louisiana Pigment Company, LP (Louisiana Pigment),

appeals the jury’s finding of wrongful termination in favor of its former employee, the

plaintiff-appellee, Herman Lee Hooper. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In April 2013, Hooper filed a petition for damages for unlawful termination by

Louisiana Pigment. Hooper alleged that following a knee replacement on November

30, 2011, unrelated to his employment, his employer unlawfully terminated him after it

re-worked his job description from a managerial position to a shift supervisor requiring

manual labor and required him to undergo a functional capacity evaluation (FCE)

despite his physician’s release for work effective May 2, 2012. Hooper alleged

violations of La.R.S. 23:323(A) and (B) (1), (2), (3), (5) and (7).

In August 2016, Hooper filed a motion in limine and request for expedited

hearing, urging that any evidence relating to the receipt of disability benefits be deemed

inadmissible. Hooper further alleged that any benefits he received constituted a

collateral source. Attached to the motion were two different job descriptions for

Hooper’s position, “Production Maintenance Coordinator,” evidencing extremely

different levels of required manual labor. Louisiana Pigment opposed the motion and

ultimately filed a supervisory writ with this court in October 2016, following the trial

court’s grant of Hooper’s motion, which ruled that “[t]here shall be no mention in

argument or voir dire, nor any evidence offered, whether testimonial, documentary, or

otherwise, relating to Plaintiff’s application for, determination by, or receipt of any

disability payments from either private long-term disability or the Social Security

Administration.” We denied the writ.1 Writs were taken to the supreme court. The

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Two members of the five-judge panel would have granted the writ and found that the trial
court abused its discretion in granting Hooper’s motion in limine and would have allowed evidence
of his applications for disability benefits.

Louisiana Supreme Court granted the writ in part and stated, “The judgment of the trial

court granting the motion in limine is reversed insofar as it excludes evidence of the

plaintiff’s applications for disability benefits.”

In July 2017, Hooper filed a Daubert motion to exclude the witness testimony of

Joel Friedman, a lawyer who was set to testify as an expert in the area of disability,

discrimination, and employment law. In September 2017, Louisiana Pigment filed a

Daubert motion to exclude the testimony of Jeffery Stevens, who would be called as an

expert in human resources. The trial court rendered a judgment denying Louisiana

Pigment’s motion to exclude the testimony of Stevens and deferred Hooper’s motion to

exclude the testimony of Friedman to the merits. Louisiana Pigment, thereafter, filed a

motion in limine to limit or exclude future earnings-loss testimony.

In April 2018, Hooper filed a motion for partial summary judgment asserting that

there were no genuine issues of material fact on the issues of Louisiana Pigment’s

violation of La.R.S. 23:323(B). In July 2018, the trial court denied Hooper’s motion

for partial summary judgment, stating:

There are conflicting records as to Plaintiff’s actual complaints.
This taken in conjuncture with the Doctor’s prognosis create a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether Mr. Hooper was an “otherwise
qualified person” as defined by La.R.S. 23:323(B)(5).

Mr. Hooper’s credibility in explaining these conflicts will need
to go to the weight of the evidence and be determined by the trier of
fact.

The matter proceeded to a jury trial. After six days of testimony and evidence,

the jury returned a verdict in favor of Hooper in the amount of $1,754,130.00 plus legal

interest and court costs. The jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that Hooper

had a disability; that he was an otherwise qualified person with a disability; that he was

terminated based on a physical examination that was not directly related to the

requirements of his specific job or was not required of all employees who are similarly

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situated; and that the physical examination given to Hooper was not job-related or

consistent with Louisiana Pigment’s business necessity and that his job performance

could be accomplished by reasonable accommodation.

The trial court awarded Hooper attorney fees in the amount of $581,682.66 and

taxed Louisiana Pigment $14,507.16 in additional court costs. In May 2019, Louisiana

Pigment filed a motion for new trial, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or remittitur,

which was denied by the trial court. Louisiana Pigment now appeals and assigns as

error:

1. The trial court erred when it allowed the admission of
evidence of subsequent employee exams through a new medical
provider engaged by Louisiana Pigment subsequent and without
relationship to the employment of Herman Lee Hooper thereby
allowing an improper and irrelevant argument to support a violation of
[La.R.S.] 23:323.B(5).

2. The jury’s general damage award of $701,652 for mental
anguish is excessive and not supported by the evidence.

3. The trial court erred when it excluded evidence of disability
benefits received by Herman Lee Hooper, benefit payments relevant to
defend the general damage claim asserted by Herman Lee Hooper.

4. The trial court erred in disallowing a credit for disability
payments funded and paid by Louisiana Pigment, payments that do not
fall within the definition of the collateral source rule.

5. The trial court abused its considerable discretion and thus
erred in its award of fees and costs.

6. The trial court erred in declining to grant a new trial, judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, reducing the award.

EVIDENCE

The jury was presented with extensive testimonial and documentary evidence.

Quentin Busby, the human resources supervisor for Louisiana Pigment, testified

that he had worked there since 1991. He reviewed a number of Hooper’s employment

records. He testified that Hooper became a maintenance supervisor in 2006. In 2008,

HR records indicate that Hooper had a knee surgery in February and was released to
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work on March 6, 2008, with the restriction of “no kneeling on knees,” with the duration

set at “undetermined.” Hooper was not required to undergo an FCE.

Busby testified that in 2011, Hooper scheduled double knee replacements and

also had to have an emergency shoulder surgery. After the shoulder surgery in Spring

2011, Hooper was released to return to work on May 27, 2011, with the restriction of

no climbing, no lifting, pushing or pulling greater than fifteen pounds. In an email dated

May 26, 2011, Hooper’s boss, Kevin Ledoux, notified various other employees:

Lee is scheduled to see his doctor on the evening of May 26th and be
released to return to work. His shoulder will not be totally recovered
and he will be going through physical therapy, but I told him that he
should be able to perform his normal duties. I told Lee to go to BHP
[Business Health Partners] on Friday morning, May 27th, unless he
hears from Sharon. Lee has vacation scheduled for June 20-July 11.
Lee has left knee scheduled for August 15, with a 6-8 week recovery
period. Then he has right knee surgery scheduled for October 17 with
a 6-8 week recovery. I asked if [he] could schedule the knee surgeries
together and he thought he would be too handicapped.

Busby then reviewed a “Job Analysis” of production maintenance supervisor that was

created by Ledoux on May 24, 2011, following the shoulder surgery in preparation for

Hooper’s return to work. The one-page document lists the following physical

requirements of the job: Standing for a half an hour at a time for a total of one hour per

day; walking for two hours at a time for a total of two hours per day; and sitting three

hours at a time up to five hours per day. It listed “equipment climbed on” as “10%

stairs, 5% ladder, and 1% scaffold.”

Following the first knee surgery, Hooper was released to return to “light duty”

work by Dr. Nathan Cohen on October 6, 2011. He was not required to undergo an

FCE. Following the second knee surgery, Hooper was released by Dr. Cohen to return

to work on March 19, 2012, with the restriction: “[Patient] may return to work light

duty-desk work only allowing him to get up every 30 minutes to walk for 3 minutes.”

Busby was then shown an email from Ledoux dated April 4, 2012, that stated:

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Just got a call from Lee. At Lee’s appointment today, his doctor gave
him a return to work release for May 2. He does not have to see him
again. The doctor told Lee that his existing pain is from scar tissue and
will get better with time. Lee is no longer having to go to physical
therapy but he is going to the gym on his own. I told him that I would
relay the message to Sharon when she returns.[2]

Dr. Cohen issued another release for return to full work duty on May 2, 2012. There

was no mention of an FCE being required. Busby testified that employees who are out

for medical reasons are required to check in with Business Health Partners (BHP)

weekly if they are able to and to see the company doctor every other week, who comes

every Thursday to the plant. On April 12, 2012, Hooper met with Jackie Guidry, a nurse

from BHP, at the plant. Guidry’s notes from that date reveal: “States decreased pain

when walking and is currently working on stair climbing. Patient is released to full duty

on 5-2-2012 by MD.” Again, there was no mention of an FCE being required.

The next document addressed by Busby is the “physical position description”

created by Paul Fontana for production supervisors at Louisiana Pigment. 3 This

document is dated April 23, 2012, and comprises twelve pages. Busby testified that

there had never been an FCE for a supervisor prior to Hooper. He said he was

responsible for coordinating with Fontana so that he could meet various employees to

find out what duties the production supervisor position entailed. Busby testified that

during Hooper’s absence, the job of production supervisor had not changed, they just

did not have a job description.

Busby next reviewed Nurse Guidry’s remarks following a visit with Hooper on

April 26, 2012, which states: “Incision has healed. States no longer taking narcotics.

States pain only increases after standing for more than eight hours. Pain level is usually

2
Sharon Groves is the nurse that works for Louisiana Pigment’s medical provider, Business
Health Partners (BHP).
3
Paul Fontana owns the Center for Work Rehabilitation, Inc., which has locations in Lafayette,
Louisiana and Houston, Texas.

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one of ten standing, and two of ten going from sitting to standing. MD released for 5-

2-12, pending FCE.” Busby agreed that this was the first time an FCE had been

mentioned. He testified that he was unaware of what the FCE would consist of. Busby

was then presented with an April 26, 2012 medical release created by Nurse Guidry

indicating that Hooper could return to work on May 2, 2012, pending completion of an

FCE. The twelve-page FCE was then offered into evidence. Busby testified that, to his

knowledge, Hooper was the only production supervisor to ever take an FCE. Busby

then testified that Louisiana Pigment subsequently employed a different company to

administer FCE evaluations, and the subsequent testing was only a day long, as opposed

to three days, and consisted of skills listed on one piece of paper as opposed to the

twelve pages of skills created by Fontana.

Busby testified regarding the FCE that was administered to Hooper. Hooper

completed the daily, eight-hour-long testing for the first two days on May 7 and May 8,

2012, but upon arriving for the third day, Fontana declined to finish the test. Hooper

then left Fontana’s office and immediately went to Dr. Cohen’s office to get a release

in order to finish the test. On May 9, 2012, Dr. Cohen issued another full-duty work

release effective May 10, 2012. Also, on May 9, 2012, Pam Davis, the Benefits

Administrator of Louisiana Pigment, sent Hooper a letter stating in part:

You have been on short term disability since November 30, 2011. Your
short term disability will end on May 27, 2012. (This also means your
employment will end). In order for your long term disability claim to
be reviewed, Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada requires that the
enclosed documents be completed.

On May 13, 2012, Fontana sent Busby an email stating in part:

After thinking about Mr. Hooper, if the doctor and PT say there is
nothing further they can do for him and that the pain he is feeling is not
an indication that something is wrong that make his knees worse, then
if you are looking to help him get back to work with ya’ll [sic] the thing
I would recommend is work hardening.

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On May 31, 2012, Busby received an email from Fontana’s business place

indicating that the FCE was discontinued on the third day due to Hooper’s reports of

increased pain in both knees with standing activities. Busby testified that he spoke with

Fontana, and Fontana would not let Hooper finish and/or repeat the FCE without first

attempting work hardening. He said that Louisiana Pigment did not volunteer to pay

for the work hardening. Busby testified that Hooper was not allowed to return to the

plant and do his job because the FCE was not completed.

On cross-examination, Busby testified that he spoke with Hooper after the first

two days of the FCE and pleaded with him to finish the test so that he could return to

work. However, Busby said that Fontana would not allow him to return to take the test

without the work hardening and that Hooper said he could not do it because it caused

him too much pain. As to why the FCE came about this time, but not any for any of

Hooper’s other surgeries, Busby testified:

The reasoning is because the complaints of pain. And because the
second knee surgery took so long as compared to the other procedures
and the other return to works. The complaints of pain and the
medications that he was taking, that was the reason for the FCE, the
concerns that brought up an FCE in the first place.

Busby went on to state that Louisiana Pigment did not order the FCE, but that

BHP did. Busby said no one can return to work without medical approval from BHP.

As to the job description Fontana created for Hooper’s position, Busby said that they

simply did not have one prior to this because they create them on an as-needed basis.

Busby testified it was never his goal to create an obstacle for Hooper to return to work,

and in fact, it was just the opposite. He said that no one at Louisiana Pigment had any

control over the testing conducted by Fontana, an independent vendor. Busby testified

that Louisiana Pigment switched to a local company owned by Scott Lounsberry to

conduct FCEs sometime in early 2013.

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Paul Fontana, an expert in the field of occupational therapy, with particular

expertise in the area of industrial occupational therapy, testified that he had worked with

industrial customers for the past forty-three years. He testified that he develops a

quantifiable physical job description and then uses it to develop protocols for return-to-

work FCEs. He also administers the FCEs. In 2012, Fontana testified that he developed

the fit-for-duty programs for about fifty different companies and performed 250 to 300

FCEs per year.

Fontana testified that Hooper successfully completed the first two days of the

FCE, which involved extremely strenuous activity such as climbing over twenty flights

of stairs and a twelve-foot ladder multiple times. Fontana testified, contrary to Busby,

that if Busby had called him and instructed him to let Hooper finish the test, he would

have complied. Fontana was questioned if it would have served any purpose to have

Hooper drive back to Lafayette for the third day of testing and he said:

If we were still looking at can he be [a] production supervisor, the
answer to that would be, no. He hasn’t done anything to make himself
better. There’s no reason to do that.

If the question was, look, we’ve got a very light-duty job or
whatever, and we just want to see. Then, yes, there could have been
some rational of me seeing him again, quickly.

Fontana testified that he has full control over deciding what will be encompassed in the

FCE; the client has no input in what he/she wants out of an evaluation. He ultimately

testified that his test is extensive to ensure the safety of the workplace. He did not

believe the test conducted by Lounsberry was satisfactory.

Dr. Nathan Cohen’s testimony was presented to the jury via deposition. Dr.

Cohen testified that he had been an orthopedic surgeon since 1982, with a subspecialty

in joint replacement surgery, and was qualified as an expert. He estimated that he

performs 300 to 400 joint replacements a year. Dr. Cohen reviewed Hooper’s extensive

medical history of bilateral knee problems, including arthritis, warranting numerous
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doctor visits and steroid injections in the years 2008, 2009, and 2010. In January 2011,

Dr. Cohen’s notes indicated that Hooper was considering joint replacement surgery. Dr.

Cohen noted that Hooper was probably unable to kneel all through this time. In May

2011, Hooper received injections in both knees.

In August 22, 2011, Hooper underwent his first total knee replacement. Dr.

Cohen testified that this surgery was successful, so much so that at a follow-up visit on

September 14, 2011, Hooper scheduled a right total knee arthroplasty for November 30,

2011. Dr. Cohen testified that there were no complications with this surgery.

At follow-up visits, Dr. Cohen noted that Hooper still complained of pain. Dr.

Cohen testified that his complaints were all within the realm of normal considering the

amount of time that had elapsed since surgery. Dr. Cohen released Hooper to return to

light duty work on March 19, 2012. An April 4, 2012 notation by Dr. Cohen’s clinical

assistant noted that:

Doing better. Patient still not ready to return to work due to increase in
pain with stair climbing in bilateral knees. And patient’s employer
doesn’t have light-duty work available. Patient also complains of pain
on the medial side of his left knee for one month. And he had completed
his physical therapy.

Nevertheless, Dr. Cohen released Hooper to return to work on May 2, 2012. Dr.

Cohen scheduled Hooper’s next appointment in six months. However, Hooper returned

to Dr. Cohen’s office on May 2, 2012, requesting a work release because:

. . . he failed the work-hardening program because of his pain level. He
states he was trying to be honest with him, and he was able to do all the
activities they asked him to do. He said they told him because of his
pain level, he can’t return to work. He presents today wanting a work
release.

Dr. Cohen’s notes indicate:

From my perspective, he is a reasonable candidate to return to full work
duties[.] I feel he is capable of completing all of his tasks. He has lived
with knee pain for an extensive period of time. Very clearly he can
endure some discomfort from time-to-time, yet still continue with his
normal work duties.
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Dr. Cohen testified that he did not have any concerns that Hooper would be a

danger to himself or others because his knee replacements were successful. Dr. Cohen

was questioned:

Q. Okay. So is it your opinion based on your years of treatment that
he’s effectively had the same physical limitations since 2008 through
present?

A. Yes. Although mechanically, his knees are certainly a lot better than
what they were, given the amount of arthritis that he had in them before.
That was all resolved with the procedure.

Q. Okay. So – in some respect, he’s actually better than he was in 2008?

A. His knees are certainly capable of a lot more, yes.

On cross-examination, Dr. Cohen was asked:

Q. . . .You said just now that Mr. Hooper was – from a mechanical
standpoint that he was mechanically better is what I wrote down, that
he should be capable of more. I feel like there’s something more – in
our care and evaluation of him that there’s more of the story to be told
than just the mechanical evaluation of the knee joint in terms of his
overall well-being. Is there?

A. Well, I think the answer to that is that his symptoms outweigh his
signs. So what that basically means is – and if you have records from
Dr. Matthews to confirm my findings as well – although his x-rays
looked excellent, all the arthritic complaints, all the arthritic changes
had been removed, that physically his knees function in a – in a better
fashion that they did before. And if I’m unable to be able to suggest
why he’s complaining of those symptoms, then I think the answer to
that is his symptoms outweigh his signs.

So I – I couldn’t come up with a reason why he would be
symptomatic. And if his symptoms are the issue at hand right now as
to whether he can or cannot work, then I think it’s – it becomes a real
gray zone as to what you do with a gentleman like that.

Finally, Dr. Cohen described Hooper’s complaints as chronic, as he was at

maximum medical improvement. Dr. Cohen testified that an FCE is a standard and fair

approach to measure a person’s work ability.

Hooper testified that Dr. Cohen told him that he could do whatever he wanted to

do as long as he could tolerate the pain. He then reviewed with counsel several

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applications he filled out for long-term disability. In conjunction with his long-term

disability, he was required to file for social security disability benefits. On that form,

Hooper indicated that “I became unable to work because of my disabling condition on

November 29, 2011.” He testified that the pain in his knees was the disabling condition.

Hooper was questioned if he believed that he was disabled from all jobs to which he

responded, “No. I was disabled from all gainful employment except the job I was

working for Louisiana Pigment.” Hooper said he could still perform his job at Louisiana

Pigment because “he had been doing it for several years in the same condition, pain-

wise.”

Hooper testified that he worked his way up from his start at Louisiana Pigment

in 1992 to outage coordinator by 2006. Hooper testified that once the routine

coordinator retired, he took on that position also. Hooper said that his job from 2006

forward involved planning and scheduling. He said he worked in a trailer next to the

maintenance building as a planning coordinator. He said he spent about 80% of his

time in the office and 20% of his time in the plant.

Hooper was questioned if the maintenance coordinator job description produced

by Fontana accurately described the actual job he performed, and he said it did not.

Regarding the three-day FCE, Hooper testified that he completed all of the tasks for the

first two days. On the first day he rated his pain level at two. On the second day he

rated his pain level at six. Upon his return on the third day, Hooper was unable to finish

the test because Fontana said he could not continue until he had a doctor’s clearance

stating that nothing structurally was wrong with his knee and that he would not injure

it further by continuing the FCE. Hooper immediately obtained the release from his

doctor, but testified that he was instructed to wait for a call from someone at Louisiana

Pigment. After he submitted the release to the office on May 10, 2012, Hooper received

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a letter, dated May 9, 2012, that his employment would be terminated on May 27, 2012.

Hooper was questioned how he felt when he received the letter. He responded:

Frustrated, angry, confused, just a whole bunch of emotions because I
got this letter after the 10th. When I went in on the 11th to give the
release to the company nurse, I was instructed to go home, and we’ll
call you. I know what that means.

I have already had too many employees to be terminated, and
that’s the last thing you hear. If you’re instructed to go home and we
will call you, that means it’s over. And then when I get this, that’s what
I am thinking, it’s over. But I keep fighting and, you know, trying to
call – I do call Quentin [Busby].

Hooper testified that he called Busby and LeDoux and told them it was just a big

misunderstanding and requested they meet to straighten things out. Hooper said that

LeDoux told him to call Busby to set up a meeting. Hooper called Busby to set up a

meeting. After conferring with LeDoux, according to Hooper, Busby called him and

told him that there would be no meeting; that they did not want to meet. Hooper testified

that Louisiana Pigment never offered him the eleven-day work hardening program nor

was he given the ability to complete the third day of testing despite his doctor’s release.

Hooper testified as to how much he loved working for Louisiana Pigment. He

described the maintenance coordinator position as his dream job. He said the period of

time following his termination was one of the worst times of his life. He testified that

he “took pride in working and having a job.” He said that when he was terminated,

“they stripped me of all my dignities and my self-esteem. So it was just a rough time.”

On cross-examination, Hooper testified that Jody Vincent came in to train with

him two weeks before his first knee surgery so that he could fill in for him while he was

out. Hooper testified that Vincent eventually took over as maintenance supervisor, the

job that Hooper had previously handled and which at one time was the job of two

different people before Hooper starting doing both jobs. Hooper admitted that

Louisiana Pigment treated him fairly and accommodated him through all of his

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surgeries up to the point of taking off for the November 2011 knee surgery. He testified

that he had pain before and after the surgeries and was limited in his ability to climb

stairs both before and after any of the surgeries. He admitted that his condition with his

knees, from the standpoint of his subjective pain, had not improved since the surgeries.

Hooper then reviewed a series of pictures of the Louisiana Pigment plant

evidencing that stairs must be used to get to certain areas and that catwalks are used to

move between production buildings. Hooper said that each production building consists

of four floors. He admitted that there have been occasional emergencies at the plant

requiring evacuations. He testified that for the biggest outage, which had been

originally planned for July 2011 but which did not occur until December 2011, he was

out because of his second knee surgery and that Vincent performed his job during that

time. Defense counsel made a point of showing that at times, Hooper would be “on

call” to fill in for duties of other workers if they were out of the plant. All of these

positions had broader physical requirements than Hooper’s job as maintenance

supervisor. Hooper said at times when he was required to do this, he simply switched

his radio to a different line in order to be able to listen if assistance was needed in the

area but that he continued to do his regular job, primarily in his office.

On re-direct, counsel counted the stairs at the Louisiana Pigment plant as

representing one flight of stairs. On day one of the FCE, Hooper walked eleven flights

of stairs and reported a pain rating of two at the end of the day. Hooper testified that he

had walked the stairs before when he had knee pain and would be able to after the

surgeries as well. The four floors of the building comprise six flights of stairs, which

again, Hooper was able to complete during the FCE following his surgeries. Hooper

testified he was able to perform his job at Louisiana Pigment even as of the date of trial.

He reviewed numerous physical activities that involved long periods of walking,

climbing stairs, getting in tight spaces, and the like that he had completed in order to
13

get in the courtroom all week. Hooper testified that he plays golf and cuts grass. Finally,

although Hooper “defines” himself first and foremost as a Christian, he testified his job

meant a great deal to him, and, the loss of it was devastating to him.

Scott Lounsberry, an athletic trainer, physical therapist assistant, certified

strengthening and conditioning coach, and ergonomist, owns a physical therapy clinic

and a sports performance center. The physical therapy center, Industrial Strength Work

Rehab Center, conducts pre-employment testing, return to work testing, and work

conditioning. Lounsberry testified that he creates job descriptions and performs FCEs.

Lounsberry described the process of creating a job description and, thereafter, an FCE

based on the job duties. He said that he meets with the supervisor to find out what the

responsibilities are of the job, then follows an employee who acutally works in the

position and records the type of activities they perform on a daily basis.

Lounsberry created a job description for Production Supervisor and an FCE for

that position for Louisiana Pigment. Louisiana Pigment approved the criteria for the

job description, which consists of a one-page document listing five specific job specifics.

The documents states in part:

For the Position

Of

Production Supervisor (CP)[chloride process]

The Company representative hereby acknowledges the following as
valid job specific tests:

Job Specific Test I: Carrying a Fire Extinguisher
The employee will demonstrate the ability to safely carry a fire
extinguisher 50 feet with one hand.

Job Specific Test II: Silo Climb
The employees will demonstrate the ability to safely ascent 169 steps
without exceeding the APMHR [Age Predicted Maximum Heart Rate].

Job Specific Test III: Push/Pull

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The employee will demonstrate the ability to push and pull at chest
height with a force of 60 lbs.

Job Specific Test IV: Mobility
The employee will demonstrate the ability to assume a posture of 24
inches off the floor and return to standing without upper extremity
support.

Job Specific Test V: Typing
The employee will demonstrate the ability to type for 5 minutes.

Lounsberry testified that the entire test takes about an hour-and-a-half. He said

that it is more difficult to do a shift supervisor job description because “as the shift

supervisor, he doesn’t necessarily have [to] do the physical part of the job of turning

valves and reading gauges and things like, but at the end of the day, he is responsible

for safety of the whole unit.”

Charles Bettinger, an expert forensic economist and statistician, testified via

video deposition, which was played for the jury. Dr. Bettinger determined that Hooper

suffered a loss of back pay and future pay. Dr. Bettinger noted that Hooper had been

terminated 6.6 years ago. Hooper’s pay included social security contributions, a 401(k)

plan, which Louisiana Pigment matched, and a company retirement program. Dr.

Bettinger determined that Hooper lost $24,944.00 in 401(K) benefits, $38,662.00 in

social security benefits, and $38,663.00 in retirement benefits. He determined Hooper’s

total loss of back pay at $760,017.00. He calculated future loss of pay at $409,404.00

for a total of past and future loss at $1,169,421.00. That calculation did not include a

reduction of $88,786.00 based on the slight chance that Hooper would be able to obtain

a job making $8.95 to $14.55 per hour. With that calculation included, Dr. Bettinger

determined that Hooper suffered a net future and back pay loss of $1,080,635.00,

assuming that he would retire at age 67.

Jackie Guidry, a nurse practitioner since 2005, testified that she worked for BHP

in 2011-2012. She testified that Louisiana Pigment was a client of BHP and that every

15

Thursday morning she would do physicals at the plant. She also met with employees

who were off for short-term disability to assess their status every two weeks. Guidry

testified that Louisiana Pigment had its own medical office on-site where she would

visit with employees. The facility had its own on-site nurse who was employed by

Louisiana Pigment, and at that time, it was Sharon Groves. Guidry testified that once

she received a release from the employee’s doctor:

What I do is a lot of times as I assess them, it is not unusual working in
occupational medicine for the employee to beg the doctor to go back to
work. My job is to make sure that the patient is safe enough to go to
work. For instance, we’ve had people that had appendicitis and had an
appendectomy and still have sutures and beg their doctor and he says,
“Full duty release.” I can’t let him go back into the construction with
these sutures – dirt, anything could happen.

So we basically do not rubber stamp anything. It is based on
where he is, what it looks like, and then we decide whether or not to
release them.

Guidry then discussed the FCE she ordered Hooper to complete on April 26, 2012.

She was questioned:

Q. Now, this was an order that you issued, correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did someone tell you, you’ve got to do it?

A. No, sir.

Q. When you issued it, was there anybody with Louisiana Pigment who
was collaborating with you?

A. No, sir.

Q. Had you had any phone calls or any input from Louisiana Pigment
that says, I think –

A. No, Sir.

Q. Does it work that way?

A. We have had some try, you know, or the – I’ve had them try before.
But it is basically us. I’ve had construction companies for some reasons

16

don’t want a worker there, you know, oh, no no. And if he’s capable,
I’m sorry, I’m returning him to work.

Q. Now, you haven’t had that experience with Louisiana Pigment, have
you?

A. No, sir, I have never.

Guidry testified that although she has been asked by companies to produce a

certain result, which she would not do, Louisiana Pigment has never asked her to do

that. Guidry stated that Hooper had three surgeries in a little over a year, and he was

still having difficulty sitting. Guidry said that because he did not complete the FCE,

Hooper was not cleared to return to work.

Jody Vincent testified that he has been employed at Louisiana Pigment for

twenty-two years. Vincent testified that in 2011, he was working as a shift supervisor.

Vincent said that he was asked to cover for Hooper because he would be out for multiple

surgeries. Vincent said that he remained a shift supervisor while he trained with Hooper

in order to learn about the maintenance supervisor position. He eventually took over

Hooper’s job after Hooper was terminated. Vincent testified that his position as

maintenance and outage coordinator required desk work as well as work in the unit. He

said the job is not sedentary.

Bryan Taylor, the administration manager at Louisiana Pigment since 2009, was

questioned why a job description for an FCE was already being created when Guidry

did not request one until April 26, 2012. Taylor testified that Guidry wanted an FCE

sometime in March before Hooper could return to work, but Guidry did not know that

there was not one for Hooper’s position. Thus, Taylor testified that he asked Busby to

have Fontana create an FCE. Taylor testified that he would have never requested that

Fontana create a physical job description if there had not been any talk of an FCE being

required. Taylor said that employees are required to take FCEs from time to time

through Fontana. He said they were the same three-day evaluations regardless of what
17

job you held. Taylor testified that employees were not treated differently if they were

hourly versus salaried workers. He further said that there was no distinction between

clerical versus CP or supervisor versus non-supervisor.

Taylor testified that he decided to start using Lounsberry because he was local,

and it would be easier and more convenient for employees to obtain return to work

evaluations. Taylor said that all of the job descriptions in existence before Hooper were

for hourly employees. He said that new job descriptions were created on an as-needed

basis. Taylor then discussed the FCE used for Hooper to return to work following his

shoulder surgery. Taylor testified that it was decided that Vincent would do all of the

physical aspects of the position while Hooper would do the office work. Taylor testified:

So I asked Kevin to prepare - - and this was a document that I
had from somewhere else I had worked. It may have been when I was
at Boeing or Westlake Chemical or Lyondell Basell. But it was a form
that I had that I had used at a previous job. And I gave it to Kevin and
I said, fill this out based on what Mr. Hooper’s job requirements are
going to be with Jody doing primarily all of the physical aspects of the
job.

Thus, according to Taylor, this job description was not an accurate one for Hooper’s

actual job but limited to office work with Vincent performing the physical activity

required of the job. Taylor testified that Hooper was out for forty-five days on short-

term disability following the shoulder surgery and forty-five days for the first knee

surgery. Taylor said that Vincent performed all of his job duties while Hooper was out,

and when Hooper returned from short term disability, Vincent performed all of the

physical aspects of his job. Following the second knee surgery, Hooper was out for the

full 180 days on short-term disability. Taylor said that between April 2011 and May

2012, Hooper was out for 271 days.

Taylor said that following the first knee surgery, Hooper never really improved

and spent a lot of time at work with his knee iced while using ibuprofen. He said that

even though he was having all of these issues, Hooper left for the next knee surgery in
18

November 2011 and never returned. Taylor testified that he was informed from BHP

that following the second surgery, Hooper continued to have issues with his knee. He

further testified:

Q. Did you at any point make a decision to send him to an FCE?

A. No. No. No, I don’t do that.

Q. Why not?

A. Because it’s not my job. That what we use Business Health Partners
for. That is their expertise. They are medical experts. I am not.

Q. Did you ever decide that you didn’t want him to come back to work?

A. Absolutely not.

Q. Did you want him to come back to work?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Why?

A. Well, Mr. Hooper - - Mr. Hooper is a very good employee, very
knowledgeable. You have heard all of this. He was there from when
the plant was built. His knowledge of the CP unit was invaluable. We
had a lot of time and money invested in him, and he was a very good
contributor to what he did. It was a big loss for us to lose Mr. Hooper.
And I think if you look at the facts in this case, it is totally opposite that
we would try to create some kind of work environment where he
couldn’t come back. It was just the opposite.

Q. Why didn’t you just let him come back despite – forget about the
FCE. Forget about Ms. Guidry. He had been doing - - we have heard
that. He had been doing the job for all these years. Why didn’t you
just let him come back and do it some more?

A. He was not able to come back until we had medical clearance, and
Business Health Partners makes that call.

Taylor said that the letter sent out by Davis was automatic and she sends that

letter to every employee within two or three weeks from having their short-term

disability end so that they do not experience a lapse in benefits. Taylor testified that the

termination upon the expiration of short-term disability applies to all employees and

that it requires the balance between the desire to have an employee return with the need
19

to have the spot filled. Taylor steadfastly denied that Louisiana Pigment was trying to

“get rid of” Hooper. He testified that, on the contrary, they went out of the way to help

him by having another person do all of the physical aspects of Hooper’s job. Taylor

said Louisiana Pigment remained hopeful that Hooper would return after completing

the work hardening that Fontana requested of him and did not fill his position until they

received Hooper’s application for long-term disability.

Tim Hall, the plant manager at Louisiana Pigment, has a PhD in organic

chemistry. He has worked for Louisiana Pigment since before the plant was built. He

reports directly to the board and coordinates with the two owners regarding business

practices. Hall testified that he does not interfere in the medical process involving an

employee returning to work. Hall said that it takes five years to have a real quality

operator in the CP plant that can perform all of the jobs. He testified that they did

everything they could to keep Hooper. He said:

And I have looked back at this case and I don’t know of anything that
we could have done different that would have changed the outcome.
Because at the end of the day, we had an employee who had a medical
problem that had pain, that Louisiana Pigment had nothing to do with.

He wasn’t hurt at work. He didn’t incur it at work. He didn’t
incur it in our process or failure to have our PPE, or something that we
did. It was a personal injury problem, a personal medical issue. And I
didn’t know here Louisiana Pigment could do anymore than we did.

After Hall testified, the defendant rested. The jury verdict sheet set forth the

following questions for the jury to answer:

1. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Herman Lee
Hooper has a disability?
____X____ YES ______ NO

If you answered “YES”, to question number 1, please proceed to
question number 2. If you answered “NO” to question number 1, please
sign this verdict form and return it to the court.

2. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Herman Lee
Hooper is an otherwise qualified person with a disability?
____X____ YES ______ NO
20

If you answered “YES”, to question number 2, please proceed to
question number 3. If you answered “NO” to question number 2, please
sign this verdict form and return it to the court.

3. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Hooper was
terminated based on a physical examination that was not directly related
to the requirements of his specific job or was not required of all
employees who are similarly situated?

___X___ YES _________ NO

4. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the physical
examination given to Herman Lee Hooper has been shown to be job-
related and consistent with Louisiana Pigment’s business necessity, and
such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable
accommodation?

________ YES ____X____ NO

If you answered “YES”, to question number 4, please sign this verdict
form and return it to the court. If you answered “NO” to question
number 4, please proceed to questions [sic] number 5.

5. What amount, if any, do you find would reasonably compensate Mr.
Hooper for each of the following?

Lost Wages (including benefits) $1,052,478.00
Mental Anguish $701,652.00

DISCUSSION

By the time of the trial, the sole issue before the jury was whether Louisiana

Pigment violated La.R.S. 23:323(B)(5). The relevant parts of the statute state:

A. No otherwise qualified person with a disability shall, on the
basis of a disability, be subjected to discrimination in employment.

B. An employer, labor organization, or employment agency shall
not engage in any of the following practices:

....

(5) Discharge or take other discriminatory action against an
otherwise qualified person with a disability on the basis of physical or
mental examinations or preemployment interviews that are not directly
related to the requirements of the specific job, or are not required of all
employees or applicants.

21

Subsequent FCE Exam Evidence

In its first assignment of error, Louisiana Pigment argues that the trial court

impermissibly allowed the evidence of the less strenuous tests Lounsberry administered

to other production supervisors after Hooper’s departure as an irrelevant argument to

support a violation of the statute. The trial court is vested with vast discretion in

connection with the admissibility of evidence. It will not be reversed absent an abuse

of that discretion. Maddox v. Omni Drilling Corp., 96-1673 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/6/97);

698 So.2d 1022, writs denied, 97-2766, 97-2767 (La. 1/30/98); 709 So.2d 706. The

jury’s findings will not be reversed in the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly

wrong. Stobart v. State through DOTD, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993).

There simply was no evidence to suggest that the company singled-out Hooper

for a different FCE that would guarantee his departure from the company. On the

contrary, they used the same FCE provider they had used for years−Paul Fontana−who

was located in Lafayette. Sometime in 2011, Louisiana Pigment decided to switch to a

local provider−Scott Lounsberry−and avoid having employees travel to Lafayette and

stay overnight in a hotel. Lounsberry himself, along with Louisiana Pigment employees,

testified that it was a very lengthy process to switch over because Lounsberry had to

create job descriptions for all of the employees. It was not until 2013 that Lounsberry

started performing the FCEs for Louisiana Pigment.

As to the FCE that Hooper was subjected to under Fontana, it is true that Hooper

was the first salaried employee to be subjected to the test because he was the first

salaried employee that ever required one. Fontana had been used for all other

employees who had required one in the past. Louisiana Pigment argues it was severely

prejudiced by the trial court allowing evidence of the Lounsberry tests, which were

undoubtedly less comprehensive, of two subsequent salaried employers to prove that

Hooper was singled out for special treatment. We disagree. The jury was presented
22

with all of the underlying facts surrounding the switch from Fontana to Lounsberry.

We find that the jury did not have to rely on this evidence in reaching the verdict that it

did. Our review of the evidence reveals no master plan to switch companies in order to

terminate Hooper. On the contrary, the switch was for the convenience of the

employees to be able to test locally.

Rather, the evidence that stands out as actionable under the statute and upon

which the jury did not manifestly err in relying upon, is that Hooper was required to

take a test consisting of extreme manual labor that was unrelated to his managerial job

requirements. This was evidenced by his past history of return-to-work evaluations that

mentioned very little in the way of physical labor. Moreover, when Hooper completed

the arduous tasks required of him that were unrelated to his job, he was not allowed to

finish the test on the third day even though he had medical clearance to do so. While

there was dispute in the testimony as to how that occurred and what happened thereafter

regarding the “work hardening,” it is reasonable to conclude that Hooper would have

completed whatever was asked of him and that none of it would have been related to

his job as a production supervisor.

Louisiana Pigment goes to great length to explain that it relied on third-parties to

administer its tests and medical clearances, but it was ultimately responsible for hiring

Fontana and approving the FCE that Fontana created for the position of “Production

Supervisor,” which bore no relation to Hooper’s actual job duties.

Therefore, a reasonable jury could have concluded that the test that was

administered to Hooper, as a manager primarily engaged in office work, set forth

requirements that were not directly related to the requirements of the specific job of

production supervisor. Thus, even if the Lounsberry test evidence had been excluded,

the jury still could have found that the Fontana test was not related to the requirements

of Hooper’s managerial job.
23

In brief, Louisiana Pigment argues that the “sole theory of the case advanced by

the plaintiff relied on this strategy to turn this case into a question of whether the two

evaluations were different, embodied in the pretrial shift to focus solely on subsection

§323.B(5),” and that “this simple difference under the specific circumstances presented

in this case cannot, standing alone, sustain a violation of §323.B(5).” Louisiana

Pigment argues that this finding creates a “an impossible paradox” for employers

because employers would automatically violate §323.B(5) any time they change their

procedure or require an employee to take an FCE test or medical exam for the first time.

Louisiana Pigment further argues that this holding could be interpreted as not allowing

employers to conduct business and choose providers as they see fit if a change in testing

automatically signaled a violation of the statute. We disagree. Our holding makes no

such finding. Under the particular facts of this case, Louisiana Pigment is ultimately

responsible for the timing of the switch, and the history (or lack thereof) of the FCE

administration regarding Hooper. That the employee got caught in the middle of the

switch does not change the fact that Fontana’s FCE had no relation to the actual job

performed by Hooper.

Hooper need not prove there was a concerted effort to get rid of him because of

his disability. Notably, in the year that Hooper elected to undergo multiple surgeries

(none related to his work), Louisiana Pigment undeniably accommodated him until the

very end by providing him a laptop to work with at home and by having Jody Vincent

assist Hooper with the physical demands of the job when Hooper returned. Hooper’s

counsel did try to paint Louisiana Pigment as a ruthless corporation looking to get rid

of its long-term employee; however, we did not find that the evidence supported such a

finding. Nevertheless, Hooper was eager and able to return to work. Louisiana Pigment

is responsible for the bureaucratic boundaries it created in order for Hooper to return to

work and for the diagnostic criteria that the company it uses employs. Louisiana
24

Pigment had to approve the job description set forth by Fontana, and Louisiana Pigment

had the ultimate discretion in determining whether Hooper was able to return to his job.

The jury reasonably determined that the FCE Hooper was required to undergo

based on Fontana’s job description bore no likeness to the job actually performed by

Hooper. We cannot say the jury manifestly erred in its finding. Moreover, we find the

jury would have reached the same result even if the Lounsberry test had been excluded.

This assignment of error is without merit.

General Damages

In this assignment of error, Louisiana Pigment argues that the jury, because of

the exclusion of the disability income evidence, was probably left with the impression

that Hooper was depressed because he was destitute and unable to pay his bills, which

was not the case because Hooper received an amount nearly equal to his salary in

benefits. We note that the general damage award was left to the total discretion of the

jury with Hooper’s counsel suggesting no specific amount.

In Wainwright v. Fontenot, 00-492, p. 6 (La. 10/17/00), 774 So.2d 70, 74

(alteration in original), the standard to be used by an appellate court when reviewing a

quantum award was set forth by our supreme court:

The assessment of “quantum,” or the appropriate amount of
damages, by a trial judge or jury is a determination of fact, one entitled
to great deference on review. As such, “the role of an appellate court
in reviewing general damages is not to decide what it considers to be
an appropriate award, but rather to review the exercise of discretion by
the trier of fact.” Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257,
1260 (La.1993). Moreover,

before a Court of Appeal can disturb an award made
by a [factfinder,] the record must clearly reveal that the
trier of fact abused its discretion in making its award. Only
after making the finding that the record supports that the
lower court abused its much discretion can the appellate
court disturb the award, and then only to the extent of
lowering it (or raising it) to the highest (or lowest) point
which is reasonably within the discretion afforded that
court.
25

Coco v. Winston Indus., Inc., 341 So.2d 332, 334 (La.1977) (internal
citations omitted).

It is not our role to determine what we feel is an appropriate award. We can only

disturb the trier of fact’s determination if it abused its discretion. Youn, 623 So.2d 1257.

Hooper worked for Louisiana Pigment for over twenty years. He did not testify that he

was destitute and unable to support his family; he testified he was making ends meet.

Hooper testified to the challenging circumstances he was raised in and how being

successful at his job was one of his proudest accomplishments in life. Considering

Hooper’s testimony of how important his job was to him and how the loss of it greatly

affected his mental health, we cannot say that the jury erred in awarding him

$701,652.00. This assignment of error is without merit.

Disability Payment Evidence

This assignment of error essentially relates to the previous one and the one that

follows. Louisiana Pigment argues that the trial court erred when it excluded evidence

of Hooper’s disability payments, which were relevant to defend the general damage

claim. While the trial court allowed evidence of the application for benefits, it did not

allow any evidence relating to the payments Hooper actually received in accordance

with the instructions of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Hooper v. Louisiana Pigment

Co., LP, 17-380 (La. 4/13/17), 218 So.3d 627.

Louisiana Pigment argues that La.Code Evid. art. 105 allows the admission of

evidence for one purpose that may not be admitted for another purpose.4 Louisiana

Pigment states in brief that “to require a jury to contemplate a general damage award

4
Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 105 states:

When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but
not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court,
upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury
accordingly. Failure to restrict the evidence and instruct the jury shall not constitute
error absent a request to do so.
26

deprived of these critical facts is improper.” It cites several cases for the proposition

that “[t]he rule is that a Social Security disability claim is not fatal to a claim under the

laws governing an employment claim premised on a disability claim, but it is evidence

to be considered by the finder of fact, here the jury[,]” namely Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt.

Syst. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 119 S.Ct. 1597 (1999), and Smith v. Thurman Oils, Inc., 06-

743 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/28/06), 951 So.2d 359, writ denied, 07-207 (La. 3/23/07), 951

So.2d 1106, the same cases that the Louisiana Supreme Court cited in its writ opinion

in this matter.

In Cleveland, the district and appellate courts found that the employee was

estopped from proving an essential element of her ADA claim after filing an SSDI claim

contending that she was unable to work due to her disability. The Supreme Court

disagreed, finding that “the two claims do not inherently conflict to the point lower

courts should apply a special negative presumption like the one [applied by the lower

courts].” Id. at 802. The Supreme Court described various circumstances in which the

application for both would not necessarily be at odds with each other. Likewise, in this

case, while Hooper’s application for SSDI benefits and long-term disability insurance

through his work might seem at odds with his claim that he was qualified to do his job,

Louisiana Pigment forced Hooper to file or risk losing his long-term disability benefits

altogether. Hooper’s testimony was that he was qualified to perform his job at

Louisiana Pigment and that was the only “gainful employment” he would be qualified

for. In this case, Hooper was stuck between a rock and a hard place, yet Louisiana

Pigment argues that the jury should have had the “facts” that he received disability

payments before it determined its general damage award.

Cleveland involved the burden of proof relating to these types of competing and

apparently inconsistent claims in summary judgment motions. The Supreme Court held

that to defeat summary judgment, the employee must provide an
27

. . . explanation of any apparent inconsistency with the necessary
elements of an ADA claim. To defeat summary judgment, that
explanation must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror’s
concluding that, assuming the truth of, or the plaintiff’s good-faith
belief in, the earlier statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless “perform
the essential functions” of her job, with or without “reasonable
accommodation.”

Id. at 807.

Smith v. Thurman Oils, Inc., 06-743 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/28/06), writ denied, 07-

207 (La. 3/23/07), 951 So.2d 1106, and the cases cited within it, similarly address the

summary judgment issue. The underlying inquiry in this assignment of error is the

nature of the evidence Louisiana Pigment sought to have introduced before the jury.

This evidence−the payment of benefits by another source−commonly referred to as a

“collateral source,” is a legal question which is addressed below.5 The implication from

the supreme court’s writ opinion does not comport with a finding that the amount of

disability payments should have been considered for another purpose as argued by

Louisiana Pigment.6 Accordingly, this assignment is without merit.

Collateral Source

Hooper argues as a preliminary matter to this issue, that Louisiana Pigment’s

answer did not plead the affirmative defense of offset/credit for disability benefits and

that it must be pled or it is waived. Hooper relies on Hyatt v. Mutual of Omaha Ins.

Co., 14-282, p. 14 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/1/14), 149 So.3d 406, 415-16:

Pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 1005, an affirmative defense
must be specifically pled in the answer. The determination of whether
an issue is an affirmative defense is a question of fact resolved by
examining the circumstances of the individual case. Fishbein v. State

5
We note that 2020 Louisiana House Bill No. 692 is currently proposed before the legislature
and seeks to enact La.R.S. 9:2800.25, which would specifically provide that any benefits received by
a plaintiff from a collateral source shall be disclosed to the trier of fact.
6
The Supreme Court’s reference to Cleveland would imply that Hooper’s application for
disability benefits claiming that he could not work could be explained in testimony as occurred in this
case when Hooper testified that he had no other alternative but to file for benefits, and that he was not
capable of finding “gainful employment” of the type he had at Louisiana Pigment.

28

ex rel. LSU Health Sciences Ctr., 06–549 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/9/07), 960
So.2d 67, writ denied, 07-730 (La.6/22/07), 959 So.2d 495. “[A]n
affirmative defense raises a new matter, which assuming the allegations
in the petition are true, constitutes a defense to the action. The new
matter must be one, however, that is not raised in the plaintiff's petition.”
Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 07-2441, p. 23 (La.4/8/08), 988 So.2d 186,
204. Offset has been recognized as an affirmative defense which must
be specifically pled in the defendant’s answer. Ducote v. City of
Alexandria, 95-1197 (La.App.3 Cir. 3/6/96), 670 So.2d 1378.

Although there are a number of cases finding that offset is an affirmative defense

that must be pled, under the unique facts of this case, we find Louisiana Pigment’s

request for credit pursuant to the collateral source rule did not need to be pled as an

affirmative defense because it does not raise a new matter. See Fishbein v. State ex rel.

LSU Health Sciences Center, 06-549 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/9/07), 960 So.2d 67, writs denied,

07-708 (La. 6/22/07), 959 So.2d 505, 07-730 (La. 6/22/07), 959 So.2d 495. Hooper

had fair notice that the collateral source issue would be significant in this case. See

La.Code Civ.P. art. 1005. Moreover, this issue is ultimately rendered moot by our

finding that disability plan benefits are a collateral source.

Louisiana Pigment argues that the trial court erred in disallowing a credit for

disability payments funded and paid by Louisiana Pigment, payments that do not fall

within the definition of the collateral source rule. The trial court allowed evidence of

the payments to be entered into the record (outside the presence of the jury), but denied

any credit based on these payments. Louisiana Pigment argues that these benefits do

not constitute a collateral source. It argues that because the payments were made by

Louisiana Pigment, denying it a credit “encourages (if not teaches) the defendant to end

the payments and terminate what is a voluntary program.” Louisiana Pigment argues

that it will be made to pay twice if this ruling stands. The benefits amounted to a credit

of 67% against the future income claim.

This case presents a novel set of circumstances unaddressed by existing

jurisprudence−whether an employer-provided long-term disability policy earned by an
29

employee−is a collateral source when the employer is held liable for lost wages for

violating the discrimination statute. In Bellard v. American Central Ins. Co., 07-1335,

07-1399, pp. 18-19 (La. 4/18/08), 980 So.2d 654, 668, the supreme court defined the

collateral source rule and its jurisprudential underpinnings (emphasis added)(citations

omitted):

[T]he rule provides that “a tortfeasor may not benefit, and an injured
plaintiff’s tort recovery may not be reduced, because of monies
received by the plaintiff from sources independent of the tortfeasor’s
procuration or contribution.” Under the collateral source rule,
payments received from an independent source are not deducted from
the award the aggrieved party would otherwise receive from the
wrongdoer. As a result, the tortfeasor is not allowed to benefit from the
victim’s foresight in purchasing insurance and other benefits.

Several public policy concerns support the collateral source
doctrine. The concern most often voiced is that the tortfeasor should
not gain an advantage from outside benefits provided to the victim
independently of any act of the tortfeasor. The objective in this regard
is to promote tort deterrence and accident prevention. Another concern
advanced is that, absent the collateral source rule, victims would be
dissuaded from purchasing insurance or pursuing other forms of
reimbursement available to them.

Of the reasons cited in support of the rule, “[t]he major policy
reason for applying the collateral source rule to damages has been, and
continues to be, tort deterrence.” In other words, the rule is grounded
in the belief that the tortfeasor should not profit from the victim’s
prudence in obtaining insurance, and that reducing the recovery by the
monies paid by a third party would hamper the deterrent effect of the
law.

Hooper argues the payments were properly excluded as inadmissible collateral

source evidence, relying on law stating that in determining whether a benefit plan that

is wholly funded by the tortfeasor is a collateral source, the ultimate inquiry remains

whether the tortfeasor established by plan as a prophylactic measure against liability.

Hooper argues the proper focus is not what the tortfeasor should pay, but what the

plaintiff should receive, and that Louisiana Pigment should not be given a

“discrimination bonus” in that it would pay less than it would have if it acted lawfully.

30

Hooper’s counsel states that “regardless of whether Mr. Hooper will receive a windfall,

Louisiana Pigment should not receive a reward for its unlawful acts.”

Applying the language used by the supreme court in Bellard does not work under

the facts of this case. The tortfeasor paid for the long-term disability policy and offered

it as an employment benefit to long-term workers. Hooper did not purchase the policy

and is, therefore, not punished for his forethought in obtaining insurance. However,

Hooper did, in a sense, earn the policy through his years of dedicated service to the

company. The supreme court recently addressed a collateral source case involving

written-off expenses through worker’s compensation in Simmons v. Cornerstone Invest.,

LLC, 18-735, pp. 8-9 (La. 5/8/19), 282 So.3d 199, 205 (emphasis added), stating:

Last, we find if Plaintiff prevails on the merits, a recovery of the
reduced amount of medical bills will make him whole, which is an
important consideration of both tort recovery and the application of the
collateral source rule. La. Civ. Code art. 2315. The plaintiff was never
obligated to pay more than the discounted amount and under our
civilian code of liability, Plaintiff should not profit from a tortfeasor in
the absence of the availability and proof of punitive damages. In
Chauvin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2014-0808, p. 10 (La. 12/9/14), 158
So.3d 761, 768, this court stated:

The general public policy in Louisiana is against
punitive damages. Ross v. Conoco, Inc., 02-0299, p. 14
(La. 10/15/02), 828 So.2d 546, 555. Thus, punitive or
other penalty damages are not allowed unless expressly
authorized by statute. And even when a statute does
authorize the imposition of punitive damages, it is strictly
construed. Id.

Plaintiff places much emphasis on tort deterrence, essentially
arguing that it, as a public policy factor, overrides competing concerns
regarding double recovery. We acknowledge the important role of tort
deterrence within our tort system; however, to stretch the argument to
include the award of un-incurred medical expenses, in addition to those
actually paid, is to effectively authorize the assessment of punitive
damages in the absence of statutory authority. Thus, in this case, we
find there is no true deterrent effect to allowing Plaintiff to recover
expenses over and above what was actually paid.

31

Although the circumstances in Simmons are different (the plaintiff did not

actually incur the written-off expense), we still have two competing interests in this

case: tort deterrence versus punitive damages against the employer.

In this case, as in some maritime cases, the tortfeasor is also the independent

source that funds the disability plan. In Wendelboe v. Seariver Maritime, Inc., 06-13 p.

4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/3/06), 950 So.2d 826, 828, the first circuit court of appeal

determined that, “[a]s these conceptual identities are merged in the same entity, there is

no true collateral source here. The inquiry hinges on the nature of the plan at issue.”

Thus, the plan is either a “fringe benefit” for the employee or was created and funded

to shield the employer from liability from injuries. Id. The primary inquiry, secondary

to whether the employer funded the plan, is “the character of the benefits received.” Id.

Fringe benefits cannot be set off against tort recovery, whereas “conscious

indemnification mechanisms” can be set off against tort recovery. Id. at 829. The

factors include:

(1) whether the employee makes any contribution to funding of the
disability payment, (2) whether the benefit plan arises as the result of a
collective bargaining activity, (3) whether the plan and payments under
it cover both work-related and non-work-related injuries, (4) whether
payments from the plan are contingent upon length of service of the
employee, and (5) whether the plan contains any specific language
contemplating a set-off of benefits received under the plan against a
judgment recovered in a tort action. Allen v. Exxon Shipping Co., 639
F.Supp. 1545, 1548 (D.Me.1986).

Id.

In this case, the employee did not contribute to the plan nor did the plan arise as

the result of a collective bargaining activity; the plan covered both work-related and

non-work related injuries; the plan was contingent upon length of service, although it

is unclear from the record what that length of time was; and, the terms of the salaried

long-term disability plan in the materials produced by Louisiana Pigment state that the

policy provides for offsets, including: “Any amount you receive due to income
32

replacement or lost wages paid to you by compromise, settlement, or other method as a

result of a claim for any other income benefit.” The Sun Life long term disability

income benefits policy states in part:

Other Income Benefits

Other Income Benefits are those benefits provided or available to the
Employee while a Long Term Disability Benefit is payable. These
Other Income Benefits, other than retirement benefits, must be provided
as a result of the same Total or Partial Disability payable under this
Policy. Other Income Benefits include:

1. The amount the Employee is eligible for under:

....

f. any other act or law of like intent.

....

9. Any amount due to income replacement or lost wages the Employee
receives by compromise, settlement or other method as a result of a
claim for any Other Income Benefit.

The terms of the policy in Wendelboe were as follows:

Under section 2, “Long Term Disability Benefit,” subsection 2.5
sets forth the “amount of each monthly installment” due to an injured
worker. This amount is to be “equal to the excess, if any, of the person’s
Long–Term Disability Standard over. . .[t]he amount of any judgment
or settlement payable to a disabled person by a service-oriented
employer on account of a claim for personal injuries, including. . .a
claim arising under the Jones Act (46 U.S.C.App. § 688) or a claim for
maintenance and cure arising under general U.S. maritime law.”

Continuing to section 3, “Denial of Benefits,” subsection 3.1
allows that the employer may deny benefits under the plan if it
determines that the worker has been “paid a sum by the employer under
a judgment for personal injuries or for maintenance and cure while
benefits are paid or payable under this Plan, until denied benefits that
would have been payable to such person equal the total of such sum so
paid by the employer.”

Id. at 829.

The plan in Wendelboe clearly expressed an intent to avoid double-liability. The

court in Wendelboe determined that the employer’s intent to avoid double-liability must

33

be observed; otherwise the collateral source rule would inhibit employers from

providing such policies. Thus, the injured seaman’s recovery would be set-off by the

employer-provided disability plan. The language in the Louisiana Pigment policy book

and the Sun Life policy are less certain. These provisions only imply that a credit would

be due to Sun Life if the employee receiving benefits receives benefits from another

source.

Although we do not find that Louisiana Pigment was an intentional tortfeasor or

provided the policy as a “prophylactic measure against liability,” we find that the

deterrent effect of the collateral source rule still outweighs the employer’s interest in

this case. Otherwise, every long-term disability policy would function as an insurance

policy for violations of La.R.S. 23:323. Because the employment discrimination arena

is significantly different than a seaman injured while working, we do not find that the

same policy considerations would be served if this long-term disability policy were

considered a collateral source. Although this novel issue presents a close-call in

considering competing policy considerations, we find the long-term disability policy

payments, earned through Hooper’s tenure at the company, are a collateral source and

that Louisiana Pigment is not due a credit for offset. Accordingly, this assignment of

error is without merit.

Attorney Fees and Costs

In this assignment of error, Louisiana Pigment argues that because Hooper’s

counsel did not seek to sever this claim from the issues assigned to the jury, nor did

Louisiana Pigment agree to waive its right to the have the fee claim decided by the jury,

the claim was extinguished. Louisiana Pigment cites no law in support of this argument

but states in brief:

The fee claim should have gone to the jury. Louisiana Pigment would
have maintained its right to have this question go before the jury to
avoid what Louisiana Pigment believes occurred: the jury included an
34

inflated general damage award to account for the costs of legal
representation. A fee claim can be severed and placed with the trial
court, but that did not happen here. There was no such agreement to
take this issue from the jury. On this basis, Louisiana Pigment
maintains the claim was waived in the same manner any other claim for
recovery not included in the verdict sheet would be lost not severed.

Louisiana Pigment fails to point out where it objected to the jury verdict form. It cannot

now avail itself of hindsight and what it wishes it would have done.

Secondly, and in the alternative, Louisiana Pigment argues that the trial court

abused its discretion in awarding $567,175.50 in attorney fees and that an award of

$120,000.00 more than adequately satisfies this claim. Louisiana Pigment essentially

argues that the trial court refused to make an award based on a 1/3 contingency fee

contract amount, and plaintiff’s counsel thereafter underwent recreating records so that

the total would equal that amount. We disagree.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:303(A) authorizes the award of attorney fees in

matters such as this one:

A plaintiff who has a cause of action against an employer, employment
agency, or labor organization for a violation of this Chapter may file a
civil suit in a district court seeking compensatory damages, back pay,
benefits, reinstatement, or if appropriate, front pay, reasonable attorney
fees, and court costs.

In Fahed v. Ayesh, 16-748, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/15/17), 211 So.3d 1179, 1187-

88, a panel of this court summarized the law pertaining to the award of attorney fees:

In Stanley v. Crowell & Owens, LLC, 15-395, pp. 3-4 (La.App.
3 Cir. 10/7/15), 175 So.3d 1204, 1207-08, writ denied, 15-2035 (La.
1/8/16), 184 So.3d 694, this court reviewed the law regarding appellate
review of an attorney fee award:

This court reviews the trial court’s award of
attorney fees under the abuse of discretion standard.
Covington v. McNeese State Univ., 12-2182 (La. 5/7/13),
118 So.3d 343. In Covington, the supreme court stated
that in applying that standard, “the role of the reviewing
court is not to determine what it considers to be an
appropriate award, but rather it is to review the exercise of
discretion by the trier of fact.” Id. at 351. Still, we review
the trial court’s factual findings in reaching the award at
35

issue pursuant to the manifest error/clearly wrong standard.
Stobart v. State, Dep’t of Trans. & Dev., 617 So.2d 880
(La.1993); Cottonport Bank v. Keller Prop. Mgmt., LLC,
13-649 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/11/13), 128 So.3d 668.

Additionally, the trial court has discretion in determining the
amount of an attorney fee based upon its own knowledge, the evidence,
and its observation of the case and the record. Custom-Bilt Cabinet &
Supply, Inc. v. Quality Built Cabinets, Inc., 32,441 (La.App. 2 Cir.
12/8/99), 748 So.2d 594. In fact, a court does not have to hear evidence
concerning the time spent or hourly rates charged in order to make an
award since the record will reflect much of the services rendered.
Burford v. Burford, 95-2318 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/28/96), 677 So.2d 722.
When the nature and extent of the services of an attorney are shown by
the record, it is the duty of the court to bring to bear its knowledge of
the value of the services of counsel and to fix the value even in the
absence of expert testimony. Mitchell v. Turner, 588 So.2d 1305
(La.App. 2 Cir.1991).

The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness
of an attorney fee award on appeal include:

(1) the ultimate result obtained; (2) the
responsibility incurred; (3) the importance of the litigation;
(4) amount of money involved; (5) extent and character of
the work performed; (6) legal knowledge, attainment, and
skill of the attorneys; (7) number of appearances made; (8)
intricacies of the facts involved; (9) diligence and skill of
counsel; and (10) the court’s own knowledge.

State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev. v. Williamson, 597 So.2d 439, 442
(La.1992).

Hooper’s counsel submitted significant documentary evidence regarding the

work she and her law firm conducted in this matter over a period spanning six years.

Counsel obtained a favorable result for her client. The litigation is the first of its kind

and required significant skill to prove the elements under the statute. We find no abuse

of trial court’s discretion in awarding $567,175.50 in attorney fees. This assignment of

error is without merit.7

7
In brief, Hooper’s counsel requests attorney fees for work performed on appeal. However,
counsel did not answer the appeal requesting attorney fees for work on appeal, thus we are precluded
from awarding attorney fees for work performed on appeal. See La. Code Civ.P. art. 2133; LaSalle v.
LaSalle, 03-293(La.App. 3 Cir. 10/1/2003), 856 So.2d 142, and Dugas v. Aaron Rents, Inc., 02-1276
(La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/03), 839 So.2d 1205.
36

New Trial, Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, Remittitur

In this assignment of error, Louisiana Pigment argues that, based on all of the

above arguments, the trial court should have granted a new trial, judgment

notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), or remittitur.

A trial court can grant a JNOV only when a jury’s verdict is one which
reasonable people could not have rendered; if reasonable persons could
have arrived at the same verdict given the evidence presented to the jury,
then a JNOV is improper. The standard to be applied by the appellate
courts in reviewing the grant or the denial of a JNOV is whether the trial
court’s findings in rendering the JNOV were manifestly erroneous.
Bertrand v. Air Logistics, Inc., 01-1655, p. 13 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/19/02),
820 So.2d 1228, 1237.

Mouhot v. Twelfth Street Baptist Church, 06-1283, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/7/07), 949

So.2d 668, 670.

At the hearing on the motions, Louisiana Pigment argued that the trial court

agreed to give it a credit for the disability payments that had been paid by Louisiana

Pigment 100% amounting to 67% of the payment he received as the other portion was

paid by social security disability income. Louisiana Pigment again argued that the

disability payment is not a collateral source because it is an employee suing his

employer and the benefits were generated directly and solely through the payments

made by Louisiana Pigment. Hooper argues that Louisiana Pigment could have put on

expert testimony but they did not and that the benefits were earned by Hooper unlike

an insurance policy which one pays for. Hooper argues that the employer is the

tortfeasor, and the “tortfeasor deterrent” purpose is met because the employer caused

Hooper to lose his job.

As the trial court noted at the hearing on the JNOV,

The plaintiff was given a test. Whether the defendant specifically set
that test up ideally to get rid of Mr. Hooper, the Court itself is not
convinced of that. However, they did contract with an independent
contractor. They did set up what the Court does agree to be an onerous
test, and the jury also completely found that the results of that test were

37

factually supportive of employment discrimination, and, therefore,
found against the defendant.

The trial court noted that the supreme court specifically indicated that no monetary

amounts should be allowed to go before the jury. The trial court then found:

In reviewing the arguments, this is one of somewhat of a first
appearance with regard to the statute. One, I think I find as a matter
that the benefit, at least based on the Court’s review of the testimony,
was for his years of service and status with the company, that is was not
offered to every individual. So, it was somewhat unique. Also, the
purpose of what we consider a collateral source is a deterrent. And, I
think I have to disagree with the defendant’s argument as to this not
being any type of a deterrent. If someone feels that they could put a
policy that would basically give them immunity from any type of
provision provided for by law would be – have a different system in its
entirety.

The bottom line is that the Court is going to find that his was a
collateral source, that the funds are unique, that the funds were
something that was incurred as a result of benefits to Mr. Hooper, and
that it’s within the jury’s province to make that determination. At this
time the Court declines to make any reduction in the wage award.

And, with regard to reviewing the general damage award, I
cannot find that that – I do not find that reasonable minds could never
reach that award. They clearly appreciated Mr. Hooper’s impact.

Based on the reasoning set forth by the trial court as well as our review of the

assignments of error, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of Louisiana Pigment’s

motions. Reasonable jurors could arrive at the verdict and damage awards in this case.

Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court awarding the plaintiff-appellee, Herman Lee

Hooper, $1,754,130.00 plus legal interest and court costs is affirmed. The award of

$567,175.50 in attorney fees is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against

the defendant-appellant, Louisiana Pigment Company, LP.

AFFIRMED.

38