State of Louisiana v. Larry James Williams

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

05-1338

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

LARRY J. WILLIAMS

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APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 273,837
HONORABLE JOHN C. DAVIDSON, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JAMES T. GENOVESE
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Billy H. Ezell, and James T. Genovese, Judges.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

G. Paul Marx
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 82389
Lafayette, Louisiana 70598
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Larry James Williams

Larry James Williams
In Proper Person
486265 Camp “C” Wolf-3
Louisiana State Penitentiary
Angola, Louisiana 70712

James C. Downs
District Attorney - Ninth Judicial District
ADA Loren M. Lampert
Post Office Drawer 1472
Alexandria, Louisiana 71309
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

GENOVESE, Judge.

Defendant appeals his convictions of aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, and

first degree robbery. For the following reasons, we affirm.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant, Larry J. Williams (Williams), was charged by indictment on June

10, 2004 with one count of aggravated rape, a violation of La.R.S. 14:42, one count

of aggravated burglary, a violation of La.R.S. 14:60, and one count of armed robbery,

a violation of La.R.S. 14:64. Williams entered a plea of not guilty to all charges on

June 18, 2004.

Trial by jury commenced on January 4, 2005. On January 6, 2005, the jury

returned a verdict of guilty of aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, and the lesser

offense of first degree robbery. Williams was sentenced on March 7, 2005 to life

imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of

sentence for aggravated rape, to forty years without benefit of parole, probation, or

suspension of sentence for first degree robbery, and to thirty years at hard labor for

aggravated burglary. A motion for appeal was filed on August 9, 2005.

Williams is before this court asserting two assignments of errors. In the first

assignment of error, he contends the verdicts of guilty of aggravated rape, aggravated

burglary, and first degree robbery, arising from one set of facts, are unconstitutional

because they violate fundamental due process by imposing multiple punishments for

a single act; therefore, all verdicts should be set aside. In the second assignment of

error, he contends the verdict of guilty of aggravated rape is not sustainable because

there was no evidence of a weapon or use of a weapon during the commission of the

crime. These assignments lack merit.

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FACTS

On April 8, 2004, H.W.1 went to a casino with her friend and returned home at

approximately 11:30 p.m. She went to bed at 12:00 a.m. and was later awakened

when a man jumped on top of her. The man proceeded to remove H.W.’s panties and

gown, and then raped her.

After the rape, the man walked H.W. from her bedroom and demanded that she

take him to her money. H.W. showed the man where her purse was. He then dumped

its contents and took all of her money. The man subsequently rifled through H.W.’s

closet looking for money and guns.

After that, the man pushed H.W. back into her bedroom where he made her lay

on the bed and covered her with a comforter. The man then jerked the phone cord

from the wall and left.

Williams was later arrested and admitted breaking into H.W.’s home, raping

her, and then removing property from her storeroom.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, there are no errors

patent.

However, this court notes that the minutes of sentencing fail to reflect that the

trial court sentenced Williams to thirty years at hard labor for aggravated burglary.

The minutes also fail to reflect that the trial court ordered the forty-year sentence for

first degree robbery to be served without benefit of parole. This case is remanded to

the trial court with instructions to amend the sentencing minutes accordingly.

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The initials of the victim will be used in accordance with La.R.S. 46:1844(W)(1)(a).

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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 22

In this assignment of error, Williams contends that the verdict of guilty of

aggravated rape is not sustainable because there was no evidence of a weapon or use

of a weapon during the commission of the crime.

Because Williams alleges that the trial evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction. As instructed by State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731 (La.1992), assignments

concerning the sufficiency of the evidence are to be addressed first.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, Louisiana appellate courts are controlled by the standard
enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61
L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Under this standard, the appellate court “must
determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of
the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
State v. Neal, 00-0674, (La.6/29/01) 796 So.2d 649, 657 (citing State v.
Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678 (La.1984)).

State v. Brown, 03-897, p. 22 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 1, 18.

Williams was found guilty of aggravated rape, a violation of La.R.S. 14:42.

Aggravated rape is defined, in pertinent part, as “a rape committed upon a person

sixty-five years of age or older.” See La.R.S. 14:42.

H.W. testified that she was seventy-eight years of age at the time of trial and

was born on December 29, 1926. The record indicates that during the rape, the man’s

penis penetrated H.W.’s vagina, and H.W. testified that she did not consent to this

sexual encounter. Rape is defined as “the act of anal, oral, or vaginal sexual

intercourse with a male or female person committed without the person's lawful

consent.” See La.R.S. 14:41. Williams’ conduct constituted a rape of the victim.

Williams gave two statements to police on April 10, 2004, which were admitted

2
Williams’ assignments of error will be addressed in reverse order due to the legal
requirement of addressing claims of insufficiency of the evidence first.

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into evidence. In these statements, Williams acknowledged that he had sex with a

lady inside a house he had broken into.

Jennifer Valentine testified that the DNA profile obtained from the sperm

found on the vaginal swab taken from H.W. was consistent with Williams’ DNA.

Detective William Bates testified that the latent print he lifted from a money box

found inside H.W.’s storeroom matched Williams’ fingerprints. Additionally,

Williams was fingerprinted in court and Detective Bates confirmed that the print

found on the metal box was a print from Williams’ right ring finger.

Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilty of

aggravated rape. Considering the precise language of La.R.S. 14:42, the State need

not present evidence that Williams used a weapon during the offense. Accordingly,

this assignment lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

In his first assignment of error, Williams contends that the verdict of guilty of

aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, and first degree robbery, arising from one set

of facts, is unconstitutional because it violates fundamental due process by imposing

multiple punishments for a single act; therefore, all verdicts should be set aside.

Williams contends that the battery he committed was a rape. Since the aggravated

burglary charge was based on the rape charge, this court should vacate his conviction

for aggravated burglary.

In his discussion, Williams only addresses his convictions for aggravated rape

and aggravated burglary, and asks that his conviction for aggravated burglary be set

aside. Accordingly, we will address Williams’ convictions for aggravated rape and

aggravated burglary only.

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Both the United States and the Louisiana Constitutions provide
that no person shall twice be put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the
same offense. U.S. CONST. amend. V; LA. CONST. ART. 1, § 15. In
interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the
federal courts employ the test enunciated in Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932):
The applicable rule is that where the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether
there are two offenses or only one, is whether each
provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.
....
In evaluating claims of double jeopardy under . . . LA. CONST.
art. 1, § 15, Louisiana courts have used the “same evidence” test, which
we have remarked is “somewhat broader in concept than Blockburger.”
State v. Steele, 387 So.2d 1175, 1177 (1980). The same evidence test
has been stated as follows:
If the evidence required to support a finding of guilt of one
crime would also have supported conviction of the other,
the two are the same offense under a plea of double
jeopardy, and a defendant can be placed in jeopardy for
only one. The test depends on the evidence necessary for
conviction, not all the evidence introduced at trial.

Id.

State v. Cotton, 00-0850, pp. 4-5 (La. 1/29/01), 778 So.2d 569, 573, rehearing
granted in part, 00-0850 (La. 4/20/01), 787 So.2d 278.

However, an accused who commits separate and distinct offenses
during the same criminal episode or transaction may be prosecuted and
convicted for each offense without violating the principle of double
jeopardy. State v. Nichols, 337 So.2d 1074 (La.1976). Louisiana has
not adopted a “same transaction” test which would prohibit, on double
jeopardy grounds, prosecutions for different crimes committed during
one sequential, continuing course of conduct. City of Baton Rouge v.
Jackson, 310 So.2d 596 (La.1975).

State v. Jones, 01-539, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/31/01), 799 So.2d 772, 779, writ
denied, 01-3310 (La. 12/13/02), 831 So.2d 975, citing State v. Thomas, 95-1646
(La.App. 3 Cir. 5/8/96), 680 So.2d 37.

BLOCKBURGER TEST

As previously noted, the Blockburger test requires that each of the two

statutory violations requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.

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Williams was convicted of aggravated rape and aggravated burglary. In the case sub

judice, aggravated rape is “a rape committed upon a person sixty-five years of age or

older.” See La.R.S. 14:42. Rape is defined as “the act of anal, oral, or vaginal sexual

intercourse with a male or female person committed without the person’s lawful

consent.” See La.R.S. 14:41.

Williams was also convicted of aggravated burglary. Louisiana Revised

Statute 14:60 defines aggravated burglary as follows:

Aggravated burglary is the unauthorized entering of any inhabited
dwelling, or of any structure, water craft, or movable where a person is
present, with the intent to commit a felony or any theft therein, if the
offender,
(1) Is armed with a dangerous weapon; or
(2) After entering arms himself with a dangerous weapon; or
(3) Commits a battery upon any person while in such place, or in
entering or leaving such place.

The crime of aggravated burglary requires proof of additional facts not

contained in aggravated rape. In this case, the State need only prove that Williams

had non-consensual sex with H.W., and that H.W. was over the age of sixty-five to

support a conviction for aggravated rape. To prove that Williams committed the

crime of aggravated burglary, the State was required to prove Williams unlawfully

entered H.W.’s home and committed a battery or armed himself with a dangerous

weapon while in H.W.’s home.

The crimes of aggravated rape and aggravated burglary each require proof of

an additional element different from the other. Thus, based on the Blockberger test,

double jeopardy does not exist.

SAME EVIDENCE TEST

Under the same evidence test, if the evidence required to support a finding of

guilt of one crime would also have supported conviction of the other, the two are the

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same offense under a plea of double jeopardy.

The evidence in the record indicated that Williams raped H.W., then picked up

a club, grabbed H.W. by the arm, and forced her into the kitchen. Once in the

kitchen, Williams hit H.W. in the arm twice and took money from her purse. He then

demanded that H.W. take him to her closet where he searched for money and hit her

on the arm again.

Williams raped H.W., who was seventy-seven years old, and that is the only

evidence needed to support the crime of aggravated rape. Williams entered H.W.’s

home without her consent and hit her on the arm three separate times while in her

home. Additionally, Williams armed himself with what H.W. described as a club.

The crimes of rape and aggravated burglary are separate and distinct offenses.

Williams could be convicted of aggravated rape without proof that an aggravated

burglary occurred. Additionally, he could have been convicted of aggravated

burglary without proof that a rape occurred, considering the fact that he committed

a battery upon H.W. when he struck her in the arm and armed himself with a club.

Separate and distinct evidence was present for both crimes, and we find prosecution

and conviction for both offenses did not subject Williams to double jeopardy.

Accordingly, this assignment of error also lacks merit.

DECREE

Williams’ convictions are affirmed. This case is remanded to the trial court

with instructions to amend the sentencing minutes to reflect that the trial court

sentenced Williams to thirty years at hard labor for aggravated burglary and to order

the sentence imposed for first degree robbery to be served without benefit of parole.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

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