State of Louisiana v. Scotty L. Webre

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-351

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

SCOTTY L. WEBRE

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 13983-06
HONORABLE DAVID ALEXANDER RITCHIE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks, and
John D. Saunders, Judges.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

John Foster DeRosier
District Attorney, 14th Judicial District Court
Carla Sue Sigler
Assistant District Attorney, 14TH Judicial District Court
P. O. Box 3206
Lake Charles, LA 70602-3206
Telephone: (337) 437-3400
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee - State of Louisiana

Annette Fuller Roach
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 1747
Lake Charles, LA 70602-1747
Telephone: (337) 436-2900
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Scotty L. Webre

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

Defendant, Scotty L. Webre, was originally charged with vehicular

homicide, a violation of La.R.S. 14:32.1. The bill was later amended to negligent

homicide, a violation of La.R.S. 14:32. Defendant pled guilty to the amended charge.

The trial court imposed a sentence of five years at hard labor with credit

for time served. The trial court also “order[ed] that at some point” Defendant receive

drug treatment if made available to him at the Louisiana Department of Corrections.

Defendant did not file a motion to reconsider sentence. He now comes

before this court on appeal asserting his sentence is excessive and that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel through failure to file a motion to reconsider.

Neither claim has merit. We, therefore, affirm.

FACTS

The State recited the following facts at the guilty plea hearing:

Yes, Your Honor. If called to trial the State would
show that on May 11th, 2005 Scotty Webre operated a
motor vehicle upon the roads and highways of the state of
Louisiana in a manner showing his disregard for the
interests of others and that his conduct amounted to a gross
deviation below the standard of care expected to be
maintained by reasonably careful men under similar
circumstances. His operation of that motor vehicle and the
resulting gross negligence that he operated it with resulted
in the death of an individual who was also operating on the
roadway, thereby he killed a human being through gross
negligence, all within the confines of Calcasieu Parish.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Excessiveness of Sentence

Defendant joins his first and second assignments of error to challenge

the excessiveness of his sentence, as follows:

1. The maximum sentence imposed on this first-time
felony offender is nothing more than a needless imposition
of pain and suffering and thus a violation of Article 1, § 20
of the Louisiana Constitution and the Eighth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.

2. The reasons given by the trial court in support of the
imposition of the maximum sentence are not supported by
the record and are insufficient to satisfy the mandates of
La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1.

Defendant did not file a motion to reconsider sentence. “Failure to make

or file a motion to reconsider sentence . . . shall preclude the state or the defendant

from raising an objection to the sentence.” La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1(E).

Accordingly, Defendant is relegated to a bare claim of excessiveness, as his

arguments on appeal were not properly preserved for appellate review.

This court has set forth the following standard to be used in reviewing

excessive sentence claims:

La.Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall
subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To
constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court must
find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the severity
of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the
sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable
penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless
imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404
So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion
in the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and
such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a
manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192 [p.
5] (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied,
00-0165 (La. 6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant
question is whether the trial court abused its broad
sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might
have been more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 [p. 3]

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(La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043,
117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035,

1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331.

To decide whether a sentence shocks the sense of justice or makes no

meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, this court has held:

[An] appellate court may consider several factors including
the nature of the offense, the circumstances of the offender,
the legislative purpose behind the punishment and a
comparison of the sentences imposed for similar crimes.
State v. Smith, 99-0606 (La. 7/6/00), 766 So.2d 501. While
a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may
provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must
be individualized to the particular offender and to the
particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d
1 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1991). Additionally, it is within the
purview of the trial court to particularize the sentence
because the trial judge “remains in the best position to
assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.
5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied,

03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061.

Defendant was convicted of negligent homicide, a violation of La.R.S.

14:32. This offense carries a maximum sentence of five years with or without hard

labor and a possible fine of not more than five thousand dollars. Thus, Defendant

received the maximum five years at hard labor.

In State v. Burnaman, 03-1647, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir.
5/12/04), 872 So.2d 637, 641, this court considered the
appropriateness of the imposition of maximum sentences,
explaining:

[M]aximum sentences are usually reserved for
the most egregious and blameworthy of
offenders. State v. LeBlanc, 578 So.2d 1036
(La.App. 3 Cir. 1991), writ denied, 620 So.2d
833 (La.1993). In reviewing the imposition

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of a maximum sentence, the First Circuit has
held:

This Court has stated that maximum
sentences permitted under statute may be
imposed only for the most serious offenses
and the worst offenders, State v. Easley, 432
So.2d 910, 914 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1983), or
when the offender poses an unusual risk to the
public safety due to his past conduct of
repeated criminality. See State v. Chaney,
537 So.2d 313, 318 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1988),
writ denied, 541 So.2d 870 (La.1989). A trial
court’s reasons for imposing sentence, as
required by La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, are an
important aid to this court when reviewing a
sentence alleged to be excessive. State v.
McKnight, 98-1790 at p. 25, 739 So.2d [343]
at 359 [(La.App. 1 Cir. 1999)].

State v. Runyon, [05-36, 05-104, pp. 22-23 (La.App. 3 Cir.
11/2/05),] 916 So.2d [407,] 423-24 [,writ denied, 06-1348
(La. 9/1/06), 936 So.2d 207].

State v. Runyon, 06-823, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/06), 944 So.2d 820, 830, writ

denied, 07-49 (La. 9/21/07), 964 So.2d 330.

A review of the record reflects that the fifty-year-old Defendant has a

prior criminal history including a 1985 conviction for DWI and a 1997 conviction for

hit and run. Defendant also has a record for assault, battery, and resisting arrest. The

record reveals that the accident involved in this case occurred at 5:00 a.m. on a foggy

morning before daybreak. Defendant was speeding on the lefthand side of the

roadway, passing three consecutive vehicles. He ran a stop sign and struck the

victim.

The trial court reviewed and considered Defendant’s pre-sentence

investigation report. He also considered the death of the victim and the impact on the

victim’s family. Additionally, the trial court observed that there was evidence of

cocaine in Defendant’s system within nine hours of the accident. The court observed

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Defendant’s lack of remorse, failure to accept accountability, and his continued drug

use after the accident as aggravating factors.

Additionally, Defendant’s sentence is comparable to those imposed for

the same or similar crimes. In State v. Rogers, 07-276 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/07), 966

So.2d 1212, this court affirmed a sentence of three and one-half years for a conviction

of negligent homicide where “[d]efendant took the victim’s infant son out of the car,

hitchhiked home, left the boy on his grandmother’s porch at three o’clock in the

morning, and never reported the accident.” Id. at 1215. In making this determination,

the court observed the following jurisprudence:

In State v. Hughes, 03-420 (La.App. 3 Cir.
12/31/03), 865 So.2d 853, writ denied, 04-663 (La.
12/24/04), 882 So.2d 1165, the maximum sentence of five
years imposed on a conviction for negligent homicide was
found not to be excessive even though Hughes was a first
time felony offender and the mother of four children. In
that case, Hughes attempted to commit suicide by driving
at a high rate of speed into the path of an oncoming
pick-up truck. The driver of the pick-up was killed. This
court stated:

The trial court cited the applicable factors set
forth in La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, noted
Defendant’s lack of a criminal record and
letters of support in her favor; but, concluded
Defendant’s “wanton and reckless disregard
for the lives and safety of others . . . dictates
a sentence that fits the nature of this offense.”
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing this Defendant to the five-year
maximum term of imprisonment.

....

In State v. Gregrich, 99-178 (La.App. 3 Cir.
10/13/99), 745 So.2d 694, this court affirmed a sentence of
three years imposed on a conviction for negligent
homicide. Gregrich, who was legally intoxicated at the
time, drove his car left of center and hit an oncoming car
head on, killing the driver. In State v. Clark, 529 So.2d
1353 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1988), the fifth circuit affirmed a
three-year sentence imposed on a conviction for negligent

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homicide. In that case, Clark was also determined to be
intoxicated at the time and drove through a stop sign,
striking the victim’s vehicle. The victim died as a result of
the accident. Clark had previous convictions for driving
while intoxicated.

Id. at 1215.

In light of the jurisprudence, Defendant’s maximum sentence of five

years at hard labor does not fall outside the norms of Louisiana jurisprudence.

Defendant has a prior criminal history, including a conviction for DWI and a

conviction for hit and run. He expressed no remorse or responsibility for his actions.

Given the trial court’s considerations in fashioning Defendant’s sentence, the court

was in compliance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1. Further, Defendant’s five year

sentence is not grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime nor does it

shock one’s sense of justice. Accordingly, Defendant’s sentence is affirmed.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Defendant contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of

counsel when he failed to file a motion to reconsider the sentence. This court

discussed ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a motion to reconsider

sentence in State v. Findlay, 06-1050, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/7/07), 949 So.2d 609,

611-12. We explained:

This court considered a similar issue in State v.
Prudhomme, 02-511, p. 16 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/30/02), 829
So.2d 1166, 1177, writ denied, 02-3230 (La. 10/10/03),
855 So.2d 324, stating:

Failure to file a motion to reconsider
the sentence does not necessarily constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel. State v.
Texada, 98-1647 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/99); 734
So.2d 854. Nevertheless, the defendant may
have a basis to claim ineffective assistance of
counsel when he can show a reasonable
probability, but for defense counsel’s error,

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his sentence would have been different. Id.
Furthermore, in State v. Francis, 99-208
(La.App. 3 Cir. 10/6/99); 748 So.2d 484, writ
denied, 00-0544 (La. 11/13/00); 773 So.2d
156, this court stated:

A claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is properly
raised in an application for post
conviction relief. This allows
the trial judge an opportunity to
order a full evidentiary hearing
on the matter. State v.
Burkhalter, 428 So.2d 449
(La.1983). However, where the
record contains evidence
sufficient to decide the issue and
the issue is raised by an
assignment of error on appeal, it
may be considered. State v.
James, 95-962 (La.App. 3 Cir.
2/14/96); 670 So.2d 461.

Id.

After considering the circumstances of the case, the background of the

defendant, and the trial court’s considerations of the pre-sentence investigation report

and the factors of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, the court in Findlay held that it was

“not likely that the trial court would have reduced the Defendant’s sentence if a

motion to reconsider had been made.” Id. at 614.

Likewise, given the factual circumstances of this case, Defendant’s

criminal history, the impact on the victims, and the trial court’s considerations in

fashioning Defendant’s sentence, we conclude that it is not likely that the court would

have reduced Defendant’s sentence had defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider

sentence. Thus, this assignment of error has no merit.

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ERROR PATENT

In State v. Gregrich, 99-178 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99), 745 So.2d 694,

this court vacated, as an error patent, the portion of the defendant’s penalty requiring

him to participate in a substance abuse program. Whether this condition was imposed

as part of his sentence for negligent homicide or his sentence for driving while

intoxicated was not clear. Nevertheless, the court observed that “[n]either statute

allows the trial court to require participation in a substance abuse program, absent

part of the sentence being subject to probation requirements.” Id. at 696. Because

Gregrich was not placed on probation, this court held that the trial court’s order to

attend substance abuse evaluations was illegal. Id.

Here, the trial court ordered Defendant to undergo drug treatment if the

Department of Corrections could accommodate him. The court did not suspend

Defendant’s sentence, nor was he placed on probation. Thus, as in Gregrich, the

court’s order to undergo drug treatment without placing Defendant on probation was

illegal.

This court also noted in Gregrich that, under La.Code Crim.P. art.

882(A), an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time by the court that imposed the

sentence or by an appellate court on review, “when such correction does not involve

the exercise of sentencing discretion,” quoting State v. Fraser, 484 So.2d 122

(La.1986). Accordingly, we amend the sentence imposed by the trial court to delete

that portion requiring participation in drug treatment.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s sentence is amended to delete the requirement that the

Defendant receive drug treatment. Defendant’s sentence is otherwise affirmed as

amended.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

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