State of Louisiana v. Jimmy Joe Chandler

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-1286

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

JIMMY JOE CHANDLER

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTIETH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERNON, NO. 75757
HONORABLE VERNON B. CLARK, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JAMES T. GENOVESE
JUDGE

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Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, James T. Genovese, and Shannon J.
Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Asa A. Skinner
District Attorney – Thirtieth Judicial District
Terry W. Lambright, Assistant District Attorney
Post Office Box 1188
Leesville, LA 71446
(337) 239-2008
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Carey J. Ellis, III
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 719
Rayville, LA 71269-0719
(318) 728-2043
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Jimmy Joe Chandler

GENOVESE, Judge.

In this criminal case, the Defendant, Jimmy Joe Chandler, appeals his seven-

year sentence pursuant to his guilty plea for the offense of attempted possession of

a firearm by a convicted felon. He claims that his sentence is excessive.

The Defendant was charged by bill of information filed on January 16, 2009,

with failure to abide by commission rules with deer harvest record requirements, in

violation of La.R.S. 56:115, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in

violation of La.R.S. 14:95.1. The Defendant entered a plea of not guilty on January

20, 2009. On March 9, 2009, the bill of information was orally amended to reflect

the charge of attempted possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of

La.R.S. 14:95.1 and La.R.S. 14:27. On that date, the Defendant, as part of a plea

agreement, waived arraignment and entered a plea of guilty to the amended charge

of attempted possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. As a result of the

Defendant’s plea, the State dismissed the remaining charge of failure to abide by

commission rules with deer harvest requirements and agreed not to pursue Defendant

as a habitual offender.

The Defendant was sentenced on August 18, 2009, to serve seven years at hard

labor and to pay a fine of $1,500.00 and costs of court. A Motion to Reconsider

Sentence was filed on August 20, 2009, and subsequently denied. A Motion for

Appeal and Designation of Record was filed on August 28, 2009, and was

subsequently granted.

The Defendant is before this court asserting one assignment of error. He

contends that his sentence of seven years at hard labor imposed for his guilty plea to

attempted possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is excessive. The Defendant

does not assert on appeal that his $1,500.00 fine is excessive; therefore, that part of

the Defendant’s sentence is not before this court and is not considered. For the

following reasons, we affirm the Defendant’s sentence.

FACTS

At the time the Defendant entered his guilty plea, the following factual basis

was given:

The State contends that on or about October 25th, 2008, the
defendant was found by Wildlife and Fisheries agents hunting in the
Little Red Banks Road, Clear Creek Wild Management area, which is
within Vernon Parish, and he was there armed with a seven millimeter
Remington bolt action rifle. This was seized at the time as it was
suspected he was a convicted felon[,] and there was a determination
made that in fact he was guilty of and convicted of the manufacture,
growth [sic] of marijuana in Desoto Parish by his guilty plea on
November 18th, 1991, full release from the sentence imposed in that
case was March 1 of 2001[,] and in Quachita [sic] Parish of the offense
of simple robbery. The plea having been entered 5/29/96 and full
release from the penalty assessed in the sentence on that case was 3/1,
2001 [sic].

ERRORS PATENT & PROCEDURAL ISSUE

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we note that there

is one error patent.

There is a misjoinder of offenses in the bill of information. The bill of

information, as amended, charged the Defendant with the following: (1) failure to

abide by commission rules with deer harvest record requirements, a violation of

La.R.S. 56:115; and (2) attempted possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a

violation of La.R.S. 14:95.1.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 493 provides for the joinder of

offenses in a single bill under limited circumstances if the offenses joined are triable

by the same mode of trial. The charge of failure to abide by commission rules with

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deer harvest record requirements is a misdemeanor and is triable by a judge without

a jury. See La.Code Crim.P. art. 779. The charge of attempted possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon is a felony and is triable by a jury of twelve in which ten

must concur to render a verdict. See La.Code Crim.P. art. 782. Therefore, these

offenses were improperly joined. However, the Defendant did not file a motion to

quash the bill of information on the basis of misjoinder of offenses, as required by

statute. See La.Code Crim.P. art. 495. Additionally, by entering an unqualified guilty

plea, the Defendant waived review of this non-jurisdictional pre-plea defect. See

State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La.1976). Thus, this error patent need not be

reviewed or considered in this appeal.

We also note that because the misdemeanor offense was not triable by jury, the

proper mode of appellate review for that offense would have been an application for

writ of review, rather than an appeal. La.Code Crim.P. art. 912.1. However, because

that charge was dismissed, that procedural issue was rendered moot.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his only assignment of error, the Defendant contends that his sentence of

seven years at hard labor imposed for his guilty plea to attempted possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon constitutes an excessive sentence.

The Defendant was convicted of attempted possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon in violation of La.R.S. 14:95.1(B), which states:

Whoever is found guilty of violating the provisions of this Section
shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten nor more than
fifteen years without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of
sentence and be fined not less than one thousand dollars nor more than
five thousand dollars.

The Defendant was convicted of an attempt crime. Louisiana Revised Statutes

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14:27(D)(3) sets forth the appropriate penalty for the attempt to possess a firearm by

a convicted felon as follows:

In all other cases he shall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the
same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment
shall not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest
term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.

“[T]he language of La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3) (the attempt statute) does not require a

minimum penalty even though one is required for the completed offense.” State v.

Everett, 05-214, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/05), 916 So.2d 1210, 1212. Further, the

sentence must be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of

sentence.1 Id.

The Defendant specifically argues that his sentence is excessive. This court

discussed the standard of review applicable to claims of excessiveness in State v.

Bailey, 07-130, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/07), 968 So.2d 247, 250, as follows:

A sentence which falls within the statutory limits
may be excessive under certain circumstances. To
constitute an excessive sentence, this Court must find that
the penalty is so grossly disproportionate to the severity of
the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the
sentence makes no reasonable contribution to acceptable
penal goals and[,] therefore, is nothing more than the
needless imposition of pain and suffering. The trial judge
has broad discretion, and a reviewing court may not set
sentences aside absent a manifest abuse of discretion.

State v. Guzman, 99-1753, 99-1528, p. 15 (La.5/16/00), 769 So.2d 1158,
1167 (citations omitted).

In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d
786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La.5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061 (citations
omitted), this court discussed the factors it would consider in order to
determine whether a sentence shocks the sense of justice or makes no
meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals:

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We note that as part of the plea agreement, the parties agreed that the sentence would be
subject to probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

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In deciding whether a sentence is shocking or makes
no meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, an
appellate court may consider several factors including the
nature of the offense, the circumstances of the offender, the
legislative purpose behind the punishment and a
comparison of the sentences imposed for similar crimes.
While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar
crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that
sentences must be individualized to the particular offender
and to the particular offense committed.” Additionally, it
is within the purview of the trial court to particularize the
sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best
position to assess the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances presented by each case.”

The Defendant that asserts he received a sentence that was six months less than

the maximum sentence. He further asserts that his sentence is excessive for

possessing a deer rifle for hunting, which he did not understand he could not do. The

Defendant additionally asserts that after his guilty plea, he gave away his handguns,

which he contends demonstrates that he did not realize that he could not hunt and,

thus, it was not his intention to violate the law.

The Defendant also asserts that the trial court did not have the benefit of his

social history in the pre-sentence investigation report and that nothing was mentioned

as to his family ties, marital status, employment status, or other factors in compliance

with La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1. The Defendant also contends that his age at the time

of his prior offenses should have been considered in formulating his sentence.

The Defendant further asserts that he has a serious lung condition, in addition

to other health problems, of which the trial court was aware. The Defendant contends

that the trial court did not adequately take into consideration the mitigating factors

set forth herein. Additionally, he contends that his sentence was imposed without

benefit of diminution of sentence for good time.

Finally, the Defendant asserts that the State did not desire a harsh sentence, as

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the State did not object to suspension of sentence, probation, or a much lesser

sentence than that which was imposed.

At the sentencing hearing, the Defendant informed the trial court that he had

been having respiratory problems. The trial court informed the Defendant that it was

aware that he had had surgery. The trial court then stated the following:

All right. The [c]ourt considered the factors of Article 894.1 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure and found that the following were
applicable. First, there are no substantial grounds which would tend to
excuse his criminal conduct. He did not act under strong provocation,
and, by that, I mean he knew he was a convicted felon[,] and he knew he
was not suppose[d] to be in possession of a firearm[,] and nobody made
him go. Nobody enticed him to do it. He’s forty years of age. I didn’t
have any social history in the report because he was not able to - or, did
not report to the probation office prior to the pre-sentence being
completed, but I do have his criminal record[,] and it reflects that he’s
a third felony offender. The report indicated that on November the 18th,
1991[,] in the Eleventh JDC[,] he was convicted of cultivation of
marijuana and possession with intent to distribute marijuana and was
given [a] four years [sic] Department of Corrections sentence. On May
29th, 1996, in the Fourth JDC[,] he was convicted of simple robbery and
given [a] one year Department of Corrections [sentence,] and that was
to run consecutive to any other sentence. On June 18th, 2003, in the
Fifteenth JDC in Crowley, he pled guilty to illegal carrying of a weapon,
[a] misdemeanor, reduced from the charge of possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon[,] and he was given a six-month sentence that was
suspended[,] and he was placed on one year of unsupervised probation.
So, he has some history of a prior charge of this kind[,] and he has a
robbery charge and then some drug charges. He’s - he’s somewhat
covered the range of charges here from drugs, to robbery, to guns. I
don’t know if you’ve learned your lesson or not. I know at the time you
were arrested on this you hadn’t learned your lesson.

The Defendant then informed the trial court that he had gotten rid of “everything,”

including his hunting clothes. He further explained that he misinterpreted the law.

Based on the trial court’s remarks and those of the Defendant, we find that the

trial court was aware that the Defendant was hunting at the time of the offense, that

he gave away his guns, and that he had serious health problems. Further, the

Defendant had an opportunity to speak at the sentencing hearing and failed to provide

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the trial court with information regarding his family ties, marital and employment

status, and any other information that he felt was pertinent to the determination of the

sentence to be imposed.

In State v. Scott, 44,509 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/19/09), 17 So.3d 1058, the defendant

was charged with illegal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He pled guilty

to the amended charge of attempted possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and

was sentenced to seven and one-half years at hard labor. On appeal, he argued that

his maximum term of incarceration was excessive. In denying his claim, the court

stated the following:

The defendant, who has two prior convictions for drug-related felonies,
was actually in possession of a loaded weapon when he was stopped by
a law enforcement officer. The defendant received a substantial benefit
as a result of the plea bargain agreement whereby he was allowed to
plead guilty to the lesser charge of attempted possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon. The sentence imposed is not grossly disproportionate
to the severity of the offense. Because the defendant pled guilty to an
offense that did not adequately describe his conduct, we find that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the maximum
sentence in this case.

Id. at 1061.

Based on the Defendant’s criminal history, which included a prior charge for

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the State’s agreement not to seek

enhancement of the sentence under the habitual offender statute, La.R.S. 15:529.1,

and the fact that he pled guilty to an offense that did not adequately describe his

conduct, we find that the Defendant’s sentence is not excessive.

We have not considered the Defendant’s claim that the trial court failed to

comply with the mandates of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, as this issue was not raised

in the Motion to Reconsider Sentence. See State v. Massey, 08-839 (La.App. 3 Cir.

12/10/08), 999 So.2d 343.

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Further, in State v. Narcisse, 97-3161, p. 1 (La. 6/26/98), 714 So.2d 698, 699,

the court held in pertinent part:

[A] trial judge lacks authority under La.R.S. 15:57[1].3(C) to deny a
defendant eligibility for good time credits against his sentence, because
that statute is “directed to the Department of Corrections exclusively.”
State ex rel. Simmons v. Stalder, 93-1852 (La.1/26/96), 666 So.2d
661. . . . When the sentencing court is of the opinion that a denial of
diminution of sentence is warranted under the specific circumstances of
the case, the trial judge’s discretion should be exercised under
La.C.Cr.P. 890.1(B).

In this case, the trial court merely advised the defendant that, pursuant to

La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1, he was not eligible for diminution of sentence. Whether

the advisement was correct has no effect on his sentence, since the statute governing

such credit, La.R.S. 15:571.3, is directed exclusively to the Department of

Corrections. Id.

DISPOSITION

For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the Defendant’s sentence in all

respects.

AFFIRMED.

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