State of Louisiana v. Russell Lippman

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

10-24

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

RUSSELL LIPPMAN

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APPEAL FROM THE
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CATAHOULA, NO. 01-0891
HONORABLE BENJAMIN C. BENNETT, JR., JUDGE PRO TEMPORE

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JAMES T. GENOVESE
JUDGE

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Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Marc T. Amy, and James T. Genovese, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Bradley R. Burget
District Attorney – Seventh Judicial District
Post Office Box 600
301 Bushley Street, Room # 203
Harrisonburg, LA 71340
(318) 744-5232
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
State of Louisiana

George L. Higgins, III
Higgins Law Office
Post Office Box 3370
2002 Hartsfield Avenue
Pineville, LA 71360
(318) 473-4250
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Russell Lippman

GENOVESE, Judge.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant was convicted of manslaughter on July 19, 2003. He was initially

sentenced to twenty-five years at hard labor. However, on August 17, 2005, at a

hearing on a Motion to Reconsider his sentence, the trial court reduced Defendant’s

sentence to twenty-five years at hard labor, with all but seventeen years suspended.

The Honorable Ronald L. Lewellyan was the pro tempore judge at the time. In State

v. Lippman, an unpublished opinion bearing docket number 06-17 (La.App. 3 Cir.

6/14/06), writ denied, 06-1787 (La. 2/2/07), 948 So.2d 1076, this court affirmed

Defendant’s conviction, but vacated his sentence because the trial court failed to

impose probation as required by La.Code Crim.P. art. 893, and the case was

remanded for resentencing.

After several delays, another pro tempore judge, the Honorable Benjamin C.

Bennett, Jr., resentenced the Defendant to twenty years at hard labor, ten years

suspended, and five years supervised probation upon release.

The State now appeals Defendant’s sentence, asserting that the trial court erred

“when it failed to give effect to the obvious intention of the original sentencing

[j]udge.”

For the following reasons, we find that the successor judge did not abuse his

discretion when he sentenced Defendant.

FACTS

Defendant was convicted of manslaughter. Defendant shot his girlfriend,

Kristy Mills, but claimed it was an accidental shooting. She died later in the hospital

as a result of the shooting.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The State argues that the successor judge erred when he did not attempt to

ascertain the intention of the original sentencing judge when the successor judge

sentenced Defendant to a different sentence. The State argues that the intent of the

original sentencing judge was that Defendant serve a sentence of twenty-five years

at hard labor, with eight years suspended.

However, the original sentencing judge did not impose probation as required

by La.Code Crim.P. art. 893(A), which mandates that a period of probation be

ordered whenever a sentence is suspended. Furthermore, La.Code Crim.P. art.

893(A) provides that “[t]he period of probation shall be specified and shall not be less

than one year nor more than five years. The suspended sentence shall be regarded as

a sentence for the purpose of granting or denying a new trial or appeal.” Hence, the

sentence imposed by the original sentencing judge was an illegally lenient sentence.

Regarding the correction of an illegally lenient sentence, the Louisiana

Supreme Court in State v. Harris, 93-1098, pp. 1-2 (La. 1/5/96), 665 So.2d 1164,

1164, stated:

The presumption of regularity in judicial proceedings, see
La.Rev.Stat. 15:432; State v. Davis, 559 So.2d 114 (La.1990), C.E.
Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Procedure, § 641 (12th ed.1976), applies
to all phases of trial, including sentencing. In the absence of an
articulable basis for concluding that the district court imposed sentence
under a misapprehension of what the law required or of its full range of
sentencing discretion, we will presume that the failure of the court
expressly to impose the special restrictions required by law (e.g., parole
disability) presents the need only for ministerial correction of the record.
Cf. La.Code Crim.Proc. art. 916(2) (allowing the correction of any error
or deficiency in the record even while a case is pending on appeal).

A district court judge presented with an application to correct an
illegally lenient sentence may therefore correct a sentence that he or she
has imposed by making the necessary changes in the minutes, without
bringing the inmate to court, and sending a certified copy of the new

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minutes to the inmate and to the relevant prison authorities, who
otherwise lack the discretion to make the amendments themselves in the
documents they receive from the sentencing court pursuant to La.Code
Crim.Proc. art. 892; State ex rel. Pierre v. Maggio, 445 So.2d 425
(La.1984); State ex rel. Almore v. Criminal District Court, Parish of
Orleans, 433 So.2d 712 (La.1983). The judge may also make the same
ministerial corrections to a sentence imposed by a predecessor unless he
or she entertains a reasonable doubt as to the intent of the original
sentencing judge and the validity of the sentence imposed by the original
sentencing judge. In all cases, a district judge retains the discretion to
vacate the sentence originally imposed and to resentence the inmate in
open court.

In the current case, however, the original sentencing error was not subject to

ministerial correction since, as noted above, the original sentencing judge had

discretion as to how much probationary time to impose, i.e., no less than a year, no

more than five years. It is arguable that the original sentencing judge intended to

impose a probationary period because of the requirement that in a suspended sentence

probation must be imposed. The original sentencing judge apparently decided, under

the facts of the case, that the original sentence of twenty-five years at hard labor was

excessive; and, therefore, he granted Defendant’s motion for reconsideration of the

sentence and reduced the sentence by suspending a portion of the time Defendant was

required to spend in prison. The query is whether the original sentencing judge failed

to impose probation because of a misapprehension of what the law required, or

because he was not aware of his full range of sentencing discretion, or whether he

simply meant to reduce Defendant’s sentence to seventeen years imprisonment, with

nothing more upon release. This is the issue the State argues that the successor judge

failed to consider.

In December 2008, Defendant filed a Motion to Set Motion to Reconsider

Sentence for Hearing. In July 2009, Defendant filed a Motion and Order to Set Post

Trial Motions for Hearing. In June 2009, Defendant filed a Motion to Quash,

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asserting his entitlement to be released from incarceration because it had been more

than three years since this court ordered his sentence vacated with the matter

remanded for resentencing. He alleged that he was being prejudiced by the delay.

On June 17, 2009, a hearing was held on Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider sentence

and Motion to Quash. The successor judge advised the State and Defendant that he

was new to the case and required more information on the issues. The successor judge

stated he wanted to review the pre-sentence investigation report and asked the

attorneys to brief him on mitigating and aggravating circumstances applicable to

sentencing. The judge noted:

Now, the third thing, I am certainly not sure that I can impose a different
sentence. I may be stuck with or required to impose the same sentence
but merely add a probationary period to the existing sentence. Since the
(inaudible) to reconsider sentence (inaudible)[.] If the later case prevails
where it’s my job to impose the same sentence with probation, I will
consider the motion to reconsider also at that time. If you can give me
authority to where I will simply have to start a fresh [sic] and sentence
him, I’ll do that[,] too.

On October 6, 2009, the resentencing hearing was held. At the beginning of

the hearing, the successor judge, the State, and Defendant discussed the sentencing

options. The successor judge stated:

That reconsidered sentence certainly would have vacated [sic]. One of
the sentence[s] of 25 years has been vacated and not - - this is
problematic the way I read the record. So that whatever this court does
today will have to be considered either as a denial of the motion to
reconsider sentence or if it is changed in any way, to that extent, it
would be a new sentence and insofar as the motion to reconsider is
concerned, it would be, that motion would be granted. This is the only
way I can treat it, you know.

The successor judge then heard testimony. Defendant’s father, Donald

Lippman, testified that since Defendant has been incarcerated, his mother and his

former wife died. Defendant’s fourteen-year-old daughter now lived with him. He

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stated Defendant has admitted that he was involved in drugs at the time of the

shooting and was very remorseful. He stated Defendant has been strongly influenced

by his incarceration, and he believed that upon release from prison, Defendant would

assume his responsibilities and be a law-abiding citizen.

Boatner Kyle Smith, chief security officer with the Catahoula Correctional

Center, testified that Defendant was a model prisoner. Defendant was one of only

twelve among over eight hundred prisoners who were “Class-A trusties[,]” which

meant, among other duties, that he was permitted to go outside the prison to mow the

lawn, pick up trash, etc., without supervision. Mr. Smith also described an incident

wherein an inmate had attacked two female guards with a fire extinguisher, and

Defendant and two other trusties protected the guards until the inmate could be

subdued.

The victim’s sister, Kimberly Boyette, testified regarding the effect the victim’s

death had on her, the victim’s children, and the other members of the victim’s family.

She stated that her sister had three children, Jacob, six at the time of the shooting,

Macy, three at the time of the shooting, and Brennon, less than a year old at the time

of the shooting. The oldest two children were children by a former relationship, and

the youngest was Defendant’s son. Brennon lived with Defendant’s sister since his

mother’s death. She stated that the two oldest children had been very traumatized.

Finally, the victim’s mother, Sara Laing, spoke of the loss of her daughter and its

effect on the family. When asked whether she had an opinion of what sentence

Defendant should receive, she answered, “We’ve had to accept what was given to

him. I guess we’ll have to accept what will happen today.”

The successor judge then sentenced Defendant to twenty years at hard labor,

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with ten years suspended, and five years supervised probation. He stated that he

believed a lot had transpired since Defendant began incarceration. The successor

judge further stated that “[i]nsofar as this sentence deviates from the sentence

originally imposed, it must be taken as a granting of a motion to reconsider sentence.”

In State v. Rockhold, 99-2445 (La. 2/11/00), 752 So.2d 158, the original

sentencing judge sentenced the defendant to ten years imprisonment without the

benefit of parole eligibility. The successor judge resentenced the defendant to fifteen

years and deleted the portion of the sentence precluding parol eligibility. The

appellate court vacated the successor judge’s sentence. The supreme court reinstated

the successor judge’s sentence and stated:

When it chose to vacate the sentence imposed by the original sentencing
judge and to remand for resentencing, instead of simply deleting the
illegal conditions placed on that sentence, as it could have, see, e.g.,
State v. Watts, 98-2594 (La.1/29/99), 736 So.2d 821; State ex rel. Meeks
v. State, 98-1930 (La.1/29/99), 736 So.2d 820, the court of appeal
authorized the successor judge to impose the first lawful penalty in the
case. State v. Husband, 593 So.2d 1257, 1258 (La.1992). Without regard
to the question of whether a successor judge must consider the intent of
the original sentencing judge when correcting an illegally harsh penalty
as well as an illegally lenient one, see State v. Harris, 93-1098
(La.1/5/96), 665 So.2d 1164, the successor judge in this case had the
discretion to consider the intent of original sentencing judge and to
resentence the defendant in a manner which effectuates as much of the
original sentencing plan as the law allows.

Id.

While, in the current case, the corrected sentence was not ministerial, we find

that the record clearly shows that the successor judge took the original sentencing

judge’s intention into consideration when he imposed Defendant’s sentence. The

successor judge indicated he reviewed the record, he reviewed the original pre-

sentence investigation report, and he asked for witnesses to testify. He also

considered subsequent events, such as the fact that during the nine years of

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imprisonment, Defendant was a model prisoner. A successor judge may consider

subsequent factors. See State v. Kujawa, 05-470 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/22/06), 929 So.2d

99, writ denied, 06-669 (La. 10/6/06), 938 So.2d 65.

Furthermore, the successor judge fashioned a sentence which, we find,

effectuates as much of the original sentencing as the law allowed, considering there

was no way to ascertain how much probationary time the original sentencing judge

would have imposed. The successor judge imposed the maximum probationary

period, five years. The original sentence allowed Defendant to be released from

prison, without probation or parole, at seventeen years. Under the current sentence,

although allowing release from prison earlier than the original sentence, Defendant

will be on active probation upon release for five years, with parole for an additional

five years after probation, for a total of twenty years under the scrutiny of the

Louisiana Department of Corrections. In part, Defendant’s current sentence is

lengthier and harsher than the original sentence. We find no merit to the State’s

assignment of error.

DISPOSITION

Defendant’s sentence is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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