State v. Davis
State v. Davis, 559 So. 2d 114 (La. 1990).
Cited by
- State of Louisiana v. Gary D. Howard 226 So. 3d 419 La. 2017
- State of Louisiana v. Russell Lippman La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2010
- State v. Lippman 38 So. 3d 1265 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2010
- State of Louisiana v. Warren Fuselier La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004
- State v. Fuselier 885 So. 2d 678 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2004
- State v. Zachary 829 So. 2d 405 La. 2002
- State v. Martin 769 So. 2d 1168 La. 2000
- State v. Carlos 738 So. 2d 556 La. 1999
- State v. Evans 715 So. 2d 604 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1998
- State v. LeBlanc 702 So. 2d 377 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1997
- State v. Hawkins 688 So. 2d 473 La. 1997
- State v. Hampton 687 So. 2d 505 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1996
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State v. Captville 448 So. 2d 676
Opinion text
559 So.2d 114 (1990) STATE of Louisiana v. Eugene DAVIS. No. 89-K-2496. Supreme Court of Louisiana. April 6, 1990. PER CURIAM. Granted. There is a presumption of regularity in judicial proceedings. R.S. 15:432; C.E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Procedure, § 641 (12th Ed., 1976). In the absence of any articulable basis for concluding that the trial court may have failed to comply with its duty imposed by La.C.Cr.P. art. 804 to instruct the jurors on the defendant's presumption of innocence and the state's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the unavailable portions of the charge should not bar harmless error analysis in this case. The trial court's instruction on circumstantial evidence may have been ambiguous and potentially misleading at one point, but it did not preclude the jury from considering whether the defendant's hypothesis of innocence was a reasonable one and whether a reasonable doubt existed as to his guilt. This case is therefore remanded to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal for determination of whether the jury reasonably rejected the defendant's hypothesis of innocence and whether any alternate hypothesis of innocence is sufficiently reasonable that no rational factfinder, if properly instructed on the principles of circumstantial evidence, could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 , 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987); State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676 (La.1984). If the court of appeal determines that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the court should treat defendant's remaining assignments of error.