State of Louisiana v. Louis Vernon Jackson

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

10-50

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

LOUIS VERNON JACKSON

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APPEAL FROM THE
TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF NATCHITOCHES, NO. C10630
HONORABLE DEE A. HAWTHORNE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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DAVID E. CHATELAIN*
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Shannon J. Gremillion,
and David E. Chatelain, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Van Hardin Kyzar
District Attorney
R. Stuart Wright
Assistant District Attorney
Post Office Box 838
Natchitoches, Louisiana 71458-0838
(318) 357-2214
Counsel for:
State of Louisiana

*
Honorable David E. Chatelain participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana
Supreme Court as Judge Pro Tempore.

Peggy J. Sullivan
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 2806
Monroe, Louisiana 71207-2806
(318) 387-6124
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Louis Vernon Jackson

CHATELAIN, Judge.

The defendant appeals his conviction for attempted possession of cocaine and

the two and one-half year sentence the trial court imposed. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After a traffic stop made on November 18, 2005, by officers of the

Natchitoches Police Department, the defendant, Louis Vernon Jackson, was charged

with possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, a violation of La.R.S.

40:967(A)(1).

The matter was tried to a jury in May 2007. The evidence adduced at trial

shows that Detective Patrick Custis, Lieutenant Brad Walker, Detective Corporal Stan

Williams, and Sergeant Jeff Franks of the Natchitoches Police Department were

riding in a police vehicle when they spotted a Ford Explorer for which a “Be On

Look-Out” notice had been issued. The department had received a complaint of a

stolen vehicle matching the description and license plate number of the Explorer. The

officers initiated a traffic stop. Lieutenant Walker was driving, Sergeant Franks was

sitting in the passenger seat, Detective Custis was sitting behind Sergeant Franks, and

Detective Williams was sitting behind Lieutenant Walker. The three occupants of the

Explorer, the defendant, a sixteen-year-old, and Jody Brown, were arrested. The

juvenile was driving the Explorer, Brown was in the back seat, and the defendant was

in the front passenger seat.

Sergeant Franks testified that prior to the stop, he saw the front passenger,

whom he and Detective Custis identified at trial as the defendant, reach over the back

of his seat into the rear of the Explorer, but he could not tell what the defendant was

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doing. Sergeant Franks stated that he was within twenty feet of the Explorer at that

time.

Lieutenant Walker testified that he saw the front passenger “place something

at the foot” of the rear passenger. According to Lieutenant Walker, he activated the

emergency lights on his vehicle, and as he did so, he saw the front passenger “turn

around and appear to punch the man in the backseat in the face.” Lieutenant Walker

testified that he was less than ten feet from the vehicle at that time. Lieutenant

Walker further testified that he removed the juvenile from the vehicle and that as he

did so, a .38 caliber handgun fell from the juvenile’s lap onto the floorboard.

Detective Williams testified that he found a medicine bottle in the rear of the

vehicle, but he did not recall if it was on the seat or on the floorboard. He also

testified that the bottle was within the reach of Brown, the back passenger. Sergeant

Franks testified that he removed Brown from the vehicle and saw that Brown was

bleeding from the area of his mouth.

Lieutenant Walker contacted Detective Corporal Jesse Tiatano of the

Natchitoches Multi-jurisdictional Drug Task Force (Drug Task Force) for assistance.

Detective Tiatano and Sergeant Billy Meziere, who is also assigned to the Drug Task

Force, went to the scene. Detective Tiatano testified that Sergeant Meziere searched

the defendant and recovered $294 from his front pockets. He further testified that the

defendant told the officers that the pill bottle was Brown’s, not his. Detective Tiatano

did not believe any fingerprint or DNA testing was performed on the pill bottle.

Sergeant Meziere testified that he collected an orange pill bottle containing

approximately sixty-seven rocks of what was suspected to be crack cocaine which

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weighed 18.43 grams. He stated that the bottle had been removed from the Explorer

by the officers who made the traffic stop.

Assistant Chief Greg Dunn is also assigned to the Drug Task Force. He

testified as an expert in the street usage, distribution, and values of crack cocaine in

Natchitoches Parish. He related that in his experience, a first-time user or someone

in the beginning stages of drug usage may have four or five rocks in his possession

but that someone with a serious crack addiction typically uses the drugs very soon

after purchase and, therefore, rarely has more than one rock in his possession. In

contrast, Assistant Chief Dunn testified that someone who has a large quantity of

rocks is normally a dealer. Lastly, he opined that fifty rocks of cocaine could be

worth one thousand to two thousand dollars and that in his experience, such an

amount would be for distribution, not for personal consumption.

Brown testified that he was a crack cocaine addict and that he had known the

defendant for eight or nine years. He admitted that he had been convicted of simple

robbery, aggravated battery, simple escape, public intimidation, simple assault, and

resisting an officer. He testified that he was in the vehicle with the defendant and

“the other guy,” whom he did not know, trying to sell the defendant some speakers.

Brown explained that he had smoked cocaine earlier in the day before he saw the

defendant and the juvenile coming down the street in the Explorer and he stopped

them. According to Brown, just before the police stopped the Explorer, the defendant

punched him in the mouth, put a bottle with “a lot” of crack cocaine in a pouch

behind the seat he was sitting in, and told him to say the drugs were his. He admitted

that he had seen the cocaine before the stop; however, he also admitted that he was

unemployed and without income and that he could never afford to buy more than a

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couple of rocks of cocaine at a time. He denied being in the business of selling

cocaine.

Charges filed against Brown in connection with this incident were dismissed

in exchange for his pleading guilty to simple robbery; the plea agreement did not

require him to testify against the defendant. Brown served a one-year sentence,

which ended three weeks before the defendant’s trial, and he had been in the city jail

in the detoxification unit for the two days prior to the trial.

The defendant testified that he had been convicted of possession of cocaine

with the intent to distribute and entry into an inhabited dwelling in January 2007 for

which he received an eight-year sentence and that he was incarcerated in the

Natchitoches Parish Detention Center at the time of trial. According to the defendant,

he and Brown got into the Explorer with the juvenile around the same time on

November 18, 2005, and Brown’s “lip was already bust [sic]” at that time. The

defendant then testified that his brother had been present when Carlos Grigsby

punched Brown in the mouth because Brown took Grigsby’s drugs. He denied

having any drugs that day and stated that he was unaware Brown had the bottle of

crack cocaine. He claimed that he was being tried “on all [his] charges” because the

police thought he knew “something . . . about a homicide on Fish Hatchery Road” that

he does not know anything about.

The jury found the defendant guilty of attempted possession of cocaine. The

trial court sentenced him to the maximum sentence for attempted possession of

cocaine, two and one-half years, which sentence was ordered to run consecutively to

the sentence he was serving at the time of his conviction.

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The defendant filed applications for post-conviction relief on April 21, 2009,

and on June 8, 2009, which were denied. On June 26, 2009, the defendant filed a

motion for out-of-time appeal, which the trial court considered as an application for

post-conviction relief. After reviewing the record of this proceeding, the trial court

determined that the defendant had not been advised of his right to appeal when he

was sentenced. Accordingly, it concluded that he was entitled to the requested out-

of-time appeal and granted it.

The defendant appeals his conviction, asserting that the evidence was

insufficient to convict him of attempted possession of cocaine, and his sentence of

two and one-half years, arguing that it is excessive. For the reasons set forth below,

we affirm his conviction and sentence.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

The defendant contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that he committed the offense of attempted possession of cocaine, claiming that

the drugs belonged to Brown, not to him.

The defendant was charged with possession of cocaine, which is a general

intent offense. See State v. Odle, 02-226 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/13/02), 834 So.2d 483,

writ denied, 03-625 (La. 6/20/03), 847 So.2d 1219 (citing State v. Clift, 339 So.2d

755 (La.1976)). However, Louisiana law defines one who attempts a crime as “[a]ny

person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the

purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object.” La.R.S.

14:27(A) (emphasis added). Therefore, an attempted offense requires a showing of

specific intent. Id. Notwithstanding, this court has determined that a conviction for

a responsive verdict which requires specific intent must be affirmed where the

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evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for the charged offense and the

defendant did not object to an instruction being given on the responsive verdict at

trial. Odle, 834 So.2d 483 (citing State v. Cortez, 96-859 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/18/96),

687 So.2d 515, and State ex rel. Elaire v. Blackburn, 424 So.2d 246 (La.1982), cert.

denied, 461 U.S. 959, 103 S.Ct. 2432 (1983)).

The standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is “whether,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the essential

elements of the crime charged.” State v. Leger, 05-11, p. 91 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So.2d

108, 170, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1221, 127 S.Ct. 1279 (2007), citing Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979); State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 678

(La.1984). “To support a conviction for possession of cocaine, the State must prove

that the defendant was knowingly in possession of the illegal drug; and, to prove an

attempt, the State must show that the defendant committed an act tending directly

toward the accomplishment of his intent to possess cocaine.” State v. Lewis, 98-2575,

p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/1/00), 755 So.2d 1025, 1027.

The Jackson standard of review is now legislatively embodied in La.Code

Crim.P. art. 821. Pursuant to this article, the appellate court cannot “substitute its

own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact-finder.” State v. Pigford, 05-477,

p. 6 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517, 521. Nor can the appellate court “assess credibility

[of witnesses] or reweigh the evidence,” State v. Smith, 94-3116, p. 2 (La. 10/16/95),

661 So.2d 442, 443, because a witness’s credibility is “a matter of the weight of the

evidence, [which is] not subject to appellate review.” State v. Carlos, 618 So.2d 933,

945 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 623 So.2d 1305 (La.1993).

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A defendant may be in constructive possession of cocaine if it is subject to his

“dominion and control,” although he is not in actual possession of it, as here. State

v. Johnson, 09-231, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/4/09), 21 So.3d 1159, 1162 (quoting State

v. Toups, 01-1875, p. 3 (La. 10/15/02), 833 So.2d 910, 913). Furthermore, a

defendant must be shown to have guilty knowledge to be convicted of unlawful

possession of cocaine. Id.

Brown testified that before the police stopped the Explorer, the defendant

punched him in the mouth. He also testified that the defendant placed the pill bottle

containing crack cocaine “behind the seat [in which he was sitting] in [a] pouch.”

The defendant claimed, however, that he knew nothing of the drugs and that Brown’s

lip was “already bust [sic]” when he entered the vehicle.

Brown’s testimony was corroborated by Sergeant Franks’s and Lieutenant

Walker’s testimony that they saw the defendant reach into the back seat, and

Lieutenant Walker’s testimony that he saw the defendant punch Brown.

The jury chose to believe Brown and the police officers rather than the

defendant. Our review of the record shows that the jury’s decision to reject the

defendant’s version of events is not unreasonable. Accordingly, viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find the jury could have found the

State proved beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime charged.

Therefore, we affirm the defendant’s conviction. See Odle, 834 So.2d 483.

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE

The defendant also complains that his sentence is unconstitutionally harsh and

excessive under the facts and circumstances of this case.

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Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 881.1(E) requires a defendant

to make or file a motion to reconsider his sentence within thirty days of imposition

of the sentence. A defendant who fails to make or file a motion to reconsider his

sentence is precluded from raising any objection to the sentence on appeal. Id.; State

v. White, 03-1535 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/28/04), 872 So.2d 588; State v. Prudhomme,

02-511 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/30/02), 829 So.2d 1166, writ denied, 02-3230 (La.

10/10/03), 855 So.2d 324. The defendant did not make or file a motion to reconsider

his sentence in the trial court. Nevertheless, we review his argument as a bare claim

of excessiveness. State v. Baker, 08-54 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/08), 986 So.2d 682.

This court set forth the following standard for reviewing excessive sentence

claims:

La.Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any
person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive
sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of
justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless
imposition of pain and suffering. The trial court has wide discretion in
the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence
shall not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion.
The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad
sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been
more appropriate.

State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035,

1042, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331 (citations omitted).

To decide whether a sentence shocks the sense of justice or makes no

meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, this court has held:

[An] appellate court may consider several factors including the nature
of the offense, the circumstances of the offender, the legislative purpose
behind the punishment and a comparison of the sentences imposed for
similar crimes. State v. Smith, 99-0606 (La. 7/6/00), 766 So.2d 501.
While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may

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provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be
individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense
committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1991).
Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to particularize
the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to
assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each
case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied,

03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061. Further, “[a]s a general rule, maximum

sentences are appropriate in cases involving the most serious violation of the offense

and the worst type of offender.” State v. Hall, 35,151, p. 4 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/26/01),

796 So.2d 164, 169.

Applying the Smith factors, we note that the nature of the defendant’s offense

was not violent in itself, but it was another drug-related offense, which followed on

the heels of a conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute.

Additionally, it involved a significant amount of cocaine. The trial court did not

order a pre-sentence investigation in this case. However, it was familiar with the

defendant’s criminal history, as it had reviewed the pre-sentence investigation report

prepared in connection with the defendant’s January 2007 convictions for possession

of a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute and

unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling. Accordingly, the trial court was aware

of the defendant’s criminal history, one of the factors of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1.

Although the trial court did not specifically address the individual factors of Article

894.1, it stated that it did not find any mitigating circumstances and that it found the

defendant’s prior convictions for possession of a Schedule II controlled dangerous

substance with intent to distribute and unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling

to be aggravating circumstances.

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The record shows that the defendant was a twenty-two-year-old high school

graduate when he was tried and that he had been employed at Con-Agra for about

three months at the time of his arrest. Pursuant to La.R.S. 14:27 and 40:967(A)(1),

he faced a sentence of up to two and one-half years imprisonment, with or without

hard labor, and a fine of up to twenty-five hundred dollars. The trial court imposed

the maximum sentence of two and one-half years at hard labor, to run consecutively

to the sentence he was serving at the time of trial but did not impose a fine.

In State v. Monette, 99-1870 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/22/00), 758 So.2d 362, the

defendant, a first-felony offender, was convicted of possession of cocaine for

possessing a pipe containing crack cocaine residue. She was also sentenced to two

and one-half years at hard labor. The trial court initially suspended her sentence but

made it executory after she failed to report to her probation officer only three weeks

later.

In State v. Herndon, 513 So.2d 486 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1987), the defendant

likewise was sentenced to two and one-half years at hard labor for the attempted

possession of cocaine. The offense involved a substantial amount of cocaine while

the defendant was already on probation, and he had prior convictions for felony drug

offenses. His sentence was held not to be excessive.

Here, the defendant was serving a sentence for possession of cocaine with the

intent to distribute and unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling when he was

convicted herein. He has neither accepted responsibility for his actions, nor has he

shown remorse. Under these circumstances, we find that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in sentencing him to the maximum term allowed.

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DISPOSITION

The defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–16.3.

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