State of Louisiana v. D'Mycal Lmontay Turner

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

21-780

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

D’MYCAL LMONTAY TURNER

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF GRANT, NO. 2021-174
HONORABLE WARREN DANIEL WILLETT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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SHARON DARVILLE WILSON
JUDGE

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Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, Candyce G. Perret, and Sharon Darville
Wilson, Judges.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

Annette Fuller Roach
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 6547
Lake Charles, LA 70606-6547
(337) 436-2900
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
D'Mycal Lmontay Turner

Hon. James Patrick Lemoine, District Attorney
James D. White, Jr., Assistant District Attorney
Thirty-Fifth Judicial District Court
200 Main Street
Colfax, LA 71417
(318) 627-2971
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

WILSON, Judge.

A jury found Defendant, D’Mycal Lmontay Turner, guilty of

possession with intent to distribute marijuana and attempted resisting an officer

with force or violence. He was subsequently sentenced to serve seven years at

hard labor with a $2,500.00 fine for possession with intent to distribute marijuana,

and one year with a $500 fine for attempted resisting an officer with force or

violence. Mr. Turner was also ordered to pay a $750 fee to the Public Defender’s

Office. Mr. Turner now appeals his conviction and sentencing. For the reasons

expressed below, we amend Mr. Turner’s sentence to delete the provision requiring

payment to the Public Defender’s Office and affirm.

I.

ISSUES

In this appeal we must decide:

(1) whether there was insufficient evidence to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr.
Turner possessed marijuana with intent to
distribute;

(2) whether there was insufficient evidence to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr.
Turner attempted to resist an officer with force
or violence by injuring or attempting to injure
an officer;

(3) whether the trial court committed manifest error
when it permitted the state to qualify a detective
as an expert in the use, sale, and distribution of
a controlled dangerous substance, specifically
marijuana, and reversible error occurred when
the State used evidence particular to this case to
elicit a response from the “expert” that
encroached on the issue of guilt or innocence
award; and

(4) whether the sentences imposed by the trial court
violate the Eighth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States and La. Const.
art. I, § 20, as both upper range sentences are
nothing more than cruel and unusual
punishment and, thus, excessive.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 22, 2020, Deputy Florey and Deputy Hemphill were

attempting to execute an arrest warrant against Mr. Turner for failure to appear in

court. After failing to find Mr. Turner at his home, the officers located him at a

convenience store with a crowd of people. The officers parked their vehicles and

waited in the parking lot so that they could arrest Mr. Turner away from the crowd.

At some point Mr. Turner climbed through his car and began walking toward an

adjacent lot. The officers drove around to the side where Mr. Turner was located.

After Mr. Turner began to run, Deputy Hemphill began chasing Mr. Turner on

foot. Mr. Turner appeared to step in a puddle and fall to the ground. Officers then

attempted to arrest and handcuff Mr. Turner, and a struggle ensued. After

successfully apprehending Mr. Turner, the officers searched his person and

recovered two bags of suspected marijuana, a bag containing twelve vials of

suspected THC wax, a scale, and approximately $1,800.00 in cash. Mr. Turner

was then transferred to the detention center.

On March 9, 2021, Mr. Turner was charged by bill of information

with possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I CDS, marijuana, in violation

of La.R.S. 40:966(A)(1), and resisting an officer with force or violence, in

violation of La.R.S. 14:108.2(A)(3). A jury trial concluded on June 23, 2021,

when Mr. Turner was found guilty of possession with intent to distribute marijuana

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and the responsive verdict of attempted resisting an officer with force or violence.

A sentencing hearing was held on September 9, 2021, and Mr. Turner was

sentenced to seven years at hard labor with a $2,500.00 fine for possession with

intent to distribute marijuana and one year at hard labor with a $500 fine for

attempted resisting an officer with force or violence. The sentences were ordered

to be served consecutively. Mr. Turner was also ordered to pay costs associated

with the proceedings as well as a fee of $750 to the Public Defender’s Office.

Following imposition of sentence, defense counsel orally moved for

reconsideration of sentence alleging that the sentence was excessive, and the trial

court denied the motion to reconsider sentence. Mr. Turner now appeals.

III.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed

for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find that

there are no errors patent.

INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

In his first assignment of error, Mr. Turner asserts there was

insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed

marijuana with intent to distribute. While he concedes to the possession of

marijuana, he contends the state failed to prove he had an intent to distribute.

Appellate courts must review claims of insufficient evidence using the

standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307; 99 S.Ct. 2781; 61 L.Ed.2d

560 (1979). “[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

3

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319. It is

the fact finder’s role to weigh the evidence and assess credibility, and the appellate

court must not second guess their determinations. However, to affirm a conviction,

the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the

elements beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Kennerson, 96-1518 (La.App. 3 Cir.

5/7/97); 695 So.2d 1367.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:966(A)(1) provides that it shall be

unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally “produce, manufacture,

distribute or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or

dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analogue

classified in Schedule I.” Thus, to prove their case, the state had to prove two

elements: (1) Mr. Turner knowingly possessed marijuana (2) with a specific intent

to distribute it. Mr. Turner does not contest that he was in possession of marijuana.

The question then is if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Turner had an

intent to distribute the marijuana. “Intent is a condition of mind which is usually

proved by evidence of circumstances from which intent may be inferred.” State v.

Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 735 (La.1992).

In Hearold, the supreme court set out five factors to be used in

determining whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the intent to

distribute a controlled dangerous substance:

(1) whether the defendant ever distributed or attempted to
distribute the drug; (2) whether the drug was in a form
usually associated with possession for distribution to
others; (3) whether the amount of drug created an
inference of an intent to distribute; (4) whether expert or
other testimony established that the amount of drug
found in the defendant’s possession is inconsistent with

4

personal use only; and (5) whether there was any
paraphernalia, such as baggies or scales, evidencing an
intent to distribute.
Id. We will now apply these factors to determine whether the state met its burden

of proving intent to distribute marijuana.

The first factor is whether the defendant ever distributed or attempted

to distribute the drug. Based on the evidence admitted at trial, there was no

evidence of Mr. Turner ever distributing or attempting to distribute marijuana.

None of Mr. Turner’s prior arrests were discussed before the jury besides the

admission of the bench warrant.

The second factor is whether the drug was in a form usually

associated with possession for distribution. In this case, Detective Coleman was

qualified as an expert in the use, sale, and distribution of marijuana. He presented

testimony that in his experience, marijuana meant for distribution is typically

contained in multiple bags weighing around the same size. Here the marijuana was

contained in two large bags of similar size. Although the weight of each bag

differed by 4.3 grams, detective Coleman testified that they were each about an

ounce. In addition, the THC wax was contained in twelve identical vials. Thus, a

rational trier of fact could find that the drugs were in a form usually associated

with possession for distribution.

The third factor is whether the amount of drug created an inference of

an intent to distribute. “In the absence of circumstances from which an intent to

distribute may be inferred, mere possession of a drug does not amount to evidence

of intent to distribute, unless the quantity is so large that no other inference is

possible.” Id. at 735-36. Moreover, “while the amount of drugs may be relevant in

evaluating whether the defendant engaged in possession with the intent to

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distribute, it is not the determinative factor statutorily. Ultimately, it is the intent to

distribute that must be proved regardless of the amount of drugs possessed.” State

v. Ellis, 14-1511, p. 3 (La. 10/14/15), 179 So.3d 586, 588, cert. denied, 577 U.S.

1218, 136 S.Ct. 1462 (2016).

In this case, the weight of both bags of marijuana together was 52.567

grams, almost two ounces. In addition, Mr. Turner possessed the twelve vials of

THC wax, which together weighed 70.063 grams. Deputy Coleman testified that a

single joint contains about two grams of marijuana, so the record shows that Mr.

Turner possessed enough loose marijuana for about 25 joints. In State v. Jack, 97-

351 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/8/97), 700 So.2d 1177, writ denied, 97-2726 (La. 2/13/98),

706 So.2d 993, this court determined that ten baggies of marijuana containing

enough to roll a total of thirty to forty hand-rolled cigarettes was not enough to

satisfy this factor. In this case however, Mr. Turner also had the twelve vials of

THC wax. Carly Desselle was qualified as a forensic drug chemist expert, and she

testified that one of the THC wax vials was as potent as one of the bags of

marijuana and users typically only use small dabs of the product. The weight of

the marijuana in conjunction with the twelve vials of THC wax could create an

inference of an intent to distribute; however, intent to distribute need not be

determined on this basis alone.

The fourth factor is whether expert or other testimony established that

the amount of drug found in the defendant’s possession is inconsistent with

personal use only. Detective Coleman testified that any amount of marijuana could

be considered an amount that could be distributed or kept for personal use, and in

making the determination he would look to see what items were found with the

marijuana.

6

The fifth and final factor is whether there was any paraphernalia

evidencing an intent to distribute. In addition to the two bags of marijuana found

in Mr. Turner’s pockets, the officers found a bag containing the THC wax vials, a

scale, and $1,746.00 in cash. The cash was made up of twenties, fives, and ones.

Detective Coleman testified that scales and large sums of money are items he

considers in determining distribution, and these items are typically found in

distribution cases, but not in personal use cases. Mr. Turner argues that neither the

weight alone nor the scale alone proves intent to distribute. Mr. Turner is correct;

however, we must consider all of the evidence together and review it under the

factors.

When viewing all of the evidence from the record in the light most

favorable to the state and considering all of the factors together, we find a rational

trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Turner was

guilty of possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Therefore, we find that

this assignment of error lacks merit.

In his second assignment of error, Mr. Turner asserts that the evidence

was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he attempted to resist an

officer with force or violence by injuring or attempting to injure an officer. Mr.

Turner was charged with resisting an officer with force or violence. Louisiana

Revised Statutes 14:108.2 provides:

A. Resisting a police officer with force or
violence is any of the following when the offender has
reasonable grounds to believe the victim is a police
officer who is arresting, detaining, seizing property,
serving process, or is otherwise acting in the performance
of his official duty:

....

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(3) Injuring or attempting to injure a police
officer engaged in the performance of his duties as a
police officer.

The jury returned a responsive verdict of guilty to attempted resisting

an officer with force or violence. Under La.R.S. 14:27(A), attempt is defined as:

Any person who, having a specific intent to
commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of
and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his
object is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense
intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the
circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his
purpose.

Mr. Turner does not contest that he knew the deputies were police

officers or that they were attempting to execute a bench warrant. He argues that

the state failed to prove he attempted to use force or violence against either officer

that evening.

Deputy Hemphill testified concerning the arrest of Mr. Turner and his

resistance. He stated that he had an outstanding warrant for Mr. Turner’s arrest,

and he sought to execute this warrant on the night in question. He testified that he

and Deputy Florey were dressed in uniform and driving marked vehicles when

they parked next to each other in the store parking lot. He further testified that

once they saw Mr. Turner attempt to sneak to a different location, he drove around

to intercept Mr. Turner who then began to run. Deputy Hemphill also testified that

he eventually turned his overhead lights on and began to chase Mr. Turner on foot.

He yelled to Mr. Turner to stop running, but he did not comply. Deputy Hemphill

stated that he attempted to subdue Mr. Turner with his taser, but he missed, failing

to make contact with both probes. Mr. Turner kept running and fell in a puddle. It

was at this point that Deputy Hemphill jumped on top of Mr. Turner to try to

8

subdue him. Deputy Hemphill testified that Mr. Turner attempted to injure him by

pushing away from the officer. He testified that Mr. Turner was fighting, shoving,

and trying to get away. He further testified that he felt if he did not let go, Mr.

Turner would have tried to injure him.

Mr. Turner asserts that Deputy Hemphill’s testimony was internally

inconsistent as to whether he received any injury that night, and he contends the

officer’s testimony was contradicted by two eyewitnesses, Donovan Jones and

James Ward, who testified that Mr. Turner was tased and fell into a water puddle,

so any actions such as shoving while being tased would not satisfy the force or

violence element since he lacked intent and acted involuntarily. As the reviewing

court, we must afford great deference to a jury’s decision to accept or reject the

testimony offered by witnesses. When there is conflicting testimony about factual

matters, and the resolution of such depends upon a determination of the credibility

of the witnesses, it is a matter of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.

State v. Guillory, 20-353 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/12/21), 318 So.3d 368.

In the instant case, the jury found Deputy Hemphill’s testimony

credible and rejected the contradictory testimony of the other witnesses. Deputy

Hemphill testified that he missed Mr. Turner with his taser, and when he was on

top of Mr. Turner, he felt he was attempting to injure him by constantly pushing

hard against him. This testimony, if accepted by the jury, is sufficient to support a

factual finding that Mr. Turner attempted to injure a police officer who was

engaged in the performance of his duties. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt that Mr. Turner committed the offense of attempted resisting an

officer with force or violence. This assignment lacks merit.

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EXPERT TESTIMONY

In his third assignment of error, Mr. Turner contends the trial court

committed manifest error when it permitted the state to qualify a detective as an

expert in the use, sale, and distribution of marijuana and then permitted

questioning that went to the issue of guilt or innocence. Specifically, Mr. Turner

notes that Detective Coleman had never been tendered as an expert prior to this

case and he was not questioned as to his reliability.

We addressed this issue in a similar case, State v. Wells, 99-628,

(La.App. 3 Cir. 12/22/99) 755 So.2d 963, writ denied, 00-181 (La. 9/15/00), 767

So.2d 39. In Wells,

Defendant claims that the court did not apply the
gate keeping standard illustrated by the United States
Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125
L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). The standard, which was adopted by
the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Foret, 628 So.2d
1116 (La.1993), requires that “expert scientific testimony
must rise to a threshold level of reliability in order to be
admissible under La.C.E. art. 702.” Id. at 1123. The
Supreme Court recently elaborated on the Daubert
standard in Kumho Tire Company, Ltd., et al. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d
238 (1999), stating that the gate keeping obligation
applies to all expert testimony, as well as scientific
testimony.

Defendant argues that the criteria for Lieutenant
Coutee to be qualified as an expert were not met because
he had not written articles or taught courses in the field
and had never been qualified as an expert before.
Defendant maintains that Lieutenant Coutee could not
testify as to the consumption habits of cocaine users
because he testified that he had never been present when
cocaine was consumed.

This court has stated in a civil matter that
“experience alone is sufficient to qualify a witness as an
expert; a college degree is not required.” State Thru
DOTD v. Wahlder, 94–761 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/7/94); 647

10

So.2d 481, 485. See also Manchack v. Willamette
Industries, Inc., 621 So.2d 649 (La.App. 2 Cir.), writ
denied, 629 So.2d 1170 (La.1993). Furthermore, the
“competency of an expert witness is a question of fact
within the sound discretion of the trial judge. His
assessment of the qualifications of experts will not be
disturbed unless clearly wrong.” Wahlder, 647 So.2d at
485.

Lieutenant Coutee had been a police officer for
twenty-three years and had worked as a narcotics
investigator/supervisor for more than ten years. As an
investigator, his duties involved participation in actual
investigations. Lieutenant Coutee received extensive
training at annual conferences of the Louisiana Sheriff’s
Association Narcotics Task Force and the Louisiana
Narcotics Officers Association. He testified about his
involvement in an organized crime drug enforcement task
force with the drug enforcement administration and that
he had been assigned to a task force officer with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, investigating narcotics
activity throughout the state and other states. Lieutenant
Coutee also received training from the United States
Justice Department relating to narcotics investigations.
He attended the Louisiana State University Law
Enforcement Institute and has attended numerous classes
and conferences relating to narcotics activities and
investigations.

Lieutenant Coutee testified that about seventy-five
percent of his personal involvement in drug investigation
deals with cocaine, and that ninety percent of the cocaine
investigations involve the crack form of cocaine. He
estimated that he personally investigated 200 to 300
cases involving the distribution, the packaging for
distribution and the holding for sale or distribution of
crack cocaine and has supervised in excess of 300
investigations. From this foundation, Lieutenant Coutee
was tendered as an expert in the area of distribution,
packaging for distribution, and manufacture for
distribution of crack cocaine and was received and
qualified as such by the court. We conclude that
Lieutenant Coutee’s experience alone was sufficient to
qualify him as an expert in the field of distribution,
packaging, and manufacturing of crack cocaine, and that
his experience encompassed the consumption habits of
cocaine users.

Id. at 968.

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In the instant case, Detective Coleman testified that he started with the

Grant Parish Sheriff’s Office in 2005 and has been on the force for sixteen years.

He testified that he completed post certification, which included classroom

education on Title 40 involving narcotics. He testified that over the years he has

specialized more in narcotics investigations and that he is considered a narcotics

officer for the department, working specifically in narcotics for over ten years. He

has worked as an investigator and canine handler. He testified that he has taken

several specific classes and trainings on narcotics. Detective Coleman also

testified that he probably works two to three narcotics cases per week and over a

hundred a year. He estimates that 1,500 would be a fair and close estimate of

narcotics cases he has worked in his career. He further testified that investigation

of marijuana cases is something he routinely does as part of his job, and over half

of his narcotics cases involve marijuana or marijuana found with other narcotics.

The trial court found that based on Detective Coleman’s sixteen years

as an officer, his trainings and other education, his ten-year focus on narcotics

investigations, and that over half of his approximately 100 narcotic cases per year

involve marijuana, the officer would be of assistance to the jury. The competency

of an expert witness is a question of fact within the sound discretion of the trial

judge, and this assessment should not be disturbed unless the trial court clearly

abused such discretion.

Based on the testimony, Detective Coleman has handled

approximately 750 cases that involve marijuana. In Wells, 755 So.2d 963, this

court noted Lieutenant Coutee estimated that he personally investigated 200 to 300

cases involving distribution, the packaging for distribution, and the holding for sale

or distribution of crack cocaine, and had supervised more than 300 investigations.

12

This court concluded that Lieutenant Coutee’s experience alone was sufficient to

qualify him as an expert in the field of distribution, packaging, and manufacturing

of crack cocaine, and that his experience encompassed the consumption habits of

cocaine users. In the instant case, Detective Coleman testified that his marijuana

investigations involved the use, distribution, possession with intent, cultivation,

and production of marijuana. We find that the officer’s training and experience

were sufficient to qualify him as an expert in the use, sale, and distribution of

marijuana. Therefore, the trial court did not commit manifest error in qualifying

Detective Coleman as an expert witness.

Mr. Turner also asserts that the prosecutor’s questions about the facts

of the case and Detective Coleman’s answers to those questions usurped the jury’s

function as finders of fact and constituted reversable error. Louisiana Code of

Evidence Article 704 provides that “in a criminal case, an expert witness shall not

express an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused.” This prohibition

also applies when the opinion is solicited through the presentation of a hypothetical

situation. State v. Deal, 00-434 (La. 11/28/01), 802 So.2d 1254, cert. denied, 537

U.S. 828, 123 S.Ct. 124 (2002). When a witness makes an irrelevant remark that

could prejudice the defendant, La.Code Crim.P. art. 771 gives the trial court the

option to admonish the jury. State v. Ducre, 01-2778 (La. 9/13/02), 827 So.2d

1120. If an admonition does not appear to be sufficient, the trial court may declare

a mistrial, but mistrial is a drastic remedy, which should only be used upon a clear

showing of prejudice by the defendant. Id. The trial judge has broad discretion in

determining whether conduct is so prejudicial as to deprive the accused of a fair

trial. Id.

13

The fifth circuit court addressed a similar claim in State v. Gross, 14-

110 (La.App. 5 Cir. 6/24/14), 145 So.3d 521, writ denied, 14-1516 (La. 2/27/15),

159 So.3d 1065. In Gross, the expert witness, Sergeant Modica, was shown the

plastic bag of marijuana seized from defendant’s vehicle and asked if he had ever

seen marijuana packaged in that manner. Sergeant Modica responded that

marijuana packaged in that manner would be indicative of someone who possessed

it with the intent to distribute. The state then presented Sergeant Modica with a

photograph of the apartment complex where defendant was located prior to arrest

and posed a hypothetical that tracked the facts of the case from the arresting

officer’s testimony. Sergeant Modica testified that based on the facts, he would

suspect a street-level drug transaction went down. Defense counsel objected to this

testimony and moved for a mistrial, which was denied. The defendant asserted that

the testimony was “equivalent to a direct statement by Sergeant Modica that

defendant distributed drugs and such testimony is tantamount to an opinion on the

ultimate issue regarding his guilt for the charged offense.” Id. at 531. The court

held,

we again find that the prosecutor’s questions mirrored the
specific facts of the case, which again caused the expert
witness to come too close to commenting on the ultimate
issue of guilt, which is the sole purview of the trier of
fact. Finding that the testimony was improper under La.
C.E. art. 704, we must determine whether the trial court
committed reversible error in denying defendant’s
motions for mistrial.

Id. at 532.

In the instant case, Mr. Turner claims that it amounted to reversible

error when the prosecutor asked Detective Coleman to examine the evidence in the

case and asked whether the amount and sizes of the bags would be consistent with

14

personal use. Detective Coleman answered that the way the marijuana was

packaged would not be consistent with personal use. We find that the state’s

questioning and Detective Coleman’s answer about whether the evidence is

consistent with personal use comes too close to commenting on the ultimate issue

of guilt, which is in the sole purview of the trier of fact. Thus, we must determine

whether the trial court committed reversible error in failing to admonish the jury or

grant a mistrial. In Gross, 145 So.3d 521, the court noted that although the trial

court did not admonish the jurors at the time of the testimony, the trial court did

instruct the jurors before deliberation as follows:

Although you are the sole judges of the facts on the
question of guilty or innocent, you have the duty to
accept and apply the law as given to you by the Court.
You must decide the facts from the testimony and other
evidence and apply the law to those facts in reaching
your verdict.
Id., at 532. The trial court also instructed the jury on the law with respect to expert

witnesses prior to Sergeant Modica’s testimony and at the conclusion of trial. The

court held that, based on their review of the record, they could not say that

Sergeant Modica’s comments were so prejudicial as to warrant a mistrial based on

the substantial evidence of his guilt presented at trial. Id.

In the instant case, the trial court did not admonish the jury, but it

provided the jury with a similar set of instructions advising them that: the jury was

the sole judges of the law and the facts on the question of guilt or innocence; the

jury must decide the facts from the testimony and other evidence, and apply the

law to those facts in reaching a verdict; the jurors alone determine the weight and

credibility of the evidence; as the sole judges of the credibility of witnesses and of

the weight their testimony deserves, the jury should scrutinize carefully the

15

testimony and the circumstances under which the witness testified; the jury must

consider any reasons a witness may testify in favor of the state and the extent to

which the testimony is supported or contradicted. The trial court also instructed

the jury as follows:

Police officials have testified in this case, I charge
you that you must determine the credibility of police
officials in the same way and by the same standards as
that you would evaluate the testimony of any ordinary
witness. You may not presume police officers or other
people in official positions to be more truthful or less
truthful than anyone else.

....

You should consider each expert opinion received
into evidence in this case and give it such weight as you
think it deserves. If you should . . . decide that the
opinion of an expert witness is not based on sufficient
education or experience or if you should conclude that
the reasons given in support [of] the opinion are not
sound or if you feel that it is outweighed by other
evidence, you may disregard the onion entirely.

After defense counsel objected to Detective Coleman’s testimony, the

trial court held a bench conference outside the presence of the jury and discussed

the issue but determined that the objection was moot. A mistrial is drastic and

should only be declared upon a clear showing of prejudice. State v. Ducre, 827

So.2d 1120. In assessing prejudice, we now look the record. At trial, Officer

Hemphill testified that before apprehending Mr. Turner, he noticed Mr. Turner

back his car to the edge of a nearby lot where another vehicle pulled up. At this

point Mr. Turner walked over to the backseat of his vehicle, crossed over the

backseat and exited out of the passenger back door moving towards the car that

had pulled up. As Mr. Turner was attempting to sneak away, the officers moved to

intercept him and then gave chase. Along with this suspicious behavior, officers

16

found on Mr. Turner’s person two similarly sized bags of marijuana weighing

approximately one ounce each; twelve THC wax vials; $1,746.00 in cash; and a

scale. In light of the evidence adduced at trial, along with the extensive jury

instructions, particularly about police officers and the possibility to disregard

expert testimony, we find that the trial court’s instructions were sufficient to

counteract any influence caused by Detective Coleman’s testimony. Therefore, the

state’s questioning and Detective Coleman’s answers about personal use amount to

harmless error.

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE

In his last assignment of error, Mr. Turner asserts that his two

sentences are excessive not only because of the length of each sentence, but also

because the court ordered the two sentences to be served consecutively. Mr.

Turner contends that considering his young age, lack of prior felony convictions,

work history, and family history, lesser sentences were warranted. He also asserts

that the trial court improperly imposed a fee to the Public Defender’s Office even

though no portion of his sentences were suspended, and he was not placed on

probation. Louisiana courts have laid out the following guidelines regarding

excessive sentence review:

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range
can be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v.
Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979). In State v. Barling,
00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779
So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La.2/1/02),
808 So.2d 331, a panel of this court discussed the review
of excessive sentence claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o
law shall subject any person to cruel or
unusual punishment.” To constitute an

17

excessive sentence, the reviewing court must
find the penalty so grossly disproportionate
to the severity of the crime as to shock our
sense of justice or that the sentence makes
no measurable contribution to acceptable
penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more
than a needless imposition of pain and
suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205
(La.1981). The trial court has wide
discretion in the imposition of sentence
within the statutory limits and such sentence
shall not be set aside as excessive absent a
manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99);
746 So.2d 124, writ denied, 00-0165
(La.6/30/00)00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765
So.2d 1067. The relevant question is
whether the trial court abused its broad
sentencing discretion, not whether another
sentence might have been more appropriate.
State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674
So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117
S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant’s sentences,
the appellate court should consider the nature of the
crime, the nature and background of the offender, and the
sentences imposed for similar crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-
648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57 (citing State
v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983)), writ denied, 99-
433 (La.6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-
719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789,
writ denied, 03-562 (La.5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a
panel of this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed
for similar crimes may provide some insight,
“it is well settled that sentences must be
individualized to the particular offender and
to the particular offense committed.” State v.
Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991).
Additionally, it is within the purview of the
trial court to particularize the sentence
because the trial judge “remains in the best
position to assess the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances presented by each
case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96);
674 So.2d 957, 958[, cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1043, 117 S.Ct. 615 (1996)].

18

State v. Soileau, 13-770, 771, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002,

1005-06, writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261.

Mr. Turner was sentenced to serve seven years at hard labor and pay a

$2,500 fine for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. He was sentenced

to serve one year at hard labor and pay a $500 fine for attempted resisting a police

officer by force or violence. The sentences were ordered to be served

consecutively, and he was ordered to pay a fee to the Public Defender’s Office.

Under La.R.S. 40:966(B)(2)(a) the sentencing range for possession of marijuana

with intent to distribute with an aggregate weight of less than two-and-one-half

pounds is imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for not less than one year nor

more than ten years, and a fine of not more than $50,000. The sentencing range for

attempted resisting a police officer by force or violence under La.R.S. 14:27 and

14:108.2 is a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment with or without hard

labor for not less than half a year but not more than one and a half years, or both.

For each sentence, me must consider it light of the Lisotta, 726 So.2d 57, factors.

The first factor is the nature of the crime. The crime of possession

with the intent to distribute marijuana involves distributions of drugs within the

community and is not a crime of violence. See La.R.S. 14:2(B).

The second factor looks to the nature and background of the

defendant. At the hearing, the trial court allowed Mr. Turner to make a personal

statement and he stated the following:

Yes, sir, . . . I’d like to say. . . I’m sorry to you and the
D.A., and I apologize, and I thank y’all for (inaudible)
me down, and (indistinct), and make me realize this ain’t
what I want to do, I want to be out there with my family,
and my kids, and supporting them, and this ain’t. . .
nothing for anybody, like . . . nobody wants to do this

19

like, I’ll tell anybody that, jail ain’t for nobody if you got
a family especially the young ones that you have to
provide for, and I’d like to provide the right way, and get
a job, I’ll tell you I’ll be able to get one next week.
(Indistinct) I’ll ask y’all if I can go no and take probation,
and go provide for my family, (indistinct) and my two
kids because she’s doing this by herself. It doesn’t matter
what you give me, you can give me anything, any kind of
probation. . . .

The pre-sentencing investigation report contained Mr. Turner’s criminal history,

which included:

[O]n August 14th, 2017, you were arrested by the Grant
Parish Sheriff’s Office for Possession of Marijuana,
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. There was no
disposition of those charges found.

September 16th of 2017, Leesville Police
Department, Speeding, and Operating While your
License was Suspended, no record or disposition was
found.

April 19th of 2018, an arrest by Grant Parish
Sheriff’s Office for Contempt, and being a Fugitive. No
record was found of the disposition.

April 23rd of 2018, an arrest by Leesville Police
Department for Contempt, Failure to Appear for
Speeding and Contempt for Failure to Appear for
Suspended License. No record of disposition was found.

March 15th of 2020, Grant Parish Sheriff’s arrest
for Intent - - Possession with Intent to Distribute
Alprazolam. Possession with Intent to Distribute
Hydrocodone. Possession with Intent to Distribute
Marijuana, Possession of CDS IV, Possession of CDS II,
and Possession with Intent, Marijuana, uh, you have
previously entered pleas of not guilty on those matters,
and they are still pending.

....

August 20th of 2020, Grant Parish Sheriff’s arrest
for Illegal Possession of a Stolen Firearm, Possession of
CDS I, Possession of CDS II, those charges are in Docket
#20-661, you’ve entered a plea of not guilty on those
charges, and those matters are still pending.

20

December 22nd, 2020, an arrest by Grant Parish
Sheriff’s Office for Contempt, Possession of CDS I With
Intent, Possession of CDS I With Intent, and Resisting
An Officer with Force or Violence, those are the charges
that you were tried on, and are standing for sentencing
today.

An arrest on February 14th of 2021 for Possession
With Intent to Distribute Marijuana, you’ve entered a
plea of not guilty on that charge, that is still pending.

June 23rd of 2021, the Jury Tampering arrest by
Grant Parish, that matter is in Docket #21-767, that
matter is set for arraignment on September 17th, 2021.

The report also showed that Mr. Turner was the youngest child, that he was

primarily raised by his mother, and that he attended Montgomery High School but

did not graduate or obtain a G.E.D. The report further noted that Mr. Turner had

no religious preferences, and he smokes weed but is not a big drinker due to his

father passing away from drunk driving. With respect to employment, Mr. Turner

had worked six months pouring cement and had also worked for U.S. Lawns. He

has skills in fencing, pouring concrete, packing boxes, and landscaping, and he

intends to work at Hunt Plywood following his release. Mr. Turner is married, has

two children, and intends to reside in Colfax. In imposing sentence, the trial court

stated that Mr. Turner’s young age, marital status, and children were mitigating

factors. However, the trial court noted that Mr. Turner’s numerous pending felony

drug charges are an aggravating circumstance. Of note was the fact he was

arrested twice over a four-day trial, with one charge involving jury tampering.

The final factor is a comparison of the sentences imposed for similar

crimes. Because the penalty provisions were amended in 2017, the cases that are

closer to this sentencing range involve attempted possession of marijuana with

intent to distribute.

21

In State v. Breaux, 18-690 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/7/19), 269 So.3d 938, the

defendant was originally charged with one count of possession with intent to

distribute marijuana, one count of cultivation of marijuana, and one count of illegal

carrying of a weapon while in the possession of drugs. Upon searching the

defendant’s home, detectives found five marijuana plants, 67.93 grams of

marijuana, an assault rifle, a grinder with marijuana residue, and other

paraphernalia. Defendant altered his plea and pled guilty to the amended charge of

one count of attempted possession with intent to distribute marijuana. The

sentencing range for attempted possession of marijuana with intent to distribute

was zero to fifteen years, and the defendant was sentenced to eight years for

attempted possession with intent to distribute. This court upheld the sentence and

found it to be in line with other sentences. Id.

In State v. Brown, 02-1382 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/2/03), 842 So.2d 1181,

writ denied, 03-1224 (La. 11/7/03), 857 So.2d 491, this court determined that a

five-year sentence at hard labor for attempted possession with intent to distribute

marijuana was not excessive. In that case, the defendant, a paraplegic first-

offender, benefited from a plea bargain, and the State amended the charge from the

original charge of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and the

defendant’s sentence exposure decreased from a potential thirty years at hard labor

to fifteen years at hard labor. However, the amount of marijuana found in this case

was twenty-eight pounds.

In State v. Purvis, 51,215 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/5/17), 217 So.3d 620, the

second circuit affirmed a fifteen-year sentence for possession with intent to

distribute marijuana. The second circuit noted that a person convicted of

possession with intent to distribute marijuana could be imprisoned for not less than

22

five years and no more than thirty years. The defendant was found with fourteen

individual bags of marijuana that had a total weight of twenty-eight grams. At

sentencing, the trial court noted Purvis was previously convicted of illegal use of a

weapon in 2007, attempted possession with intent to distribute in 2008, and illegal

use of a firearm in 2014. Despite his criminal record, Purvis argued he was

remorseful for his actions and could be rehabilitated. However, the trial court

stated that regardless of Purvis’ remorse, it could not ignore Purvis’ previous

record and concluded Purvis was in need of correctional treatment in a custodial

environment. In affirming the sentence, the second circuit noted that considering

Purvis’ previous criminal history, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

In light of the above case law, we cannot say that the trial court

abused its broad discretion in sentencing Mr. Turner to seven years at hard labor

with a $2,500 fine. Mr. Turner asserts the trial court’s comments, that if he were

resolving all of his charges on the day of sentencing, then the court might look at

the pending charges differently as well as the comment that he continued to deny

responsibility for distributing drugs, were inappropriate and should not have

affected the sentencing choice. However, in State v. Williams, 96-37, p. 8

(La.App. 3 Cir. 6/26/96), 677 So.2d 692, 697, this court stated:

In State v. Berry, 630 So.2d 1330, 1335 (La.App. 4
Cir.1993), the court stated, “[t]he Louisiana Supreme
Court held a trial court could consider unadjudicated
criminal activity in sentencing.” The court, citing State v.
Bouie, 532 So.2d 791, 793 (La.App. 4 Cir.1988), further
stated, “we reiterated that a trial court may consider both
arrests and convictions in imposing sentence, provided
the defendant ‘is given notice of the information and is
afforded a chance to speak in mitigation.’” Berry, 630
So.2d at 1335. In [State v. ]Stein, 611 So.2d [800,] 802,
this court stated:

23

However, in selecting a proper sentence, a
trial judge is not limited to considering only
a defendant’s prior convictions and may
properly review all criminal activity. . . . The
trial judge may consider whatever factors
and evidence he deems important to a
determination of the best interest of the
public and the defendant. (citation omitted).

Mr. Turner had notice that the trial court was considering all of his

criminal history and was allowed to speak at the hearing in mitigation. Thus, Mr.

Turner’s argument that the trial court’s comments were inappropriate is without

merit since the court may consider all criminal activity and whatever factors and

evidence deemed important. The trial court found Mr. Turner’s past drug-related

arrests, lack of remorse, and continued denial of responsibility to be aggravating

factors. A trial court is given wide discretion in imposing a sentence, and a

sentence imposed within the statutory limits will not be deemed excessive in the

absence of manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Howard, 414 So.2d 1210

(La.1982).

We find that Mr. Turner’s seven-year sentence for possession of

marijuana with intent to distribute is not excessive.

Considering Mr. Turner’s conviction for attempted resisting and

officer by force or violence, we must first consider the nature of the crime. The

conviction constitutes a crime of violence with a maximum of one-and-a-half years

at hard labor and/or a fine of up to $1,000. The nature and background of Mr.

Turner has been discussed thoroughly above.

We now look to similar cases to consider whether Mr. Turner’s one

year sentence was excessive. In State v. McCauley, 48,321 (La.App. 2 Cir.

8/7/13), 122 So.3d 596, the defendant was found guilty of resisting an officer with

24

force or violence, and he was sentenced to two years at hard labor. In imposing

this sentence, the trial court noted that it considered the defendant’s criminal

history, which included pleading guilty to threatening a public officer; a letter from

Defendant’s mother; and Defendant’s apology and request for leniency. The trial

court noted that the defendant could have been charged with three counts of

resisting by force or violence, since the incident involved three police officers and

occurred over four hours. The trial court stated that it was originally going to

impose the three-year maximum sentence, but upon hearing the defendant’s

apology, reduced the sentence to two years. The second circuit affirmed the

sentence and noted that the defendant’s behavior was more than a mild resistance

to an arrest, since he resisted over the course of several hours and was restrained

by more than just handcuffs. The second circuit also considered the defendant’s

past criminal history in affirming the sentence.

In State v. Walker, 48,502 (La.App. 2 Cir. 11/20/13), 128 So.3d 619,

the defendant was sentenced to two years at hard labor for resisting a police officer

with force of violence. In imposing the sentence, the trial court noted the

defendant was driving while drunk, the defendant had been arrested forty-two

times, the defendant had eight prior felony convictions, there were several actions

of aggression toward law enforcement, and the defendant could have been

adjudicated as a fourth felony offender and exposed to a minimum of twenty years.

The second circuit affirmed the sentence based on the defendant’s prior criminal

history.

In State v. Miller, 49,234 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/20/14), 147 So.3d 1201,

the defendant was sentenced to two-and-a-half years for resisting an officer with

force or violence. The arresting officer indicated that the defendant was stopped

25

for speeding, and the officer noted the odor of alcohol on her breath. Upon

refusing to participate in field sobriety tests, the defendant was placed under arrest.

The defendant refused to be peacefully arrested and attempted to break one of the

patrol unit’s windows with her head. During transport, the defendant was kicking

the partition inside the vehicle. In affirming the sentence, the second circuit noted

the trial court considered the defendant’s mental history as a mitigating factor but

balanced it against her aggressive actions and lengthy criminal history.

Additionally, in State v. Musacchia, 13-169 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/12/13),

131 So.3d 286, the defendant physically resisted and took a swing at the officer

with a closed fist, and the defendant and officer physically struggled on the ground

until another officer tased defendant. The defendant was convicted of attempted

resisting a police officer with force or violence and was sentenced to a one-year

suspended sentence at hard labor with credit for time served and further imposed

upon the defendant five years of probation. In State v. Turner, 51,228 (La.App. 2

Cir. 4/5/17), 217 So.3d 601, the defendant struggled with the officer. Although he

did not swing at the officer, he did jerk his right hand away while the officer

attempted to arrest him. While the defendant was struggling to keep his right arm

from the officer, his left arm was flailing around with the open cuff attached to it.

The defendant was convicted of attempted resisting a police officer with force or

violence, and he was sentenced to serve one year at hard labor, suspended, two

years of supervised probation, and was given a $750 fine or six months in jail in

default of payment. However, we note that excessiveness of the sentence was not

raised as an assignment in these cases.

In all these cases the defendants were largely given sentences below

the maximum amount. In several of the resisting arrest cases, the defendants were

26

given two-year sentences out of a maximum of three years. Two years is

approximately 66.6% of the three years allowed under the sentencing statute.

Similarly, in the instant case, Mr. Turner was sentenced to one year out of a

maximum sentence of one-and-a-half years for the attempted resisting an officer

with force or violence. One year also reflects the same percentage, 66.6%, of the

total amount of years allowed under the sentence statute for an attempt. The trial

court thoroughly considered the aggravating and mitigating factors and ultimately

decided to impose this sentence based on Mr. Turner’s lengthy criminal history. A

trial court is given wide discretion in imposing a sentence, and this court does not

find a manifest abuse of discretion in imposing the sentence for attempted resisting

an officer with force or violence.

As to the consecutive nature of the sentences, while the consecutive

nature was mentioned in Mr. Turner’s brief, he provided no argument or analysis

for this claim. Furthermore, the consecutive nature of the sentences was not raised

in Mr. Turner’s motion to reconsider sentence. Under La.Code Crim.P. art.

881.1(E), the failure “to include a specific ground upon which a motion to

reconsider sentence may be based. . . shall preclude the defendant from urging any

ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.” Therefore, this court need

not address Mr. Turner’s claim about the excessiveness of his consecutive

sentences.

Lastly, Mr. Turner asserts his sentences are excessive because the trial

court imposed fines, court costs, and a payment to the Public Defender’s office

even though no portion of the sentences was suspended nor was he placed on

probation. Along with Mr. Turner’s seven-year sentence for possession of

marijuana with intent to distribute, he was ordered to pay a $2,500 fine. Under

27

La.R.S. 40:966(B)(2)(a), a fine not to exceed $50,000 may be imposed.

Additionally, Mr. Turner was fined $500, along with his one-year sentence, for

attempted resisting an officer with force or violence. Under the statute, the fine

was not to exceed $1,000. The fines are supported by the record. The trial court

properly considered Mr. Turner’s criminal history and other mitigating factors.

Additionally, the $2,500 fine is considerably less than the maximum amount

allowed, and the $500 fine was half of the maximum allowed, so the fines in both

sentences were toward the lower end.

Along with his argument about the fines, Mr. Turner contends that the

trial court improperly imposed court costs as part of his overall sentence. We look

to this court’s opinion in State v. Allen, 09-1281, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/10),

36 So.3d 1091, 1095 (footnote omitted), for an analogous result:

Allen argues that he is indigent, and, thus, the imposition of a
$2,000.00 fine was not appropriate. In support, Allen refers to State v.
Perry, 472 So.2d 344 (La.App. 3 Cir.1985). There, a defendant who
pled guilty to attempted distribution of a counterfeit schedule II
controlled dangerous substance was found indigent by the trial court
and was appointed counsel for his defense. In addition to four years of
imprisonment at hard labor, an upper-range sentence, the trial court
imposed a $5,000.00 fine and court costs, or, in default of paying the
fine, imposed an additional year of imprisonment. This court found
that sentence excessive.

Relying on State v. Mims, 550 So.2d 760 (La.App. 2 Cir.1989),
the State argues that consideration of Allen’s ability to pay the fine is
premature. In Mims, the court discussed the consideration of default
jail time before a defendant is required to pay a fine and concluded
that such consideration was premature.

The issue in Perry and in Mims regarding fines was the default
jail time, not that the indigent defendant was ordered to pay a fine.
Further, in Perry, the jail time and fine were both excessive because
the trial judge failed to state for the record the considerations and facts
upon which the sentence was based.

This court was unable to find any jurisprudence which prohibits
or limits the trial court’s imposition of a fine on an indigent defendant.

28

Moreover, although the ruling in Mims is distinguishable from this
case, it does suggest that considering a defendant’s indigence prior to
the time he is called upon to pay the fine is premature.

As noted above, Allen’s $2,000.00 fine was less than one-half
of the maximum possible fine. Also, the trial court clearly stated for
the record the facts it considered in determining Allen’s sentence.
Finally, the trial court did not order default time in the event Allen did
not pay his fine. For these reasons, Allen’s fine is not excessive.

The instant case is analogous to Allen in that the court did not order default time in

the event that Defendant did not pay his court costs, and the trial court clearly

stated for the record the facts it considered in determining Mr. Turner’s sentence.

Therefore, the trial court’s order of payment of court costs is not excessive.

As to the $750 payment to the Public Defender’s office, we turn to

this court’s opinion in State v. Belton, 11-948, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/7/12), 88

So.3d 1159, 1162:

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 895.1 provides,
in pertinent part:

B. When a court suspends the imposition or the execution
of a sentence and places the defendant on probation, it may in
its discretion, order placed, as a condition of probation, an
amount of money to be paid by the defendant to any or all of
the following:

(1) To the indigent defender program for that court.

(2) To the criminal court fund to defray the costs of operation
of that court.

(3) To the sheriff and clerk of court for costs incurred.

(4) To a law enforcement agency for the reasonable costs
incurred in arresting the defendant, in felony cases
involving the distribution of or intent to distribute controlled
dangerous substances.

In this case, the trial court did not suspend imposition or
execution of Defendant’s sentence and place him on probation;
therefore, we find that the trial court lacked authority to order
payment to the Public Defender’s Office as part of the principal

29

sentence. Accordingly, we amend Defendant’s sentence, deleting the
$500.00 fine and costs and the provision requiring the $500.00
payment to the Public Defender’s Office. The trial court is instructed
to note the amendment in its court minutes.

As in Belton, the trial court did not suspend imposition of sentence or

place him on probation. Therefore, we find that the trial court lacked authority to

order payment to the Public Defender’s office, and we amend the sentence to

delete that provision.

V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Turner’s convictions and sentences for

possession with the intent to distribute marijuana and attempted resisting an officer

by force or violence are affirmed. Mr. Turner’s sentence, however, is amended to

delete the provision requiring payment to the Public Defender’s Office. Costs of

this appeal are assessed to Mr. Turner.

AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Rule 2-16.3 Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal.

30