State of Louisiana v. Michael R. Suydam, Jr.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

23-475

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

MICHAEL R. SUYDAM, JR.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTY-SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF BEAUREGARD, CR-2021-19
HONORABLE MARTHA ANN O’NEAL, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

LEDRICKA J. THIERRY
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, Jonathan W. Perry, and Ledricka J.
Thierry, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Chad M. Ikerd
Louisiana Appelate Project
P.O. Box 2125
Lafayette, LA 70502-2125
(225) 806-2930
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Michael R. Suydam, Jr.

James R. Lestage, District Attorney
36th Judicial District/Beauregard Parish
124 South Stewart Street
DeRidder, LA 70634
(337) 463-5578
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

THIERRY, Judge.

Defendant, Michael R. Suydam, Jr., appeals his conviction and sentence on

one count of attempted aggravated assault with a firearm. For the following reasons,

we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant was convicted of committing an attempted aggravated assault with

a firearm upon his wife Angela Doll.1 Doll testified she and Defendant argued, and

she walked to a neighbor’s home to cool off. Defendant subsequently fired two gun

shots from a pistol. Doll, concerned Defendant might harm himself or her dogs,

returned home to find Defendant with the pistol in his mouth. The two struggled

over the gun, and Defendant pointed the pistol at Doll and touched her lips with it.

Defendant was charged by bill of information filed on January 13, 2021, with

aggravated assault with a firearm, a violation of La.R.S. 14:37.4. Jury selection

commenced on January 23, 2023, and Defendant was found guilty of the responsive

verdict of attempted aggravated assault with a firearm, a violation of La.R.S. 14:27

and La.R.S. 14:37.4. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to serve four years at

hard labor and to pay a fine of $1500.

A Motion for Appeal and Designation of Record was filed and granted with

this court on April 3, 2023. Counsel for Defendant sent a letter to the Beauregard

Parish Clerk of Court on April 20, 2023, stating Defendant wished to withdraw his

request for an appeal. On April 25, 2023, the State filed a pleading titled “State’s

Motion on Designation of Record or Payment of Appeal.” Therein, the State

requested a hearing to address whether Defendant sought an extension of time or to

1
The victim’s last name is spelled Doll and Dail in the record. We have used the spelling
found in the bill of information.

dismiss his appeal. At a hearing held on May 22, 2023, Defendant informed the trial

court that he wanted to be declared indigent. The trial court subsequently found

Defendant indigent and ordered the clerk of court to notify the Louisiana Appellate

Project.

Defendant is now before this court asserting four assignments of error: 1) the

evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; 2) trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to raise the issue of intoxication as a defense or to request a special jury

instruction on the issue of intoxication; 3) his sentence is excessive; and 4) trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to reconsider sentence.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

In his first assignment of error, Defendant contends the State failed to

sufficiently prove that he was guilty of attempted aggravated assault with a firearm.

Defendant argues he should have been found guilty of a lesser charge of aggravated

assault, which does not require specific intent.

Defendant was charged with aggravated assault with a firearm, which was

defined by this court in State v. Watson, 21-725, pp. 9–10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/27/22),

338 So.3d 95, 101:

Aggravated Assault with a Firearm is defined by La.R.S.
14:37.4(A) as “an assault committed with a firearm.” An Assault is
defined in La.R.S. 14:36 as “an attempt to commit a battery, or the
intentional placing of another in reasonable apprehension of receiving
a battery.” A Battery is further defined as “the intentional use of force
or violence upon the person of another; or the intentional administration
of a poison or other noxious liquid or substance to another.” La.R.S.
14:33. Therefore, Aggravated Assault with a Firearm may be correctly
stated as “An attempt to use force or violence upon the person of
another with a firearm, or the intentional placing of another in
reasonable apprehension of receiving force or violence with a firearm.”

Aggravated assault with a firearm is a general intent crime. State v. Julien, 09-1242,

p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/7/10), 34 So.3d 494, 499. “General criminal intent is present

whenever there is specific intent, and also when the circumstances indicate that the
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offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the

prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or

failure to act.” La.R.S. 14:10(2).

Defendant was convicted of attempted aggravated assault with a firearm.

Any person who, having a specific intent to commit a crime, does
or omits an act for the purpose of and tending directly toward the
accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt to commit the
offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the
circumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose.

La.R.S. 14:27(A). Specific intent to commit a crime is an element of an attempted

offense. State v. Jones, 43,053, p. 10 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/20/08), 982 So.2d 105, 112,

writ denied, 08-710 (La. 10/10/08), 993 So.2d 1282. “Specific criminal intent is that

state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively

desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.”

La.R.S. 14:10(1).

Because it is a state of mind, specific intent need not be proven as a
fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances and the defendant’s
actions. State v. Broaden, 99–2124, p. 18 (La.2/21/01), 780 So.2d 349,
362; State v. Graham, 420 So.2d 1126, 1127 (La.1982). Specific intent
may be formed in an instant. State v. Cousan, 94–2503, p. 13
(La.11/25/96), 684 So.2d 382, 390.

State v. Mickelson, 12-2539, p. 6 (La. 9/3/14), 149 So.3d 178, 182–83.

In order to convict Defendant of attempted aggravated assault with a firearm,

the State was required to prove Defendant had the specific intent to place Doll in

reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery and committed an act in furtherance

thereof.

The Defendant contends the State failed to prove he had the specific intent to

commit the attempted offense. The State looks to State ex rel. Elaire v. Blackburn,

424 So.2d 246 (La.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 959, 103 S.Ct. 2432 (1983), and

suggests this court can review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the charged

3

offense instead of that supporting the responsive verdict returned by the jury. In

Elaire, 424 So.2d at 251 (footnote omitted), a plurality opinion, the supreme court

addressed responsive verdicts provided for in La.Code Crim.P. art. 814:

The 1982 amendment adding Section C to Article 814 now gives
the trial judge discretion, on motion of either side, to exclude a
responsive verdict which is not supported by the evidence. Therefore,
even if the offense is legislatively designated as responsive by Article
814, the defendant may timely object to an instruction on a responsive
verdict on the basis that the evidence does not support that responsive
verdict. If the court overrules the objection and the jury returns a verdict
of guilty of the responsive offense, the reviewing court must examine
the record to determine if the responsive verdict is supported by the
evidence and may reverse the conviction if the evidence does not
support the verdict. However, if the defendant does not enter an
objection (at a time when the trial judge can correct the error), then the
reviewing court may affirm the conviction if the evidence would have
supported a conviction of the greater offense, whether or not the
evidence supports the conviction of the legislatively responsive offense
returned by the jury.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 814 does not set forth the

responsive verdicts for aggravated assault with a firearm. Thus, the case at bar is

governed by La.Code Crim.P. art. 815 and La.R.S. 14:27(C). In State v. Price, 17-

520, pp. 6–7 (La. 6/27/18), 250 So.3d 230, 233–34, the supreme court stated that the

plurality in Elaire did not purport to address lesser and included offenses under

La.Code Crim.P. art. 815.

The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence is well-settled:

A sufficiency of the evidence claim is reviewed on appeal under
the standard set forth by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). In that case, the United States Supreme
Court explained that “the relevant question is whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (emphasis in original).

Commenting on Jackson, the Louisiana Supreme Court
cautioned that “[t]his standard, now legislatively embodied in
La.C.Cr.P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle
to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact-
finder.” State v. Pigford, 05-477, p. 6 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517,
521. Put simply, a reviewing court must afford great deference to a
4

jury’s decision to accept or reject the testimony. State v. Allen, 36,180
(La.App. 2 Cir. 9/18/02), 828 So.2d 622, writs denied, 02-2595 (La.
3/28/03), 840 So.2d 566, 02-2997 (La. 6/27/03), 847 So.2d 1255, cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1185, 124 S.Ct. 1404, 158 L.Ed.2d 90 (2004). “Where
there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of
which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses,
the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.” Id.
at 626.

State v. Artis, 23-348, pp. 2–3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/23), ___ So.3d ___ (2023 WL

8440365) (alterations in original).

Angela Doll testified that she met Defendant online prior to December 24,

2003, and the two were married on January 30, 2015. On March 29 or 30, 2020,

Defendant arrived home “under the influence of something.” Doll indicated

Defendant was drinking whiskey or vodka on the day at issue. Doll additionally

stated Defendant had a drug problem and had drugs in his system that night. She

described Defendant as “completely gone.” Doll testified she had two or three shots

of Fireball, a cinnamon flavored whiskey that was about thirty-five proof, which she

said was “like drinking water,” during this time.

Doll and Defendant fought, and Doll told Defendant she wanted a divorce.

Doll testified Defendant threatened to beat her ass. As a result of the argument, Doll

left to go to her neighbor’s house to cool off. After Doll left, Defendant yelled her

name in an unpleasant tone and called her phone several times. Defendant fired a

gun shot into the ground. Doll then ran back home “because at this point he’s got a

gun and threatened his own life and the life of my hounds. I can’t say exactly why

I went back, other than I was terrified he was going to follow through and injure

him, himself, one of those dogs, or somebody else.”

Defendant subsequently stepped onto the back porch and fired a second shot.

Doll was going around the fence line and saw the flash from the gun because it was

dark at that time. As she went up the steps to her home, Defendant put the gun in

5

his mouth. Doll testified that when she “went to grab for the gun is when it was

turned to” her. She was questioned:

Q. When did you try to pull the gun out of his mouth?

A. After I’d begged him to think of those that he loved most, and he
still had it in his mouth and had this look in his eyes that clearly said he
was not giving in at all. So it was just steadily staring -- it felt to me like
staring Satan in the eyes as he’s shaking. And I remember begging him
to think of them -- and when he didn’t I reached up for the gun and
when I did I was pulling on it and so he just simply turned it on me. I’m
close enough to grab the gun so --

Q. So the gun was pointed in your face now?

A. Yes, sir.

She further explained:

Q. When did you approach the defendant?

A. After the second gunshot.

Q. You did --

A. Because when I went up the steps -- because there was maybe,
like I said twenty yards. And when I heard that shot, then I picked up
speed because how do I know.

Q. And when did he put the gun in his mouth?

A. When I came up the steps to the back door to the utility room,
laundry room.

Q. And that was after the second gunshot.

A. Yes.

Q. When did he point the gun at you?

A. After the second gunshot, after I came in the door and was trying
to reason with him, when I went to grab for the gun is when it was
turned to me.

Q. So I still am -- was it after it was in his mouth or before?

A. Yes, after.

Q. So after it was in his mouth, it was pointed at you?

6

A. Yes.

Q. And how far away were you at that time?

A. Not even two feet.

Q. And was the gun physically touching you?

A. Yes.

Q. Where?

A. Right on the lips, almost to the, I wanna [sic] say the tooth line.
But literally on the lips pressing.

Doll did not recall what Defendant was saying when he had the gun in his mouth.

However, she subsequently testified that Defendant said he was going to take his

own life.

Doll eventually got the gun away from Defendant. She described how this

occurred:

A. As we were struggling for the gun, somehow, we went from the
utility room into the kitchen, which is literally not even five feet. But
he was standing against the island, and we were still steadily arguing
over the gun and everything else apparently. And finally -- I just
couldn’t think of anything else to reason with him for I simply looked
him in the eyes and said, can I suck your dick. Because there is one
sure way to elevate to get his mind off of it obviously. Because nothing
else worked and I figured hey, I’ve always heard from my guys friends’
[sic] what man can resist a blow job, right.

Q. So in order to survive is that why your thought process was there?

A. Yes, sir. Because I had tried everything else. I’ve tried reasoning,
I’ve tried bargaining, I’ve tried reminding him of what he had and what
he was steadily losing. I begged for help, I begged him, I begged his
family.

Q. And did this work to get the gun away?

A. Yes, for a brief little bit.

After oral sex, Doll still had the gun in her pocket.

Doll subsequently went into her bedroom, and Defendant entered the room,

asking where the gun was. Sometime later, Defendant wanted to have sex, and Doll
7

testified “it was easier to comply then [sic] have him go for a larger caliber gun . . .

.” Doll “laid there and fell asleep with [Defendant’s] penis right next to my mouth

because that’s the only way he would let me go to sleep.”

Defendant left home the following day, and Doll called a friend and begged

her to stay on the phone while Doll took a shower. Doll made the call in the event

Defendant returned and something happened to her.

Doll indicated she was trying to get through to Defendant during the incident

because “this was not the man that I knew.” According to Doll, she felt very

threatened at that time and was afraid of being shot. She later testified she was

terrified and traumatized and cared about Defendant.

Doll was extensively questioned about why she did not leave after the initial

fight and after Defendant turned the gun on her. Doll testified she did not run away

because she was “surrounded by a wooded area” and was worried Defendant would

shoot himself, as Defendant had threatened to do so “in the days prior to.” She

further said she did not run because she was terrified Defendant would shoot one of

the dogs. Additionally, she knew there was nowhere for her to go because she

weighed 350 pounds and used a cane. Also, the car keys were inside the house, and

they only had one vehicle. Doll did not call 911 because Defendant had detailed

what would occur if she did, and it involved shots being fired. When asked why she

did not leave after the second shot was fired, Doll stated: “Because there is a whole

arsenal of guns and plenty of ammunition and nothing but woods around me to sit

there and wait while he was out of his mind. And he was very clear about me leaving

his home.” Doll claimed Defendant was in the militia.2

2
The transcript says “Malacia,” which we assume is a typo.
8

Doll was asked about her mental health and testified that at one point she was

diagnosed with bipolar disorder and depression. However, therapy indicated her

bipolar diagnosis was probably inaccurate. Doll was also asked about whether she

told anyone she had multiple personalities.

Doll indicated she knew Nick Bertrand, who had been neighbors with

Defendant and Doll for approximately fifteen years. She went to him “after all of

this happened because nothing made sense. I actually asked him to come and get

my pistol because I didn’t understand what was going on other than my pistol kept

getting moved and unloaded and the safety turned off. Things were not normal

around the house.” Doll indicated she also saw Bertrand after she separated from

Defendant to ask Bertrand about an incident because she “was not clear on exactly

what I was remembering.”

When asked what she did on the March date at issue, Doll said she was taking

care of her dogs. She further declared:

A. I’m fairly sure, I can honestly say that I remember clearly
because nothing made sense.

Q. Have you had problems with your memory before this even [sic],
Ms. D[ol]l?

A. Only when things were not clear in the home, beyond that
sometimes yes because nothing made sense. And I also had medical
conditions that didn’t help. I was on enough medications because I
thought I was crazy. When the house almost burnt down that was
placed on me. So, I went on medications because this does affect my
family, my kids.

The event at issue occurred on March 29 or 30, 2020. Doll left the home on

May 11 or 13, 2020, called police on June 23, 2020, and gave a statement to police

on July 3, 2020. Doll was asked to read her statement to police, which indicated, in

part:

And I heard the first gunshot go off, so my only thought was either A,
he killed my dogs, which is the only reason that I’ve stuck around this
9

point, or he’d killed himself. Dumbass me went back. There was a
second shot fired when I went back towards the house. When I went
around the corner, and at that point the -- in time he had the gun on me.
When I got up to the steps he put the gun in his mouth, the fight ensued
from there over the pistol. It’s loaded 380, it ensued and I finally got
the pistole [sic] out of mouth [sic] and then he aimed it in mine. I said,
okay fine. We are standing there with pistol [sic] in my mouth ‥‥

She told police there were parts of the events that she did not remember. She was

further questioned about her statement:

Q. All right. This is page five of your statement. The top of it -- read
that first line of it, please.

A. “Tried and fought for it and that was once I got ahold of it, I’m
not letting it go, I’m not, fuck that.”

Q. So what are you talking about there? What did you get a hold of?

A. The pistol in question.

Q. And ya’ll [sic] got into physical altercations she asked you about
the physical; is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Read the third line, your statement.

A. “Just struggling to pull away from him and trying to talk to him
and you know, get through to whatever demon had in him. I mean it
was --”

Q. She asked you if there was any strikes during the tussle and you
said you didn’t remember any; is that correct?

A. Honestly I don’t think so, I don’t remember. There were threats
too.

Q. So how long did this struggle go on over this gun, Ms. D[ol]l?

A. Honestly, sir, I was terrified and I could not tell you the amount
of time that passed.

Q. Well, can you tell me -- if he had the gun like this in front of him;
is that how he had it? One hand, two hands?

A. As I pointed out yesterday, he had it in his mouth and then when
he turned it, it was on my mouth. The same way, except for different
face.

10

Q. . . . So, is it at that point you reached up and grabbed the gun?

A. As near as I can recall.

Q. Okay. So, you ended up with the gun though, right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. So ya’ll [sic] struggled over the gun, and you can’t tell me
how long that lasted, but then after that -- she asked you about, “did
anybody get hurt, did anybody receive any injuries”, “not that I
remember”. “Okay, do you remember if he did”, “no he didn’t, other
than maybe a bruise, that would be about it”. “Okay so you got the gun
from him and at what point did you get the from him?” And your answer
was?

A. After I asked to suck his dick.

Q. So was it after you asked to suck his dick or before or before or
after you did suck his dick?

A. It was during that I was able to retrieve the pistol completely and
put it in my hoodie pocket, and he still reached for it.

Q. Okay. So he -- let me make sure I understand, Ms. D[ol]l. You’re
saying that during the struggle your hand is on the gun, his hand is on
the gun, you make the comment that you make here, “I asked to suck
his dick”, and it was after you asked him is when you got the gun; right?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And so -- and if I’m correct in what I read here; you had
the gun -- as you got the gun you had it for the rest of the night or you
knew where it was. You placed it wherever it was?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you’re answering these questions from the page before,
“okay, so you got the gun from him, what did you with it?” And your
answer was --

A. “Sucked his dick to keep him from putting [sic] that fucking gun,
because he was determined to get it back.”

Q. “Okay. Where did you put it?”

A. “In my hoodie pocket.” I had a hoodie on, so I stuck it in my
pocket and had my hand on it the entire time.

After oral sex, Defendant wanted the gun back.

11

In a phone call made to Doll, Defendant denied pulling a gun on Doll or

pointing a gun at her. He, however, admitted to firing a gun into the ground to get

her attention. Defendant apologized for his actions. Later in the conversation, the

following exchange occurred:

Doll: Because you held me at gun point, Mike.

Defendant: No, Angela, I didn’t.

Doll: Yeah, you did, you had that gun in your mouth.

Defendant: I’m sorry, I did, I did that and I’m sorry for it, okay?

....

Defendant: I apologize, I told you, you don’t know how sorry I am.

Defendant told Doll he would be going to jail soon. He further stated, “I did this,

but you didn’t have to file charges.”

Angela Trahan testified that Doll called requesting that she stay on the phone

while Doll showered. Doll was terrified at that time, and it was difficult for Trahan

to understand her. A few days later, Defendant appeared outside Trahan’s home.

Trahan refused to tell Defendant where Doll was. Defendant said, “I should have

shot her when I had the chance.” When explaining what had occurred between

herself and Defendant, Doll told Trahan she had a weapon in her mouth, and she did

not want to die.

Detective Tiffany Maks with the Beauregard Parish Sheriff’s Office testified

that Defendant was arrested on August 20, 2020, as the result of a complaint made

on June 23, 2020. Detective Maks indicated Doll had reported that a gun had been

pointed at her face, and then Defendant pointed it at himself. According to Detective

Maks, Doll got the gun away from Defendant, put it in her hoodie, and performed

oral sex on Defendant. During the sexual encounter, Defendant attempted to get the

gun several times. Thereafter, Doll entered the bedroom, and Defendant followed
12

her. They argued more and ended up having sexual intercourse. Detective Maks

agreed this was “one constant argument.”

Detective Maks interviewed Defendant on July 7, 2020, regarding an event

that occurred in March 2020. Defendant admitted he and Doll argued. He initially

denied that firearms were involved but eventually said he shot a firearm into the

ground. Defendant stated he did this to get Doll’s attention and to get her to return

home. Defendant reported that Doll was not afraid of him. Defendant ultimately

admitted he was angry that Doll left. In his interview, Defendant denied that sex

occurred on the night at issue.

Defendant’s statement to the police was published to the jury. In that

statement, Defendant said Doll was mentally ill and took psych medication.

Defendant discussed his divorce and said Doll wanted half of everything. Defendant

was asked about an incident that occurred in March. Defendant denied an incident

with a firearm occurred. He then said he fired a shot outside a door once, possibly

in March. He claimed he did so to get Doll’s attention because she ran off. When

Doll returned, they argued more. He guessed they made up but denied they had sex.

Defendant said there was no reason for Doll to be scared of him. He said he never

laid a hand on her or threatened her. Moreover, he would never dream of hurting

her. Defendant guessed he fired the gun because he was angry and was trying to get

Doll’s attention. Thereafter, he put the gun away. He denied her requesting oral sex

and indicated they had not had sex in a long time. He also denied forcing Doll to

have sex with him. He also denied being a violent person. Defendant said the events

at issue did not happen in March but occurred way before that.

Detective Maks testified that Defendant admitted there was an argument, he

had a gun, he fired the gun, and he fired the gun out of anger. Detective Maks was

further questioned:
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Q. Did he say that he had oral sex?

A. He denied sex.

Q. Okay. And how did -- I watching the video -- how did he react
when you asked him for the first time if she asked to suck your dick?
Did he act surprised? He later said, where did that come from;
remember that?

A. He did say that.

Q. Were you - go to page ten, please. The first - second time Mr.
Suydam is speaking on that page. It says, “I never laid a hand on that
woman”. Right?

A. That’s what it says.

Q. I never threatened her life, ever; right?

A. Correct.

Q. And then you say, “I mean, I would take that as a threat”. “Yeah,
I would never hurt that woman, ever”. “Explain, okay”. “I never laid a
hand on that woman”. “Okay, I didn’t say you did”. “I would never
dream of hurting that woman”. “Listen to me for a second”. Hhh -huh”.
“Why else do it?” “Out of anger, I guess, just trying to get her attention,
just trying to get her back in the house were [sic] we can, I mean”. So,
what happened to the pistole [sic] after you fired the [sic] ground?
What was the next thing that happened?” “I put it up”. So, he never
acknowledged holding a gun to her face, putting it in her mouth or
anything like that?

A. He did not.

Detective Maks acknowledged that a gun was pointed or fired or both, and Doll was

afraid of being shot.

Doll called Nick Bertrand in March 2020 and asked him to hold her 380 Ruger

pistol, which he did. He returned the gun ten days later.

Regina Nicol testified that Defendant was her future brother-in-law, and she

had known him for six years. Nicol indicated that in the latter part of 2019, Doll

told her Defendant raped her at gunpoint. Nicol further testified that Doll said she

was “going to stick it to Mike, and she was going to say her raped her.”

14

Officer Quincy Buckley of the Beauregard Sheriff’s Department testified

regarding Doll’s complaint that OnStar did something to her vehicle, including

locking and unlocking doors, making the alarm go on and off, and turning the engine

on and off. OnStar could not determine where the connection was coming from but

did indicate that the OnStar application could not disable the vehicle while it was

being driven and could not start the vehicle. This occurred in August of 2020.

The issue raised herein is whether the State proved Defendant had the specific

intent to commit the offense of which he was convicted. We have found no cases

addressing the sufficiency of the evidence to prove attempted aggravated assault

with a firearm.

In State v. Blaise, 504 So.2d 1092, 1094 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1987), Ms. Bailko

and Mr. Bernard testified the defendant in that case was holding a gun when he

entered the bar. Ms. Bailko further stated the defendant was brandishing the pistol

when he entered. The fourth circuit concluded this was sufficient to prove the

general intent to scare mental element of aggravated assault. In State v. Connors,

432 So.2d 308, 311 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1983), the court concluded that an assault

occurred when the defendant intentionally raised the gun “as if to aim it” and thereby

placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery. In State v.

Major, 19-621 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/15/19), 290 So.3d 1205, writ denied, 20-286 (La.

7/31/20), 300 So.3d 398, the first circuit concluded the act of pointing a weapon at

another person and threatening bodily harm was sufficient to establish the general

intent element of aggravated assault.

Defendant indicated he was angry because Doll left and, therefore, fired a gun

twice. According to Doll, Defendant subsequently placed the gun in his mouth and

then pressed the gun against Doll’s lips. Based on the above-cited cases, pointing a

gun at Doll is sufficient to prove general intent to commit an assault. We also find
15

that pointing a gun at Doll and touching her on the lips with the weapon when Doll

was trying to take the gun away from Defendant was sufficient to prove Defendant

had the specific intent to place Doll in reasonable apprehension of receiving a

battery, as specific intent can be formed in an instant.

For these reasons, we find no merit to this assignment of error, and affirm

Defendant’s conviction for attempted aggravated assault with a firearm.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

In his second assignment of error, Defendant contends trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise the issue of intoxication as a defense to attempted

aggravated assault with a firearm or to request a special jury instruction on the issue

of an intoxication defense.

To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
petitioner must show that: (1) his defense counsel’s performance was
deficient, which requires a showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious that he failed to function as that “counsel” guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment; and (2) the deficient performance so prejudiced the
defense that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial, which is one
“whose result is reliable.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Both showings must be
made before it can be found that the defendant’s conviction “resulted
from a breakdown in the adversary process that render[ed] the trial
result unreliable.” Id. The proper standard for attorney performance is
not perfect assistance. Rather, it is “reasonably effective assistance” of
counsel. Id.

State v. Deville, 22-350, p. 23 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/23/22), 354 So.3d 99, 112

(alteration in original). “A claim of ineffectiveness is generally relegated to post-

conviction, unless the record permits definitive resolution on appeal.” State v.

Bright, 98-398, p. 41 (La. 4/11/00), 776 So.2d 1134, 1157. We find the record is

sufficient to review Defendant’s claim.

Defendant suggests trial counsel should have raised intoxication as a defense

to attempted aggravated assault with a firearm or requested a special jury instruction

thereon. Defendant acknowledges he did not provide advanced notice of his intent
16

to assert the affirmative defense of intoxication. However, he suggests the record

was replete with evidence of his drug use and intoxication. Moreover:

[o]nce the jury rejected the charge as billed and started to consider the
lesser attempt charge, the lay jury did not know intoxication could have
vitiated one of the key elements of attempted aggravated assault with a
firearm—specific intent. Since the jury was not armed with this
information, they stopped their deliberations at attempted aggravated
assault with a firearm. If the jury had been properly instructed, it would
have been obvious that aggravated assault was the only viable lesser-
included offense.

Therefore, Defendant maintains his trial counsel’s failure to ensure the jury was

properly instructed was ineffective.

The State claims Defendant’s argument is flawed in that the charged offense

of aggravated assault with a firearm is a general intent crime to which intoxication

is not a defense. The State asserts trial counsel is required to defend against the

charged crime, not a responsive offense.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:15 addresses intoxication:

The fact of an intoxicated or drugged condition of the offender
at the time of the commission of the crime is immaterial, except as
follows:

(1) Where the production of the intoxicated or drugged condition
has been involuntary, and the circumstances indicate this condition is
the direct cause of the commission of the crime, the offender is exempt
from criminal responsibility.

(2) Where the circumstances indicate that an intoxicated or
drugged condition has precluded the presence of a specific criminal
intent or of special knowledge required in a particular crime, this fact
constitutes a defense to a prosecution for that crime.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 726 (emphasis added) provides for

notice of a defense based upon mental condition:

A. If a defendant intends to introduce testimony relating to a
mental disease, defect, or other condition bearing upon the issue of
whether he had the mental state required for the offense charged, he
shall not later than ten days prior to trial or such reasonable time as the
court may permit, notify the district attorney in writing of such intention
and file a copy of such notice with the clerk. The court may for cause
17

shown allow late filing of the notice or grant additional time to the
parties to prepare for trial or make such other orders as may be
appropriate.

B. If there is a failure to give notice as required by Subsection A
of this Article, the court may exclude the testimony of any witness
offered by the defendant on the issue of mental condition.

“Intoxication is an ‘other condition’ bearing on the issue of whether the defendant

had the mental state for the offense charged.” State v. Trahan, 576 So.2d 1, 6

(La.1990) (emphasis added). Based on La.Code Crim.P. art. 726(A) and Trahan,

whether intoxication is available as a defense is determined based on the offense

charged.

There was no evidence of involuntary intoxication in this matter, and

“voluntary intoxication can be considered as a defense only in cases where specific

intent is a necessary element of the crime.” State v. Boleyn, 328 So.2d 95, 98

(La.1976). The charged offense of aggravated assault with a firearm is a general

intent crime. Accordingly, an intoxication defense would have been improper in this

case. State v. Frank, 549 So.2d 401, 407 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1989). Thus, counsel was

not ineffective for failing to raise an intoxication defense or request a jury instruction

on intoxication.

For these reasons, this assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NO. 3 & 4

In his third assignment of error, Defendant contends the four-year hard labor

sentence for attempted aggravated assault with a firearm is constitutionally

excessive. In his fourth assignment of error, Defendant contends trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to file a motion to reconsider sentence to preserve his statutory

right to seek review of the trial court’s sentence. Defendant alternatively suggests

this case be remanded for a hearing on the issue of counsel’s ineffectiveness.

18

Inasmuch as these issues relate to Defendant’s sentence, we will address them

collectively.

Defense counsel made a general objection at the time sentence was imposed.

However, no motion to reconsider sentence was filed. “The failure to timely file a

written motion to reconsider sentence or to orally urge any specific ground for

reconsideration at sentencing precludes a defendant from objecting to the sentence

imposed.” State v. Barling, 00-1241, p. 10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035,

1041, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331. Louisiana Code of Criminal

Procedure Article 881.1 serves as the basis for this proclamation and provides, in

pertinent part:

A. (1) In felony cases, within thirty days following the imposition
of sentence or within such longer period as the trial court may set at
sentence, the state or the defendant may make or file a motion to
reconsider sentence.

....

B. The motion shall be oral at the time of sentence or shall be in
writing thereafter and shall set forth the specific grounds on which the
motion is based.

....

E. Failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to
include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence
may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the
state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from
urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.

“In cases where courts have held that an oral objection alone is sufficient to preserve

the issue for review, the oral objection contained the basis for the motion, such as

excessiveness of sentence.” Barling, 779 So.2d at 1041–42. When there is no basis

for the objection, the court is relegated to a bare claim of excessiveness. Id. at 1042.

Thus, Defendant would receive a bare excessiveness review of his sentence based

on defense counsel’s general objection. However, in brief to this court, Defendant

19

raises several claims regarding his sentence that would not be addressed in a bare

excessiveness review.

In support of his claims, Defendant suggests the nature of the crime and his

minor criminal history are evidence that his four-year sentence is excessive.

Defendant notes there was no pre-sentence investigation (PSI) or mention of his

criminal history at sentencing. Defendant avers the appellate record includes a rap

sheet that shows a 1996 conviction for second offense possession of marijuana,

which would be a misdemeanor under the current law, for which he received a

suspended sentence and three years of probation. Moreover, there was no evidence

that he “was terminated from probation.” Thereafter, Defendant addresses the facts

of the case. He claims the offense was a one-time event, he showed no intent to

harm Doll prior to her trying to prevent him from harming himself, and Doll did not

testify that he threatened her at the time he pointed the gun at her. Furthermore, he

expressed remorse for what his addiction caused him to do and the loss of his family.

Defendant next addresses defense counsel’s failure to file a motion to

reconsider sentence or voice a specific objection to the sentence. He suggests

counsel had no strategic reason for failing to file a motion to reconsider given the

objection to the sentence at the time it was imposed, the lack of a PSI, and the trial

court’s failure to mention or consider the sentencing factors set out in La.Code

Crim.P. art. 894.1. In addressing statements made by the trial court at sentencing,

Defendant claims he was in Arkansas because he lost his home due to a hurricane

and was caring for his mother while there, he missed a court date because he had

COVID-19, there was no mention of his criminal record and whether he complied

with probation, and the trial court’s discussion regarding his failure to return to

Louisiana for a probation hearing was muted by the fact that his probation would

20

have to be transferred to Arkansas. Defendant further suggests the trial court failed

to consider the following:

Michael Suydam was a felon for the first time in nearly thirty years.
Clearly, he has some substance abuse problems he must control, but
when he is not using, he does not appear to have a problem. He was
sixty years old at the time of sentencing. He was the sole caregiver for
his ill, elderly mother. “The imprisonment of the defendant would entail
excessive hardship to himself or his dependents.” La. C. Cr. P. art.
894.1(8)(31). Suydam expressed what appeared to be genuine remorse
for the pain he caused, even if he did not remember what happened.

In State v. Doucet, 09-1065, pp. 6–7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/10), 36 So.3d 1105,

1110–11 (third alteration in original), writ denied, 10-1195 (La. 12/17/10), 51 So.3d

19, this court discussed ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a motion

to reconsider sentence as follows:

[W]hen the record contains sufficient evidence to address the
ineffective assistance of counsel issue, this court examines “whether
there was a reasonable probability that the trial court would have
reduced” Defendant’s sentence if Defendant’s trial counsel made or
filed a motion to reconsider sentence. [State v. Blake, 03-1465 (La.App.
3 Cir. 5/5/04), 872 So.2d 602] at 608 (citing State v. Prudhomme, 02–
511 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/30/02), 829 So.2d 1166, writ denied, 02–3230
(La.10/10/03), 855 So.2d 324).

When the defense counsel fails to file a motion to reconsider
sentence, Defendant may have a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel when Defendant “can show a reasonable probability, but for
defense counsel’s error, his sentence would have been different.”
Prudhomme, 829 So.2d at 1177 (citing State v. Texada, 98–1647
(La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/99), 734 So.2d 854). Moreover,

[a] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
properly raised in an application for post-conviction relief.
This allows the trial judge an opportunity to order a full
evidentiary hearing on the matter. State v. Burkhalter, 428
So.2d 449 (La.1983). However, where the record contains
evidence sufficient to decide the issue and the issue is
raised by an assignment of error on appeal, it may be
considered. State v. James, 95-962 (La.App. 3 Cir.
2/14/96); 670 So.2d 461.

State v. Francis, 99-208, pp. 10-11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/6/99), 748 So.2d
484, 491, writ denied, 00-544 (La.11/13/00), 773 So.2d 156.

21

To prove an allegation of ineffectiveness, Defendant must
specifically show prejudice. Blake, 872 So.2d 602 (citing State v. Reed,
00-1537 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/02), 809 So.2d 1261, writ denied, 02-1313
(La.4/25/03), 842 So.2d 391). “Whether or not a defendant received
ineffective assistance of counsel is a two-part inquiry. First, we must
determine whether the trial court would have reduced the Defendant’s
sentences upon the filing of a ‘Motion to Reconsider Sentence.’
Second, we must determine whether the sentences were excessive.” Id.
at 609.

The first question to be answered is whether the trial court would have reduced

Defendant’s sentence had a motion to reconsider sentence been filed. Defendant

was convicted of attempted aggravated assault with a firearm. This offense is

punishable by a fine up to $5000 and imprisonment with or without hard labor for

not more than five years. La.R.S. 14:37.4(C); La.R.S. 14:27(D)(3). Defendant was

sentenced to serve four years at hard labor and to pay a fine of $1500.

Defendant called two witnesses at the sentencing hearing held on March 1,

2023. Defendant’s mother, Doris Suydam, testified that she lived in Benton,

Arkansas. She was in poor health and used a wheelchair. She indicated Defendant

was the only person who could help take care of her. She further testified that

Defendant did not go to Arkansas to hide, and she was shocked when he was arrested

at her home. Ms. Suydam was questioned about Defendant having COVID while in

Arkansas. She indicated her address was 418 Jefferson Street in Benton, and

Defendant did not live at 416 Jefferson Street despite that address being listed on his

COVID test result. Ms. Suydam was unaware that the Sheriff’s Office tried to serve

Defendant in Benton and could not get in touch with him. In a letter, Ms. Suydam

stated that before Defendant was incarcerated on August 8, 2022, Defendant was her

caretaker and was living with her during that period.

Defendant’s sister, Monica LeBlanc, testified she was at her mother’s home

when Defendant was arrested. Their father died in May of 2021, and Defendant

moved to Benton right after that. LeBlanc indicated Defendant did not complete the
22

rehabilitation program he entered in New Orleans. The two discussed Defendant’s

obligation to turn himself in to the Beauregard Sheriff’s Department because of his

failure to complete the program. According to LeBlanc, Defendant was picked up

by police before he could turn himself in. LeBlanc was not aware of any bond

conditions imposed on Defendant.

Doll presented a victim impact statement to the court. Thereafter, the trial

court filed a letter from defense counsel into the record and left the record open to

allow any other letters from counsel concerning the sentence to be received.

Defense counsel’s letter addressed sentencing, stating Defendant “had very

little if any criminal history and ha[d] been gainfully employed for the majority of

his adult life until he was forced to go on Social Security Disability.” Defense

counsel further stated Defendant had been living with and helping his mother at the

time of his incarceration, and both Defendant and his mother hoped he would be

placed on probation and that probation could be transferred to Benton, Arkansas.

Counsel asserted Defendant was remorseful, and it was clear from his statement to

police that he did not have a “great recollection of the events and I’m sure that’s

because of ingesting some kind of intoxicant.”

After the hearing, the State also filed what it labeled an informal sentencing

memorandum. Therein, the State asked that Defendant not be placed on probation,

noting he was offered a partially suspended sentence but refused to accept a

favorable felony plea proposal. The State averred Defendant’s actions were

deliberately cruel, and the offense was a crime of violence. The State noted that

Defendant had previously been given the opportunity to participate in a

rehabilitation program, but his failure to complete the program showed he was not

ready to accept responsibility for his actions or become accountable to himself and

others. Moreover, Defendant failed to comply with the conditions of his bond when
23

he moved to Arkansas. The State alleged Doll and her family members would be at

undue risk during a period of any suspension of sentence or probation. The State

asked for imposition of the maximum sentence.

At proceedings held on March 9, 2023, defense counsel informed the trial

court that Defendant wanted to read a statement to the court. The court responded:

Well, I thought that’s why we had the sentencing hearing . . . .
I’m ready to sentence him and it’s going to have no effect, but he can
read whatever he’d like today. But the sentence has already been
prepared and I’m ready to proceed because we had a sentencing hearing
at his request. But he can read it.

In that statement, Defendant indicated the events that occurred were his fault, and he

had very little memory of that night. He also apologized to the victim. Defendant

further indicated that he had been clean and sober for quite some time. He also asked

for the opportunity to take care of his ailing mother.

The trial court gave the following reasons for the sentence it imposed:

On March 1, 2023, a sentencing hearing was scheduled before
this Court. Two family members testified on behalf of the defendant,
and counsel for the defendant wrote a letter. I understand and I’m
sympathetic to Ms. Suydam, the defendant’s mother, a resident of the
State of Texas [sic] , that testified. The defendant’s mother is clearly in
need of her son to be present to care for her and to assist her and [sic]
addressing her unfortunate health challenges.

It is unfortunate that her need for her son falls at a time when he
is a defendant in a criminal matter. Her daughter, who also testified,
voluntarily cares for another person, as opposed to her mother but
renders some support to her mother. That testimony, while presented at
the sentencing hearing, and again, I would say reiterated today by the
defendant, indicates the desire of the family for the defendant. It is not
uncommon for this Court to hear the personal reasons why the family
prefers their loved one to have one sentence over another. And in this
instance, the family’s desire, according to the counsel’s letter, also his
desire, for the Court to place him on probation so is [sic] to allow him
to go to Arkansas, as he no longer has a residence in Louisiana.

I also heard from the victim, Angela D[ol]l, who read her victim
impact statement into the record, and it has been filed. It reflects a man
that at one time was her loving husband but had a reversal in that role
to become violent. Based on evidence heard at the trial, the reversal was

24

likely due to substance abuse. As this Court is aware, substance abuse
and guns result in unfortunate circumstances.

The past actions of Michael Suydam indicate to this Court that
the defendant would likely not fare well on a probated sentence. In the
past the defendant failed to follow Court orders. Mr. Suydam requested
through his first attorney, Terry Fowler, to be allowed to go to Teen
Challenge, he failed to remain there. He absconded from there after
only six days and failed to report this to any authority, although Teen
Challenge immediately reported it to the Court and a warrant was
issued, upon which three days later after leaving Teen Challenge, the
defendant was arrested.

On July 22, 2022, the defendant was contacted personally by the
-- the defendant contacted personally the Beauregard Parish District
Attorneys [sic] Office indicating he was positive for COVID and would
not be at his specially set trial date for July 25th. It was at this time that
it was learned the defendant was living out of State and in violation of
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 320.

Defendant’s attorney at that time, Robert Lounsberry was given
notice of this in open court on July 25, 2022, and a [sic] arrest warrant
was issued. Knowing this arrest was outstanding, the defendant was
given ample opportunity to return voluntarily to Louisiana, after being
informed he was in violation of his bond. However, six weeks later he
was arrested and extradited back to the State of Louisiana arriving at
our jail on September 11, 2022, where he has remained.

The defendant, while on bond, was not working but receiving
Social Security Disability. Testimony at trial indicated the defendant
had been a crane operator, but apparently lost his job prior to the matter
before the Court due to substance abuse.

Based on this history of the defendant, and a pattern of refusing
to comply with the Court’s order, this Court finds that it is unlikely that
the defendant would comply with this order of probation. If ordered to
return her [sic] for probation hearing, I do not know that he would
return because based on past history he had to be arrested to return here,
to the Court twice.

This Court is convinced that he would not appear. In this case to
grant the defendant’s plea through his counsel and family to place him
on probation and allow him to move Arkansas [sic], outside this
jurisdiction would not be punishment, it is simply giving him his way
and I believe he would fail to appropriately account to his probation
officer or the Court in this situation.

Mr. Suydam is sixty years old, he’s already been given a chance
for drug rehabilitation, I’m happy to hear he took it upon himself to do
that and I hope that is correct. He will have to make that choice; the
Court will no longer be able to do that for him.
25

At this time, based on the factors stated here in [sic] incarceration
seems to be the appropriate punishment considering the above reasons.

Reviewing the record, we cannot say there was a reasonable probability the

trial court would have reduced Defendant’s sentence if a motion to reconsider

sentence had been filed. The trial court noted this was a crime of violence and that

Defendant fired the gun twice during the incident, specifically commenting that

“substance abuse and guns result in unfortunate circumstances.” The trial court also

specifically noted Defendant was given ample opportunity to return voluntarily to

Louisiana, but even after being informed he was in violation of his bond he chose

not to return and was arrested six weeks later in Arkansas. The trial court concluded

that the past actions of Defendant “indicate to this Court that the defendant would

likely not fare well on a probated sentence” and that “incarceration seems to be the

appropriate punishment.”

The law is clear that a “trial judge need not articulate every aggravating and

mitigating circumstance outlined in art. 894.1, the record must reflect that he

adequately considered these guidelines in particularizing the sentence to the

defendant.” State v. Smith, 433 So.2d 688, 698 (La.1983). Additionally, the trial

court is not required to order a presentence investigation report. La.Code Crim.P.

art. 875(A)(1); State v. Peterson, 96-1663, p. 18 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/4/97), 696 So.2d

211, 222, writ denied, 97-1742 (La. 11/26/97), 703 So.2d 644. Looking at these

general principals, coupled with the trial court’s stated reasons for sentence, we

cannot say the trial court likely would have reduced Defendant’s sentence had a

motion to reconsider sentence raising the issues suggested by Defendant been filed.

We also find no merit to Defendant’s argument that his sentence is excessive.

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be reviewed
for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762
(La.1979). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of
26

sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set
aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Barling, 00–1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d
1035, 1042–43 (citing State v. Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir.
10/13/99), 746 So.2d 124, writ denied, 00–165 (La. 6/30/00), 765 So.2d
1067).

....

“[Louisiana] Const. art I, § 20, guarantees that, ‘[n]o law shall
subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.’ ” Barling, 779
So.2d at 1042–43. “To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing
court must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the severity
of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes
no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore,
nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and suffering.” Id. at
1042 (citing State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981)).

The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad
sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been
more appropriate. Barling, 779 So.2d at 1042–43 (citing State v. Cook,
95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, cert denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117
S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996)). In reviewing the defendant’s
sentence, the appellate court should consider the nature of the crime,
the nature and background of the offender, and the sentences imposed
for similar crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98),
726 So.2d 57 (citing State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983)), writ
denied, 99–433 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. “[T]he appellate court
must be mindful that the trial court is in the best position to consider
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of each case. . . .” State
v. Williams, 02-707 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/03), 839 So.2d 1095, 1100
(citing Cook, 674 So.2d 957).

State v. Rexrode, 17-457, pp. 3–4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/15/17), 232 So.3d 1251, 1253–

54 (alterations in original). Attempted aggravated assault with a firearm is a crime

of violence. La.R.S. 14(2)(B)(33). Testimony revealed Defendant put the gun to

Doll’s mouth, after previously firing two shots as Doll was initially walking away.

Defendant acknowledged he was under the influence of intoxicants during the

entirety of the incident.

Although Defendant’s sentence of four years is in the upper spectrum of the

sentencing range, it was not the maximum sentence. The jurisprudence is well

settled that “[t]he trial judge is given great discretion in the imposition of sentences

27

within statutory limits, and the sentence should not be set aside in the absence of

abuse of his discretion.” State v. Bradley, 414 So.2d 724, 725 (La.1982) (citations

omitted). The relevant question is simply “whether the trial court abused its broad

sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more

appropriate.” State v. Cook, 95-2784, p. 3 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 959 (per

curium) (quoting State v. Humphrey, 445 So.2d 1155, 1165 (La.1984)), cert. denied,

519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615 (1996). We cannot say the sentence imposed is an

abuse of the trial court’s discretion nor is it disproportionate to the severity of the

offense and the specific violent facts of this case.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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29