Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Rottman v. Beverly, 165 So. 153.

188 citing documents.

  • Belshe v. Gant 92 So. 2d 719 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1957
  • Crosby v. Brown Oil Tools 92 So. 2d 115 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1957
  • Brooks v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. 91 So. 2d 403 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1956
  • Tucker v. State 91 So. 2d 56 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1956
    In the Wheadon case, supra, , 165 So.
  • Carlson v. Fidelity Mutual Insurance 88 So. 2d 461 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1956
  • Guillory v. Lemoine 87 So. 2d 798 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1956
    Unquestionably Vincent Guillory was negligent, but it is equally clear Lemoine under the rulings established by the Supreme Court in Rottman v. Beverly, 1935, , 165 So.
  • Ramsey v. McDaniel 84 So. 2d 276 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1955
    * * * * * * "Counsel for McDaniel contends McDaniel was guilty of no negligence and that therefore, this doctrine does not apply, quoting the landmark case of Rottman v. Beverly [ ], 165 So.
  • Chouest v. Remont 81 So. 2d 568 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1955
    wrong side of the highway has the last clear chance of avoiding the accident is normally a question of fact, depending on whether the oncoming driver did or should have observed that the other driver had created or was creating a dangerous situation; and whether after such time, the oncoming driver could have avoided the accident in question, but nevertheless failed to do so, , 165 So.
  • Kennix v. Burt 81 So. 2d 73 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1955
    of the last car rather than between two parked cars; therefore, the view of the defendant driver of the scene, where the child emerged from the alley onto the sidewalk into the street was unobstructed, giving the driver the last clear chance to avoid the accident after discovery of the apparent peril— “ , 165 So.
  • Micklich v. General Lloyds Fire & Casualty Co. 81 So. 2d 43 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1955
    In this Court plaintiff makes the additional argument that although Mrs. Swilley did not see plaintiff, she should have seen plaintiff and even if he walked into the side of the truck she had ample time to discover the peril, which presumably would bring the plaintiff’s , 165 So.
  • Montault v. Bradford 79 So. 2d 601 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1955
    Counsel for plaintiff in relying upon the well established principles of law originally enunciated in the cases of Rottman v. Beverly, 1936, , 165 So.
  • Deck v. Page 77 So. 2d 209 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1955
    In the alternative, counsel for plaintiff argues that even if it be conceded that plaintiff was negligent, , 165 So.
  • Davis v. Lewis & Lewis 78 So. 2d 174 La. 1954
    '947, , cited by the defendant, is not applicable.
  • Whittey v. Locascio 76 So. 2d 455 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1954
  • Moore v. Moran 74 So. 2d 767 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1954
  • Anderson v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. 74 So. 2d 761 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1954
  • Broughton v. Touchstone 72 So. 2d 552 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1954
  • Prine v. Continental Southern Lines 71 So. 2d 716 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1954
  • Moore v. Nola Cabs 70 So. 2d 404 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1954
  • Wheadon v. Porter 69 So. 2d 610 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1953
    The instant case presents facts which we think call for application of the last clear chance doctrine as applied in Rottman v. Beverly, 1935, , 165 So.
  • Mitchell v. Buras 68 So. 2d 617 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1953
    which found, as a fact, that “plaintiff was guilty of negligence in failing to look and to see the truck and that her negligence was such as to bar her' recovery, irrespective of whether it was the sole or only a contributing cause of the accident.” However, counsel for the plaintiff relies upon the well established principle of law originally enunciated, in the case of Rottman v. Beverly, 1936, , 165 So.
  • Crossley v. Stell 69 So. 2d 78 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1953
  • Audubon Ins. Co. v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. 68 So. 2d 232 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1953
  • Dupuy v. Veazey 63 So. 2d 756 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1953
    Counsel for plaintifif in relying upon the well established principles of law originally enunciated in the cases of Rottman v. Beverly, 1936, , 165 So.
  • Silvera v. Gallardo 63 So. 2d 15 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1953
  • Attaway v. Lanusse 62 So. 2d 156 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1952
  • Hanks v. Arkansas & Louisiana Missouri Ry. Co. 62 So. 2d 139 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1952
  • Allison v. Turner 61 So. 2d 207 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1952
    The kindred doctrine of discovered peril announced . , 165 So.
  • Pereira v. Herbert 59 So. 2d 729 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1952
  • Bergeron v. Department of Highways 60 So. 2d 4 La. 1952
  • Kimble v. Airco Refrigeration Service, Inc. 57 So. 2d 788 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1952
    adillac obstructed plaintiff’s view of the approaching truck and that plaintiff was engaging in an extremely hazardous act in endeavoring to cross Jackson Avenue when he could not see the approach of traffic moving in this street from the lake to the river and it is, of course true, that in spite of this negligence exemplified by the plaintiff, , 165 So.
  • Bechtel v. Oriol 52 So. 2d 589 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1951
    By doing so I do not put myself to blame."” , 165 So.
  • Duet v. Terrebonne 52 So. 2d 263 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1951
    It was shown to the satisfaction of the trial judge, and to ours, that the defendant driver did everything that could be expected of a prudent man in the circumstances that confronted him and, in the language of the Supreme Court, , 165 So.
  • Bergeron v. Department of Highways 50 So. 2d 337 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1951
    In the case entitled Rottman v. Beverly, reported in , 165 So.
  • Cox v. Gross 47 So. 2d 102 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1950
  • Flowers v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America 46 So. 2d 776 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1950
  • Gonzales v. Hanle 46 So. 2d 369 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1950
  • Wall v. Great American Indemnity Co. 46 So. 2d 655 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1950
    Had Wall not been an employee of the highway department but simply a pedestrian crossing the highway for his own purposes, there is no doubt but that his failure to look for traffic in both directions would constitute negligence and would be a legal bar to his recovery ( , 165 So.
  • Rohm v. Hamburg 43 So. 2d 923 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1950
  • Tillman v. Public Belt R. R. Commission 42 So. 2d 888 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1949
  • Maher v. New Orleans Linen Supply Co. 41 So. 2d 101 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1949
  • O'Connor v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co. 40 So. 2d 663 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1949
    The Court stated: " , 165 So.
  • Hollabaugh-Seale Funeral Home, Inc. v. Standard Acc. Ins. 41 So. 2d 212 La. 1949
  • Cassar v. Mansfield Lumber Co. 41 So. 2d 209 La. 1949
    In other words, if he discovered Cassar’s peril and had a last clear chance to avert the accident, by refraining from turning left into the path of the passing automobile, defendants would be liable notwithstanding Cassar’s negligence — , 165 So.
  • McLelland v. Harper 38 So. 2d 425 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1948
  • Heydorn v. New Orleans Public Service 35 So. 2d 893 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1948
  • Atchley v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co. 35 So. 2d 888 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1948
  • Ingram v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. 35 So. 2d 781 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1948
    As to the charge of contributory negligence which is urged by defendants, , 165 So.
  • Mahne v. Steele 32 So. 2d 761 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1947
    The Court also said, , 165 So.
  • Kemp v. Donnes 32 So. 2d 383 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1947
    It is, of course, true that in spite of this, , 165 So.