Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Parks v. Hall, 181 So. 191.

81 citing documents.

Brenton Bobb and Valarie Pickette v. Chester Slyvester and State Farm Insurance Company La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2023
4 Another longstanding axiom of insurance law is the “initial permission rule,” So.
Coleman v. United Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. 181 So. 3d 781 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2015
Sensebe v. Canal Indemnity Co. 58 So. 3d 441 La. 2011
Permission is easily inferred, however, under the broad construction of the law regarding permission: , 181 So.
Barton v. U.S. Agencies Casualty Insurance Co. 948 So. 2d 1267 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2007
Hartzo v. AMERICAN NAT. PROP. AND CAS. INS. 951 So. 2d 1120 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2006
Arceneaux v. Norman 931 So. 2d 484 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2006
Henry Arceneaux v. Pamela Norman La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2006
Valdetero v. Commercial Union Insurance 782 So. 2d 1210 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2001
Tross v. Windsor Ins. Co. 726 So. 2d 459 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1999
Since 1938 Louisiana has followed the "initial permission" rule, , 181 So.
Aycock v. Jenkins Tile Co. 703 So. 2d 117 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1997
In Norton , the court recognized the historically broad construction of the word "permission," , 181 So.
Blackman v. Eggerton 684 So. 2d 78 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1996
32:861(B) requires a person who posts a motor vehicle liability bond to satisfy “[a]ll judgments rendered against him or any person responsible for the operation of the obligor’s motor vehicle with express or implied consent....” , 181 So.
Langston v. Shirley 682 So. 2d 1281 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1996
Perkins, supra; , 181 So.
Mahaffey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 679 So. 2d 129 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1996
Boyd v. Terrell 669 So. 2d 1301 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1996
Manzella v. Doe 664 So. 2d 398 La. 1996
Panzico v. Price 647 So. 2d 1154 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1994
Norton v. Lewis 623 So. 2d 874 La. 1993
Perkins v. McDow 615 So. 2d 312 La. 1993
Norton v. Lewis 604 So. 2d 679 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1992
The “initial permission” , 181 So.
Schroeder v. Board of Sup'rs 591 So. 2d 342 La. 1991
King v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Ins. Co. 549 So. 2d 367 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1989
Carey v. Ory 421 So. 2d 1003 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1982
Hughes v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co. 340 So. 2d 293 La. 1976
Adams v. Ross 300 So. 2d 192 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1974
868 (reversed by the Supreme Court on other grounds, , 181 So.
Wolfe v. Employers Commercial Union Insurance Co. 272 So. 2d 714 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1973
One group of cases in our jurisprudence involves the situation where the driver initially had express permission to use the vehicle for a certain purpose but had deviated from that purpose at the time of the accident, , 181 So.
Rawls v. J & M Poultry, Inc. 273 So. 2d 340 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1972
In Hampton v. Security Storage and Van Company, La.App., , the Court, , 181 So.
Lusk v. Travelers Insurance Co. 250 So. 2d 197 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1971
Hanover Insurance Co. v. Caruso-Simoneaux Agency, Inc. 249 So. 2d 322 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1971
2nd Cir. 1937), annulled on other grounds, , 181 So.
Guidry v. Rhodes 238 So. 2d 248 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1970
American Home Assurance Company v. Czarniecki 230 So. 2d 253 La. 1969
American Home Assurance Co. v. Czarniecki 216 So. 2d 115 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1968
Brady v. American Insurance Company 198 So. 2d 907 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1967
David v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance 192 So. 2d 583 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966
The following general principles of law are applicable to our decision, to-wit: , 181 So.
Taylor v. Liberty Mutual Insurance 191 So. 2d 786 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966
Rancatore v. Evans 182 So. 2d 102 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1966
McConnell v. Travelers Indemnity Company 180 So. 2d 406 La. 1965
Primo v. Travelers Indemnity Co. 172 So. 2d 341 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1965
Casano v. Cook 157 So. 2d 616 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1963
Anderson v. Adams 150 So. 2d 585 La. 1963
186 , (concurring opinion) , 181 So.
Hampton v. Security Storage and Van Company 148 So. 2d 788 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1962
Coco v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 136 So. 2d 288 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1961
Hurdle v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. 135 So. 2d 63 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1961
Rogillio v. Cazedessus 127 So. 2d 734 La. 1961
This variation in policy language, in my opinion, effects no change in the initial permission doctrine as announced by this Court in Parks v. Hall, 1938, , 181 So.
Gonzales v. Beaumont Cement Sales Company 125 So. 2d 785 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1961
Thomas v. Peerless Insurance Company 121 So. 2d 593 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1960
The instant case falls within the "initial permission rule", stated in Parks v. Hall et al., 1938, , 181 So.
Garland v. Audubon Insurance Company 119 So. 2d 530 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1960
Based upon the quoted facts, the court, with Judge Tate as the organ of the majority, stated: " , 181 So.
Harding v. Christiana 103 So. 2d 301 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1958
868 , subsequent proceedings on another point, 1938, , 181 So.
Leteff v. Maryland Casualty Company 91 So. 2d 123 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1956
Brooks v. Delta Fire & Casualty Company 82 So. 2d 55 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1955
Parker v. Great American Indemnity Company 81 So. 2d 79 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1955