Ursula Marie Ratliff v. Regional Extended Home Care Personnel Services, LLC

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

13-1175

URSULA MARIE RATTLIFF

VERSUS

REGIONAL EXTENDED HOME CARE
PERSONNEL SERVICES, L.L.C.

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APPEAL FROM THE
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, DISTRICT 9
PARISH OF ST. MARTIN, NO. 12-02760
ELIZABETH C. LANIER, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE

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JAMES T. GENOVESE
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Marc T. Amy, and
James T. Genovese, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Mark T. Garber
2000 West Congress Street
Lafayette, Louisiana 70506
(337) 234-5500
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Ursula Marie Rattliff

James D. Hollier
Philip H. Boudreaux, Jr.
NeunerPate
One Petroleum Center, Suite 200
1001 West Pinhook Road
Post Office Drawer 52828
Lafayette, Louisiana 70505-2828
(337) 237-7000
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Regional Extended Home Care
Personnel Services, L.L.C.

Stephen Winston Glusman
Glusman, Broyles & Glusman
Post Office Box 2711
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821-2711
(225) 387-5551
COUNSEL FOR INTERVENOR:
LUBA Casualty Insurance Company

GENOVESE, Judge.

In this workers‟ compensation case, Claimant/Employee, Ursula Marie

Rattliff, appeals the judgment of the Office of Workers‟ Compensation granting

summary judgment in favor of Defendant/Employer, Regional Extended Home

Care Personnel Services, L.L.C.1 For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 26, 2011, Ms. Rattliff, a licensed practical nurse, was employed by

Regional Extended Home Care Personnel Services, L.L.C. (Regional) as a home

health nurse. On that date, after leaving her home en route to the home of one of

Regional‟s clients, Ms. Rattliff was involved in a motor vehicle accident while

operating her personal automobile. She subsequently filed a disputed claim for

workers‟ compensation benefits, seeking wage benefits, medical treatment, and

penalties and attorney fees.

Regional denied Ms. Rattliff‟s workers‟ compensation claim and filed a

motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Ms. Rattliff was not in the

course and scope of her employment with Regional at the time the accident

occurred. Ms. Rattliff filed a cross-motion on the same issue. The Workers‟

Compensation Judge (WCJ) granted Regional‟s motion and dismissed

Ms. Rattliff‟s claims. Ms. Rattliff appeals.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The sole issue before this court is the propriety of the WCJ‟s grant of

summary judgment in favor of Regional on the grounds that Ms. Rattliff was not in

the course and scope of her employment with Regional when the accident

occurred.

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LUBA Casualty Insurance Company, Intervenor, is also a party to the proceedings;
however, its claims are not relevant to the present appeal.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

“Appellate courts review summary judgment de
novo, using the same criteria that govern the trial court‟s
consideration of whether summary judgment is
appropriate, and in the light most favorable to the non-
movant.” Yokum v. 615 Bourbon Street, L.L.C., p. 25
(La. 2/26/08), 977 So.2d 859, 876 (citing Suire v.
Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov’t, 04-1459
(La.4/12/05), 907 So.2d 37). Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure Article 966(A)(2) states “[t]he summary
judgment procedure is designed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action,”
and this “procedure is favored and shall be construed to
accomplish these ends.” “[I]f the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue of material fact,” then judgment shall be
granted as a matter of law in favor of the mover.
La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B) and (C).

Kleinman v. Bennett, 11-947, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/7/11), 80 So.3d
689, 691-92.

Edwards v. Larose Scrap & Salvage, Inc., 11-1412, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/4/12),

89 So.3d 1227, 1230-1231, writ denied, 12-1510 (La. 10/12/12), 98 So.3d 870.

Relative to a motion for summary judgment, La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C)(2)

provides that:

The burden of proof remains with the movant. However, if the
movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is
before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the movant‟s
burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential
elements of the adverse party‟s claim, action, or defense, but rather to
point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for
one or more elements essential to the adverse party‟s claim, action, or
defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual
support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his
evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of
material fact.

In this case, Ms. Rattliff bears the initial burden of proving that she suffered

personal injury caused by an “accident arising out of and in the course of [her]

employment” with Regional. La.R.S. 23:1031(A). If she is unable to meet this
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burden, then there is no genuine issue of material fact, and Regional is entitled to

summary judgment.

The jurisprudence is replete with caselaw determining the compensability of

injuries sustained by employees while traveling to and from work. Such

considerations require courts to apply what has come to be known as the

“going-and-coming rule.” Dean v. Southmark Constr., 03-1051, p. 8 (La. 7/6/04),

879 So.2d 112, 117. “Normally, injuries sustained by an employee while traveling

to and from work are not considered to have occurred within the course and scope

of employment, and thus, are not compensable under the Workers‟ Compensation

Act.” Id. (citing McLin v. Indus. Specialty Contractors, Inc., 02-1539 (La. 7/2/03),

851 So.2d 1135). As the supreme court opined, the rule “is premised on the theory

that, ordinarily, the employment relationship is suspended from the time the

employee leaves work to return home until he resumes his work.” Id.

“Furthermore, an employee‟s place of residence is a personal decision not directly

controlled by the employer, and treating commuting time as part of the

determination of course and scope of employment would remove manageable

boundaries from the determination.” Martin v. Pride Offshore Co., Inc., 05-2373,

p. 6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/3/06), 950 So.2d 805, 808-09 (citing Orgeron ex rel.

Orgeron v. McDonald, 93-1353 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So.2d 224).

The jurisprudence has recognized exceptions to this general rule, such
as: 1) if the accident occurred on the employer‟s premises; 2) if the
employee was on a specific mission for the employer; 3) if the
employer had interested himself in the transportation of the employee
as an incident to the employment agreement by either contractually
providing for transportation or by reimbursement of the travel
expenses to the employee; 4) if the employee was performing work
for the employer and circumstances indicated that the employer‟s
consent could be fairly implied; 5) if the injury occurred while
traveling to/from one work site to another; 6) if the injury occurred in
an area immediately adjacent to his/her work place and the area
contained a distinct travel risk to the employee; and 7) if the operation
of the vehicle was one of the employee‟s duties of employment.
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Edwards v. Transwestern Publ’g, LLC., 06-1057, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/7/07),

953 So.2d 1006, 1010.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Ms. Rattliff had left her home and was

on her way to a patient‟s home when she was involved in the accident. Thus,

unless the facts of this case come within an exception to the going-and-coming

rule, her accident did not arise out of and in the course of her employment with

Regional, thereby precluding her from receiving workers‟ compensation benefits.

Ms. Rattliff asserts that “[h]er case squarely fits within established

exceptions” to the going-and-coming rule. We disagree.

Ms. Rattliff drove her own vehicle to work each day. She was not paid for

the time that she spent traveling to and from work. Regional did not pay

Ms. Rattliff for mileage or travel expenses. Ms. Rattliff was paid on an hourly

basis for actual patient care while she was at the patient‟s home, and she received

no form of additional compensation. She was responsible for paying her own

automobile insurance and her cell phone expenses. When the accident occurred,

Ms. Rattliff was only assigned to care for one patient. She traveled the same route

to the patient‟s home each day, and there was no deviation on this particular day.

In an effort to circumvent the going-and-coming rule, Ms. Rattliff asserts

that the accident occurred while she was on a special mission for Regional.

However, her own testimony defeats this assertion. In her own words, Ms. Rattliff

described the day of her accident as just a “[n]ormal day.” She stated that there

was “[n]othing special[,]” and she was just doing her usual “routine” as she did

“every other day.” Clearly at the time of her accident, Ms. Rattliff was not on a

special mission for Regional.

Ms. Rattliff alternatively seeks to classify her home as a worksite and argues

that because she was traveling from one worksite to another, she was not subject to
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the going-and-coming rule. She makes much of Regional supplying her with a

laptop and the use of her cell phone at home for work purposes. However, her own

testimony likewise defeats her attempt to classify her home as a worksite.

According to Ms. Rattliff, she rarely used her laptop for work at home. She would

go to Regional‟s office to turn in her paperwork and receive her paycheck. In fact,

there was no evidence that she did work for Regional while at home, nor was she

paid her hourly rate while she was at home.

Lastly, Ms. Rattliff argues that Regional had interested itself in her

transportation as an incident of her employment. She points out that she was

required by Regional to have a valid driver‟s license, to submit proof of insurance,

and to take a safe driving test. Given the nature of Regional‟s home healthcare

business, Ms. Rattliff posits that “driving to patients‟ homes to provide „home

health‟ care was the performance of her employment duties[.]” Regional counters

that all Louisiana motorists are required to have a driver‟s license and proof of

insurance; therefore, these facts are of no moment. Additionally, “[r]equiring an

employee to show up for work does not make the employee‟s transportation

incidental to the employment contract.” Notably, Regional did not contractually

provide for Ms. Rattliff‟s transportation, nor did they reimburse her for her travel

expenses. Also, Ms. Rattliff was not assigned to travel between different locations

to care for different patients during the course of her workday. Rather, as Regional

argues, she simply “was required to travel to work just as every other employee

travels to his place of employment to start his/her day‟s work.” However, “[h]er

employment relationship with Regional did not begin until she arrived at her only

client‟s home each and every day.”

Given these facts, we do not find that Ms. Rattliff falls within any exception

to the going-and-coming rule. Therefore, she did not meet her threshold burden of
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establishing that she suffered personal injury caused by an “accident arising out of

and in the course of [her] employment[.]” La.R.S. 23:1031(A). As she is unable

to meet her burden of proof, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and, as a

matter of law, Regional is entitled to summary judgment.

DECREE

For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Office of Workers‟

Compensation granting summary judgment in favor of Regional Extended Home

Care Personnel Services, L.L.C. is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to

Ursula Marie Rattliff.

AFFIRMED.

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