Cited by

2d 922.2 By his remaining assignments, Galindo urges the court failed to address whether Castillo’s actions were sufficiently employment-related to create vicarious liability, (La.

2d Cir. 1991), writ denied, (1992) (quoting LeBrane v. Lewis , 218 (La.

Robinson, 2016-0258, p. 7, 201 So.3d at 927 (-19 (La.

Code art. 2318; (2) employer and employee (see LeBrane v. Lewis , (La.

ermine whether the employee’s tortious conduct was ‘so closely connected in time, place and causation to his employment-duties as to be regarded a risk of harm fairly attributable to the employer’s business, as compared with conduct motivated by purely personal considerations entirely extraneous to the employer’s interests.’” Id., 98-0816, pp. 4-5, 721 So.2d at 871 ( (La.

2d Cir.1991), writ denied, (1992) ( 218 (La.1974)).

2 Cir. 1991), writ denied, (1992), (

LeBrane v. Lewis , , 218 (La.

nd scope issue in Orgeron, the supreme court reiterated its prior pronouncement that “[a]n employer is responsible for the negligent acts of its employee when the conduct is so closely connected in time, place, and causation to the employment duties of the employee that it constitutes a risk of harm attributable to the employer’s business.” Orgeron, 639 So.2d at 227 ().

Orgeron , 639 So.2d at 227 ( ).

" LeBrane v. Lewis , , 217 (La.

App. 1st Cir. 6/27/03), (employer vicariously liable where an altercation ensued between employee and employer *214 after employer informed employee that he must drive an additional bus route); LeBrane v. Lewis , (La.

and summarized by the supreme court in Edmond v. Pathfinder Energy Services, Inc., 11-151 (La.App.

2d Cir.1991), writ denied, (1992) ( 218 (La.1974)).

the tortious conduct of the [employee must be] so closely connected in time, place, and causation to his employment duties as to be regarded as a risk of harm fairly attributable to the employer’s business, as compared with conduct instituted by purely personal considerations entirely extraneous to the employer’s interest.” Baumeister , 95-2270 at p. 3, 673 So.2d at 996 ().

the Louisiana Supreme Court set out four factors in holding an employer vicariously liable for its supervisor’s actions in stabbing a fellow employee: (1) whether the tortious act was primarily employment rooted; (2) whether the violence was reasonably incidental to the performance of the employ- ■ ee’s dut

Carr argues on appeal that Webb’s intentional act is primarily employment rooted and incidental to the performance of his duties; therefore, Sanderson Farms is vicariously hable for Webb’s intentional act, and Carr has stated a cause of action.

Courts state that the specific inquiry should be whether the act “was so closely connected [in] time, place and causation to his employment duties as to be regarded a risk of harm fairly attributable to the employer’s business, as compared with conduct motivated by purely personal considerations entirely extraneous to the employer’s interest.”

Courts state that the specific inquiry should be whether the act “was so closely connected *1173 [in] time, place and causation to his employment duties as to be regarded a risk of harm fairly attributable to the employer’s business, as compared with conduct motivated by purely personal considerations entirely extraneous to the employer’s interest.”

we set forth the requisite considerations for determining whether the tortious conduct of the employee may be properly imputed to the employer.

we set forth the requisite considerations for determining whether the tortious conduct of the employee may be properly imputed to the employer.

To determine whether the shop was vicariously liable for Deare‟s action, and summarized in Edmond v. Pathfinder Energy Services, Inc., 11-151 (La.App.

To determine whether the shop was vicariously liable for Deare’s action, and summarized in Edmond v. Pathfinder Energy Services, Inc., 11-151 (La.App.

Baumeister, 673 So.2d at 996-997

5 (employer of supervisor, who fired employee, followed him outside, and knifed him during a fight, held liable in tort to discharged employee).

2d Cir.1991), writ denied, (1992) ( 218 (La.1974)).

The test is whether “the tortious conduct of the employee so closely connected him time, place, and causation to his employment-duties as to be regarded a risk of harm fairly attributable to the employer’s business, as compared with conduct motivated by purely personal considerations entirely extraneous to the employer’s interests.”

laid out the factors necessary to determine whether an employer has vicarious liability for the intentional torts of its employees.

the Louisiana Supreme Court articulated four factors in holding an employer liable for its employee’s actions in stabbing a fellow employee: (1) whether the tortious act was primarily employment rooted; *439 |a(2) whether the violence was reasonably incidental to the performance of the employee’s duties; (3

In the instant case, the plaintiffs rely upon the earlier Supreme Court decision, cited with approval in Baumeister , as providing authority to preclude summary judgment in favor of Manning.

at 996-997 (citing LeBrane v. Lewis ).

Accordingly, the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims against the firm’s professional liability and business liability insurers is not before us. 3 In support of its motion, the firm, a vicarious liability case, and its progeny, introduced Hawkins’ plea agreement and a statement of undisputed facts, to-wit: (a) the alleged rape occurred after business hours; (b) Hawkins pled guilty to second degree battery, an intentional tort; (c) the actions of Hawkins in raping or battering the pl

|4In support of its motion, the firm, a vicarious liability case, and its progeny, introduced Hawkins’ plea agreement and a statement of undisputed facts, to-wit: (a) the alleged rape occurred after business hours; (b) Hawkins pled guilty to second degree battery, an intentional tort; (c) the actions of Hawkins in raping or battering the plaint

Felix v. Briggs of Oakwood, Inc., 99-721 at 4 (La.App.