Cited by
Opinions in Louisiana that cite Reck v. Stevens, 373 So. 2d 498.
- Fritscher v. Chateau Golf & Country Club 453 So. 2d 964 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1984
- Ward v. La. & Ark. Ry. Co. 451 So. 2d 597 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1984
- Harrell v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co. 449 So. 2d 1177 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1984
- Ed Bulliard Co., Inc. v. FORETICH-ZIMMER CONST. CO. 451 So. 2d 29 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1984
- LeRay v. St. Paul Fire and Marine 444 So. 2d 1252 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
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Rutherford v. Jenkins
449 So. 2d 701
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
where the court stated: “Before a court of appeal can disturb an award made by a' trial court, the record must clearly reveal that the trier of fact abused its discretion in making its award.” At page 500.
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McKinley v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co.
449 So. 2d 705
La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1984
the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case compel us to conclude that there was no clear abuse of discretion in the award of damages.
- Baldwin v. Schwegmann Giant Super Markets 449 So. 2d 167 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1984
- Quave v. Bardwell 449 So. 2d 81 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
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Brown v. Morgan
449 So. 2d 606
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
art. 1934(3); Dunaway v. Rester Refrigeration Service, Inc., (La.App.
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Burgess v. City of Shreveport
448 So. 2d 861
La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1984
Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., supra; Winterrowd v. The Travelers Ind.
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Bennett v. Tusa
447 So. 2d 72
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
In reviewing quantum, : Before a trial court award may be questioned as inadequate or excessive, the reviewing court must look first, not to prior awards, but to the individual cir *74 cumstances of the present case.
- Lang v. Prince 447 So. 2d 1112 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
- Jones v. Soileau 448 So. 2d 1268 La. 1984
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Jenkins v. Schwegmann's Bros. Giant Super Markets, Inc.
445 So. 2d 1326
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
Concerning appellate review of awards of damages, : the initial inquiry must always be directed at whether the trier court’s award for the particular injuries and their effects upon this particular injured person is, a clear abuse of the trier of fact’s “much discretion,” La.Civ.C.
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Ciuffi v. Wilson
445 So. 2d 1320
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
1st Cir.1983); and Bolton v. MFA Mut.
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Roque v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
445 So. 2d 506
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
We may not substitute our subjective belief as to the appropriate damages due; rather the finding below is to be honored in the absence of a “clear abuse of discretion.” Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., (La.App.
- Benson v. Seagraves 445 So. 2d 187 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1984
- Watters v. City of Bastrop 445 So. 2d 73 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1984
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Burnham v. Frey-Shoemaker-Colbert-Brodnax
445 So. 2d 477
La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1984
Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., supra ; (La.App.
- Simmons v. Whittington 444 So. 2d 1357 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1984
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Palmer v. Stokes
444 So. 2d 213
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
we conclude the lowest amount the trial court could have reasonably awarded Mrs. Palmer for general damages is $20,000.00.
- Farnsworth v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. 442 So. 2d 1340 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1983
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Cummings v. Nixon
442 So. 2d 1291
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
Only after such determination of abuse has been reached, is a resort to prior awards appropriate under Coco for purposes of then determining what would be an appropriate award for the present case.”
- Boyce v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. 442 So. 2d 808 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1983
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Thibodaux v. Acme Truck Lines, Inc.
443 So. 2d 716
La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1983
Civil Code art. 1934(3); -501 (La.1979)
- Wiggins v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. 441 So. 2d 803 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1983
- Ross v. Noble 442 So. 2d 1180 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
- McSweeney v. Dept. of Transp. & Development 442 So. 2d 659 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
- Davis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 441 So. 2d 18 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
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Arena v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc.
441 So. 2d 73
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
See, Miller v. Thomas, 258 La.
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Jenkins v. Jenkins
439 So. 2d 504
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
The initial inquiry is directed at whether the trial court’s award for the particular injuries and their effects upon this particular injured person, is a clear abuse of the trier of fact’s “much discretion.”
- Garrick v. Washington Parish 440 So. 2d 787 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
- Johnson v. Folse 438 So. 2d 1137 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
- Coleman v. Ballanco 439 So. 2d 469 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
- Jones v. Winston 437 So. 2d 889 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1983
- Garsee v. WESTERN CAS. & SUR. CO., INC. 437 So. 2d 933 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1983
- Greer v. State, Department of Transportation & Development 437 So. 2d 1170 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
- Langston v. Marsalis 436 So. 2d 735 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
- Weeden Engineering Corp. v. Hale 435 So. 2d 1158 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1983
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Jeanmard v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
436 So. 2d 577
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
QUANTUM As we review the facts to determine whether the trial court’s which stated as follows: “We do re-emphasize, however, that before a Court of Appeal can disturb an award made by a trial court that the record must clearly reveal that the trier of fact abused its discretion in making its award.
- Spears v. Aguilar 436 So. 2d 672 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1983
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Larson v. Huskey
440 So. 2d 769
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1983
"Only after such determination of abuse has been reached is a resort to prior awards appropriate under Coco for purposes of then determining what would be an appropriate award for the present case."
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Davenport v. Nixon
434 So. 2d 1203
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
Gaspard v. LeMaire, 245 La.
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Followed
Lee v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.
433 So. 2d 903
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1983
to determine if the trial court's award of damages was a clear abuse of discretion.
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Curry on Behalf of Curry v. Allstate Ins. Co.
435 So. 2d 1030
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1983
In assessing general damages where the jury has erroneously awarded none, this court and the Third Circuit have uniformly held that the appellate court [under the guidelines of Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., ] must award the lowest amount that the jury reasonably could have determined in its discretion.
- Sons v. Commercial Union Assur. Companies 433 So. 2d 842 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1983
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Rivet v. State, Through Dept. of Transp.
434 So. 2d 436
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1983
Code Art. 1934(3); Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc.
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Pitre v. Aetna Life and Cas. Co.
434 So. 2d 191
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1983
Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc.
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Johnson v. Dufrene
433 So. 2d 1109
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1983
Moreover, the scope of our inquiry is narrowly focused upon the individual plaintiff to determine whether he has received just compensation for his injuries in light of his particular circumstances, bearing in mind that the object of reparation is to return plaintiff to the condition which he enjoyed prior to the act which caused his damage.