Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Maltby v. Gauthier, 506 So. 2d 1190.

31 citing documents.

  • Kevin Byrd v. Bossier Parish Sheriff, Deputy Scott Nelson, Deputy H. Balkom, Officer M. Hannah, and Officer K. … La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2023
  • Brittni Castille v. Estate of Trissy Hargrave La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2017
    Absent clear, contrary legislative intent, “prescriptive statutes which can be given more than one reasonable interpretation should be construed against the party claiming prescription.” n. 5 (La.
  • Castille v. Estate of Hargrave 216 So. 3d 337 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2017
    Absent clear, contrary *343 legislative intent, “prescriptive statutes which can be given more than one reasonable interpretation should be construed against the party claiming prescription.” ,1193 n. 5 (La.
  • Correro v. Ferrer 216 So. 3d 794 La. 2016
    Absent clear, contrary legislative intent, “prescriptive statutes which can be given more than one reasonable interpretation should be construed against the party claiming prescription.” Maltby |5,v. Ga uthier, , 1193 n. 5 (La.
  • Crescent Property Partners, LLC v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. 158 So. 3d 798 La. 2015
    The panel acknowledged that up until Ebinger,' “it had been assumed by some courts that a peremptive statute which shortened the time periods for filing suit could not be applied retroactively unless it provided in the statute itself a specific grace period.” which held the medical malpractice statute of limitations could not be applied retroactively, on the basis that in those cases, according to the panel, the statute had immediately extinguished vested causes of action as of the effective dat
  • Crescent Property Partners, L.L.C. v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company, Bison Building Materials of Texas, Inc. C/W Greystar … La. 2015
    The panel acknowledged that up until Ebinger, “it had been assumed by some courts that a peremptive statute which shortened the time periods for filing suit could not be applied retroactively unless it provided in the statute itself a specific grace period.” 9 (La.
  • Crescent Property Partners, LLC v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. 134 So. 3d 85 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2014
    The Supreme Court, found that the Legislature’s failure to provide for a reasonable “grace” period can be construed as an indication that no effect on vested causes of action was intended.
  • Cheron v. LCS Corrections Services, Inc. 891 So. 2d 1250 La. 2005
    Cheron, 02-1049 at 14-15, -1103
  • Cheron v. LCS Corrections Services, Inc. 872 So. 2d 1094 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2004
    (wherein the court instructed, "[w]hen the Legislature, in enacting prescriptive statutes potentially affecting existing causes of action, fails to require parties to exercise vested rights within a reasonable time, the courts should refrain from supplying this legislative lapse.") Thus, since we have
  • Williams v. Jackson Parish Hospital 798 So. 2d 921 La. 2001
    1193 n. 5 (La.1987); Branch, supra .
  • Hendrick v. ABC Ins. Co. 760 So. 2d 650 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2000
  • Criticized Naquin v. Titan Indem. Co. 767 So. 2d 726 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2000
    the court said: "When the Legislature, in enacting prescriptive statutes potentially affecting existing causes of action, fails to require parties to exercise vested rights within a reasonable time, the courts should refrain from supplying this legislative lapse."
  • Watson v. Regional Transit Authority 757 So. 2d 876 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2000
    In Jamison the court noted that “ [w]hen the Legislature, in enacting prescriptive statutes potentially affecting existing causes of action, fails to require parties to exercise vested rights within a reasonable time, the courts should refrain from supplying this legislative lapse.” But Act 518 of 1997 was not an issue in Jamison becau
  • Moreau v. State 752 So. 2d 312 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2000
    In Jamison the court noted that " `[w]hen the Legislature, in enacting prescriptive statutes potentially affecting existing causes of action, fails to require parties to exercise vested rights within a reasonable time, the courts should refrain from supplying this legislative lapse.'" In Maltby the court stated that where the *313 legi
  • Falgout v. Dealers Truck Equipment Co. 748 So. 2d 399 La. 1999
  • Succession of Young 732 So. 2d 833 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1999
    1st Cir.1990); -1193 (La.1987); -524 (La.1979); Cooper v. Lykes, 218 La.
  • Jamison v. Hilton 721 So. 2d 494 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1998
    "[w]hen the Legislature, in enacting prescriptive statutes potentially affecting existing causes of action, fails to require parties to exercise vested rights within a reasonable time, the courts should refrain from supplying this legislative lapse."
  • Robinson v. Whitney National Bank 709 So. 2d 937 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1998
    r and now existing relationships and transactions involving financial institutions.” However, this interpretation of the legislative history runs afoul of two rules of statutory construction: first, that retroactive application of a new prescriptive period can be constitutional only if the Louisiana legislature has expressly included a grace period in the prescriptive statute, , 1193 and n. 5 (La.1987); and second, that the statute and its legislative history should be interpreted, if possible,
  • Marsh Engineering, Inc. v. Parker 688 So. 2d 1042 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1996
    also has instructed us "[w]hen the Legislature, in enacting prescriptive statutes potentially affecting existing causes of action, fails to require parties to exercise vested rights within a reasonable time, the courts should refrain from supplying this legislative lapse."
  • State v. Green 616 So. 2d 1262 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1992
  • Landmark Savings Bank v. Greenwald 582 So. 2d 943 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1991
    9:5628, which regulates actions against physicians but does not, affect any cause of action vested before the effective date of the enactment.
  • Landmark Sav. Bank v. Greenwald 582 So. 2d 943 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1991
    9:5628, which regulates actions against physicians but does not, affect any cause of action vested before the effective date of the enactment.
  • Taylor v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 579 So. 2d 443 La. 1991
    Foster v. Breaux, 263 La.
  • Fust v. Fontenelle 558 So. 2d 715 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1990
    they filed their suit in state court and should be allowed to revive their claim which was wrongfully dismissed in federal court due to the faulty interpretion of Louisiana law.
  • Holmes v. Baton Rouge Water Works Co. 558 So. 2d 629 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1990
  • Maltby v. Gauthier 526 So. 2d 455 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1988
    Then, on May 18, 1987, the Supreme Court handed down an opinion in the Maltbys' favor, reversing the court of appeal, and ruling that the claim had not prescribed (at (La.
  • Cheramie v. Terral 516 So. 2d 1329 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1987
  • Landry v. Lafayette General Hosp. 520 So. 2d 947 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1987
  • McBride v. Earl K. Long Memorial Hospital 507 So. 2d 821 La. 1987
    the judgment of the court of appeal is affirmed.
  • Deas v. Louisiana Department of Health & Human Resources 507 So. 2d 824 La. 1987
    the judgment of the trial court overruling the exception of prescription is affirmed.
  • Griffin v. Kinberger 507 So. 2d 821 La. 1987