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Public record · Human review · No verdicts asserted

Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite State v. Bradley, 746 So. 2d 263.

23 citing documents.

  • State of Louisiana v. Tristen J. Lamons La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2023
    3 Cir. 11/3/99), this court explained that the power to regulate one on parole is vested in a parole board within the Department of Corrections and that a trial court has no authority to impose a condition on a parolee.
  • State of Louisiana v. Harvey G. Love La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2013
    3 Cir. 11/3/99), this court explained that the power to regulate one on parole is vested in a parole board within the Department of Corrections and that a trial court has no authority to impose a condition on a parolee.
  • State of Louisiana v. R. K. La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2011
    3 Cir. 11/3/99), this court explained that the power to regulate one on parole is vested in a parole board within the Department of Corrections and that a trial court has no authority to impose a condition on a parolee.
  • State v. R.K. 64 So. 3d 426 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2011
    3 Cir. 11/3/99) , , this court explained that the power to regulate one on parole is vested in a parole board within the Department of Corrections and that a trial court has no authority to impose a condition on a parolee.
  • State of Louisiana v. Raymundo Franco La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2009
  • State v. Franco 8 So. 3d 790 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2009
  • State v. Bass 4 So. 3d 110 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2009
  • State v. Kotrla 996 So. 2d 1224 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2008
    App. 3 Cir. 11/3/99), , this court explained that the power to regulate one on parole is vested in a parole board within the Department of Corrections and that a trial court has no authority to impose a condition on a parolee.
  • State of Louisiana v. Marshall M. Kotrla La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2008
    3 Cir. 11/3/99), this court explained that the power to regulate one on parole is vested in a parole board within the Department of Corrections and that a trial court has no authority to impose a condition on a parolee.
  • State of Louisiana v. S.J.I. La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2007
    3 Cir. 11/3/99), citing La.R.S.
  • James Coleman v. Warden Thompson La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2006
    3 Cir. 11/3/99), (“Release on parole is a release from only [DPSC’s] physical custody because [DPSC] still retains legal custody over the parolee.”) Thus, Mr. Robinson’s claim constitutes a complaint or grievance against the State which arose while he was an offender within the custody of the DPSC.
  • Coleman v. Thompson 923 So. 2d 889 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2006
    3 Cir. 11/3/99) , (“Release on parole is a release from only [DPSC’s] physical custody because [DPSC] still retains legal custody over the parolee.”) Thus, Mr. Robinson’s claim constitutes a complaint or grievance against the State which arose while he was an offender within the custody of the DPSC.
  • State of Louisiana v. Jefferson W. Gill La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004
  • State v. Gill 884 So. 2d 1272 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2004
  • State of Louisiana v. Felton Cofield Bey La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2003
  • State v. Bey 857 So. 2d 1268 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2003
  • State v. Dixon 839 So. 2d 1141 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2003
    3 Cir. 11/3/99) , , citing La.R.S.
  • State v. Laird 829 So. 2d 1098 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2002
  • Robinson v. PAROLE & PROBATION, PUB. SAFETY 819 So. 2d 1031 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2002
    3 Cir. 11/3/99) , ("Release on parole is a release from only [DPSC's] physical custody because [DPSC] still retains legal custody over the parolee.") Thus, Mr. Robinson's claim constitutes a complaint or grievance against the State which arose while he was an offender [4] within the custody of the DPSC.
  • State v. Laird 800 So. 2d 427 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2001
  • State v. Taylor 801 So. 2d 549 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2001
  • State ex rel. Talbert v. State 814 So. 2d 2 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2000
  • State v. Chaisson 746 So. 2d 774 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1999
    3 Cir. 11/03/99) ; , an opinion released this day, we rejected an argument similar to that of Chaisson (although advanced by the state rather than the defendant) and concluded that when the trial court is silent as to the beginning date of the probation period of a split sentence, the probation period begins upon release from DOC’s lega